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# **Collaborative governance and planning: An evaluation of two housing regeneration projects in New Zealand and Iran**

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A Thesis

submitted in partial fulfilment

of the requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of philosophy

at

Lincoln University

by

Zohreh Karami Nejad

Lincoln University

2019

Human beings are members of a whole  
In creation of one essence and soul  
If one member is afflicted with pain  
Other members uneasy will remain  
If you have no sympathy for human pain  
The name of human you cannot retain

Saadi Shirazi

To my oldest brother, Aziz, who, in the absence of my dad, did not pursue his dream of becoming a doctor to support me and my siblings to go to university.



Abstract of a thesis submitted in fulfilment of the  
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

## **Collaborative governance and planning: An evaluation of two housing regeneration projects in New Zealand and Iran**

By

Zohreh Karami Nejad

Over the past several decades, the modern rational planning model has been strongly criticised for being ineffective in responding to urban challenges in both the “developed” and “developing” worlds. This model is seen as incompatible with the changing role of central and local governments, which have become more inclusive of a wide variety of stakeholders in decision-making in order to accommodate and respond to the needs of increasingly diverse societies. Consequently, more collaborative approaches have emerged which are concerned with multi-stakeholder involvement and public participation in planning and policy. Collaborative governance (CG) is one of the approaches increasingly advocated by planners, academics and theorists, where local and central government agencies aim to directly involve local communities in planning and policy making. One of the main benefits associated with a shift to more collaborative approaches is that they are more likely to build consensus, resolve conflicts and reach higher quality decision making. Many claims have been made about the benefits of this approach, but the efficacy of such approaches in practice are rarely tested empirically.

The literature raises a number of potential problems with collaborative governance and planning that need further investigation. There are a number of issues around what ‘the process’ of collaborative governance is, how this process should be conducted in ideal, as opposed to real world situations, and what the relationship is between process and the products that it promotes. These concerns form the basis of this research which analyses two housing renewal projects - one in New Zealand and one in Iran – that were described as collaborative. The research uses qualitative data obtained principally from semi-structured interviews and participant observations.

This thesis addresses four important points as theoretical contributions to the collaborative governance and planning literature. Firstly, it indicates the need to extend and expand our conceptualisation of CG to include a composite of formal and informal elements that provide varied opportunities for inclusion and alternative means of representation. Every collaborative initiative has a context and history, a present and a future that are of critical concern. I present a new set of criteria

applicable to an informal 'pre-collaboration' stage as well as the formal 'collaboration' process, and the on-going activities and relationships that endure 'post-collaboration'.

Secondly, this research indicates that CG is not an idealistic and optimistic process aiming at 'resolving' conflicts, 'building' consensus, with 'equal power sharing' or making a decision that is best for everyone. Rather, CG should be seen as an 'adaptable', 'interactive', and 'pragmatic' process.

Thirdly, this research shows that the focus on 'implementation' and 'doing' may be even more important than 'talking' and 'discourse'. While much of the literature emphasises deliberation as the centrepiece of CG, implementation is rarely examined.

Fourthly, this research suggests a way of integrating and evaluating process and product given their inseparability. A 'good' process, which is durable, empowering and committed to ongoing relationships - and when improving the process quality is a goal in itself - it may be more likely to have broadly acceptable outputs and outcomes on the ground.

**Keywords:** Collaborative governance, urban planning, process, pre-collaboration, collaboration, post-collaboration, empowerment, trust and relationship building, capability building, conflict resolution, consensus building, products, outputs, outcomes, adaptation, durability.

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## Acronyms

ACRC	Aranui Community Renewal Committee
ACTIS	Aranui Community Trust Incorporated Society
CCC	Christchurch City Council
CEPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CERA	Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority
CG	Collaborative Governance
CP	Collaborative Planning
DAUD	Department of Architecture and Urban Design
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
HCD	Housing Construction Department
HNZC	Housing New Zealand Corporation
IAP2	International Association for Public Participation
IRD	Inland Revenue Department
ISNA	Iranian Students' New Agency
ISO	Iran's Standard Organization
LEED	Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
MBIE	Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
MCH	[New Zealand] Ministry for Culture and Heritage
ME	Ministry of Education
MH	Ministry of Health
MIF	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
MRUD	Ministry of Road and Urban Development
MSD	Ministry of Social Development
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PHO	Private Health Organization
SCAF	Strengthening Community Action Fund
SCI	Iran Statistics Center
SIA	Social Impact Assessment
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS)
URO	Urban Renewal Organization

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Background to the research

Urban planning emerged as a profession in the latter part of the 19th century, underpinned by the development of the 'modern' state, and in response to the rapidly growing, chaotic and polluted industrialising cities in Western Europe (Hall, 1988; UN-Habitat, 2009). Although there are many variations of what is often referred to as modern rational planning, they share a number of common characteristics. First, planning was seen an exercise in the physical preparation and design of human settlements, with physical and technical aspects taking priority over social, economic and political matters (Taylor, 1998; UN-Habitat, 2009). Second, in its early stages, planning involved the production of master plans and comprehensive plans, underpinned by land use regulatory systems characterised by the mono-functional use of areas (Taylor, 1998; UN-Habitat, 2009). Third, and perhaps most importantly, it involved a particular process of producing plans that was 'top down' and expert led with planners concerned with 'how' to implement 'what' politicians had decided (thus, enacting a supposed distinction between 'politics' and 'technical rationality' (Freestone, 2000). Planning was, therefore, perceived as a technical activity to be carried out by trained experts with little involvement from communities (Taylor, 1998; UN-Habitat, 2009).

From the early 1960s, planning became subject to major criticism (particularly from scholars who aligned themselves with nascent "post-modern" theories of art, architecture and other disciplines) and resistance in various forms, such as reforms, riots, protests and citizen action. One important criticism of planning as a top-down process was the reliance on the knowledge of planners, which made planning expert-driven and state-directed, and led to the 'exclusion' of the major constituents of urban communities (i.e., the so-called "working classes," ethnic minorities, women and people disadvantaged or discriminated against by virtue of not being white, male and middle-class) from planning and decision-making (Freestone, 2000; Friedmann, 1987; Holston, 1998; Sandercock, 1998). Modern planning was also criticized for its reliance on sophisticated technical analysis and modelling that, although apparently sophisticated, was not sensitive enough to capture the diverse nature of groups and communities and their needs (Innes & Booher, 2004, 2010; Sandercock, 1998). Communities played a passive role in planning and were seen as recipients of the decisions and actions of planning experts (Sandercock, 1998).

Since the 1960s, one response among planning theorists has been to think much more specifically about planning as a 'multi-party collaborative' process concerned with public participation and community involvement (e.g. Allmendinger, 1998; Dryzek, 1994; Forester, 1982; Friedmann, 1973; Healey, 1992; Lane, 2005). This was driven in planning theory by Sherry Arnstein's well-known Ladder of Citizen Participation, published in the Journal of the American Planning Association in 1969 (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein argued "participation is a significant element of direct democracy as it promotes transparent, inclusive, and fair decision-making processes that entail some degree of power sharing between government agencies and members of the public" (Laurian & Shaw, 2008, p. 294). Arnstein provides a bridge between planning as a practice and governance, broadly defined, in her positioning of types of democratic governance arrangements in the top three rungs of the ladder (partnership, delegated power and citizen control) (Arnstein, 1969). Consequently, the three terms 'planning', 'collaboration' and 'governance' have been drawn together discursively and planners have started to consider governance more explicitly (e.g. Carley, 2000; De Roo, 2017; Duncan, 2013; Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 2003a; Jones & Evans, 2006; Lovan, Murray, & Shaffer, 2017).

Some see governance "thinking" by planners as a necessary pre-consideration for planning while others view planning as a style of governance and believe that planning collaboratively improves governance capacity (e.g. Healey, 1998; Innes & Booher, 2003b). This has been followed by discussions about collaborative governance, which is often considered linked to ideas about collaborative planning. This study focuses on collaborative governance and considers collaborative planning as part of collaborative governance. This is supported by arguments in the literature noting that collaborative governance has two dimensions: planning and policy (Healey, 1997). Using the principle that collaborative planning is only one dimension of collaborative governance this study focuses on both dimensions.

For me this is not merely an academic or theoretical matter. My interest in the topic of collaborative governance took root during two years of work experience as a planner in Tehran, Iran, my home country. I was involved in a housing renewal project that claimed to be collaborative and to actively involve local communities. The project was implemented in a southern neighbourhood of Tehran called Abouzar, recognized as a low socio-economic area that had experienced physical and social deterioration over four decades. There are many such areas in southern Tehran and, for 16 years, different renewal projects had been implemented in different neighbourhoods by Tehran's council and other public organizations. These projects developed from being top-down government-led to supposedly more collaborative, bottom-up ones; the Abouzar project that I was involved in was

promoted and labelled as an example of a collaborative approach by the Metropolitan Authority, Tehran's City Council.

In terms of prior academic study it is acknowledged that I had no specific background in political science or governance, but working full-time on the Abouzar project as an urban planner made me both interested in, and concerned about, what governance means. My colleagues and I were based in a local office in the community and we were in daily contact with local people, council planners and representatives of different public agencies. There were many claims made by council officials (including by me) about engaging with communities and having a collaborative housing renewal or regeneration process but I always had some personal doubts because I would daily observe the local people's concerns about the process and products of this "renewal." I witnessed how local people were involved, or not, in the process. My background in sociology and planning made me question the process and its claims about being collaborative. These questions and doubts became my main motivations to look further afield for definitions for some of the concepts, including community participation, collaboration and governance, and, importantly, where implementation of these ideas had been tried in the world outside Iran.

I chose to undertake a PhD in New Zealand and started reading the literature on collaboration including collaborative governance (CG) as this resonated with me more than theories that did not discuss governance per se. This work led me to Aranui, Christchurch (New Zealand), where similar claims about collaboration had been made in a housing renewal project. On the basis of my experience and interest, I chose to study CG in the context of housing regeneration or renewal projects (the terms renewal and regeneration are used interchangeably in this study). It was definitely not an easy process for me to study and write about collaboration and governance in English specifically in a concise manner. English is not my first or, even, my second language, as in Iran we study for our bachelors and master's degrees in Persian.

## **1.2 Problem definition**

For over two decades CG has attracted the attention of many scholars in multiple disciplines, including planning (Booher, 2004; Forester, 1982, 1999; Hajer, Hoppe, & Jennings, 1993; Healey, 1992, 1997; Innes & Booher, 2010), environmental studies (Brisbois, 2015; Koontz, 2014; Koontz & Newig, 2014; Memon, Duncan, & Spicer, 2012), political science (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Dryzek, 1994), public administration (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007), public management (Leach, 2006) and conflict resolution (Innes & Booher, 1999). CG reflects a change from the traditional notion of 'government', which refers to the command-and-control model



of decision-making, to multi-stakeholder 'governance' in which affected stakeholders are involved in the decision-making (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Brisbois, 2015; Kapucu & Garayev, 2011a). Planning theory has reflected this transition and the more nuanced democratic ideals have developed from a simple representative democracy, as the arena of government power, to participative or deliberative democracy that focuses on the inclusion of non-state actors in decision-making (Lane, 2005; Laurian & Shaw, 2008).

This shift from government to governance occurred as a result of improvements in knowledge and understanding of the diverse interests in societies (Dryzek, 1994; Habermas, 1984; Innes & Booher, 1999), the interdependence of interests (Dryzek, 1994; Dunn, 1993; Innes & Booher, 2010), and the complex nature of problems and improving state and non-state capacity (Booher, 2004; Eppel, 2013; Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005). CG is a formal deliberative, democratic and discursive process to reconcile knowledge, resources and abilities of diffuse actors (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Some contributions of such a process have been highlighted by its proponents as conflict resolution, consensus building, higher quality decisions and democracy, social learning and network building (Gollagher & Hartz-Karp, 2013; Innes & Booher, 1999; Kapucu, 2014; Kim, 2010; Koontz, 2014). However, there is also criticism of CG around process quality that necessitates a critical evaluation of the process (Hillier, 2003; Mouffe, 2000, 2005; Purcell, 2009; Roy, 2015; Young, 1997). As Lane (2005) argues, there is a critical difference between going through an empty ritual of participation and having the real power needed to affect the process's outcomes.

Nevertheless, although the implications and contributions of the process have received a great deal of attention (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2008; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Innes & Booher, 2010), the products of CG and their implications and contributions are less clear (products can include an output like a house or an outcome like housing affordability). Criticism of the process elements of CG seems to have generated greater attention than those for products 'on the ground'. More troublingly, the 'connection' between the process and products appears to have been neglected by scholars. It is conceivable that a good process may still generate a poor product, and vice versa, depending on the criteria used to evaluate them. The process of working together does not necessarily mean the stakeholders, together, benefit from the outputs and outcomes nor that the outcomes are broadly acceptable to all. Therefore, assessing the connections between processes and products is an important, but poorly understood aspect of CG theory.

The term 'product' is used in CG literature (e.g. Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Innes & Booher, 1999) to refer to outputs, outcomes and adaptations. Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) suggest that CG projects can have three types of products: first, outputs (immediate results) that can be houses in a renewal

project; second, outcomes/impacts (results on the ground), such as safety or affordable housing; and third, adaptation (adaptive responses to the outputs and outcomes), such as moving or elevating a community towards a higher level of recognition or political standing. Following this strand of CG literature, I use the term 'product' and then 'product performance' to refer to these three aspects (outputs, outcomes, adaptation). For the term product, there are many variations. For example, in the literature about social impact assessment (SIA) and environmental impact assessment (EIA), the term 'substance' is used but this did not resonate particularly well with my research. I am also aware that in SIA and EIA studies, the term product is interchangeably used with 'outputs' but various writers in the CG literature talk of these two as being different; products cover outputs, outcomes and adaptation (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).

According to Emerson and Nabatchi (2015), the "agreed goals" of participants are the main unit of analysis for products. For example, product evaluation would mean looking to see if the houses are ones that the participants wanted. In this respect, in this study, the agreed participants' goals are considered the main analysis unit for products. However, CG studies have to be careful because the process of defining agreed goals is not immune to a power imbalance and elite domination, hence, evaluating 'satisfaction with the products' might be helpful making that problem apparent.

Furthermore, some scholars have discussed varying types of contextual influence on the process and product of collaborative initiatives (e.g. Bryson & Crosby, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012; Healey, 1997). In this respect, contextual factors will be incorporated into this research questions.

In summary, this study is a performance evaluation of CG because, to date, although many planners strongly advocate CG as a superior approach, few studies have challenged that and highlighted its strengths and weaknesses in both theory and practice (Laurian & Shaw, 2008). More importantly, few studies have tried to integrate process and product performance evaluations. Hence the current research aims to do that by having equal attention given to process, product, and their relationship. In this study, CG is not considered as perfect or completely flawed, but it is a new approach whose performance needs to be evaluated in the light of its strengths and weaknesses. The study is conducted with the objective of contributing to both theoretical and empirical literature on CG and planning.

### **1.3 Research questions**

Considering the research gaps noted above, the main goal of this study is to evaluate the nature of CG in theory and practice in the context of housing renewal; to balance process and product performance evaluation; to refine methods of assessing processes and products; and to explore the connections

between process and products. Therefore, the research investigates the following propositions and research questions:

“There is some relationship between CG process and broadly acceptable products on the ground.”

1. Process performance: How are CG processes practised in the context of housing renewal?
2. Contextual factors: Which context factors may significantly influence the CG process?
3. Product performance: To what extent do CG products (outputs, outcomes, and adaptation) meet the collaboratively agreed goals and objectives of the participants?
4. Satisfaction with the product: How satisfied or dissatisfied are participants with the products?
5. Connections between process and products: What is the nature of the connections or possible contradictions between the process and product performance?

## **1.4 Outline of the study**

This thesis is organized into 10 chapters. Chapter 1 is a brief introduction to the research problem, aims and questions. Chapter 2 is a literature review that brings together the concepts of government, governance, CG and CP. The chapter highlights the importance of CG in planning and it critiques the CG frameworks suggested to date in the literature. It then discusses how CG can be evaluated in practice. Chapter 3 presents the research methods and justifies why an in-depth qualitative case study approach is used. It also briefly introduces the two case studies and the framework that is used as a ‘road map’ for data analysis. In this research there is more content and chapters on Aranui as the first case study. Chapter 4 provides the background information about Aranui as the first case study and it covers the history of state housing in New Zealand and Aranui, and the general history of Aranui before the renewal project. Chapter 5 as findings one presents the Aranui findings related to the process. Chapter 6 as the second findings provides Aranui’s findings for the products: outputs, outcomes and adaptation, and the participants’ satisfaction with the products. At the end of the chapter, the connections between the process and the products in Aranui’s case and contextual performance are presented. Chapter 7 provides background information about the second case study, Abouzar. This covers Iran’s political structure and the history of poor housing in Tehran and Abouzar. Chapter 8 as findings three presents the Abouzar findings for process, products, and connections between process and products and contextual performance. Chapter 9 discusses the study’s findings in relationship to the literature on CG, presents new suggestions and indicators for assessing CG success and redefines the theory. Chapter 10 concludes the study by highlighting the contributions to knowledge, the lessons learnt and the implications of the study for the theory and practice of CG. The chapter also provides a new evaluative framework and definition for CG according to this study’s findings.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Literature Review**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

The objective of this study, as outlined in chapter one, is to undertake a critical evaluation of CG using two different housing regeneration projects as a lens with which to do so. As a conceptual anchor for this thesis, the key objective of this chapter is to review the current literature of CG in planning, in order to explore how to evaluate CG approaches, and to highlight some central themes in recent debates that need to be considered when carrying out the evaluation.

During the last few decades, many planners have used a diverse range of collaborative and bottom-up approaches in planning and policy making to effectively address urban-related issues (Beierle, 1998; e.g. Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 2010; Lane, 2005; Laurian & Shaw, 2008; McLaverty, 2017). They frequently use the term 'governance' (often contrasted with 'government') to refer to these collaborative approaches but these approaches often have some differences and advocate for different things. For example, some adhere to a pure community-defined and led project without a state role, while others advocate for collaborations between public and private sectors (Watson, 2014). In this respect, governance is a term used in different ways to refer to a broad range of approaches that are different according to the role of the local communities or governmental agencies. This raises a number of issues.

First, in considering that, this chapter aims to clarify the definition of governance in the current research, and so begins with a brief description and comparison of the terms, 'government' and 'governance', and differentiates different types of governance based on the government's role. It concludes by explaining how the term collaborative governance is employed in this research to include central and local governments or, at least one of them, as an active partner.

Secondly, the chapter continues by defining CG theory and introducing what the theory suggests in terms of process, structure, goals, objectives and indicators. This section highlights a number of points; for example, it explains that the theory suggests a formal process is to be used when working together with public agencies and local communities, which are often government-initiated and government-led. In spite of that, the section indicates that there is also a need to investigate the role of informal collaborations and community-led projects within CG processes. It also suggests that local communities can be considered as active players in CG.

Thirdly, the chapter highlights two reasons why planners have advocated for CG approaches in many if not all, planning and decision-making contexts. Fourthly, both CG and collaborative planning's (CP) literature seems to advocate for much the same thing in terms of goals and objectives. For example, both offer a formal process of collaboration that leads to agreements and consensus between conflicting interests, so they often are considered as twinned and many people may conflate them. Therefore, the chapter will continue with a separate section to discuss the relationships between CG and CP and justify why the current research uses the term CG, and considers CP as a part of CG.

Fifthly, I will ask this question: *How to evaluate CG?* and then review the literature with respect to housing renewal programmes and conclude that the processes and products (e.g. outputs, outcomes) of CG need equal attention and need to be integrated. This section is followed by two sub-sections asking two questions: *How to evaluate the process?* and *How to evaluate the products?* In terms of process, two important issues or dilemmas of the process are outlined that include: democratic issues and prehistory, context and future dilemma. These two, potentially, create political and practical barriers for the successful performance of the CG process offered by the literature. So, the section ends by highlighting the necessity of having a critical perspective towards the CG process while evaluating it. The chapter continues with discussing how to evaluate the products, by categorizing three possible products of CG as underlined by the literature and they are: outputs, outcomes and adaptation. These three are defined, some example of them in respect to housing renewal projects are presented, and then the criteria that can help to evaluate them are provided.

Finally, the role, influence and importance of context in the process and product performance is briefly discussed. Contextual performance is introduced as something to 'consider' but not to evaluate because contextual factors can be very diverse and they are difficult or even, impossible to be comprehensively evaluated. The chapter ends with a brief summary and an outline of the research gaps and some questions.

## **2.2 Government and Governance**

Despite their obvious shared phonetic and etymological roots and elements, 'government' and 'governance' are distinct concepts that must not be conflated. Exploring these distinctions is important in teasing out some of the key principles behind collaborative governance. 'Government' is defined in policy and planning literature as "hierarchical governing by nationally or locally organized political institutions" (Hysing, 2009a, p. 647). In government, 'the state' or a nationally organized political institution, makes decisions on behalf of the community and on public matters, so the state shapes citizens' economic and social life (Frahm & Martin, 2009; Hysing, 2009a; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998).

Decisions are based on legal rules and uniform policies, so social issues are more vulnerable to a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to policy (Frahm & Martin, 2009). When needs or problems arise, government focuses on implementing programmes, projects or desired outcomes required to address the problem. It is more interested in implementation and execution of policy than an introspective focus on the processes and means by which it defines and implements such policies, such as whether a public private partnership (PPP) might be more appropriate (Frahm & Martin, 2009).

In the post-World War II period, in many countries, especially in Europe, states organized many ambitious economic and welfare programmes. However, according to critics, they lost contact with changing needs and the self-governing capabilities of citizens and firms that they were intended to serve (Healey, 1997). In the early 1970s, pressures rose to renegotiate the remit of formal government and to reconsider the ways in which it operated and engaged with its publics (Healey, 1997). Demands increased for devolution of government power to the private sector (businesses and citizens) and for increased openness and accountability. Some factors fostered this rising demand. For example, 1) there was a growing recognition of complex interactions with and impacts of government activities on economic and social life (Healey, 1997). 2) Changes in social relationships and citizen involvement in the management of activities in businesses, schools, families and sports through boards led to increased direct experience of self-governance in publics (Healey, 1997) and 3) an increased perception that some actors such as property owners have more influence on government decisions (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998). 4) At the same time, greater world environmental awareness was leading to demands that politicians re-establish the trust and faith of citizens and behave fairly, for the common good and to address environmental challenges (Kapucu & Garayev, 2011a; Koontz, 2014; Koontz & Newig, 2014).

While such debate continued, and particularly from the 1980s onwards, the term 'governance' has been hailed as a new approach capable of addressing the complexity, diversity and dynamics of contemporary governing (Frahm & Martin, 2009; Hysing, 2009a; Kooiman, 1993). Yet the word 'governance' can be applied in a variety of ways and any exact meaning can be hampered by ambiguity and a blurring of distinctions (Frahm & Martin, 2009). The meaning of governance relates more generally to "how societies are governed, ruled and steered" (Wang & Bramwell, 2012, p. 988). In the literature, governance is more concerned with the area of 'collective affairs' or 'public interests' and is often referred to as a new paradigm in place of 'government'. The baseline agreement between governance definitions is that "governance refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred" (Stoker, 1998, p. 17). Therefore, the essence of governance seems to be in its focus on governing mechanisms that do not

just rest on the resources of the authority and the sanctions of government (Stoker, 1998), rather it tends to create a structure or an order that cannot be externally imposed and is the result of interactions between the influencing actors (Kooiman, 1993; Stoker, 1998). So, while government can be considered to be a particular, authoritative style of governing, governance is the outcome of more diverse styles of networks of governing.

One key question at present is: Who are the participants or 'players' in governance? Graham, Amos, and Plumptre (2003) highlight four sectors: Citizens at large, business and the institutions of civil society (including the voluntary or not-for-profit sector), government, and the media. Fig 2.1 depicts one possible configuration of these sectors where the size of each player provides a crude indication of their relative power, but they overlap because the organizations' borders are permeable. These relations are very situation-specific, however, and a similar illustration for a different country could show a very different distribution of power.




Figure 2.1 Major players of governance (Graham, Amoes, & Plumptre, 2003, p. 1)

Given that in many countries power is shifting across borders and some state functions are being transferred to business and society the question that then arises is: 'What is the division of responsibilities?' and, more specifically, 'What is 'the role of the government' in governance?'.

In response to these questions, I have categorized governance studies into two groups based on the role of the state.

1. One group believes in 'governance without government' or governance with a minimal role for government (e.g. Peters & Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998). This group tends to withdraw the state from governing and reduce the role of formal government because, first, central and local governments when collaborating with the private sector may seek to control and interfere with the

private sector organizations (Hysing, 2009a; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1996). Secondly, when there is blurring of responsibilities between public agencies and the private sector, there is the capacity for scapegoating and blaming the private sector by public agencies when something goes wrong (Peters & Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1996). Hence, this group believes that the state's role has to change from a 'provider state' to a 'strategic enabler' framing and providing domains of activity for businesses and citizens (such as a free market to allow economic activity and freedom of choice) (Healey, 1997; Stoker, 1998; Young, 1997). However, this group seems to *"offload what has previously been government responsibility onto the business sector, the voluntary and households"* (Healey, 1997, p. 228). Business-driven projects, community-based and community-oriented projects - often referred to as 'co-production' in the literature – all play a key role within this conception of governance (Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006; Watson, 2014). A typical example might be a local community and businesses being encouraged to take on management of facilities such as local open spaces.

In such situations, self-organizing networks at local, national and international level are formed to take on government responsibilities (Ostrom, 1990a; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1997; Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998). This results in transferring the functions and power of governmental agencies upward to international organizations such as the European Union, downward to local actors and outward to agencies and private actors and volunteers (Hysing, 2009a). In this research the term 'governing collaboratively' or co-management is used to refer to the type of governance advocated by this group, which is governance with a minimal role for the government.

2. The second group, argues that rather than withdrawing the state from governing it is better *"to make government agencies more responsive to the concerns of business and citizens, and to require them to be more accountable to the people who, in a democratic society they are supposed to serve"* (Healey, 1997, p. 208). This group speaks about 'shifting'<sup>1</sup> rather than 'shrinking' the role of the state, so the role of the state is transformed from being based on constitutional power towards functioning as a facilitator and cooperative partner (Hysing, 2009a; Peters & Pierre, 1998). Governments, instead of being a 'provider state', try to facilitate and support private governing by shaping the ground rules of the governance. The government's task is to enable socio-political interaction, to encourage many of the varied arrangements for coping with problems and to distribute services among several actors. This group argues that it is not empirically possible or normally justifiable to eliminate the government

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<sup>1</sup> However, there is some literature that discusses government and governance as non-mutually exclusive, where both are operating within one context. The direction of influence is not just from government to governance, but can also operate from governance to government. Hysing (2009a) by studying state- and private sector-led projects in Sweden, shows that the role of state across a continuum (from government to governance) changes based on three dimensions – governing styles and instruments, public-private relationships and policy level – but the state role changes in a unidirectional way. While the state seems to be losing ground when considering any single dimension, it retains or even increases its role when studying all dimensions simultaneously.



role because it results in deregulation and letting the private sector increase self-regulation<sup>1</sup> (Hysing, 2009b; Kooiman, 2003; Pierre & Peters, 2005). Hysing (2009b), who assessed the claims of governance without government in a private-led forestry project in Sweden, found that government nonetheless was involved in the project through enabling and influencing the arrangements. He concluded that what appeared to be a prime example of governing ‘without’ government is better understood as governing ‘with’ government (Hysing, 2009b). In summary, this group advocates an active role for government in governance; projects are often initiated and funded by public agencies or public agencies have a leadership role, but the process is supposed not to have a dominant actor and decisions are supposed to be made through negotiation, agreement and a goal-oriented process (Rhodes, 1996).

In the current study, the term ‘collaborative governance’ is used to refer to this second type of governance: collaborative governance is defined as a type of governance in which both central and local governments or, at least one of them, are active players in governing the process of engagement in public affairs.

Therefore, collaborative governance is different from governing collaboratively according to the role of government: they are like two poles on a continuum (Fig 2.2) where collaborative governance involves a key role for government as a facilitator and enabler of public governing, while governing collaboratively is characterised by reducing the role of government or getting it ‘out of the way’.



Figure 2.2      The governance continuum

## 2.3 Collaborative governance (What does the theory suggest?)

Collaborative governance (CG) is advocated for by a number of scholars as a new type of governance that refers to the decentralization of decision-making through multi-stakeholder involvement to ensure the practice of good governance in decision-making (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Booher, 2004; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Koontz, 2014; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007; Weymouth, 2015). Collaborative

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<sup>1</sup> Another criticism of the idea of ‘governance with a minimal role for the state’ relates to an important criticism of neoliberalism. Neoliberals advocated for a free, open and competitive market with an invisible hand for the state. Their idea has been criticized for reinforcing hegemony in societies because owners of capital and the market achieve more control over public decisions and the fortunes of people and places, which brings more disempowerment to disadvantaged people (Purcell, 2009; Roy, 2015).

means to co-labour and cooperate to achieve common goals while working across boundaries in multi-sector relationships (Eppel, 2013). Also, as a general term, governance refers to the act of governing, or *“to steer the process that influences decisions and actions within the private, public, and civic sectors”* (Eppel, 2013, p. 26). There are many definitions of CG in the literature. Emerson et al. (2012, p. 2) define it as: *“The processes and structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished.”* The important point is that most definitions of CG suggest a ‘formal’ inclusionary argumentative process of collaboration that aims to meet some ‘ideals’ that is grounded in communicative rationalities and the ideal conditions put forward by Habermas (1985). These ideals relate to participative democracy indicators that have been developed over the years by many planning theorist and political scientists (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2008; Dryzek, 1994; Hajer et al., 1993; Healey, 1992; Leach, 2006; Voets, Van Dooren, & De Rynck, 2008). They include: broad inclusiveness, face-to-face dialogue and communication, political equality and equal power sharing, honesty, accountability, impartiality and deliberativeness (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Dryzek, 1994; Leach, 2006; Roy, 2015). These indicators are often used to evaluate the democratic level or success of CG.

CG proponents believe a single stakeholder or group is unlikely to have all the resources necessary to achieve the objectives and effectively plan for the future. Therefore, the claim or objective of CG theory is to have a ‘broad inclusion’ of ‘all affected stakeholders’ where each stakeholder has an ‘equal influence’ on decision-making (Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Innes & Booher, 1999, 2003a, 2010). For example, Innes and Booher (2010, p. 6) note that:

*All the affected interests jointly engage in face-to-face dialogue, bringing their various perspectives to the table to deliberate on the problems they face together. All participants must also be fully informed and able to express their views and be listened to, whether they are powerful or not.*

Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders as: *“Any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objectives.”* CG studies often divide stakeholders into two groups: public and private sectors or state and non-state stakeholders (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2008). State stakeholders are local and central government agencies who control the legal and political aspects; non-state stakeholders include local communities as those most affected by the projects, and may also include the business sector, and non-profit and voluntary organizations. The point about CG is that it is often introduced as a ‘formal’, ‘government-initiated’ and ‘government-led’ process in which public agencies try to engage directly with local communities as non-state stakeholders in decision-making (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2008). Although a few scholars have questioned imposing these criteria on CG

(Emerson et al., 2012; Memon et al., 2012), they have not been able to show that CG includes community-initiated, community-led projects and informal collaborations.

CG advocates appear to argue that since governance is undertaken using 'common pool resources' in societies, and different stakeholders have shared or have conflicting interests in the shared resources, participation is a logical approach to mediate conflicts that arise from the commonality of resources (Innes & Booher, 2010). That is why CG's main objectives often are defined as 'consensus-building' and 'conflict resolution' through using the tools of 'dialogue', 'deliberation' and 'discourse' (Booher, 2004; Kim, 2010; Levi-Faur, 2012; Memon et al., 2012; O'Leary & Bingham, 2007). However, this claim potentially leads to a question about whether or not CG involves real action and implementation rather than simply discourse.

In relation to Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation and the IAP2 spectrum (2007) (Arnstein, 1969; IAP2, 2018), one of the highest levels of participation is consensus-building, which is the focus of CG. Therefore, CG claims to support one of the highest levels of participation. With respect to theories that talk about: 1) engaging; and 2) engaging with communities, CG supports the latter. Engaging, on its own, means enabling and facilitating communities to be able to solve their problems whereas, engaging with communities is related to local or central governments' use of various media (face-to-face) to communicate with residents in 'two-way conversations' that differ from 'token' consultations or 'information delivery' when attempting to be deliberative or open to discussion (Vallance, 2013).

Although, the literature tends to highlight conflict-resolution and consensus-building as the main contributions of CG (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Booher, 2004; Innes & Booher, 1999; Memon et al., 2012), there is some evidence that shows that CG has moved beyond conflict resolution and consensus-building and is connected to 'social learning' (Kim, 2010; Koontz, 2014; Koontz & Newig, 2014; Laurian & Shaw, 2008), and 'trust and network building' (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Kapucu, 2014; Kapucu & Garayev, 2011b, 2012; Keele, 2007; Laurian & Shaw, 2008). These new contributions lead to claims about CG having 'transformative potential' in difficult times (Healey, 1997) and that is why it is advocated as an appropriate model by planning scholars (e.g. Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 1999, 2010).

The potential benefits of CG have not blinded scholarship to a number of problems. For example, the ideal of broad inclusion has been called into question for being irrational and not practical, and the ability of CG to mediate conflicts is heavily under question (Hillier, 2003; Keshavarz & Mazé, 2013; Lane, 2005; Mouffe, 2005; Purcell, 2009). Despite that, CG scholars still assert that CG paves the way for harmony in the society in question and for effective conflict resolution through mutual

understanding (Innes & Booher, 2010). The model has also been criticized for its time-consuming and expensive process of argumentation because people may not have enough time to continually engage in collaboration (Healey, 1997; Leach, 2006). In response to that, Healey (1997) notes that the costs of democracy are often set against the need for quick and strategic action to take a key economic opportunity to safeguard environmental assets. In this respect, CG may not necessarily be as successful and ideal as the literature claims so its performance needs to be critically evaluated in light of both its strengths and weaknesses; this study aims to do that.

Finally, it is important to note that considering the nuances around the definition of CG, this study adopts Ansel and Gash's (2008, p. 544) definition<sup>1</sup> (below) for CG and aims to redefine it.

*A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programmes or assets.*

In this research, public agencies and local communities (non-state stakeholders) are regarded as two active players in CG. Although the CG literature seems to constrain collaboration to formal, state-initiated, state-led discourses, the current study seeks to discover if CG includes informal, community-led and community-initiated collaborations and whether it also involves 'actors' in its action and implementation.

## **2.4 Reasons why planners advocate CG approaches**

It is undeniable that CG approaches have been highlighted by a considerable number of planners as an ideal approach with many benefits. As a result, some new concepts such as the "*collaborative turn*" (Memon et al., 2012), "*argumentative turn*" (Hajer et al., 1993), and "*communicative turn*" (Healey, 1997), have been introduced into the planning literature. CG proponents highlight two factors or reasons why CG is an appropriate approach to take in urban planning.

First, there is a new world understanding of the diversity and interdependence of interests in society and this understanding has directed planning towards more discursive and collaborative ways of decision-making (Brisbois, 2015; Dryzek, 1994; Habermas, 1984; Innes & Booher, 1999). This has been derived from Giddens' (1984) structural theory and Habermas et al.'s (1985) communicative action theory. It is argued that societies at different scales from global to local have a diversity of cultures,

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<sup>1</sup> Ansell and Gash reviewed 137 cases of CG and they were deliberately restrictive in their definition to enable their comparative study. As such, they had to draw some boundaries but admit there are other readings of CG.

ethnicities, values and languages. They are a combination of groups and individuals with different histories, experiences, ways of understanding and levels of knowledge about problems and solutions (Eppel, 2013; Hajer et al., 1993; Healey, 1992, 1997; Innes & Booher, 2010). These differences generate potential conflicts between individuals and groups that have different, sometimes conflicting, interests in a shared environment. Therefore, planning needs an approach that mediates these conflicts and respects this diversity. However, in traditional planning, scientific knowledge, technical expertise and substantive rationality as the main sources of planning, did not paid enough attention to the needs of these diverse groups and individuals (Forester, 1999; Healey, 1997).

According to Innes and Booher (2010), understanding the diversity of interests in a society results in a new understanding of the interdependence of the interests. Since all share the same environment, we are more or less interdependent, we cannot meet our interests independently. This raises questions about how does planning act with respect to these differences. This is connected to Habermas' question: 'How do people with different perceptions of a good life co-exist in communities?' His answer was communication and interaction between different individuals and groups to achieve consensus (Habermas, 1984). The implication for planning, as a "*communicative enterprise*", is to be more inclusive and create a web of relationships between the diverse groups and individuals to exchange their ideas, create mutual understanding and together define problems and solutions (Healey, 1997). CG proponents claim that diversity and the interdependence of interests are two preconditions of the collaborative, deliberative governance model in planning (Dryzek, 1994; Dunn, 1993).

Secondly, new concerns of planning, such as 'wicked' environmental problems and multiple social deprivation, are known as complex, dynamic and uncertain. These problems have changed the planning perspective from finding an immediate solution to a discrete 'technical' problem to the long-term adaptation of communities and institutions (Booher, 2004; Gollagher & Hartz-Karp, 2013; Innes & Booher, 2010; Tierney, 2012; Waugh Jr & Streib, 2006; Weymouth, 2015). According to Innes and Booher (2010), knowledge has a central role in dealing with these problems and we lack sufficient understanding and knowledge of them. In modern rational planning, knowledge would be created by scientists and experts but even experts and institutions eventually experience situations where their knowledge or capacity is not enough to solve new problems (Dunn, 1993; Innes & Booher, 2010). On this basis, exploring different ways of knowledge building and knowing has become important. According to (Dryzek, 1994; Habermas, 1984; Innes & Booher, 1999, 2010), knowledge is distributed between different individuals and groups in communities like different pieces of a puzzle, if one part

does not work another part may be the answer. In support of that, Ansell and Gash (2008) note that knowledge is socially constructed and is a result of multiple-sided interactions between actors.

More importantly, knowledge has a strong attachment to the context (Innes & Booher, 2010; Vallance, 2015). In other words, people in each city and country define their problems differently based on their perspective and knowledge. This means that they need a specific approach to solve their problems and that universal solutions may not be appropriate for them. On this basis, collaboration with those in the context is important in planning and policy making plus the claim that it has the potential for mutual learning.

In adaptive management literature, knowledge and learning play principal roles in improving the long-term capacity of communities to deal with difficult situations (Adger, 2003; Folke et al., 2005; Koontz, 2014; Koontz & Newig, 2014). Many studies of local environmental planning, with a strong tendency towards this model, argue that knowledge is constructed by different individuals and groups when they collaborate to get through difficult situations (e.g. Aldrich, 2012; Frahm & Martin, 2009, p. 647; Kapucu, 2014; Kapucu & Garayev, 2011a, 2011b; Koontz, 2014; Koontz & Newig, 2014; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Shaw, 2003). 'Social learning' has been hailed by these scholars as an important contribution of CG, for example, Koontz (2014) assesses the performance of collaboration in watershed planning. He gets a result that CG helps to develop communities' social learning potential, which means they learn how to deal with future problems through increasing connections to professionals and other agencies (Koontz, 2014). As mentioned above, CG advocates call these abilities or claims the "*transformative potential*", which means the whole society would be resilient over the long-term and difficult situations are transformed into more ideal situations (Healey, 1992, 1997; Innes & Booher, 1999, 2010).

## **2.5 Collaborative planning and collaborative governance relationship**

Collaborative planning (CP) and collaborative governance (CG) are two concepts that have been frequently used in urban planning literature in recent years (e.g. Bidwell & Ryan, 2006; Day, Gunton, & Frame, 2010; Koontz & Newig, 2014; Koontz et al., 2010). During the last three decades, many planning academics took it upon themselves to talk about governance arrangements and CG in particular (e.g. Healey, 1998; Innes & Booher, 2003b). Some have even claimed that doing urban planning collaboratively will foster governance, management and institutional capacity (Healey, 1998; Innes & Booher, 2003b). They appear to believe that urban planning task has shifted from 'building places' or from a process where government officials and experts control the city-building process to fostering governance and institutional capacity to shape the ongoing flow of 'place-making' activities

and to build community and societal capacity for self-governance (Healey, 1998; Innes & Booher, 2003b). In this respect, two concepts of CP and CG appear to be similarly used by planning scholars with the same definitions and offering the same processes and criteria, this can potentially lead to confusion about their relationship. Consequently, this section aims to clarify CG and CP relationship.

According to Healey (1997), governance in general and CG as a type of governance have two dimensions: policy and planning. The first dimension refers to policy development and the articulation of the purposes of governance and the making of strategic decisions about directions and key actions (Healey, 1997). Planning as the second dimension, relates to the implementation and delivery of the policies and programmes (Healey, 1997). Traditionally, up until around the 1980s, policy and planning were kept separate. Central government developed policies at the top which were often transformed into rules (Allmendinger, 2009; Healey, 1997). Local governments/city councils and planners who had the planning task appeared not to have a role in developing those rules and policies, instead, their responsibility was to find the best and most efficient course of action to implement those policies (Alexander, 1997; Allmendinger, 1998; Allmendinger, 2002, 2009). Therefore, policies (often in the form of rules) referred to the goals, ends, substances, values or outputs of central government or elected politicians while local government planners (non-elected bureaucrats) were the technical experts charged with finding the best 'means' of meeting the politicians' goals. This planning era, known as modern rational planning or positivist planning, has 'substantive rationalities' as a central concern (Allmendinger, 1998; Allmendinger, 2002, 2009; Faludi, 1973; Sandercock, 1998).

In the 1980s, while some new trends arose in policies that directed policy making of the government towards governance, planning followed the same trends towards collaboration and multi-stakeholder involvement (Lane, 2005; Laurian & Shaw, 2008). This was due to criticisms of traditional planning as being apolitical and anti-democratic. Allmendinger (2009, p. 64) says: "Bureaucrats such as planners were not just concerned with serving politicians whose responsibility it was to devise ends or substantive rationality \_they were actually opposed to democracy". Planning was viewed as undemocratic because of the impression that it only served the elected politicians or central governments. This is in contrast to democracy, which is more than simply serving the elected politicians who are sometimes partisan about their own personal or business interests. In the current world, all cities and countries comprise plural societies with diverse publics and this requires the planning profession to involve these diverse publics rather than focussing on a coherent public. Planning, as with policy, asked for more openness and accountability to better represent the more diverse publics' interests and focus on democratic processes and procedural legitimacy rather than just the ends and goals of politicians (Alexander, 1997; Allmendinger, 2002, 2009; Friedmann, 1973; Healey, 1997, 2003).

Planning has followed democratic trends in policy and, since the 1980s, policy and planning became more integrated, and collaboration between central and local governments in policy making and planning became more common (Allmendinger, 2002). CP is a product of this new perception and the changes in planning history that required planning to serve both diverse publics and the government.

On this basis, planning as one aspect of CG has moved towards collaboration and that is why, in the current research, CP has been defined as a part of CG although not all of it. One aspect of CG is policy development or shaping the rules of the game (developing general rules of behaviour with respect to collective interests) and the other aspect is delivery of the policies and putting them into practice. CP provides a particularly powerful expression of how this delivery might be done. Delivery and implementing policies is crucial for the legitimacy of governance, as Healey (1997, p. 205) notes: *“A policy-driven approach to governance activity requires that policy objectives and strategies are articulated, and linked to programmes of action, judged by output and outcome criteria linked to the objectives.”* The CG and CP literature claim that policies are not transformed into rules anymore, but they are specific to each political community and context (Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 1999). Sometimes, even new policies emerge or are invented through actions as people and agencies are implementing other policies in communities, they develop new policies at the same time (policy as practised) (Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Healey, 1997). Clearly, policies can have different levels as some are developed at the local government level and some in central government departments but the CG approach tends to include all levels of policy development. In fact, in this study, allowing things to happen is a governance and policy aspect of CG; for example, allowing a park to be built, while the actual building and implementing the park is the planning aspect of CG.

Therefore, in the current research, CP is a part of CG and this research chooses to use the term CG in this research. Because it involves both policy-making and planning, central and local government, and includes management other than design and implementation. It is an ongoing collaboration not just a one-off process. This research focuses on both technical side of planning and also governance and the management aspects to see how these processes are met in a holistic sense. In this research, the boundaries between policy and planning are blurred and they are not distinguishable because everything happens at the same time, when local and central governments work together in the community and work with the local community, make decisions and implement them. For this purpose, in this study, collaborative housing renewal is chosen as a lens to explore CG.

## **2.6 How to evaluate CG?**

Evaluation studies of CG in planning often look at the extent to which collaborative projects meet the ideal speech criteria of Habermas (Habermas, 1984) or whether they can be called examples of



participative democracy drawn from criteria that were later developed by CG proponents (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Dryzek, 1994; Emerson et al., 2012; Hajer et al., 1993; Healey, 1992; Leach, 2006). These studies often tend to evaluate the degree of inclusiveness, equity, accountability, impartiality, deliberation or shared understanding of common interests, empowerment, transparency, and more. Considering that the suggested criteria seem to be difficult to meet, proponents of this approach have developed new goals for collaborative discourse such as “*sufficient agreement*”, “*achievable consensus*” or “*achievable mutual understanding*” (because full understanding or common understanding is difficult to achieve and different individuals have their own meaning systems and knowledge forms) (e.g. Dryzek, 1994; Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 2010). On this basis, CG scholars, through implementing the aforementioned criteria in planning, have highlighted the virtues of CG ‘process’ (e.g. Kapucu & Garayev, 2011b, 2012; Kim, 2010; Koontz, 2014). In fact, the virtues or contributions of CG process have often been regarded as the products of it. The three important process contributions are:

1. Democracy and improving the quality of decisions: This contribution appears to be the one highlighted most by almost all CG proponents (e.g. Brisbois, 2015; Fung, 2006; Kim, 2010; Laurian & Shaw, 2008; Leach, 2006; Voets et al., 2008). It shows the extent to which CG principles are implemented successfully (such as inclusiveness, accountability, process equity, process control, and common view), guarantees a higher level of democracy and improves the quality of decisions (Koontz, 2014). Ball and Maginn (2005) believe that in the context of collaborative regeneration projects, these principles focus on improving the act of governance and community involvement and there is the idea that if the community is more involved in the regeneration process, higher quality decisions will be achieved.

2. Social learning: This seem to be another virtue of the process highlighted by many scholars (e.g. Innes & Booher, 2010; Kim, 2010; Koontz, 2014; Koontz & Newig, 2014; Laurian & Shaw, 2008). The claim is that the process of working together leads to information exchange, raises awareness about the goals, interests, and responsibilities of others, and mutual understanding. These are important factors for learning. The hope is that this learning process ultimately leads to adaptation of that communities and agencies to changes and difficulties. Social learning has been significantly assessed in environmental planning in the US, for example, Koontz (2014) assesses that in watershed planning. He concludes that learning happens for the communities at two levels, individual cognitive gains (individual learning) and group cognitive gains (collective learning). Individual-level learning is achieved through exposing the assumptions and working methods of others and transforming existing knowledge between individuals. Collective knowledge, as a property, emerges through agreements,

trust and commitment to a group vision (Koontz, 2014). In that sense, collective learning links to the third contribution of CG process.

3. Trust and network-building: This virtue of the process has been highlighted by (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Kapucu, 2014; Kapucu & Garayev, 2011a; Parés, Bonet-Martí, & Martí-Costa, 2011). The idea is that collaborative actions eventually lead to establishing new relationships, networks and trust and strengthening existing ties between and within agencies and communities.

Although, the contributions from the process, as outlined above, seem to be very important, the current research argues that process quality or contributions to good process are not the actual end results or products of CG. For example, in the context of collaborative urban regeneration, some argue that the collaborative process is, at first, a means to achieve the end results and products on the ground (Ball & Maginn, 2005; Henton, Melville, Amsler, & Kopell, 2005). It leads to a question for example, *'whether a collaborative housing regeneration process reassures stakeholders that the houses are the ones they wanted or agreed on?'* While many CG studies tend to emphasise the positive outcomes from the process, we cannot overlook the products of that process. To what extent does the effectiveness of collaborative processes mean that the intended and desirable products on the ground will be achieved? A study by Koontz and Newig (2014) relating to the implementation of CG, shows that the

local community was effectively involved in making decisions but the decisions were not implemented as 'intended'. So, if the actual products may differ from the those that were agreed on by participants in the collaborative process, is it possible that they need to be assessed separately?

The processes of CG often claim to balance or redistribute power among actors, consequently, many studies, such as those in collaborative housing renewal, measure the success of collaborative projects based on their power distribution or redistribute and then compare that with an ideal situation where there is an equitable distribution of power. For example, Smith and Beazley (2000) evaluated a number of collaborative urban regeneration projects based on their power distribution and the level of community involvement but their study has been criticized by others (e.g. Ball & Maginn, 2005) for the lack of attention given to the quality of the outputs and outcomes of regeneration in the projects. Even if a power balance is possible, it raises a question about the quality of the outputs and outcomes (Ball & Maginn, 2005). The question is *'whether equal influence of stakeholders on the process creates broadly acceptable outputs and outcomes or if unequal influence reflects ineffective, unacceptable outputs and outcomes?'* Without assessing both process and products (outputs and outcomes), is it possible to argue that CG, as a process, is superior?

In addition, collaborative and deliberative approaches have been well characterized in the literature as expensive kinds of governance (Healey, 1997; Vallance, 2015) as they demand more resources, capacity, money, time, and energy. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask questions about the cost-effectiveness of the products and the connections between the process and the products. For example, *Does the process of working together necessarily mean that the participants all benefit from the products? Are the products broadly acceptable to a wider range of participants? Which process factors attribute to which products?* In this respect, evaluating process, products and ‘their connection’ (if there is any) seem to be highly important.

On the other hand, there are some studies that evaluate only the products of collaborations without looking at the processes themselves (Ball & Maginn, 2005). For example, Thomson, Atkinson, Petticrew, and Kearns (2006) evaluated two target areas of an urban regeneration programme in the UK based on their outcomes in terms of increasing public health and process evaluations were excluded in their research. In contrast, some studies, such as Rhodes et al. (2002) who evaluated the processes of ten single urban regeneration projects in the UK, and showed that those studies that focused solely on product evaluation, generally failed to demonstrate the contribution of collaborative principles to the success or failure of the project (Ball & Maginn, 2005). Arguably, effective products are desirable in any decision-making, whether based on collaboration or any other governance structure (Ball & Maginn, 2005). Similar conclusions; for example, are cited in standard texts as essential for success in private property development (Ball & Maginn, 2005). On this basis, other than product evaluations, process evaluations are critical because performance depends considerably on many process-related factors, such the ability of various actors to work together; the ability to overcome tensions and conflicting interests; the adoption of a strategic vision, and aspirations for common goals (Ball & Maginn, 2005).

In conclusion, for assessing the success of collaborative initiatives, evaluating both process and product performance and their connections are critical. Process and product performance evaluations need to be given ‘equal attention’ and the current research aims to evaluate both processes and products and find the connections. Accordingly, the following sections will review the current literature about how to evaluate the processes and products of CG approaches and highlight the relevant themes to consider in the evaluation.

### **2.6.1 How to evaluate the process?**

The principles of the CG processes in theory, such as inclusiveness and impartiality, aim to help us do planning more democratically (Agger & Löfgren, 2008). Although there are some good reasons for such

processes and principles, the rationality and applicability of them in theory and practice have been criticized by many scholars (Hillier, 2003; Mouffe, 2005; Purcell, 2009; Roy, 2015; Young, 1997). Consequently, this necessitates taking a critical perspective of the process while evaluating it. In this study, I have categorized process issues and dilemmas into two sets: first, democratic issues or dilemmas that are related to both the theory and practice of CG; and secondly, the, prehistory, context and future issues or dilemmas that tend to be related more to the practice of CG. Every procedure performance evaluation needs to consider these two items while evaluations. They are explained in more detail, below.

#### **2.6.1.1 Democratic issues and dilemmas**

The first and most repeated criticism relates to the lack of a strategy for power sharing and power balance (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Lane, 2005; Purcell, 2009; Roy, 2015; Young, 1997). According to Purdy (2012), power has different sources that include authority, legitimacy and resources; resources can be tangible (such as, financial capital) or intangible (such as, knowledge, skills and information). Typically, public agencies, well-educated citizens, experts, middle class citizens have more knowledge, skills and information about policies and programs than lay citizens. Purcell (2009) argues that in CG and other deliberative approaches, power is often treated as a discrete and alienable resource of the participants that they can set aside, contain or collaborate without. However, power is relational and is inherent in the relationships between social agents and is always present (Foucault, 2003; Mouffe, 2005; Purcell, 2009). This disparity of power and resources can result in the exclusion of some voices. For example, communities can be co-opted by developers who have more money; well-educated citizens and experts can sway the opinion of others in ways that suit their own ends because they have more knowledge, skills and information about policies and programmes than lay citizens (Innes & Booher, 2010). Therefore, it is not uncommon that the ‘arrangements’ of dialogue and discussion leads to exclusion of many voices and domination by elites of various kinds. That is why, as a critic, Young (1997) notes that CG relies heavily on “*persuasion*” through rational argument and favours some social groups, genders, or classes because of their capacity to evoke acknowledgement of their arguments. Such persuasion seems to reinforce power relations and hegemony rather than transforming them (Purcell, 2009; Roy, 2015). In this respect, the most affected stakeholders are typically excluded, and CG does not seem to offer an ‘equal’ process and, if people are not equally esteemed, arguments are less likely to be accepted by others (Purcell, 2009).

The second deficit of CG relates to the ability of this process to build consensus and resolve conflict as its main goals. CG seems to aim at forming undistorted arguments or dialogues to build consensus among stakeholders but, on the way there, it wants to resolve conflicts and balance power among

actors. Critics argue that speech acts cannot be neutral and undistorted; they must necessarily contain distortion to be intelligible (Hillier, 2003; Mouffe, 2000, 2005; Purcell, 2009). This means that language and communication, as the centrepieces of CG, cannot be a neutral, fully shared and undistorted medium. Rather, language is always political; it is distorted by power, and those distortions establish hegemonic relations among the participants (Hillier, 2003; Mouffe, 2000, 2005; Purcell, 2009). Mouffe (2000) calls distortions, conflicts and antagonism *“the political”* and criticizes Habermas and his adherents for trying to remove the political and form non-political communications by focusing on conflict resolution.

Conflict management literature, agonism literature (Hillier, 2003; Mouffe, 2000, 2005; Purcell, 2009), incrementalism and satisficing literature (Chadwick, 1971b; Levy, 2009; Lindblom, 1959a; March & Simon, 1958) as direct or indirect ‘critics’ of CG, tries to say that conflicts and antagonistic relationships, are always present in human society because they are rooted in the power inequalities (Mouffe, 2005; Purcell, 2009) and different values that humans have. Mouffe (2000) argues that not only power and conflicts are irremovable but they are necessary conditions for dialogue and discussion to be meaningful. She has suggested that we should not try to eliminate conflicts and power to create non-political communications; rather, we should accept that conflict and power, try to manage conflicts and mobilize power, not minimize it (Mouffe, 2000). In this respect, Mouffe (2005) differentiates two concepts, *“antagonism”* and *“agonism”*; in antagonism, we look at our conflicts as an enemy to be destroyed whereas, in agonism, we accept that we have conflicts but we do not seek to eliminate them. It is impossible to build a society without conflicting friends and relations; antagonism is an irreducible and ineradicable feature of social relationships (Purcell, 2009). The task of democratic practice is to domesticate antagonism and generate ‘agonism’ instead in which conflicts are managed (Mouffe, 2005). According to Mouffe’s argument, agreement and consensus in CG masks conflicts when attempting to resolve conflicts is impossible.

The third criticism relates to ‘participative or participatory democracy’ and its main ideal, inclusiveness. This is also the first condition or criterion of CG to broadly include all affected stakeholders (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Chrislip & Larson, 1994b). The rationality and practicality behind inclusiveness is heavily questioned, for example, Purcell (2009, p. 153) says: *“such inclusiveness can never be total, every group that includes must always also exclude... every inclusive ‘we’ must exclude a ‘they’ in order to exist”*. The logic behind including every affected stakeholder seems unachievable (Hillier, 2003; Mouffe, 2005; Purcell, 2009). Even if this ideal of inclusiveness were logically possible, it would be so difficult as to be virtually impossible in practice (Purcell, 2009). Including every affected stakeholder is far beyond the resources of the agencies and the stakeholders might not be willing or have time for collaboration

(Leach, 2006). *“In practice of course, what happens is that agencies get the most affected stakeholders to the table (or, more accurately, they get representatives of the most affected stakeholders), and exclude relatively less affected stakeholders”* (Purcell, 2009, p. 154). This means that this participative ideal (inclusiveness) is not met and that the gap between ideal and reality *“is papered over far too easily in public discourse, so that processes that are necessarily exclusive get narrated as inclusive”* (Purcell, 2009, p. 154). Therefore, CG though often called inclusive seems to be exclusive but its exclusiveness is rarely questioned.

The discussion above has highlighted some issues and democratic deficiencies of the CG process and indicators that can be regarded as both political and practical barriers to the process. The standard theory of CG, it appears, is not able to provide an appropriate answer for these issues; therefore, the process may not necessarily be successful and its quality needs to be critically evaluated in light of both its strengths and weaknesses. In this study, CG is neither considered perfect, nor completely flawed; it is considered as a new approach that needs to be critically evaluated to highlight both its positive and negative aspects. Although the critics believe that the principles of this theory are not applicable, the current research, while considering these issues, will explore what is applicable in the real world and aims to offer some new criteria.

#### **2.6.1.2 Prehistory, context and future issue and dilemma**

While the concerns set out above are more associated with democracy/political concerns, this section underlines a concern that appears to arise from the actual practice of CG and this issue has to be considered when evaluating the process.

In the current study, pre-existing conditions, or prehistory context, and the future of collaboration are identified as another problem that CG theory may face. On the one hand, there may be pre-existing distrust, lack of relationships or social capital among actors, but, on the other hand, pre-existing power imbalance of the actors may put up barriers for collaborative processes to perform successfully. Some scholars acknowledge the presence of these pre-existing conditions (e.g. Andranovich, 1995; Ansell & Gash, 2008; O'Flynn & Wanna, 2008; Radin, 1996; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Ansell and Gash (2008) highlight two pre-existing conditions to CG: firstly, any prehistory of antagonism or cooperation (conflict or an initial trust level); secondly, any power and resource imbalance among actors. They believe that these two conditions may improve incentives for collaboration or may provide constraints to collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008). This means that, as a result of pre-existing conditions, actors eventually tend to go for other ways to solve problems rather than investing in collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

It is not uncommon to have distrust and conflict within local communities toward agencies because of previous 'bad' experiences they have had; even different public agencies may distrust each other because of their prehistory of conflict before starting to work together on a new initiative. Other than trust, there may be many asymmetries in power, resources, knowledge and capability of the actors before starting to enter the CG forum. Agencies are often strong actors having authority, information, organization, defined goals, and a history of public decision-making. Communities are often diffused actors and individuals that do not necessarily work together or have an organized group (English, 2000). Thus they may not have the ability to act as an equal actor and have an equal partnership with the agencies. Definitions of CG (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2008) often insist on including non-state stakeholders or communities in decision-making that is often all community members as a collection of individuals. It is completely normal that before starting to collaborate there are imbalances in the capabilities of actors and typically communities are less well equipped. Ansell and Gash (2008, p. 551) say: *"if some stakeholders do not have the capacity, organization, status, or resources to participate, or to participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders, the collaborative governance process will be prone to manipulation by stronger actors"*. This raises important questions about how this lack of capacity and capability might be addressed in CG processes.

Although the pre-existing conditions of distrust, conflict and capability imbalances often exist in the real world, and CG scholars acknowledged that, standard CG theory nevertheless appears not to have a treatment for them and lacks adequate attention to them. CG theory offers a process of 'formal collaboration or deliberation' which is focussed on solving a single issue. So, CG, in theory, starts with formal collaboration at the table, but also ends with formal collaboration because, in theory, CG ends when the problem is solved, or the project is complete. Therefore, no future is expected for CG after the project is complete. Moreover, CG is often known as the governance of '*public affairs*' (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Buanes, Jentoft, Karlsen, Maurstad, & Sørensen, 2004; Rogers et al., 1993), but this raises another question, "Are public affairs defined by public agencies or by local communities?" The current theory lets the agencies define public affairs on behalf of communities.

The discussion above about the prehistory and future of collaboration raises a very important question: *When does CG begin and end?* The point whether CG starts and ends with formal collaboration has received little attention in the literature. Some see pre-existing imbalances as negative conditions (e.g. Futrell, 2003; Weber, 2003); some see it as a positive (Andranovich, 1995; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gray, 1989; Margerum, 2001), but there appears to be lack of debate or guidance about how to deal with them in practice. This study, while assessing the procedural performance of CG, investigates whether

there are any efforts in practice devoted to the prehistory and future of collaboration and when CG begins and ends.

In conclusion, this research evaluates the CG process in the light of its democratic deficits and deficiencies that relate to its pre-history, context and the future of collaboration.

## **2.6.2 How to evaluate the products?**

Although CG performance evaluation is a critical public management task (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Hajer et al., 1993), empirical research to assess products' benefits often faces conceptual and methodological challenges and lacks measurable indicators (Ball & Maginn, 2005; Voets et al., 2008). There appear to be few research projects on the products of CG and sometimes the studies that are done tend to conflate process and product performance or they consider process quality as the end. Innes and Booher (1999, p. 415) argue that *"processes and products cannot be neatly separated in consensus building because the process matters in and of itself, and because the process and outcome are likely to be tied together"*. In response to that Emerson and Nabatchi (2015, p. 720) state that *"advancing the study of collaborative performance requires the separation, and better articulation and specification, of the process and productivity sides of the performance equation<sup>1</sup>"*. In this study, the meaning of an effective product goes beyond solving the problem or having an actual outputs and outcome (like houses in urban regeneration projects, or safety) or having an immediate agreement. In fact, an effective product will relate to long-term adaptation and durability, which is different from short-term collaboration to solving problems.

A few people have developed frameworks to assess product performance with specific reference to their collaborative nature. They often evaluate products based on *'goal attainment'* or the extent to which outputs and outcomes meet the target goals of the process (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Voets et al., 2008). Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) have offered a framework for CG products and it covers three aspects: outputs, outcomes/impacts and the adaptation of collaborative outputs and outcomes that are different from the anticipated results of the collaboration. In this respect, one objective of the current study is to find evidence of these three products (below) and then evaluate them:

- Output
- Outcome
- Adaptation

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<sup>1</sup> The word product in this study differs from the term *"productivity"* that Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) use. Productivity does not necessarily refer to contribution of the actual products; it can be related to the process more than the products. Product is a different subject and this study will assess its nature and contributions.



Other than these three, '*satisfaction with the products*' (outputs, outcomes and adaptation) is also assessed in the current research. The sections following underline the justifications, and give definitions of these concepts and how to evaluate them.

### **2.6.2.1 Outputs/actions**

Collaborative actions (or the steps taken to implement the shared purposes of CG) are the direct and "*intermediate outputs*" or "*end outputs*" of the collaboration dynamics (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Thomas & Koontz, 2011). People and agencies collaborate across boundaries to get something done, and they often have shared aims, which result in direct or indirect instrumental actions or outputs (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). In respect to housing renewal or regeneration projects, outputs are often related to the transformations in the built environment or its physical aspects (Buchan & Austic, 2007; Parés, Bonet-Martí, & Marti-Costa, 2012). For example, housing (Ansell & Thompson-Fawcett, 2008; Parés et al., 2012), streets, roads, infrastructure and physical amenities (Macdonald & Peel, 2005; Parés et al., 2012), green-based design (LEED, 2013), and also collections of materials that go with meetings, such as reports and documents, or the plan itself, educational classes, workshops and training courses. The evaluation of the output has always been, and still is, one of the most common types of performance evaluation in planning studies. There are many programmes or projects that only aim to make physical changes in the built environment. For example, Parés et al. (2012) presented two examples of urban renewal projects in Europe that aimed only to improve buildings and streets and had with nothing considered about community empowerment or community satisfaction.

One goal of the current study is to explore what possible outputs there are from collaborative housing renewal projects and whether there is any relationship to process. There is definitely a difficulty in measuring outputs because they are diverse, and each and every collaborative project can have its own outputs (Ball & Maginn, 2005). The target goals of every project are different even in the same area, such as urban regeneration and outputs and all other products (e.g. outcomes) are context-driven. For example, the results of a collaborative urban renewal in New Zealand might be a wooden and detached house but, in Iran, it might be a concrete apartment because of the climate and weather conditions. That is why the outputs of two collaborative initiatives are not directly comparable and this makes generic evaluation difficult. We can only expect the outputs that have been defined as '*agreed goals*' or '*target goals*' of participants in the process. On this basis, CG scholars (e.g. Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Voets et al., 2008) believe that, "*the most appropriate*" way to evaluate outputs and other products (outcomes, etc.) is to compare them with the agreed goals and objectives of participants that are supposed to be designed in respect to public problems, conditions and resources.

So, this helps to develop the question: *To what extent outputs result in achievement of agreed goals and objectives of participants and equal sharing of the cost effectiveness of the achievements?*

In this research, the “*agreed goals*” of participants in the process are the main ‘*unit of analysis*’ for evaluating outputs but physical outputs will also be compared with the international standards.

### **2.6.2.2 Outcomes/impacts**

Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) define outcomes as the implications or impacts of the outputs. These impacts are called “*results on the ground*” or “*immediate outcomes*” or “*end outcomes*” Thomas and Koontz (2011). It is argued that outputs and actions are taken in the hope of achieving some desired impacts about existing conditions that are undesirable and need to change (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Outcomes or results on the ground are known as the direct evidence of benefits for stakeholders; they can be physical, social, economic, environment and political (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Benefits can be long-term or short-term and can improve or worsen the situation for the public.

According to the literature, outcomes are often considered as impacts from the outputs, but this raises some questions. For example, do outcomes relate to the process and can be measured to evaluate the process or do they only relate to outputs? In the case of housing renewal or regeneration Parés et al. (2012) believe that outcomes are often the result of projects that are socially-oriented where the role of citizens’ participation in the network of governance has been more important. On this basis, Parés et al. (2012) see outcomes as the result of the process and not the outputs. They give two examples of collaborative regeneration projects in Europe that had some outcomes as direct benefits for the communities other than only changing the built environment. In this respect, it is important to investigate how outcomes connect to outputs and the process or whether they are impacts from the process, the outputs or both. Some outcomes from housing renewal projects include: home ownership (Macdonald & Peel, 2005), reduced overcrowding and changes in demographics (Buchan & Austic, 2007), social mixing and cohesion (Dixon et al., 2009; Wood, 2001), health and safety (Curtis, Cave, & Coutts, 2002; Dixon et al., 2009; Macdonald & Peel, 2005), employment (Dixon et al., 2009; Macdonald & Peel, 2005), housing affordability (Ancell & Thompson-Fawcett, 2008), improved relationships in the community (Agger & Löfgren, 2008; Ancell & Thompson-Fawcett, 2008), a sense of belonging and a sense of attachment (Dixon et al., 2009), a community spirit (Wood, 2001), empowerment (Buchan & Austic, 2007; Carley, 2000) and improved quality of life (Dixon et al., 2009), improved quality of service delivery (Carley, 2000), mixed tenures (Macdonald & Peel, 2005), diversity in design and greater choice (Buchan & Austic, 2007; LEED, 2013; ME, 2007)

Outcomes, as well as outputs, are diverse and may be a result of the agreed goals of the participants in the projects being achieved. In the current research 'agreed goals' are the main unit of analysis for evaluating outcomes. So, outcome assessment aims to see the extent to which the designated goals, in targeted public conditions, goods, services or products, are achieved (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). The possible connections between outcomes, outputs and the process is also investigated. In this study, how people use and experience the outputs helps in evaluating the outcomes.

### **2.6.2.3 Adaptation/durability**

Adaptation is the third aspect of CG products that Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) point out. They believe that adaptation is the most important consequence of CG which refers to the ability of collaboration to transform the context complex situations or issues (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Innes & Booher, 2010).

To complete or complement the argument made by Emerson and Nabatchi (2015), I have borrowed from the adaptive management literature that differentiates two concepts "*coping*" and "*adaptive capacity*" (Adger, 2003; Folke et al., 2005; Montgomery, 2016). Coping is a "*participation in response to an event or initiative to get through the immediate circumstances and it does not necessarily reflect or predict individuals or communities' adaptation over a long-term period*" (Montgomery, 2016, p. 3). Adaptive capacity is a more durable notion and long-term adaptation to challenges (Montgomery, 2016). This study introduces the term '*durability*' interchangeably with adaptation. According to Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) adaptation seems to be related to how outcomes and outputs grow, develop or change over different time-frames. Therefore, effective outcomes are expected to generate adaptation, or adaptive responses, to the outcomes of collaborative actions (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). Adaptation aims to reduce uncertainty by monitoring systems and improving long-term outcomes through learning (Adger, 2003; Folke et al., 2005). Adaptability may happen at different levels and scales and can include individuals, communities, organizations and the overall context. According to Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) argument, adaptation is the credit given to collaboration by stakeholders for stability and the development of collaboration and for tracing the development by increasing the number of stakeholders and changing the incentives. Stakeholders adapt themselves over time to new situations, changes and challenges.

Although Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) introduced adaptation as one aspect of CG products, to date they have not been able to provide enough clarification and evidence about the nature of adaptation and how it happens in the real world, or if adaptation relates to outcomes, outputs or processes (or which aspects of the process leads to adaptation). So, clearly, we still have only a limited understanding

of adaptation as a product of collaborative initiatives. Following Emerson and Nabatchi, the current research will investigate whether adaptation can be attributed to CG and, if so, how it might contribute to CG theory.

Adaptation in this research refers to two factors. The first is the durability and sustainability of new developments, such as new housing developments, which means how effectively the actual outputs and outcomes are maintained by communities. This can be translated into *durability of places*. The second aspect of adaptation is *durability of relations and developing new relations*. This means that the networks of relationships between stakeholders are maintained and strengthened and new relationships are established. These factors, if they exist, help communities and organizations to develop new and stronger capacities and be resilient in difficult situations. These factors are evaluated according to agreed goals to see if CG has such products and if they meet the agreed goals (if there are any agreed goals) or are unintended products.

### **2.6.3 Satisfaction with the products (outputs, outcomes, adaptation)**

A comprehensive evaluation of the products is difficult or impossible because they are so diverse. Moreover, each product (as mentioned above) has its own evaluation criteria, though I have argued one important aspect to consider is the extent to which it meets the needs of all participants (rather than through established and universal criteria, or reflecting the voices of dominant parties). Assessing the level of participants' satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the end products (outputs, outcomes, and adaptation) can help illuminate possible connections between processes and products. (Roberts et al., 2015). The definition of satisfaction in this study is different from "*preference satisfaction*" that refers to the freedom and resources to meet one's wants and desires (Roberts et al., 2015). In this study 'satisfaction' is connected to addressing the multiple needs of the participants and not their desires and wishful thinking. In fact, 'needs' and 'satisfaction' are slippery words and have different meanings. In this research, 'needs' does not just refer to basic needs because other than food and shelter we have other more fundamental needs. Max-Neef, Elizalde, and Hopenhayn (1992) believe we humans have nine fundamental needs as well as basic needs. They include kindness, participation, understanding, affection, subsistence, protection, idleness, creation, identity and freedom. In fact, the mental feeling of growth, upward mobility, acceptance, being counted on and feeling respected are some highly important needs for us. In this research, when talking about satisfaction, it does not only refer to materials and basic needs but also refers to non-materials, mental feeling and happiness. When someone is asked 'how satisfied you are with your life? They automatically think about material possessions, such as having a car or a house. But when they are asked: how happy you are with your life? They think about non-material things (Roberts et al., 2015). In this research, satisfaction and needs

refer to all of these material (basic needs) and non-material factors. Although measuring this is difficult, I consider acceptance and lack of active complaints as important indicators of satisfaction.

Products may meet all agreed goals and be regarded as successful products while the participants may not still be satisfied because the products have not addressed their needs. In fact, comparing the products just with the agreed goals does not demonstrate whether or not the products have been successful in the participants' view. Hence, participants' satisfaction with the products need to be compared with both the products and the process. It should be mentioned that the nature of CG is to give power to the stakeholders to make decisions and to be satisfied with them, so how they perceive the product should be regarded as a key measure in performance evaluations. In the current study, I will compare the participants' satisfaction of the products with the products themselves and also the process.




Figure 2.3 A simple diagram of product performance evaluation

In conclusion, as the diagram above shows, after evaluating the outputs, outcomes and adaptations with the agreed goals (and international standards for physical outputs), the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the participants with the products is assessed. Finally, the connections between these products (outputs, outcomes, adaptation and satisfaction) with the process are investigated.

## 2.7 Contextual factors (context influence on process and product performance)

After clarifying the importance of assessing process and product performance, it is important to note that these assessments have to be conducted in context. Every collaborative initiative performs in a larger context at local, national and international levels, and its processes and products are influenced by that context. The context either creates opportunities and support for collaboration or constrains it (Emerson et al., 2012). The contextual performance here is different from the discussion, above, about the prehistory and the context (Section 2.6.1.2). That discussion was about the history of collaboration and what happened before the initiation of a collaborative project. Instead, contextual performance here relates to the present and the impact of the contextual factors on the processes and products of collaborative projects while they are being undertaken. These factors can be related to the

geography in which collaboration happens or the culture, society, the economy, and many other elements.

According to Emerson et al. (2012), context is highly important and shapes the overall CG performance. Processes and products may act differently and with different levels of success or failure in two neighbourhoods of one city. Some researchers have highlighted the leading context factors that may influence the nature and prospects of CG as, socio-economic, cultural health and diversity (Emerson et al., 2012; Sabatier et al., 2005); resource conditions (Emerson et al., 2012; Ostrom, 1990b); policy and legal frameworks (Bingham, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012); previous failure to address the issues through conventional channels (Bryson & Crosby, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012); political dynamics and power relations (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012); and the degree of connectedness within and across existing networks (Emerson et al., 2012; Selin & Chevez, 1995). Although context seems to be important, it often appears to be ignored in CG research. Even comparative studies, such as those by Bull and Jones (2006); Koontz (2014); Koontz and Newig (2014), assess the process principles regardless of the contextual differences between cases. Many of the suggested general frameworks for collaboration do not give any attention to the context (e.g. Voets et al., 2008) but some prominent CG researchers underline the importance of doing this (e.g. Emerson et al., 2012). The point is that, although the context factors are important, evaluating their influence on process and product performance is very difficult, if not impossible, because of the very diverse aspects the two different contexts might contain. Therefore, in order to make an appropriate judgement about the process and product performance, this study 'considers' the impacts of context on the process and products but is not going to attempt to evaluate context exhaustively. Rather, it will investigate which contextual factors have the most influence on process performance. In this study, the role of context in the process is investigated but not its impact on the products because the products are the result of the goals agreed for their individual processes, and the agreed goals of each and every process can be radically different. Thus, the products of collaborative projects are not compared; they are just compared with their own processes.

## **2.8 Chapter summary and research questions**

This chapter reviewed CG as an approach that has emerged in response to the many challenges of planning and policies in the current world. CG is different from governing collaboratively because it involves both central and local governments where at least one of them is an active player as well as local communities. It also encompasses both policy development and planning.

Although CG approaches have been advocated and adopted by many planners as appropriate approaches, they often consider and assess CG as a process and, consequently, they tend to highlight the virtues of the process. This raises questions about the virtues of CG products on the ground and their connections with aspects of the process. In this respect, the current research will evaluate the performance of CG by giving equal attention to the process and the products. For this purpose, collaborative housing renewal projects will be used as a lens through which to carry out this evaluation. The outputs, outcomes and adaptation, as products, are evaluated with the agreed goals and the participants' levels of satisfaction. Contextual elements that have been shown to be important will also be considered. On this basis, this research has identified a number of research questions and sub-questions, as follows:

**Process performance:** How are CG processes practised in the context of housing renewal?

How do we delineate a CG process?

**Product performance:** To what extent do CG products (outputs, outcomes and adaption) meet the agreed goals and objectives of the participants?

Are the products of CG broadly acceptable to a broader range of participants?

**Satisfaction with the products:** How satisfied or dissatisfied are participants with the products?

**Connections between the process and the products:** What is the nature of the connections or possible contradictions between the products (outputs, outcomes and adaptation) and the process?

Which aspects of the process are attributed to which products (outputs, outcomes and adaptation)?

Are outcomes and adaptation the impacts of the outputs or the process or both?

Does an equal influence from participants on the process create broadly acceptable outcomes and outputs on the ground? Or does an unequal influence reflect ineffective and unacceptable outcomes?

**Contextual factors:** What contextual factors influence process performance the most?

The next chapter presents the methods that are used to answer the above questions.

## Chapter 3

### Methods

#### 3.1 Introduction

While discussions in chapter one and two led to some important questions that the current research aims to answer, this chapter presents a detailed description of the procedures used to answer the questions and the reasons why these procedures were chosen. This study adopts a case study approach, so there is a justification on why this approach is taken also, two case studies of the research are briefly introduced. The chapter carefully explains the way the methods have been implemented in the field and the way data were analysed using an analytical framework. Finally, the ethical concerns and challenges faced in implementing the research methods are presented.

#### 3.2 Qualitative research

This study uses qualitative methods to allow the in-depth analysis required to investigate processes and products of CG. Selecting research methods should be based on the goals and circumstances of the study (Hammersley, 1995). CG studies often involve power relations among actors, experiences of working together, relationships, and perceptions about working together. (e.g. Ball & Maginn, 2005; Kapucu & Garayev, 2011b; Koontz, 2014). These perceptions and meanings are difficult to measure because they are diverse and subjective, so researchers have to look for a complexity of views rather than narrowing meanings into a few categories or ideas (Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Ibabao, 2013). In this regard, Ormston, Spencer, Barnard, and Snape (2013, p. 17) note that qualitative or interpretive research has value in being *“mediated through meaning and human agency [enabling] the social researcher... to explore and understand the social world using both the participant’s and the researcher’s understanding”*. This approach allows exploration of subtle nuances in attitudes to examine social process over time (Babbie, 2016).

Flyvbjerg’s work in social science raised many debates about which methods are appropriate for social science scholarship (Flyvbjerg, 2001). According to his ideas, social science should not emulate natural and physical science; methods to produce knowledge in social science need to be different. There is not one ‘truth’ or grand theory to describe society, rather Flyvbjerg (2001) advocates methods that expose values and power relationships and are reflective. On this basis, most CG studies in the world are conducted through qualitative methods (e.g. Eckerberg, Bjärstig, & Zachrisson, 2015; Koontz, 2014; Koontz & Johnson, 2004; Koontz & Newig, 2014) in the hope of discovering rather than testing variables. This study is no exception; the study’s questions set out in Chapter 1 require in-depth



analysis of the experiences, views and relationships of participants and triangulation of those with document and field observations. That is why, a qualitative or interpretive research method was preferred because it involves understanding the different meanings, perspectives and relationships of participants through value judgments, beliefs and motivations.

### **3.3 Case study approach: “Power of example”**

A case study is neither a methodology nor a data collection method, but a field research design (Hapuarachchi, 2016; Sarantakos, 2005). This study adopts qualitative methods in a case study approach because a case study is suitable when in-depth investigations underpin the study (Yin, 2009). A case study involves in-depth experiments with individuals, organizations, and groups over time and gives the researcher an opportunity to study the phenomenon in its context (Yin, 2009). A case study can also reveal the “web of relations, variety of activities and diverse events” to produce rich data (Neuman, 2011). This approach is significantly in line with CG studies looking at this web of relationships. Assessing CG performance needs its own examples or case studies that claim to be collaborative and meet CG ideals. The ideal way to discover the performance of collaborative approaches is to choose some projects as case studies in which participants are involved and exchange their knowledge to benefit from the process and the products of it. That is why most CG studies, if not all, choose case studies and go in-depth into different aspects of the topic (e.g. Eckerberg et al., 2015; Koontz, 2014; Koontz & Johnson, 2004; Koontz & Newig, 2014). The current research also selected two projects that had the claim of being collaborative as examples to assess CG performance in practice.

However, the case study approach is sometimes criticized for a lack of reliability and its ability to produce generalizations. Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 25), in support of the case study approach, declares that *“the study of social phenomena is not, never has been, and probably never can be, scientific in the conventional meaning of the word science; that is, in its epistemic meaning”*. He believes that knowledge in natural science is based on rules and laws; these rules allow natural science to produce universal theories, whereas social science deals with human activities and studies *“particulars in their context”* Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 25). Knowledge is context-dependent in social science and that is why social science does not produce universal theories in the meaning of natural science and does not aim to produce universal theories. If context is excluded in studying social phenomena, knowledge cannot be produced, and prediction would be impossible. In this sense, Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 70) highlights *“the power of example”* in which an in-depth study of an individual or a single case is the base; the case generates practical, concrete and context-dependent knowledge. He concludes that studying a social phenomenon can be generalized in terms of “examples”.

It is correct that a case cannot be formally generalized but “*formal generalization is only one of many ways by which people create and accumulate knowledge*” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 76). Saying that knowledge cannot be formally generalized does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or in a society. A purely descriptive, phenomenological case study without any attempt to generalize can certainly be of value in this process and has often helped cut a path toward scientific innovation (Flyvbjerg, 2001). In addition, according to Karl Popper, a case study is ideal for generalization using a type of test “falsification” to which a scientific proposition can be subjected. If just one observation does not fit the proposition, it is considered not generally valid and must therefore be either revised or rejected (Flyvbjerg, 2001). In this respect, the case study approach is used in this study because it identifies “black swans” and helps the general principles to come out of examples.

### **3.3.1 Selection of the cases**

This study is a cross-country comparison that is not uncommon for studies on CG (e.g. Bull & Jones, 2006; Koontz, 2014; Koontz & Newig, 2014). Comparative case studies are particularly useful in studying questions related to interactions and complex social processes that unfold over time (George, Bennett, Lynn-Jones, & Miller, 2005; Gerring, 2004; Koontz, 2014; Yin, 2009). They also reveal the nature of a theory’s problem much more clearly than by studying the system in a single jurisdiction and they enable better understanding of the practice. Two case studies are chosen in this research, the first is considered the main case which helps to develop the main themes of the research, following this the second case was tested with these themes. These themes ultimately helped to develop a framework for CG. The main case study is a social housing renewal project in New Zealand; the second is a local authority housing renewal project in Iran.

### **3.3.2 Case study selection criteria**

Identifying the key variables of interest allows the researcher to select cases to control some factors while allowing others to vary (Yin, 2009). Selection criteria for the cases in this study include, first, examples of housing renewal projects (the word renewal is interchangeably used with regeneration in this study<sup>1</sup>) that claimed multi-stakeholder involvement or collaboration. The name of the first project

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<sup>1</sup> The researcher is aware that in the literature, the term regeneration entails different actors having different levels of power and regeneration also refers to all physical, social, environmental and economic aspects of a project. However, in this research, the terms regeneration and renewal are not different, as both are talking about changing a situation, either physical, social, environmental or all of them, from deterioration to renewal. The only factor that makes a renewal or regeneration project of great value and different from other projects is the term ‘community’. For example, ‘community renewal or community regeneration’, these two show the presence and leadership of the local community in the projects. More importantly, the focus of this thesis is on CG and assessing the claims of this theory. In this regard, I am looking at two cases that have the claim of being collaborative. Therefore, renewal or regeneration projects are just ‘two examples’ that helped me examine the claims of CG theory. That is why, in the thesis I am not too concerned with the differences between the terms renewal and regeneration, but use them interchangeably as some other scholars, such as Zheng, Shen, and Wang (2014, p. 2), have done the same in their research.

in Aranui, New Zealand, later changed into “community renewal” but was initially labelled “housing renewal.” Secondly, both projects were selected as government-initiated (central or local government) in situations where government bodies used legislation to initiate collaborative processes at the local level. Both cases were also known as “government-led” in the sense that the CG literature often describes CG as government-led (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Brisbois, 2015; Koontz & Newig, 2014). One project was funded by central and local government and the other was funded by central and local government, and private developers. So, in both cases, the local communities had no control over the budgets. Thirdly, both cases studies were selected as neighbourhood level projects because Innes and Booher (2010), for example, argue that CG can happen at the neighbourhood level and it is normal in such studies to focus on neighbourhood level projects. Fourthly, the projects had already been implemented and homes were occupied, so the study allowed retrospective evaluation of processes and the products (for example, the houses and the quality of life in them). Fifthly, the cases were selected not only because central and local government agencies were key participants but also because the local communities were key players (or the projects claimed involvement of the local people). Sixthly, diverse contexts was another indicator for case study selection although both cases were in low-socio economic areas of different cities. A brief description of the two case study areas is provided below but before that it is worth noting the similarities and differences between New Zealand and Iran in terms of broader, nation-state governance matters.

### **3.3.2.1 Similarities and differences between New Zealand and Iran governance arrangement**

Although New Zealand and Iran have two different models of governance and planning based on their history and traditions, this study tries to find out their commonalities and differences in establishing a more collaborative style of governance. New Zealand has a ‘unitary parliamentary representative democracy’. Some concepts such as ‘consensus building’, ‘collaboration’, ‘stakeholder’, and ‘empowerment’ are familiar to local and central government officials and New Zealand’s citizens (O’Leary, 2014). Politicians frequently talk about the devolution of central government power to local government and other local actors, which means governance is evolving but it does not mean that every project in the country is participative. For example, after the 2010-11 earthquakes in Christchurch the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA), as a central government organization, was formed in Christchurch (Chang et al., 2014). It acted in a hierarchical way having many conflicts with the city council (Stevenson et al., 2014). Learning from the mistakes, a new organization called Regenerate Christchurch replaced CERA. It tends to work more collaboratively with

the city council.

Iran has a different history and tradition; 40 years ago, it had a civil war that resulted in a change of regime. The definition of a representative democracy can also be cautiously applied to Iran. Since 40 years ago, Iranians choose their president, parliamentary and council members for the cities, districts and villages through public elections every four years. Even in the previous regime, Iran had the same system. Although it had a king, the governing system was parliamentary. Parliament's members are chosen by public elections and the parties with more seats in parliament choose the Prime Minister. Currently, the main difference between Iran and other countries is having a supreme leader but the point is that, based on Iran's constitution, the supreme leader is not allowed to interfere in internal aspects of governance. Most things in the country are done through the President who is elected by the public. According to Iran's constitution, central government is not allowed to interfere in local government activities. Local governments act independently; they do not receive any funding from central government except for implementing important national projects in the cities.

Tehran, as a mega city, had its first master plan in 1966 provided by the National Council of Urban Planning; the latest one was published in 2007. In 1993, Tehran's municipality declared '*decentralization of decision making*' as the council's most important objective. Since then '*public participation*', as a new concept, entered local government organizations. For example, Tehran's council required private sector consultants (who were responsible for providing detailed plans for the 22 districts of Tehran) to base their offices in each district and design the detailed plans in direct consultation with local communities.

Tehran's governing style is evolving, trying to move towards collaboration and public involvement although the quality of collaboration that politicians are looking for might be low. Urban renewal started in a hierarchical way of decision making but very soon changed into collaboration and public engagement. The city council claims to have a CG procedure in the renewal of Tehran's deteriorated areas. Even if this is not collaboration based on Western standards, it is called collaboration in the language of Iran's local governments. This means Iran's local governments desire CG and their perspective is evolving from a command and control government towards a collaborative type of governance although there may be serious problems in practice.

The literature confirms that a stable approach to governance can never be found or is very difficult to find (Skelcher, De Rynck, Klijn, & Voets, 2008). "*Government agencies try different styles in succession in a restless search to find a stable approach which would be accepted as legitimate by all parties*" (Healey, 1997, p. 240). However, the agencies are always caught in the tension of an impossible demand, that they should meet everyone's objectives and accountability and legitimacy (Skelcher et

al., 2008). Some believe that governance styles are context-dependent and they are products of the local environment, culture, history and traditions (Hysing, 2009a; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Pierre, 1999; Skelcher et al., 2008; Stoker, 1998). The “politics of place” refers to the point that governance is place-based and every area of the world has its own local political culture (Pierre, 1999; Stoker, 1998). However, this tradition and local embedding is not stable but is always shifting in response to internal and external forces (Skelcher et al., 2008). The direction of these movements in governance needs to be read in promoting institutional redesign.

### **3.3.2.2 Case study one: the Aranui Community Renewal Project (Christchurch, New Zealand)**

As noted above this initiative was originally labelled a “housing renewal” project in 1999 by New Zealand’s newly-elected Labour government to be implemented in different neighbourhoods across New Zealand that had a high percentage of state houses with histories of social problems. In 2000, six housing projects were initiated by Housing New Zealand Corporation (HNZC) and the Aranui neighbourhood was chosen for the pilot project in New Zealand. Aranui is one of the lowest income areas in Christchurch city and has the highest percentage of state houses, in addition there are a higher degree of social issues in comparison to other suburbs in the city. Soon after initiating the project, senior managers of HNZC found that ‘housing’ was just one aspect of the renewal and they needed to think holistically and involve other agencies such as Christchurch City Council (CCC). HNZC then asked CCC to join the renewal and after some negotiations, CCC accepted and the two parties signed a memorandum of understanding to work together and involve the community. The renewal began in 2000 and ended in 2008, having had three main players: HNZC as the central government organization; CCC as the local government, and; the Aranui local community (later the Aranui Community Trust Incorporated Society (ACTIS)). During the process, more agencies joined the renewal but these three were initial ones and the key players. The project was mostly funded by HNZC and CCC.

In the current research, this eight year project was studied to assess the process performance and also what has happened in subsequent years until June 2017 as part of the product performance evaluation.

### **3.3.2.3 Case study two: the Abouzar housing renewal project (Tehran, Iran)**

This project was initiated by the Tehran Municipality in 2010 (in Iran, the legal title is Tehran Municipality but I will call it Tehran’s city council in the research). Based on the law, the council had the authority and responsibility to renew southern parts of Tehran. In 2003, a disruptive earthquake happened in Bam city, Iran, and killed around 30,000 (Alireza, 2007). Central government became worried about Tehran because 2.3 million people in the south of Tehran lived in non-earthquake proof houses. Considering that and political sensitivity about the vulnerability of the country’s capital city, a

law was passed by the parliament in 2004 called the “*Revitalisation and Renewal of Deteriorated Urban Areas*” in which the Tehran city council became the main agency responsible to lead the renewal of the southern part of the city. The law also required all other relevant government and non-government organizations to work with the council to annually renew 10% of the south. Loans and finance were supposed to be provided by the central government to facilitate the process. The council-led Urban Renewal Organization (URO) which had previously been inactive. URO was asked by the council in 2004 to specifically work on this task. For six years from 2004 until 2010, URO and the council implemented some top-down projects in different neighbourhoods but the projects were considered failures (for example, no one wanted to buy the new apartments). In 2010, the council and URO initiated a collaborative renewal in which they aimed to form a collaboration between local communities, private developers and the URO/council (and central government institutions indirectly). Abouzar was chosen as one pilot and the project started in 2010. After 4 year, around 30% of the neighbourhood was renewed and occupied but the project was still ongoing in other parts. In this study, this 4 years (2010-2014) is studied as the process and 2014 to July 2017 is studied as a part of the product.

In Abouzar, the houses were privately owned but the owners (in south Tehran) are low income and do not have the financial ability to do the renewal themselves. In Aranui the houses were state houses and this is a difference between the Aranui and Abouzar case studies (ownership of houses). The point is that this study aims to assess the nature of collaboration and investigate who holds the stronger voice, power or influence. Also, in Abouzar, private developers were key players and it was a more multi-party setting. In Aranui they were no private ‘developers’, only private contractors, working to the conditions of tenders. The characteristics of each case are summarised in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Characteristics of case studies

<b>Factor</b>	<b>Aranui</b>	<b>Abouzar</b>
<b>Project</b>	Housing renewal	Housing renewal
<b>Socio-economic condition</b>	Occupied by low income communities, high rate of crime	Occupied by low income communities, high rate of crime
<b>Population</b>	8000	15000
<b>Multi-cultural</b>	Maori, European, Pacifica, Asian	Fars, Turk, Kurd, Lor, Afghan
<b>Plans and projects</b>	No master plan or detailed plan but there are plans related to state housing and renewal	Master plan, detailed plan, neighbourhood plan
<b>Start of the project</b>	2000	2010
<b>Key players</b>	HNZC, CCC, Aranui local community (ACTIS)	URO, private developers, local communities, other council departments
<b>End of project</b>	2008 and then the earthquakes renewed attention...	2014 (but ongoing in some parts)

### 3.4 Field work and data collection

Before starting to collect data, all procedures for data collection, including the interviews, observations and document gathering, were presented to the Human Ethics Committee (HEC) at Lincoln University. The committee did a detailed assessment and approved the methods (see Appendix A for HEC approval letter). Therefore, all questions that were going to be asked, the way to contact interviewees and the interview place and much more were all assessed and approved as being consistent with a low risk data collection approach.

#### 3.4.1 Qualitative Interviews

Before discussing the interviews, it is useful to identify the typical stakeholders in housing regeneration or renewal projects. According to Tsenkova (2002), four groups have a stake in regenerations: 1) government institutions (central and local departments and organizations and authorities, councillors and other elected bodies) that are important to control legal and political aspects, provide financial support and tax incentives; 2) the community (residents and community organizations) that is the principal beneficiary and the party most affected by regeneration and its involvement is important to ensure full commitment to achieve the established goals; 3) the markets or private sector (investors, banks, trust and loan companies, property developers and businesses) that provide financial capital and more employment opportunity for residents; 4) non-profit organizations but if there are any such as voluntary organizations, NGOs and charities that can be important groups of stakeholders who establish trust relationships and fund services that government is not willing to provide. Therefore, housing regeneration projects provide a good setting for CG to be assessed in this study since the cases definitely involve local communities and public agencies.

In this study, 28 semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted, mainly with representatives of agencies, the community, developers and those involved in the project from the beginning to the end or, at some point, who had an important role in the project. In Aranui, 14 face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted between 15 January and 17 April 2017 (see Appendix D for interview questions). See Table 3.2 for the list of interviewees.

Table 3.2 Interviewees for the Aranui, New Zealand, project

Council planners (CCC project manager, land and waterway manager, community development advisor)	3
HNZC representatives (HNZC project manager, two tenancy managers)	3
East Christchurch MP	1
Adult educator (Ministry of Education)	1
Private developer	1
Community representatives (ACTIS board members and manager)	5

As noted in the introductory chapter, I am originally from Iran and before the data collection I had no connection to Aranui, but one supervisor, Dr Roy Montgomery, had a good knowledge of Aranui and good connections to ACTIS (Aranui Community Trust). Before starting data collection, I met the ACTIS manager in one of Dr Montgomery's undergraduate urban planning teaching courses (she talked to the students about Aranui). I also went to the Affirm Festival 2016 in Aranui to get to know the environment and its safety issues a little more because, historically, the area has been known as not very safe. Therefore, the first interviewee was purposively chosen to be the ACTIS manager; almost all of other interviewees were chosen through snowball sampling. To contact the interviewees, I used email communication (see Appendix B) and sometimes phone calls. The email contained a short cover letter in which I declared how I knew them and how I got their contact email address. I would then introduce myself, my study and why I was contacting them. I would ask them if they were interested to know more about my study before deciding to participate. If they were interested, I sent them the research information sheet (RIS) (see Appendix C.1) that includes more details of the research goals and a consent form (see Appendix C.2). The RIS and the consent form had already been approved by Human Ethics Committee, Lincoln University. Thus the interviewees had time to read the documents and make a decision. In fact, all signed the consent forms and sent them back to me.

I directly contacted the interviewees; none requested me to ask permission from their managers. To contact two Maori women ACTIS board members, I used phone calls because one did not use the internet and the other did not use email. For the phone calls, I did the same as email communications except that I explained everything verbally. For these two interviewees, I printed the consent form and on the interview day read it to them and then they decided to sign it or not (although they had given me verbal consent). All interviewees signed the consent form. To do four of the interviews, I travelled to Aranui with an accompanying friend. Three interviews were conducted in the ACTIS building and one in Aranui public library. Ten other interviews were conducted in different office buildings in Christchurch including the HNZN main office in Papanui, the city council building in the Palms Mall and Wilson and Hill's (a private developer) office in Cashel Street in the central city. I interviewed the Christchurch Mayor in her office, not because of her Mayoral status but because she was the Member of Parliament for Christchurch East at the time of the renewal project (2000-2008) and she had a significant role in the project. I interviewed also her husband, Rob Davidson, in his office in Upper Riccarton because he also played an important role in the community renewal project.

Interview times ranged between 30 to 90 minutes. I recorded all of the conversations for which permission had been given in the consent form. No interviewee asked me to be 'off the record'; almost all were passionate and excited to talk about the Aranui community renewal. I had a set of questions in hand as my 'road guide'. The questions had been approved by the ethics committee but I did not



always ask exactly those questions. I let the conversation be freely flowing rather than distracting the interviewee's mind and talk by asking many defined questions. I normally would start with: *"Please tell me the story of this project from the beginning, how this project started, why, who was involved what did you do, and dynamics of the process."* It helped me to know how the process started, when, what led to it and what happened during it. Then, I would ask *"What happened after the project, what did the parties do, what products did they get, were they satisfactory?"* These questions were to help me assess the products. I also asked what was the key point or factor that made the project work or not work. That was to help me work out each interviewee's perspective of the connection between the process and the products. For the contextual performance, I normally did a brief introduction about what the context is then would listen to them. Usually, I would not ask all questions of every person but, based on their experience and role in the project, we would concentrate more on the process or product. For example, one ACTIS board member who was in the community renewal from day one was a key person to tell me about the process, so I focused on the process in her interview. After an interview I normally transcribed it and did a short analysis for myself before going to the next interview. This helped me go for the questions that were raised in previous interviews or focus on the questions that had not yet been answered.

On April 2017, I travelled to Iran and, basing myself in Tehran, I conducted 14 face-to-face qualitative interviews there from May to July 2017 (see Table 3.3 for a breakdown of the interviewees).

Table 3.3 Interviewees for the Abouzar, Tehran, Iran, project

URO representatives as planners (project manager, urban planner, architect, higher level managers)	5
Community representatives and local land owners	5
Representatives of other council departments (the mayor of 17th district council and head of the head of council Department of Architecture and Urban Design (DAUD))	2
Private developers	2

I was quite familiar with the Iran case study and those involved in the project who could help me answer my questions because I worked in the URO local office in Abouzar for two years from December 2012 to December 2014. I stopped working there when I came to New Zealand and started my PhD studies. I first translated the RIS, consent form and the email cover letter into Persian, then I called the URO project manager rather than emailing him because he had been my manager for two years. He agreed to be interviewed; I purposefully chose him as the first interviewee because of my knowledge of his role and responsibility in the Abouzar project. He is an architect and the project manager based in the local office from the beginning of the project until 2018. I presented the RIS and consent form to him and he signed it. My interview with him took four hours because it turned out to be a friendly discussion as he explained the whole story in detail. The questions were asked with the same style and

sequence as in the New Zealand case. Although I had some people in mind to interview, I used snowball sampling and let the interviewees introduce the next person to me. Interestingly, many of them were exactly the ones I had in mind. As New Zealand, in Iran there was no need to contact managers and ask for their permission to approach their staff.

To contact some interviewees from URO and council at a higher level (not the local office), I sent them emails with a cover letter, then the RIS and consent form. Some knew me from before and my former manager texted them and introduced me. All responded positively to the emails and signed the consent form; none asked permission from their manager. To contact local developers, two local community home owners, and the head of council Department of Architecture and Urban Design (DAUD), I used phone calls (because they normally do not use email). All of them asked me to send them the RIS and consent form by “Telegram”. Telegram, unlike the traditional association in the West, is a messaging, voice and video application that every Iranian has it on his or her phone, even the very elderly. So I sent the forms on Telegram and received the interview consents. Two local community people, in the phone call, asked me to print and give them a copy of the RIS and consent form when I came to interview them, so I did.

Interviews were conducted in three places: the local URO office in Abouzar, the URO main office building in Tehran, and 17<sup>th</sup> district council building. I travelled to these places to do the interviews. Local land owners and developers came to the local URO office because it was easily accessible for them. All interviews were recorded; as in Aranui none asked me to be ‘off the record’. The interviews normally took 30-60 minutes.

### **3.4.2 Field observations and interpretive walks**

Observations and interpretive walks in Aranui and Abouzar had an important role in this study, especially to assess the CG products. Interviews are subjective and, according to Emerson and Nabatchi (2015), using less subjective methods in assessing the product dimension is important. They suggest using multiple data sources and triangulation. In this study, direct observations and interpretive walks, which are suitable to evaluate adaptation to the new developments, residents’ behaviour in the new developments and the maintenance, are used. Such data, which is very important for the purpose of this study, cannot be collected solely through interviews, so observations are crucial. For example, changes in the neighbourhood, physically and socially, the quality and maintenance of the physical products need to be seen or examined first-hand. Therefore, before starting data collection I prepared a research information sheet and consent form separately for such observations (the forms were approved by Human Ethics Committee, Lincoln University (see Appendices C.3 and C.4). In Aranui, I knew that HNZC was the owner of the new houses built in the renewal project, so when interviewing

the tenancy managers I also asked them to give me an opportunity to observe of some of their properties. I provided them with the RIS and consent form for observations and followed this with a phone call when they gave me verbal consent. They also reassured me that one of them would accompany me on the visit to the houses to take photos. I and a friend with one HNZC tenancy manager went to Aranui and visited some houses; the tenants had already given their permission to the HNZC tenancy managers. We walked around the houses and neighbourhood and had a close look outside, inside, the back and front gardens of the houses and photos were taken. Four houses were intensively inspected to give me a proper understanding of the physical products. Observation of houses was conducted after the interviews. During the observations, the HNZC tenancy manager, who had been significantly involved in the project, explained and talked about the house features, and their quality and maintenance. This interpretive walk was very helpful in understanding the physical changes and their impact on the safety and overall impression of Aranui. Another part of observations in Aranui was observing the upgraded Wainoni Park, playground, new road and the Affirm Festival as other project products. Several times I went to Aranui, observing how people use these facilities, took part in the festival and other events in the community and took photos. In general, since 2016, I have regularly gone to Aranui, to its festivals and even helped ACTIS with the festivals.

In Iran, the new apartments were often privately owned but I had access to the contact details of the owners from the local Abouzar office. I asked three local community home owners that I interviewed if they would let me have a closer look at their property. I provided them with the RIS and the consent form but they often gave verbal consent. With the permission of my previous project manager, one of my previous male colleagues accompanied me on the observation trips. Home owners or their wives would show me their property and explain the pros and cons of it to me. I conducted three house observations in Abouzar. In addition, I used many photos that the local office had from the houses before and after the renewal. My colleague and I walked around the neighbourhood several times and took photos to see the changes in the community.

### **3.4.3 Document collection**

Documents, especially reports, correspondence and meeting notes, were an important part of the data in this study because they helped with understanding the details of the process and the way the process was formed as a democratic process. They would also increase the reliability of the data from the interviews. In Aranui, during the interviews I asked all interviewees if they had documents related to the project and if they were able to provide me with a copy of them. Interestingly, for Aranui, the HNZC project manager and the council Land and Waterway manager had kept many documents related to the project. They were very happy seeing someone doing research on the project so willingly provided me copies of all the documents and photos they had. The council Land and Waterway

manager, who believed that this project had been the best project of her working life, said: *“I have got it all documented. It is funny, I have kept everything with the idea that one day I would write up all this whole process and have it all documented, which I have never done, but if you want to do it, it would be great”* (28 Feb 2017). Also, ACTIS, the community trust, and an adult educator who worked with ACTIS for a few years provided me with other documents related to the project and I copied most of them and returned the original files. The document providers gave me verbal permission to use the documents; they believed there was no need for official permission from the agencies. The documents included some meeting minutes of the time, surveys such as a Needs Analysis survey, Maori hui<sup>1</sup> and FONONO<sup>2</sup>, memorandums of understanding, photos, brochures, the first scope plan of the project and much more. I also had online access to the ACTSI monthly newsletter, its Facebook page, organizations’ websites, news, social media, census data, city council data and reports about the rate of tenancy, vacancies, percentage of owner occupied buildings, density. These data were significantly important because no individual interviewee was aware of all of them.

In Abouzar, Iran, I had easy access to all the documents that the local Abouzar office had. I used meeting minutes related to the meetings between locals, URO representatives and developers. The results of the design meetings between these three, the monthly reports URO provided from progress in the renewal process and community involvement, the detailed plan of 17<sup>th</sup> district of Tehran of which Abouzar is a part, maps and GIS layers of the area and the National Building Law. I copied and used the relevant documents with the permission of the local office manager.

### **3.5 Data analysis**

Bearing in mind the point made in the literature that research on CG, deliberative and discursive democracy is largely about power relationships among players that naturally leads to discursive analysis in which the position, role and power of those giving the information have to be significantly taken into account. Discursive analysis is derived from Foucault’s scholarship on power and knowledge (Foucault, 1980; Johnston, 2014). The analysis naturally includes analysing the content of the discussions. During the analysis, I was not only concerned about what my interviewees said (content analysis) but also paid attention to ‘who’ said that and what was his/her position in the power system. I would not judge based on what some people would say unless I had also listened to others who had

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<sup>1</sup> Maori are New Zealand indigenous people and the term ‘hui’ is a Maori term which means meeting or a gathering (Webster, 2019a, 2019b).

<sup>2</sup> Fono is a Samoan term that means meeting and council (Webster, 2019c).

less power (financial and political). In this respect, I have followed the strategies that Waitt (2005) recommends to help interpret and analyse discourse.

Waitt (2005, p. 180) recommends the strategies below to help interpret and analyse discourse:

- Suspend pre-existing categories: examine your texts with fresh eyes and ears.
- Familiarisation: absorb yourself in your texts.
- Coding: identify key themes to reveal how the producer is embedded within particular discursive structures.
- Persuasion: investigate within your texts for effects of 'truth'.
- Incoherence: take notice of inconsistencies within your texts.
- Active presence of the invisible: look for mechanisms that silence. Focus on details (Johnston, 2014, p. 69).

All the data, including the primary and secondary data, were analysed in an 'inductive' manner. After an interview, I would normally transcribe it so, other than listening to the voice, I would read the transcriptions and highlight the key points that the interviewees raised. Therefore, the first analysis round was done while collecting data in the field. After data collection, I printed the transcriptions and, with a pen and highlighter in hand, I started reading and rereading the transcripts in depth and highlighting key points and conflicting points that they talked about, then took notes. This was time consuming but very exciting when key themes began to appear; many were at odds with the theory that I had read. During the data analysis, I used an Excel template derived from Philipp (2000) to analyse and categorise the data but I did not rely on that unduly. I did all analysis by noting the themes and providing supporting quotes for them. In the Excel file, I wrote the main research questions at the top identified by number (1,2,3,4 and 5). I would then read and reread my transcriptions highlighting different parts of the texts that I found to be interesting. Then, I would copy and paste those parts into my Excel spreadsheet and would write a number in front of them, such as 1 or 2, to signify questions numbers 1 or 2. This would show me that this part seemed to be an answer for question number 1. At the end, I would read all my answers to the question in the Excel file and then develop themes and sub-themes. Below is a screenshot of my Excel file.

Table 3.4 A screenshot of the Excel template

Home Insert Draw Page Layout Formulas Data Review View									
Calibri (Body) 12 General Conditional Formatting Insert Delete Sort & Filter Find & Select Ideas									
A28 fx									
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
1	Questions								
2		1	Process performance: How is collaborative governance process practised in planning? /How were different stakeholders involved in CG process?						
3		2	Contextual performance: Which contextual factors influence the process of CG the most?						
4		3	Product performance: Does CG product meet the target goals and results of the process?						
5		4	Satisfaction with the product: How satisfied or dissatisfied are stakeholders with the product of CG?						
6		5	Connection of process and product performance: What are [or: What is the nature of] the links between process and product performance?						
7									
8	Interview	page	line	paraphrase	generalising	main question	category	organization	
9		1	1	memorandum of understanding was a commi governemnt commitment		1	commitment		
10		1	1	council said to trust leader Rob we pay for a r supporting the trust to form by paying for a commur		1	true commitment		
11		1	2	our leader here for 16 years		1	commitment of community leader longevity		
12		1	2	local empies say this is special and we could r local empies making sure that this is special		1	trust building		
13		1	2	we participated at the beging and at the end keeping community on board from the beginning to i		1	ongoing involvement		
14		1	2	Houses were fantastis and outside of that we the good think is we have got a say about how the de		1	involvement in design		
15		1	2	we people could into it (we got single dowelli people could have input on the process (could into it		1	community influence and input/ they created a platform to ...		
16		2	3	they had never done that before (with this go supportive government		5	commitment		
17		2	3	another supportive minister, he introduced S another supportive minister/people (visionery), SCAI		1	supportiv personalities		
18		2	3	this SCAF is about devolveing government fur this SCAF is about devolveing government fund to th		1	community empowerment		
19		2	3	based on his talking: he believes tentions wer getting scaf fund reduced tentions and ACTIS became		1	conflict resolution		
20		2	3	lianne applied for Aranui at the first round b no capacity of the community to get the scaf at first		1	capacity building and strong leadership		
21		2	6	We had to employ someone to run it to meet employing staff to meet goals of SCAF		1	empowerment and capacity building		
22		2	6	very important quote: he explained that the education classes because of having ACTIS, empoweri		1	community empowerment		
23		2	7	we granted some of the SCAF money to the o granting money from SCAF to organizations (co-oper		1	empowerment and capacity building		
24		2	7	they make submissions to us (at that time whi organizations make submissions to us		1	empowerment and capacity building		
25		2	7	after re-election of labour in 2005 minister c minister from the same government cancelled SCAF/		1	conflict management, the feeling of responsibility of Lianne.		
26		2	7	the idea of SCAF was to devolve funding to lo Vision behind SCAF was devolving government fund		1	community empowerment		
27		2	7	because government officials do not like devo conflict/ governemnt officials don't like devolution of		1	passion and willingness		

I had multiple data sources and I analysed the documents the same way as I did the interviews, highlighting key points and taking notes. The documents, especially meeting notes, helped me to see what had occurred that the interviewees did not talk about and whether they were in conflict or confirmed what the interviewees had said. The photos of the process at the time were very good, compelling information that helped me visualize the process and what had exactly happened at the time. The photos I took during the observations were also crucial in assessing the products on the ground and how they were used and maintained by the local community and the agencies.

### 3.5.1 Framework for data analysis




Figure 3.1 Data analysis framework

The framework, above, is a reflection of the way and stages of data analysis in this research. At first, reviewing the literature helped me to develop some themes. I then received the data from the field and undertook the first round of analysis. On that basis, some emergent and new themes were developed as well as some supporting and conflicting themes. Finally, I was able to integrate all the findings and draw a more comprehensive framework for evaluating CG and also present the key conclusions of the research.

The framework in Fig. 3.1 was used as a road map while assessing the data. It is simply a reflection of the current research theoretical framework for evaluating CG, and it helps to know which aspects of the framework need to be compared with which evaluations.




Figure 3.2 Research theoretical framework a road map for data analysis

- Process evaluation considering the context:** To assess how the process performs, I looked at how different stakeholders worked together, the dynamics of the process, how conflicts were dealt with and some other factors, done under the principles of CG. The principles of CG theory are general and not specific to a context. Although they were developed in the West, they are supposed to work everywhere in the world. Thus, comparing different collaborative processes, such as in New Zealand and Iran, is possible but how stakeholders work together is affected by the characteristics of the context. Therefore, in data analysis stage, the processes of collaboration in the two countries were compared under the impact of the context.

For process performance evaluation I looked at collaboration throughout the whole planning process as every planning process seems to be a linear process having different stages that come in order including: defining goals and alternatives, design, implementation and monitoring

(Allmendinger, 2009; Chadwick, 1971b; Faludi, 1987; Levy, 2009).

In the field, when asking the 'context question' I had a plan. At first, I would give an introduction and explain why I was asking this question and what I meant by it. I would mention some contextual factors as examples to help the interviewees understand what I meant. This was so they could think about their own context and the factors that supported or restricted regeneration in their neighbourhood (with examples or evidence).

- To evaluate the product, the products of the two projects were not compared because, as explained in Chapter 2, the products are the results of the process' target goals. The products were compared with their process goals and agreements to see the extent to which they met the goals. However, only the physical outputs were assessed and from a technical point of view, which was the relevant international standards.
- As the products are the results of agreed goals and discussions that might be affected by a power imbalance and they are highly context-driven, assessing satisfaction bridges these gaps. The products in Abouzar and Aranui were compared based on the satisfaction of the stakeholders with the products. In the field, I would first ask 'how did outputs, outcomes and adaptation meet the agreed goals of the participants?' I would then ask, 'are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the outputs (such as the houses), outcomes and adaptation? Which factors did you find satisfactory or unsatisfactory?'
- Finally, connection of process and products in Aranui and Abouzar was investigated to see how the stakeholders evaluated both of them.

### **3.6 Ethics**

As mentioned earlier, the research for this study went through a full human ethics approval procedure. In the RIS given to the interviewees, they were reassured about the anonymity and confidentiality of written and oral presentations of the study or in general discussions. On the day of the interview, I verbally reassured them that their name could never be identified and that just job titles would be used. Throughout the study interviews, job titles have been used but, if any name is mentioned it is a pseudonym and not the real name of the interviewee or those about whom they have talked.

In the RIS given to the interviewees, they were also given the right to withdraw from the project up to eight weeks after the interview including the withdrawal of any information they had provided. They could do it by contacting the researcher or one of supervisors of the study. No one related to the Aranui and Abouzar case studies made contact to withdraw their information from the study and none asked to be 'off the record'.



Interviewees were also offered a summary of the study's findings. Interviewees related to the Aranui case had a lot of passion and interest and even asked me to present the findings to them. Therefore, on 1 November, 2018, a presentation was made in the Aranui community hub/centre in the presence of the study supervisors, some CCC and some HNZN representatives involved in the project, the ACTIS manager and chairperson and some local people. The presentation was well-received.

One ethical concern related to the data collection was the possibility of harm to me when conducting observations and interviews in Aranui and Abouzar since they both are known for a higher rate of crime compared with other city neighbourhoods. To overcome this concern, I always had a friend accompany me to Aranui whenever I went for an interview or observation. Also, as mentioned earlier, observations occurred while the HNZN tenancy manager accompanied us. In Abouzar, because I did most interviews in the local URO office in Abouzar, I did not need to take someone with me because the staff were all previously colleagues. For the observations in Abouzar, one male colleague would accompany me all the time.

Another ethical concern that the readers might have but was not a concern for the researcher, was the behaviour and reaction of people (from institutions and local communities) in Iran to a woman researcher. The world's media have produced a picture of Iran as an oppressive environment for women in general. As a woman born, raised and having lived in Iran, I can attest that a big part of this picture is wrong. For example, in 2015, 2016 and 2017, females outnumbered males in the university entrance exam, 56.5% to 43.5% (Tehran Times, 2017). It is very normal to be a woman researcher in Iran. Before coming to New Zealand, I had done research for my masters and bachelor courses. That research involved conducting interviews and carrying out surveys and questionnaires in different government departments and even very remote villages. Therefore, I had no problems while collecting data and behaviour was very normal.

Finally, I must mention that all consent forms and data are saved and kept in my password protected computer. Based on the HEC requirements, I will keep them for six years and then they will be removed and destroyed.

### **3.7 Reflexivity**

Flyvbjerg (2001) states that what sets the social sciences apart from the natural sciences is that self-reflecting humans are studied. The entire research process takes place within a particular context that gives sense and meaning based on self-reflection and self-understanding of both the researcher and researched. According to Johnston (2014), 'positionality' is the idea that is important to be understood. As a researcher, what your position is within the world in relation to your subjects because your gender, ethnicity, experiences and other factors influence the way you view the world and the way

your produce knowledge. Self-reflecting on your position as a researcher is reflexivity. Social scientists advocate reflexivity as a method to counter the idea that the knowledge created by scientists is neutral and objective (Johnston, 2014; Rose, 1997). Also, knowledge is connected to power and researchers may give voice to some groups and ignore others (Haraway, 1991). I am not an exception and I know that my perceptions may have influenced the way I have conducted and reported this study.

After graduating in sociology (bachelor) and planning (master), I worked for two years on housing renewal projects in Tehran and I developed some concerns and misgivings there about the ways in which the community was involved, the results of their involvement and also the basic definition of good collaboration. I then came to New Zealand with the intention to know more about this and potentially address some of the questions that I already had. I read about CG theory and what is 'good' or 'bad' in collaboration. I designed questions and went into the field. There is the possibility that my perceptions have affected the question design, the way of asking them or the way I interpreted the answers. For example, increased emphasis on power relations between agencies, developers and local people. I am aware of this reflexivity problem and declare that but the only solution might have been 'not being present' in the Abouzar renewal or not studying the CG literature. But if I were not there and if I did not study the literature, I could not see the problem and would not have done this research.

Reflexivity or the lack of it for me could be more related to the Abouzar case study; the selection of those whom I chose to interview might have been biased by my past experiences. However, I tried to rely on the participants and let them introduce the next person to be interviewed. Also, I did do other data collection and did the first round of analysis for Aranui first, before I started collecting data on the Abouzar case, which helped me tackle reflexivity to some degree in the sense that I had an understanding of how people related to me as an independent researcher.

### **3.8 Chapter summary**

This chapter outlined the methodologies that this study used to answer the questions highlighted in Chapter 1. The study adopted an in-depth qualitative method with a case study approach; the two cases studied were briefly introduced, one was the main case and the other was used to test the main case. The cases are two housing renewal projects that help to evaluate CG performance. The main data collection method was qualitative face-to-face interviews with additional observations, interpretive talks and document analysis as methods for data triangulation and for improving the data's validity and reliability. Data analysis procedures with a framework that was used as a 'road map' for data analysis were also presented. The framework indicates that processes of collaboration in these two projects are compared but their products are not compared. Products are evaluated based on their own process (agreed goals of participants in the process). Finally, the ethical considerations, challenges

and reflexivity that the research faced with were highlighted. The next chapter provides the background to the Aranui case study.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Background, Aranui, New Zealand**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides background information of Aranui before implementation of the Community Renewal Project. Historically, Aranui has been, and continues to be, heavily impacted by state housing policies issued by successive New Zealand governments. Therefore the history of state housing in New Zealand is outlined first. This is followed by a broader history of Aranui, its housing and the demographic trends of the community over time. It is important to note that some of my interview data are contained in this chapter because the interviewees provided important information about the pre-project case study's background.

#### **4.2 History of State Housing in New Zealand**

In the late 1930s, following the Great Depression, there was an increase in suburban growth around the world and many central governments became involved in producing housing for workers who could not afford, initially at least, to build or buy their own homes (Montgomery, 2016). In 1936, a survey on housing conditions in New Zealand clearly revealed overcrowding and poor quality of the housing stock in the country (Ferguson, 1994 ). When the Labour government was elected, in 1935, it announced its intention to address the housing shortages in New Zealand (Montgomery, 2016). The government was determined to use the government's resources to improve the building industry in New Zealand in order to improve living standards. The Labour government entered the housing market in the 1930s both as a developer and a financier (Montgomery, 2016). In the 1936 budget, the government declared that 5000 rental houses would be built by the state under the Housing Act 1919 (Schrader, 2005). In shorthand terms this type of housing was called 'state housing' (Montgomery, 2016). The Housing Construction Department (HCD) was formed to administer the construction of the rental houses, but the houses were to be built by private developers through a tendering process (Boyd, 2011).

In terms of the design, the Labour government looked at designs of state houses around the world to find a suitable design for New Zealand (Boyd, 2011). The final decision on the design was building detached, individual units on sizeable sections and no two houses within a particular area would be of the same design to avoid monotony (Shaw, 2003). The Labour government had the idea of building high quality houses *"to avoid a sense of anonymity or conformity by social class"*

(Montgomery, 2016, p. 14). The initial plans were mostly designed as two and three-bedroom detached houses in an English cottage style, as shown in the pictures below (Boyd, 2011). Figure one illustrates indoor and outdoor design of the first generation of state housing in New Zealand by the Labour government; it includes a separate living room, bedrooms and a kitchen.




Figure 4.1 Plan for state house in 1938 (Hodgson, 1990)

The large-scale building state houses started in the North Island of New Zealand in the 1930s because of the larger population and topographical limitations for housing in many North Island cities. Yet at the same time, there was much pressure on housing in the cities in the South Island. So, construction was expanded to include all New Zealand. By 1943, 14,892 state houses had been built in 146 towns throughout New Zealand (Schrader, 2000). State houses had two special areas: public and private, and the Labour government redesigned the plans several times. However, there were some problems related to the houses built; for example, lack of one-bedroom houses for single people or couples without children. There were also problems related to the large townships that were designed around large cities, such as Naenae, in Lower Hutt, Wellington. Naenae was designed for a population of 10,000 based on Howard's garden city principles. The idea behind that was creating a comprehensive community but this was largely unsupported by residents of Naenae once they arrived (Boyd, 2011). Schrader as a critic said, *"Planning for a community in a township of 10,000 people was a mistake in*

*terms of the scale being too large*” (Montgomery, 2016, p. 4). More importantly, this generation of state housing was also criticised for lack of expertise and politicians’ understanding about community building and community development. Houses were designed by engineers who had no knowledge of community planning, so they built houses before building community facilities (Montgomery, 2016; Schrader, 2005). Although there were criticisms of what Labour government did in the 1930s and 1940s, Boyd (2011, p. 35) argued

*The first Labour government developed housing policies that captured the attention and imagination of people in a way that has never quite been achieved since. Although the state housing scheme was not immune to problems, there is no question that the actions of the first Labour government led to a substantial improvement in the quality of the housing stock in New Zealand and provided homes for thousands of New Zealanders.*

During the 1930s and 1940s, the rents of state houses was nearly half the rent of houses in the private market (Boyd, 2011). At the time of World War 2, construction costs increased but the Labour government refused to lift the rents saying that such an increase would break the promise of security of tenure to tenants (Schrader, 2005).



Figure 4.2 Aerial view of a 1947 development in Oranga, Auckland (Wikimedia Commons, 2017)

In 1949, a National government was elected into office and it had a different housing policy and a different direction for state housing. National did not support the ‘state house dream’ of Labour which guaranteed every working family a roof over their heads. The National government wanted to improve

home ownership because it would help develop *“initiative, self-reliance, thrift, and other good qualities which go to make up the moral strength of the nation”* (Schrader, 2005, p. 47). Consequently, the National government started a deliberate programme to sell off state houses in the 1950s (Boyd, 2011). There was a conflict in the ideology of the Labour and National governments towards state houses where Labour saw state houses as providing tenants with long-term tenure but National saw a rental focus a barrier for home ownership of those living in the houses (Boyd, 2011).

Nevertheless, when National was elected there were 45,000 people on the waiting list to rent state houses and the government did not want to reduce that number by building more state houses (Boyd, 2011). Instead National attempted to reduce the demand for state houses; first, by increasing the rent of state houses to even out the rental housing market; secondly, by establishing an income limitation (£520 per year) for people to be eligible to apply for state housing (Schrader, 2005). National hoped that by encouraging existing tenants to buy their houses they would join a ‘property owning democracy’ (Schrader, 2005). According to Schrader (2005), National wanted to stop the debt of the state housing account from increasing because by 1950s 32,000 state houses had been built by Labour, and the state housing account had a significant debt. A National Housing Conference was held in 1953 to debate state housing and the funding that the government would spend on it (Boyd, 2011). This conference highlighted the idea of ‘Group Building Schemes’ to control urban sprawl (Boyd, 2011) and this was in line with the purpose of National government reducing construction costs. National developed its own scheme for tackling the problem, a new idea, which was creating a ‘partnership’ between central government and the private sector as an alternative to state house construction (Montgomery, 2016). It is important to note, however, that central government, whether under National or Labour, accepted and continued the role of land developer throughout the 1930s to the 1970s i.e., central government, through the Ministry of Works, bought or took by compulsory purchase, large tracts of land and then cleared, excavated, drained, piped, roaded and lighted these suburban developments before handing them over to local authorities and private builders. In that sense the State still project-managed the location and supply of housing.

Attempts by National to reduce the cost of housing construction and its partnership with the private sector resulted in introduction of ‘Group Building Schemes’ and new designs for New Zealand. The new design included multi-storey buildings, duplexes and non-detached houses for state houses. National saw this type of design necessary for new developments and a popular design was blocks of four flats having two units upstairs and two downstairs (Boyd, 2011). So, multi-unit buildings became the most significant development in state housing design during the 1950s.

All house plans had to be approved by the government and the government would buy unsold houses to secure the sale of the buildings for private sector (Boyd, 2011). At the time, the private sector complained about being unable to compete with the monopolistic conditions created by the government's presence in the sector (Montgomery, 2016). As a result, the National government demanded cheaper designs for houses (Boyd, 2011; Montgomery, 2016). Thereafter, an open plan design was selected that merged the living room, dining room and kitchen into one space using cheaper materials (such as fibreboard ceilings, cheaper wallpapers and lighter roofs). Therefore, the previous high-quality state houses were changed into multi-unit houses and duplexes with a cheaper design (Montgomery, 2016). Ferguson (1994 ) noted that the focus of the National government on reducing building costs supported the growing attitude that state houses were for 'losers' and 'misfits' in the society.

In the 50s, there were concerns about the expansion of the urban sprawl; for example, in Christchurch, during 1955-1961, 214 sections of horticultural land were changed into urban development areas (Forrest, 1973). According to Ferguson (1994 ), 36 people could live in detached three-bedroom houses per acre while, in multi-storey units, 75-80 people could be housed per acre. This encouraged National to increase density by increasing the number of multi-units and duplexes from a fifth to a third (33%) of the units built (Montgomery, 2016). The photo below is an example of multi-units built by the National government at that time.



Figure 4.3 Multi-units in Porirua East, Wellington in the 1950s (MCH, 2014a).

In 1957, a Labour government was elected and almost immediately stopped the bulk selling off of state houses. However, it continued the scheme of building multi-storey buildings (Boyd, 2011). In 1960 a



National government returned to power and stayed until 1972. The above process of selling state houses and building multi-unit buildings and duplexes started again until the 1970s. This type of housing promoted by the National government, was also widely criticised. After building the houses, officials faced difficulties with renting them. The main things that tenants complained about were the lack of privacy and private outdoor spaces (Boyd, 2011). Schrader (2005), highlights cultural factors as the main source of dissatisfaction of New Zealanders with multi-units and duplexes. This is because the ideal house for most New Zealanders was, and it remains, the detached single dwelling with a garden. The multi-storey buildings did not meet their expectations. Some researchers reported on the lack of community spirit among people living in state houses attributed by lack of community facilities (Ferguson, 1994 ). According to Boyd (2011), the lack of the National government's commitment to state houses resulted in them attracting less desirable tenants. Multi-units had become the main feature of some of the large suburbs around the country, such as Porirua, Mangere and Otara, and stories of violence, crime and gangs in state houses were released by the media (Schrader, 2006). Eventually, a negative attitude towards state housing areas emerged in New Zealand as "*riddled with crime, violence and gangs*" (Schrader, 2006, p. 159). State houses were labelled as slums or ghettos and this label stuck in the collective perceptions of New Zealanders (Boyd, 2011).

Schrader (2005), highlights three main factors contributed the development of a negative attitude towards state houses in New Zealand. Firstly, the downgrading of the Housing Division by the Ministry of Works; the government increasingly focused on reducing costs and ignored special and social planning. Secondly, building single-class neighbourhoods meant restricting state houses to those on low incomes. Consequently, there was a lack of professional and self-employed people in state houses while the rate of Maori and single-parent families was higher in comparison with other areas. Thirdly, large-scale developments and medium density housing resulted in a visual uniformity and monotony not seen in neighbourhoods with conventional houses. These factors resulted in other problems e.g., high turnover rates and transience of tenancies which again led to unpopularity.

In the subsequent three decades, from 1970 until the 2000s (when the Community Renewal Project in Aranui started), the same conflictual approaches were repeatedly implemented by both Labour and National government. For example, the third Labour government in 1974, fixed 'fair rents' based on family income which was half the amount of rent in the private market for the same property (MCH, 2014b). It also initiated a scheme called Papakainga in the late 1980s to help rural Maori build their own houses on iwi-owned land (MCH, 2014b). At the same time, the population of Maori and

disadvantaged people attracted to the state housing areas increased considerably<sup>1</sup>. But setting 'market rents' by National government seemed to be the most radical decision made from 1970 until the 2000s that affected communities in state houses very negatively. National removed income-related rents and established government accommodation supplement. The rents of state houses were raised to market level but for those who were unable to afford the rents an accommodation supplement was established (MCH, 2014b). National's intention was to make the rental market more equitable because some were receiving more from the government; and it wanted to encourage tenants to become less dependent on the government and buy their own houses. However, it resulted in overcrowding in the 1990s, because families were sharing houses with their friends and relatives (MCH, 2014b). It has been reported that this decision in 1990s, reduced the living standards of families in state houses, eventually, the number of foodbanks in state housing areas increased (MCH, 2014b). One of the state housing tenants in Palmerston North revealed:

*[The] rent has increased from \$100 to \$180 over time. It's a real struggle now. Food is very expensive. When money is tight, food gets put off. If you go three times to a foodbank, they refer you to budgeting. I don't need to budget, I have no money (MCH, 2014b, p. 4).*

However, with these types of schemes and reducing deposit required to buy a state house, National was able to sell 1800 houses across New Zealand in the 1990s (MCH, 2014b).

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<sup>1</sup> Labour when came into the government in 1984, as a response to rising inflation and unemployment in New Zealand, it implemented 'Free Market Reforms', which became known as 'Rogernomics'. Many government departments were corporatized and restructured into commercially-oriented organisations and some of them were sold to private investors. Then 'Foreign Tariffs' were removed and this made local companies unable to compete with international companies, which resulted in loss of a lot of manufacturing jobs. At the same time, social reforms happened and attitudes towards de facto relationships changed. Women received more freedom with 'no fault with divorces' so the rate of divorce and single parents increased. Women also had more presence in every job in the country (MCH, 2017).

### 4.3 History of Aranui before Community Renewal Project



Figure 4.4 Aranui area (Modified from Google Map, 2018a)

Aranui, is a neighbourhood located in the east of Christchurch. The area referred to as Aranui is outlined above in figure 4.4 and has been selected according to existing circumstances and historical scheme plans. The names 'Aranui' and 'Wainoni' have been used interchangeably to describe the area; these names are not Maori names but seem to be to artefacts of late 19th or early 20th Century European settlement (Montgomery, 2016). Aranui, is loosely translatable as a path or way that is wide or great, and Wainoni, is translated as water or a river that contains a bend (Baker, 2004 as cited in Montgomery, 2016). Over time the name, Aranui, has become more popular to describe the area (Baker, 2007). So, in the current research, Aranui, is the name used to describe the area highlighted by the black border on the map.

As shown in the map, the area is close to the Pacific Ocean and receives cold winds from the ocean. Environmentally, Aranui is dry in summer and cold in winter with sandy soil and stiff winds (Montgomery, 2016). During the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Aranui was not part of Christchurch City but was part of a semi-rural local authority called 'Bromley Riding in the Heathcote County' (Montgomery, 2016, p. 7). The environment was predominantly rural and the number of people living there was under 400 people. In the first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century the population of Christchurch was rapidly growing (from 51,330 to 118,501 between 1896 and 1926) but there was not much interest in

developing subdivisions in Aranui because of the dry environment, sandy soils and the lack of proper connections and roads to the city (Boyd, 2011).

However, a school was built in Aranui in the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and then a community hall, in 1925. At that time, Aranui had a residents' association called the 'Aranui Burgesses Association' that used to be very active and worked hard to get the community hall for Aranui (Baker, 2007). Before having a community hall, the small Aranui community used to hold community meetings in the school or in New Brighton. The area was poorly serviced in the first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century having a lack of infrastructure for water drainage and fire protection (Boyd, 2011). Barker, one local historians highlights the role of the Aranui Burgess Association in providing services for the area in the first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century, "*[It] has been responsible for the progress in the area ... and thanks to them roads, footpaths, Playcentre, water supply, rubbish collection and whole lot more was [were] organized and petitioned for [by them]*" (Baker, 2007, p. 159).

The land in Aranui, other than being used by farmers for their animals, was used by Christchurch residents who could not afford building regulated houses in other areas of the city (Montgomery, 2016). Although, the area was seen an unattractive place for Christchurch residents and the city council to spend money on, some business people saw Aranui as a good place for entertainment businesses. For example, in 1949, a speedway was built in Aranui and thousands of people were entertained with domestic and international games. The speedway was active for 10 years but, in 1959, it was closed and the land purchased by the Crown and then subdivided into residential sections for public and private housing (Baker, 2007).

As Christchurch City expanded during the second half on the twentieth century it absorbed more and more small town boroughs or rural ridings. In 1953, Aranui became a part of the city (Boyd, 2011). After that the area was then chosen by the government as a good place for building state houses. In 1954, the first layout plan for Aranui was prepared by the Department of Housing Construction in Wellington and then submitted to the Christchurch City Council (Montgomery, 2016). This plan was prepared through a central-led and top-down process. Boyd (2011), believes that this top-down process might be the reason why the area appears particularly self-contained and lacks integration with the surrounding environment. There were 739 sections of land in the plan and also some medium density housing, including multi-units and duplexes. This plan was in contrast with the plans of the 30s that focused on single houses on one section of land. The government at the time aimed at building one-fifth of all the state houses as multi-units (Boyd, 2011). The Christchurch City Council was not happy with the idea of multi-unit buildings and duplexes so the Housing and Town Planning Committee at the council did not approve residential buildings with more than two units (Boyd, 2011). This was

the beginning of the discussions and tense relationships between the council and the government. There was approximately two years of discussions and frustration. The map below was one of the maps used by officials of the Department of Housing Construction to persuade the council that multi-unit buildings would give positive attributes to the area and to the city.




Figure 4.5 Proposed Portsmouth and Hampshire multi-units in 1956 (*Tentative siting for two and four unit flats, Wainoni Block, Chch, 1956*)

The map shows the corner of Portsmouth and Hampshire streets with four multi-unit buildings near the shopping area, Wainoni Park and the community centre. At the time, it was discussed with the council that “[*this area in the map*] would create a focal point in the centre of the block which would encourage people to use the shops and community centre [more often]” (Boyd, 2011, p. 61).

However, a discussion about urban sprawl and the efficient use of the urban lands by building multi-units was happening at that time. Eventually, the city council agreed on building medium density housing but with some restrictions. The restrictions included: no permission for the sale of individual units, and blocks of duplex units would consist of no more than six units. The council also created a zone, known as ‘Residential B’, where there was provision for building multi-units and duplexes but only on this zone (Boyd, 2011). Nevertheless the central government (National) increased the

proportion of multi-unit buildings from one-fifth of the state houses in the early 1950s to half in 1958 (Boyd, 2011).

Therefore, the first generation of state houses in Aranui was built in the 1950s and the second generation was built in the 1960s. National started a Group Housing Scheme in 1953 in Aranui and the idea behind that was to encourage the construction of affordable houses by the private sector. This meant that the government would not be solely responsible for the costs of housing construction, as it was slowly shifting the construction of houses back into the private sector. The National government remained committed to slowly withdrawing from the state housing programme throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Boyd, 2011). The map below illustrates the Group Housing houses as they were built in 1963, which is a combination of private and public housing. The red part is public housing and the blue part is private, as shown in the map, the red part is large and it had provided a good platform for the government to build the multi-units and duplexes (Montgomery, 2016).



Figure 4.6 Plan of state housing for Aranui in 1963 (Source: Archives New Zealand, Christchurch, Ref: R19759509 CAHM CH 195 Box 192.) Cited by Montgomery (2016, p. 11),

Those who were the buyers of the private sections in 1957 were not aware that state housing was going to be built in these blocks (Baker, 2007). However, the National government built around 500 buildings and, according to Montgomery (2016, p. 15), *“There is no evidence that Social Impact Assessments or community surveys were carried out prior to implementation of the Aranui/Wainoni*

*project.*” In contrast with the designs of the 30s, the National state houses of the 1950s and 1960s seemed to have the same patterns and repeated housing designs on adjacent sections throughout Aranui. This might have been because of a lack of trained professionals, the short timeframes and the high level of demand at the time (Boyd, 2011). The maps, below, show the implications of the same designs for multi-unit buildings in Portsmouth Street, which created monotony across the area. They also show another important factor, which is the proximity of several multi-unit buildings that had the potential to attract residents from the same social classes (Montgomery, 2016). For example, if a group of gang people got together in that space it would make the surrounding area unsafe for other residents and children.




Figure 4.7 A part of the Aranui plan for state housing on Portsmouth Street and the houses after construction.

Image 1 from Archives New Zealand, Christchurch, Record Code: R19758681, Cited by Montgomery (2016, p. 11),

Image 2 from Archives New Zealand, Christchurch, Record Code: R22246719 cited by (Boyd, 2011),

Image 3 from Archives New Zealand, Christchurch, Record Code: R22245204 cited by (Boyd, 2011),

However, there were still some positive aspects in this government-led plan for Aranui and that was the inclusion of a park (Wainoni Park), a community centre, 18 small shops, a kindergarten and Plunket centre for the area in the plan (Boyd, 2011). Although the prime minister of the time (1949) discarded the concept of comprehensive planning and focused on residential developments, Aranui received a light-handed reserve and shopping centre treatment, as did all such developments at this time (otherwise city council would have blocked them if not included) (Ferguson, 1994 ). This might have been because of the distance of Aranui from the rest of the city.

Some early issues raised right away even before the subdivision was complete. they can be categorised them into two groups: 1) multi-units and duplexes; and 2) landscaping (Boyd, 2011).

Connelly (1959), a Member of Parliament for Riccarton, Christchurch in 1959 had some discussions with the tenants of these dwellings, and he wrote to Prime Minister Nash in 1959 criticising multi-units and duplexes (Connelly, 1959). Connelly's criticisms, fell into four categories: 1) the reluctant occupation of these flats - tenants believed that these buildings were not suitable as a permanent family house and they were regarded as transient housing. So, although they might agree to go there they wanted to be eligible to go for a more single storey house after a while; 2) architectural defects - lack of fences, which had made the outdoor area a communal space; lack of soundproofing between units meant that tenants were able to hear noises, such as conversations and arguments and acts of domestic violence); 3) landscaping and absence of garages – there was great difficulty in cultivating lawns and gardens in the sandy soil); and 4) workmanship (cracks in woodwork and paintwork) (Connelly, 1959).

The second main problem was landscaping; the sandy soils of Aranui required ground development for all the houses and, unfortunately, when the multi-units and duplexes were being built good ground development was not included (Leeburn, 1963). So sand erosion became another concern in the early 1960s. Most tenants established lawns and gardens by themselves with their own money to protect themselves from sand erosion (Leeburn, 1963). However, since the 1950s, Aranui's destiny became tied to state houses that were mostly initiated and implemented by the National government. National's policies in state housing were criticised for their lack of attention to comprehensive planning, community building and inclusion of community preference. They mainly focused on physical renewal. Although Aranui residents at the time of construction complained about multi-unit buildings and duplexes, the construction of them even increased from one-third to a half of all the state houses (Baker, 2007).

Aranui began to slowly deteriorate in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and new problems emerged which exacerbated this deterioration. One of them was related to light industry. The area is close to Woolston, which at the time was a long-established industrial neighbourhood of Christchurch, so it had the potential of attracting new industries aligned to those that already existed. In the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, a part of Aranui was zoned for industry and some industries placed their factories in the area, including a mattress factory, a bacon factory, timber and joinery yards and a poultry farm (Baker, 2007). One of the factories was a drug company that was formed in Christchurch in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and expanded all over New Zealand in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, called the 'Stevens Group' (Baker, 2007). In the 50s, the way of shopping in New Zealand changed and the big shops emerged so the Stevens Group



built a new factory called “Stevens Chemical Limited” located in Bickerton Street in Aranui in the 1960s (Baker, 2007). *“This grew into a very big company employing local people”* (Baker, 2007, p. 71). At the same time, big migrations of Maori to the cities was happening in New Zealand and, consequently, a lot of unskilled workers, especially Maori and Pasifika people, went to Aranui to work and live. But in the 1980s, because of the removal of foreign tariffs in New Zealand, huge drug making companies made it difficult for the Stevens Group and some other small companies to survive (MCH, 2017). So, the Stevens Group was closed in 1992 as well as some other small companies. This resulted in a lot of unemployment in Aranui and *“by the 1990s it [Aranui] had become a severely impoverished suburb”* (Montgomery, 2016, p. 15).

Since state houses were built in the 50s, another community association was formed by locals called the ‘Aranui Progressive League’ replacing the ‘Aranui Burgesses Association’. It carried on with the same goals and responsibilities. The League worked to bring local services to the area. For example, in the 1960s, they focused on solving problems of noxious smells coming from the sewerage treatment farm for Christchurch city, which was just a kilometre away from Aranui (Montgomery, 2016). This was called “Aranui Controversy” in which the League took court action against the council (Foddy, 1967; Montgomery, 2016). This controversy resulted in appointing ‘smell wardens’ or ‘sniffers’ who would record residents’ claims about smells and then get action from the Drainage Board to put lids over the filters (Baker, 2007; Montgomery, 2016). However, according to some researches (e.g. Baker, 2007; Montgomery, 2016), the league’s activities reduced over the years and finally, it disappeared in the 1990s to for no explicit reason although some of its members remain active behind the scenes today.

Since the state houses were built in Aranui (the second half of 1920<sup>th</sup> century), it was also negatively affected by the conflicting approaches of Labour and National government related to the sale of state houses, maintenance, tenancy management and asset management. The pressure on Aranui was the highest in the 1990s when National was in power for nine years. The government had more an intention to be a profit-driven company than having social responsibilities. The 1991 budget statement on the housing reforms set out the clear intention of the government to change the Housing Corporation into a profit-driven state-owned enterprise (SOE) (Thorns, 2000). The name of HNZC changed to HNZ, as a company, to operate on a commercial basis and secure an agreed rate of return on their investment for the Crown. Some of the important policies taken by the National government in the 1990s were first, ‘the sale of the state houses’ and no payment for maintenance and tenancy management; second, applying ‘market rents’, which impacted highly on the living standards of the community. Previously rents had been income-related and set at 25 per cent of household income (Thorns, 2000). Market rents were now to be set on the property regardless of the income of the

current occupants; and third, a new policy was introduced to replace the existing pattern of benefits and support with a new Accommodation Supplement, which replaced a more restricted accommodation benefit. The Accommodation Supplement was to be available to help low income households pay either their rent or mortgage payments. Under this new arrangement the Government's social responsibility would be picked up primarily through the new Accommodation Supplement (Thorns, 2000).

The project manager of Housing New Zealand Corporation [HNZC] as the central government organization responsible for state houses and ACTIS manager describe the years before Community Renewal Project:

*For nine years we [HNZC staff] were tasked ... at selling houses to tenants and to investors ... we had nine years that largely the condition of state housing stock was going down. It all goes back to an asset management approach and looking after the houses, maintenance and replacing the building. So, when the policy was about selling the houses, there wasn't very much funding available to maintain the houses or improve them. So, the standard of the houses was dropping because if you are selling something you don't want to go back and spent a lot of money on it (HNZC project manager, Jan 30, 2017).*

*[In the 90s] it didn't matter who was in the house, you [from private sector] just rent the house to a poor person and the government pays the subsidy to top up there. So, they could pay the rent and they [the government] didn't really need [the] state houses... there were market rents charged. Then state houses [were] like any other rental house and it was vicious. So, the community [had] a high level of unemployment, high levels of deprivation, high levels of need and it was just awful and that is where we started from (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017).*

Moreover, other than the reported problems of multi-buildings physical appearance, in the 90's the National government made cuts to tenancy management. This meant that there was a lack of control, evaluation and management of tenants before housing them in Aranui. This led to instances where convicted criminals were put next to each other in Aranui, reducing the safety for the community to the point where even the police avoided going to Aranui unless absolutely necessary.

*The [single-storey] houses by themselves didn't present so many problem... big concentration we had, was on multi-units ... what you might see in a city but a bit unusual in New Zealand in a suburb. So, they were unpopular, they had a lot of tenants only for a short time. If we [HNZC] had some tenants that we had to house them and we knew that they were not good tenants but we had a responsibility under government policies to house them. We would put them in the multi-units ... as a government agency HNZC has to provide housing for those people who nobody else houses... So, if we had a nasty or gang person who had been in prison for 10 years, had been released and couldn't get housing from the private sector you would say where will he be safe in his continual criminal activities? Aranui. And it just made it [Aranui] worse and worse ... then you get the whole social structure of the area starts to go down and down....*

*We have had real situations in 90s, [when] local police were going to [do] their job in New Brighton and the quickest way was going through Aranui. But they say no we don't go to*

*Aranui, we only go around Aranui. They only came here when they had to, when somebody wanted, wanted and wanted. It was too hard and they [Aranui community] had no support... [The] majority of people living in the area were good citizens [but] they would be reluctant to ring the police if they saw somebody getting hit in the store. If you lived in [Aranui] as a new tenant, your neighbour probably comes and says at first if you see a man hitting his wife don't ring the police if you do, there will be retribution, your house may be set on fire and the man may come and punch you (HNZC project manager, Jan 30, 2017).*

The rate of crime, vandalism and graffiti was high in Aranui and even a small projects called “Aranui Murals Project” was implemented in the 1990s by the National government to remove graffiti from Hampshire street walls (Baker, 2007).

As mentioned earlier, the ‘Aranui Progress League’ which used to be active and strong remained silent in the 1990s and kind of disappeared. ACTIS chairperson believes that was because they did not receive any support from the council (7 March, 2017). However, many other organizations and institutions were doing small things in Aranui because it was regarded as the lowest socio-economic area in the city. The ACTIS chairperson observed, “[before Community Renewal project] *there was a proliferation of organizations and church groups working there but they needed to have an organization with an overview and a strategy*” (7 Feb, 2017). Thus, in the 1990s Aranui did not have a community leadership, organization that could act as a voice.

In the 1990s, even the pleasures and sports that the community used to have and was very proud of disappeared and left the community because of lack of facilities and support from the government and the council. Baker (2007) has reported that since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Aranui people have been involved with rugby league, cricket, soccer and hockey. Importantly, the first Rugby League Club in Christchurch was formed in Aranui in the 1960s. They used to play in Wainoni Park and they had great successes in the 1970s and 1980s (Baker, 2007). The Aranui Rugby League has been a well-known team in New Zealand. However, in the 1990s, when National was in government, members left the group due to financial pressures. Baker (2007, p. 172) writes, “*Like most team sports during the 90s, less children and seniors were joining teams, putting financial pressure on the club, as team members got fewer and fewer and the club was losing money.*” In 1999, a year before the establishment of the Aranui Community Renewal project, the Rugby club room was burned down and the rest of the group left Aranui and went to other suburbs in the city to play (Baker, 2007).

#### **4.4 Demographic trends of Aranui (1991-2001)**

Since the Aranui Community Renewal project (as the focus of the current research) was started in 2000, it helps to be aware of available data and demographic trends of the area before the start of

Community Renewal project. I present the data taken from New Zealand censuses in 1991, 1996 and 2001 in the following paragraphs.

In terms of population, in 1991, the total population of Aranui was 4827 but it gradually decreased to 4494 by 2001 (Statistics New Zealand, 1991, 1996, 2001). This was a 6.8% reduction of the Aranui population while the population of the whole of Christchurch city had a large increase of 10.7% (from 292854 in 1991 to 324300 in 2001) (Statistics New Zealand, 1991, 2001). During that time, 'market rents' were applied by the National government and this might have accelerated the reduction in the population in areas with state houses. The percentage of the population aged younger than 15 was around 30% of the whole Aranui population (during the 90s) and this was considerably higher than in Christchurch city with around 17% of the population aged less than 15 (Statistics New Zealand, 1991, 1996, 2001). According to (Kelly, 2001) the rate of the population aged younger than 15 in Aranui was the highest in the city. In contrast, the population of people aged more than 60 had a reverse pattern; it was less in Aranui (around 10%) and considerably more in Christchurch city (Around 19%) (Statistics New Zealand, 1991, 1996, 2001). The table below illustrates the rate of increase and decrease in the population of Christchurch and Aranui during the 1990s.




Figure 4.8 Rate of increase and decrease of Aranui and Christchurch population (1991-2001) (Statistics New Zealand, 1991, 1996, 2001)

In terms of ethnicity, different ethnicities, including European, Maori, Pacifica people, Asian Middle Eastern, Latin American and African people, lived in the area, but the population of some of them was significantly higher than other areas of the city.




Figure 4.9 (A&B): Rates of ethnic populations in Aranui and Christchurch (Statistics New Zealand, 2001)

The proportion or percentage (not rate)<sup>1</sup> of the European population was the highest during the 1990s, with around 75%, then the second highest rate belonged to Maori people, with around 20% (Statistics New Zealand, 1991). The proportion of Maori people living in Aranui was three times more than their population in Christchurch city, which had 7% of Maori people residing there. The third highest rate of population was for Pacifica people, with 11.8% of the Aranui population; this was nearly six times more than their population in Christchurch city (2.1%) (Statistics New Zealand, 2001). Around 1.7% of Aranui people were Asians, this rate was only one-third of the Christchurch city average for Asian people (Statistics New Zealand, 1996). However, Kelly (2001) notes that the rates of Maori and Pacific Island people in Aranui had the highest ratios in the city in the 1990s. The chart above clearly illustrates the rates explained above for Aranui and Christchurch. In 2001, most Aranui dwellings housed families (Kelly, 2001) and around 72% of the families had children (Statistics New Zealand, 1991). Thirty-five per cent of them were single parents, while this rate for Christchurch was around 19%. This clearly shows that the rate of single parents living in Aranui was much more than that in the rest of the city

1. Sometimes the rate of ethnicities together will be more than 100%. That is because for example, a person can claim of being Maori, and European at the same time.

(Statistics New Zealand, 2001). The proportion of couples without children 'couples only' in Aranui was the lowest in Christchurch city at 27% and 41%, respectively (Kelly, 2001; Statistics New Zealand, 2001). A significant number of households in Aranui were recorded as 'two family', which means that more than one family lives in a house and this ratio doubled between 1991 and 2001 (Kelly, 2001).

In terms of income, the families who earned less than \$10,000 per year were nearly 8.7% and 6.4% in 1996 and 2001, respectively (Statistics New Zealand, 2001). This rate for Christchurch was 5.2% and 2.6% in 1996 and 2001, respectively (Statistics New Zealand, 2001). Aranui residents had the lowest median income rates of all Christchurch residents in the 1990s (Kelly, 2001). The total ratio of employment in Aranui in 2001 was 85.5% with a 14.3% unemployment rate (Statistics New Zealand, 2001). The unemployment rate of Aranui was two times more than in Christchurch, which had 6.7% of unemployed people (Statistics New Zealand, 2001). It is reported that in 2001 half of the population over 15 would receive some form of income support payment from the government and the area had the highest city average of registered unemployed (16.7%) (Kelly, 2001).

In terms of education, 42% of the Aranui population aged more than 15, had no school qualification in 2001 (Statistics New Zealand, 2001). Only 2% of the population had a university degree and this was five times lower than Christchurch city. Aranui had the lowest city ratio of over 15-year-olds holding a post-school qualification (Kelly, 2001).

On this basis, Aranui seemed to be the poorest neighbourhood in Christchurch with the highest number of state houses, the most ethnically diverse and crowded suburb, and was probably the area in the city most urgently in need of attention by 2000.

## **4.5 Chapter summary**

The above chapter reported the history of state housing in New Zealand that was initiated by Labour government to be a normal New Zealand house for low income families. National government was not a fan of state housing and it did not follow Labour policies, National was more focused on selling the houses and withdrawing the state from being a housing provider. Labour and National had conflictual approaches related to state houses that negatively impacted some neighbourhoods such as Aranui. Although Aranui, by virtue of its geographical location was not an ideal place to live in the first place, state housing policies and some other problems such as closure of industries led to deterioration of the community overtime. Before the start of Community Renewal Project, Aranui had one of the highest rates of crime, deprivation and transience population in New Zealand. Even, Aranui's favourite sport (rugby league) left the community and there was no voice or community organization in the community.

## Chapter 5 Finding one

### Aranui Community Renewal: the process

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents findings related to the process performance of the Aranui Community Renewal Project as the main case study of this research. The chapter explains the findings as a story which begins with how the project was established and how it progressed over time. Every, and each step of the project is explained with details and evidence. At the end, a chapter summary is provided which is a good conclusion of the whole the findings. In this chapter, I use many quotes from interviews but, these are supplemented by observational data and artefact documents and photographs from the project.

#### 5.2 Establishing Aranui Community Renewal project: the first pilot project in New Zealand

The beginning of the story of Community Renewal project originated in a change in government and, consequently, a change in state housing policies. After the National government being in power for nine years (1990-1999), the Labour government was elected into the office with a different housing policy.

*Their policy was to increase the number of state houses, get the numbers back from those that have been sold and hold on for the long-term with the government being the owner of state houses and running them, so it was a complete reversal (HNZC project manager, Jan 30, 2017).*

At the same time, new people entered the project, including a new housing minister, and these personalities appeared to be supportive of Community Renewal. The chairperson of ACTIS commented, *“the deputy prime minister and his wife<sup>1</sup> who was a councillor [chair of the housing subcommittee at the council] at the time and she was responsible for housing, they were very supportive of a good government and a community”* (24 Jan, 2017).

In 2000, two ministers, including the Minister of Housing and the Minister of Social Development, were piloting two projects in New Zealand. The “Strengthening Community Action Fund’ (SCAF) established by the minister of Social Development; and the ‘Community Renewal’ project as a HNZC initiative (East

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<sup>1</sup> Jim Anderton was the deputy prime minister of New Zealand from 1999 to 2002. At the same time, his wife Carole Anderton, was the chair of housing subcommittee in the Christchurch City Council (CCC Park and Waterway Manager, 25 December, 2017).

Christchurch MP, 10 April, 2017). The Minister of Housing was supportive of improving the quality of housing in areas that were dominated by HNZN and he was looking for projects to be implemented in particular areas. HNZN had two strategic goals in the 2000/01 financial year including:

*To foster strong communities in areas of predominantly state houses and;*

*To exhibit a sense of social responsibility by having regard to the interests of the communities in which it operates” (HNZN, 2000, p.4)*

The concept of ‘Community Renewal’ was introduced to provide a cohesive programme for achieving these goals.

*The key driver for Housing New Zealand’s involvement in community renewal is the identification of social exclusion rather than a desire to improve the value of the stock of free tied-up capital” (HNZN, 2000, p.5)*

Out of 50 localities in New Zealand that were considered as high need areas, Aranui was chosen to have the first pilot project in New Zealand. It appears that the Christchurch East MP, whose electorate included Aranui, lost no opportunity to advocate for that area to receive the first pilot project. Christchurch East MP<sup>1</sup> says

*Every time I walked past him [the Minister of Housing] I would say Aranui, Aranui, Aranui, I didn’t even talk to him I would say Aranui, Aranui, Aranui. Because I thought Aranui had the largest number of state houses between all areas of Christchurch and HNZN was the largest landlord in Aranui. It was an area sort of regarded as having a low socio-economic status but there was a lot of passion and good will in Aranui and I thought it could be captured in such a programme (13 April, 2017)*

At the same time SCAF, another project was being established by the Ministry of Social Development in 2000. The Christchurch East MP was initially more interested in SCAF for Aranui than the Community Renewal project because SCAF was going to focus on strengthening communities. So, she applied for Aranui to receive SCAF, but the application was rejected made but it was rejected because of lack of clarity around how and who would be spending the money (Dalziel, 13 April, 2017). However, Aranui received the first Community Renewal Project of the country in 2000 that was initiated by central government and led by HNZN. At the time, the suburb was dominated by HNZN rentals, around 461 out of 1500 homes in the area (HNZN, 2000)

The table below, was provided by HNZN describing the conditions of Aranui at the time. It is described as an area with two sorts of properties including ugly, high-density two storey multi-units around a shopping centre and single-storey buildings. It was also a suburb with a high stigma within Christchurch

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<sup>1</sup> Aranui’s MP is the Christchurch East MP who is in Parliament to represent Aranui and other suburbs of east Christchurch. Within this text when I use ‘local MP’ or ‘the MP’ that refers to the Christchurch East MP.



having a reputation of “poor” social cohesion with a high rate of crime and a ‘no go’ area for family upbringing (HNZC, 2000)




Table 5.1 A description of Aranui’s characteristics in the year 2000

(HNZC, 2000, p.43)

It was called the worst ranked suburb in the city that could not attract investment because of its reputation (HNZC, 2000). On this basis, of physical problems, social dysfunctions, crime and unemployment, HNZC project manager said:

*What do we do about it.... it became apparent [for HNZC] that just fixing the houses or replacing the houses wasn’t going to... [Make the area] suitable to live. And hous[ing] was only one part, so, that become a sort of Housing Regeneration Approach ... and obviously they hired people that had experience overseas in housing regeneration and Community Renewal (Jan 30, 2017).*

The Aranui project was quickly transformed to become a more holistic regeneration exercise called Community Renewal with the goals and procedures below:

*Increasing participation by involving local people and resources in addressing local problems to improve the wellbeing of the individuals who live there and increase the amount of social capacity available within the community (Ministry for the Environment, 2008) .*

- *A holistic approach of the locality in question and the opportunities for the renewal programme to add value;*
- *A co-ordinated and collaborative approach across central and local government, residents, community organizations and [the] private sector;*
- *Housing providers and other organizations working with tenants and communities rather than doing this “for” or “to” them;*

- *An emphasis on empowering communities and building their motivation and capacity to solve problems.*
- *An emphasis on sustainability: social, environment and economic (p.5).*

Housing New Zealand designated a full-time project manager for Aranui Community Renewal project who had several years of experience on asset management in the North and South Islands but he had no experience on community development. So, he and others who were going to be involved in the project went on training courses to learn how to do a collaborative Community Renewal. The HNZN project manager added that

*Myself and other people in the project went outside for specific training and consultation technics through the organisation. We were sent on training to get better on this... [Year] 2000 was a year of doing something that we had never done before and it was a year of very fast trying to learn... because always big government organisations are seen as those who try to dictate things to the communities. So, from the very start we had to try and understand what community development type of approach is good to work with (Jan 30, 2017).*

Apart from workshop training, the HNZN officials knew that they had no experience on Community Renewal so they spent time on research about experiences of other countries, such as Australia and Britain. A chief executive for HNZN was then hired who had years of experience on housing regeneration in Glasgow (HNZN project manager, Jan 30, 2017). As a result of one year learning and research, they understood that:

*There was a real risk that we could create our own plan, race into it then go to the community. In this case, we would only ask the community to sign off on the plan that we had developed. We realized that if the community we wanted them to take ownership of it they had to be involved in developing the plan. I guess in many ways this was a plan of how we might get into some joint planning with the community, it wasn't a plan to deliver the whole things, so it was a plan about how we approach it (HNZN project manager, Jan 30, 2017).*

HNZN emphasized on a holistic and collaborative approach from the beginning. They also saw the Community Renewal as a long-term project that would not be complete in 1 year or even 5 years if the goal of the project was to make a sustainable community (HNZN, 2000, p.43). In line with these goals, HNZN looked at gaining the agreement and co-operation of Christchurch City Council (CCC) to act as a partner. The HNZN project manager said *"before we actually involve the community, we had to get solid partners, we thought [that we] needed CCC as a partner because some of the renewal was about the housing, some of that was about the council facilities, the parks, the roads, the library (24 Jan 2017).* After long discussions between CCC and HNZN, following housing Minister's visit of Aranui, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding as an agreement to work together on Aranui's Community Renewal project. On 4 September 2000, the media released that

*A Memorandum of Understanding between the Christchurch City Council and Housing New Zealand was signed today [4 September 2000] to launch three joint initiatives for the city with an emphasis on housing.... The agreement launched today would ensure that a holistic picture for affordable housing was established for the city (Gee, 2000).*

In the Memorandum they established some joint objectives. First, a combined and co-ordinated effort in meeting the needs of affordable housing; second, working towards a common strategy in providing affordable housing; third, establishing a working arrangement between CCC and HNZN's staff who have similar roles; fourth, to explore and develop community enrichment and urban renewal initiatives especially dealing with infrastructure and amenities available to the community (Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement, 2000)

### **5.3 A trust building process at the beginning**

At the end of 2000, HNZN and CCC wanted to start communication with the Aranui local community<sup>1</sup>, but they had no prior connection to the community. As the HNZN project manager said, *"we didn't have any strong connection to Aranui community, so we started to look at the different ways you can get people involved, which is workshops, meetings and events... [but actually, not many people were gathered] we started with having just a very small Hui or gathering or meeting in the old hall"* (Jan 30, 2017). HNZN and CCC used the knowledge of some council staff having a 'Community Relations' role<sup>2</sup>, and the tenancy managers at HNZN to start connections with local people and invite residents to the table that had already been working in Aranui (council project manager, 16 Feb, 2017). HNZN tenancy managers and council staff having community relation role acted as gate keepers that helped establish relations with local people:

*[At the beginning] there was no Aranui community trust to start with... so we called these public meetings and they [were] really facilitated by Walter... who was a council staff member whose normal role was a community relations role. So, council had community relations role around the city... to look after things that are happening in communities whether it is related to some of the buildings or community groups, their role is to try and strengthen communities. So, because community relationship was his role he sat up and shared some of the initial meetings with the community... through the contact that Walter had and because of HNZN's tenancy managers who [would] manage the properties in Aranui and working with the community they passed the messages as well and they were often in people's homes checking various things... so the message was spread in various ways and we had good turnout (Council project manager, 16 Feb 2017).*

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<sup>1</sup> The term 'community' in this research refers to HNZN tenants, tenants renting from private owners and private owner occupiers. In another word, all of those living in Aranui neighbourhood were counted as a part of community. Although the Community Renewal Project only aimed to renew state houses, it did not mean that state housing tenants were the only participants in the project. Everyone in the community was unhappy with the situation and wanted a change, so there was a strong presence and participation of private owners and their tenants in the project.

<sup>2</sup> Their job title is "Community Development Advisor." Previously, they were a part of Community Relations Unit at the council but now they are a part of Department of Costumer and Community (community development advisor, 6 Feb 2018).

So, in the early meetings, (held in the old community hall) by HNZN, and CCC representatives, some local people attended who were *“people from the community who didn’t have a representative from the community they were just individuals within the community... and natural leaders* (council project manager Feb 16, 2017). HNZN and CCC started talking to the community about the renewal, what they wanted to do, and how the community could have input but the point was that the community was hostile and untrusting of those people coming in from public organizations (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017). The local people said to HNZN and CCC representatives that

*We don’t trust you, you are a government organization you have been here before, promised to work with us on other things but you haven’t. You said something really good and then you leave and [things] fall over* (ACTIS manager, 17 Jan, 2017).

Every single participant of the current research highlighted the pre-existing conflicts at the beginning and the lack of the local community’s trust towards public organizations. The council project manager said *“there was a lot of scepticism to start with, in the early meetings people didn’t really believe that this was a real commitment and anything was just going to happen. They thought we talk for a while and then nothing will happen* (16 Feb 2017). In this situation, HNZN and CCC representatives wanted to reassure the community that the Community Renewal project was different and the organizations had commitment to that. The HNZN project manager would say to the community that, *“We accept that [what HNZN has done before] and we realize that happened and we’re trying to change that now, and that’s why we are here talking to you”* (Jan 30, 2017). The organizations started doing things differently to work towards building trust and showing their commitment to the community’s wants. The CCC project manager gives an example:

*The early things that we did [were] to prove that we really meant it... by actually demonstrating that we were making sort of physical changes and doing things. [For example] one of the early celebrations we had [in Aranui] ... we decided that the best place was to do it in the middle of the road. We [CCC and HNZN] closed the road. I don’t think that anyone believed that we would actually be able to close the road ... usually you can’t have a public event just in the middle of the street because the traffic needs to get through but if you do the right things you can temporarily close that section of the road .... So, we did [that and] what I am demonstrating is that we decided to do it here we could make it happen and I will make that happen. You know, close the road for two hours [and] to do that you have to have a building consent [and] fire extinguisher. Initially people in Aranui wouldn’t have thought that was possible and we demonstrated that that was possible* (16 Feb 2017).

Another important thing that happened was that the HNZN and CCC representatives would patiently listen to what the community wanted and acted in a way that they wanted as much as possible. For example, one of the earliest requests of local people was that, CCC and HNZN had to come to Aranui, and make a commitment to stay for the long-term and be based in the neighbourhood otherwise, the community does not work with them (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb 2017). Although HNZN and CCC were

not happy with this idea, they eventually decided to do it (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb 2017). HNZN turned one of its state houses on Hampshire Street next to the shopping area and Wainoni Park into an office and they called it 'Aranui Community Housing and Information Centre' (Aranui Community Renewal Accomplishments, 2001). A formal celebration was held in Aranui for the opening of the Information Centre by HNZN, CCC and those local people early in the project. The MP, student at school and local people were invited and attended the celebration as photos below show.




Figure 5.1      Opening day of the Information Centre (photo by CCC Park and Waterways Manager, 2001)

With this move communications and collaborations for the project were transferred to the community and where the community actually lived. CCC, like HNZN, soon appointed a project manager for Aranui Community Renewal and they were based in the Information Centre to facilitate better communication with the organizations (HNZN project manager, Jan 30, 2017). The HNZN Project Manager was to be based full-time in the community while the CCC Project Manager was part-time based. The ACTIS manager said *“there were certain people that were designated to Aranui for four years from those organizations [HNZN and CCC] to work in here [Aranui] with us then they extended [until 2008] (personal communication 17 Jan, 2017).*

In late 2000, HNZN and CCC kept inviting local people to come and talk and be listened to. The ACTIS chairperson noted that in the early meetings individuals from the community said to officials:

*the only way we participate with you is full partnership based on the Treaty of Waitangi<sup>1</sup> ... that was what community wanted and it was pretty [well?] accepted by officials” (7 Feb, 2017).*

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<sup>1</sup> Treaty of Waitangi is an agreement between British crown and New Zealand indigenous people, Maori, signed in 1840. It was an agreement to protect the interest of Maori while stating the terms under which Europeans settlers could gain access to the lands (NZ History, 2017).

This group of individual local people, HNZN and CCC representatives getting together in the early meetings called themselves a 'Steering Group' (community development advisor, 23 Feb, 2017). The Steering Group commenced some small and larger projects to bring the broader community "on board" and inform them about the Aranui Community Renewal project. They decided to hold 'Community Day' as a fun day for the community creating an opportunity for all the family members to go out to Wainoni Park to not only enjoy the entertainment opportunities but also to talk and be informed about the Community Renewal Project and what HNZN and CCC had to offer. This was held in December 2000, and resources, funds and assistance were provided by HNZN and CCC but it was led by local residents (mostly the members of the Steering Group) (HNZN project manager, Jan 30, 2017). Entertainment opportunities were provided and at the same time, HNZN and CCC opened their tents and introduced the Community Renewal project to people. It was like an introduction and asking the community to give their feedback and ideals about the renewal.




Figure 5.2 (a &b): Community Day in Wainoni Park, 2000; (photo: CCC Park and Waterways Manager 2000)

In addition, the Steering Group initiated and implemented some small projects very early in the project. Some of them were highlighted (by interviewees) as being very impactful on the community's thoughts about the Community Renewal project including some refuse and waste collection initiatives such as 'skip day,' 'cleaning the back of the shops' and a 'Saturday morning clean-up'. This was because there were a lot of complaints about the mess and rubbish around Aranui, especially behind the shops on Hampshire Street (ACRC, 2001). Also, many families did not have a garden trailer to get rid of their rubbish in the back yard. These projects were commenced to clean up the area, HNZN and CCC jointly funded the projects and they were led by local people. The evidence showed that the community really liked them. One of the local people at the time and now an ACTIS board member said

*Council to me was really good when we... [As local people said] let's do the clean up the area... we dropped the skips off at different places and the community just brought all the rubbish from*

*the backyard... and filled it in and they [CCC staff] took it away. That was so good. The community really loved it and they got on board with that. And another community project was 'Cleaning Back of the Shops' you know the shops in Hampshire Street. We cleaned up all the back and I know that was good, kids participated in that. She [my daughter] was little but I took her with myself [and] there were something for them to do" (April 10, 2017).*

The areas around the shops and Hampshire Street next to the park were effectively the heart of Aranui but most of the time were untidy with a lot of rubbish (ACRC, 2001a). The implementation of another small projects, but doing that regularly, was suggested by one of the local community people. It was a 'Saturday Morning Rubbish Clean-up' (ACRC, 2001a). He volunteered to lead a group to clean Hampshire Street and the shopping area regularly (ACRC, 2001b). HNZN and the CCC welcomed the idea, so local community people were invited to join and create a group of volunteers to clean the area every Saturday at 7 am. The local people would take their gloves and collect the rubbish and CCC would take the rubbish away (ACRC, 2001b). The group would report their activity to the Steering Group and ask for more support if they needed (ACRC, 2001). It has been documented that regular Saturday clean-up "highly improved appearance of the shopping centre" (ACRC, 2001c, P.4). And the group members were thanked by the Steering Group for making such a major contribution to Aranui (ACRC, 2001, P.4).

One of the immediate actions taken by HNZN very early in the project on May 2001, was putting three full-time tenancy managers in Aranui to take care of the area. This was in response to complaints about the bad behaviour of HNZN's tenants and it was seen as a very important and influential decision at the beginning. The tenancy managers took actions immediately after hearing about people's problems and they established strong connections and relationships with the community (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017). The HNZN project manager noted "Through 2001 we decided that as a part of our response we had to put tenancy managers in the area ... they used to work from an office in Linwood [not in Aranui] in the distance and separation ... So, we based three tenancy managers working full-time in Aranui" (30 Jan, 2017).

The tenancy manager highlighted their role in building trust and the small and early wins that they had while being in Aranui:

*We were able to react so if someone rung up and there was a problem we were only two minutes away instead of being there [in our Papanui or Linwood office] and saying 'I will come along and have a look tomorrow.' If people... wanted to call and see someone... they didn't need to wait for the next Tuesday... Yeah and if you are looking for someone, there he is. 'I will go and talk to him now.' And you have got to know your clients very well and I suppose a lot of us were building a trust, we already started building trust for the Community Renewal to get to action....*

*We had some money we could do some garaging and fencing, we even volunteered [to do] a maintenance job. So, if someone coming saw us for a maintenance job we could go and put it*

*in there and say it was done... You have to be able to be relied upon... [So] during that time there [in Aranui] ... we were receiving more applications in our sub-office [in Aranui] with our three staff than we were receiving in our Linwood office, because people saw us that we were taking action (7 April, 2017).*

Late 2000 and the year 2001 were full of small and large events that happened in Aranui funded jointly by HNZN and CCC to build trust, relationships and showing that they really meant it and wanted to make a positive change. As a result, the Aranui community slowly started to be involved and trust the council and Housing New Zealand as the then local MP noted:

*Right at the beginning people didn't believe it could happen... [but] you know, gradually people started to put their small yellow sticky notes on the wall and saying all the things [that] they wanted to achieve and then those things started to happen, and we could say that it was possible and we could get things done (April 13, 2017).*

The above discussion showed that HNZN and CCC unexpectedly faced with a situation of distrust in the community. So, at the beginning of the project, they spend time and money on building trust and relationships to the community. This trust building process is not finished here and it is continuing through the next section that I call 'capability building'. Trust building and capability building are interconnected in this research showing a process in which a plenty of things happened and created a platform for the Community Renewal.

## **5.4 A community capability building process**

Early in the project Aranui community did not have a representative body and just individual people from the community who were showing their interest in the project would attend the meetings with HNZN and CCC representatives (community development advisor, 23 Feb, 2017). There were also many fragmented groups and organizations working in Aranui to help the community with the poverty but it seemed that they have not been working together. A community development advisor added:

*You know it [Aranui] is an area with high need, low socio- economic all the rest of it all the bad data Aranui is on the top of it. That's why it was a lot of agencies support groups and things like that, and everybody identifies that... so, they weren't working necessarily collectively. They were all doing their own things, their own purposes and their own ways, their own visions and they worked because there was so much of need and everybody was able to actually support some forms of need (23 Feb, 2017).*

The ACTIS chairperson added, "There was a proliferation of organizations [and] church groups working there but they needed to have an organization with an overview and a strategy" (7 Feb, 2017). HNZN and CCC had observed the lack of community togetherness, integration and collective action and decided to encourage them to get together and build a community, a representative body, to provide



leadership that integrated groups, individuals and their views together. HNZN project manager explained that:

*In the early meetings, the community consisted of a lot of individuals, and we [HNZN and CCC] were talking about [that] it would be easier for us to work with you and then get things finalized if you could bring your individual views into one point of view. So, say the community wants this rather than Jim wants this. So, we were gently sort of persuading them to have a committee or have an entity which has some structure that represented the views of the people...*

*[It was] one of the things that we really worked hard at, getting, trying to encourage the community to form their own entity, you know, a group that represented them. Because it is all very well having individuals come along and they are a part of the community but they needed to get to the position that they could act together and speak on behalf of the community rather than just turn up as a person that lives in this street and one person from another street. Right from the very start we wanted to strengthen the community to the extent that they had a voice and they had somebody that represented their voice. So, that was the concept of what ACTIS [Aranui Community Trust Corporation Society] became. We had to encourage that to happen, we had to support that to happen (30 Jan 2017)*

This process of forming ACTIS as a community organization for Aranui started early in the project when the MP used to go to the meetings on behalf of the community because she knew that there was no strong community representative there (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017). One time, she was not able to go to the meeting so she asked her husband (who was a lawyer) to go and keep an eye on things on behalf of her (The MP, 13 April, 2017). In the meeting, local community people asked the local MP's husband to be chair of Aranui community committee. The MP confirmed that: *"I couldn't go to a meeting it was very early and I asked Peter [my husband] if he would go for me, and when he came home he got elected as the chair"* (13 April, 2017). One of the natural leaders of the community was, and still is, a Maori woman who has been very trustworthy in the community:

*I have been living in Aranui for 52 years. People come here... [Ask me] can we have some food I always give it... I want to be here [in Aranui] to help... you know with all the houses all the windows got smashed but not this house [my house] and still today a lot of houses got alarms and they have been broken, people have come in and broken the houses and taken stuff but never here [my house], this house has never been touched (1 March, 2017).*

She played an important role in persuading the MP's husband to be the Chairperson of the community committee as she knew the MP's husband even before the Community Renewal Project. In conversation with the MP's husband she was firm:

*I said to him I want you to be the chairperson, he said, 'I am only here to write down notes because of my wife.' I went, 'No, I bet you agree with me, you're going to be the chairperson for Aranui,' Then he said, 'No, nobody knows me,' [I said] I don't care, [I have looked at] the lawyers, the police and different ones in community that I knew, I'm going to pick you ...' then he said 'All right I do it for a year' (1 March, 2017).*

Interestingly, the MP's husband wanted to do it just for one year but as of 2018 he was still the Chairperson of the Aranui Community Committee. He is described by HNZN project manager as follows:

*Quite a vocal person who has a strong view on his own... he came from a trade union background. So, he was very good at organizing, he knew all these we needed in a committee but looking around the room, good people but a lot of them didn't have experience at running a committee (30 Jan, 2017).*

In order to formally form the community committee and choose the board members, a series of meetings was held and a large 'Community Hui/Meeting' was established to invite the community at large on March 2001 (ACRC, 2001). It was funded by HNZN and CCC and led by local people. There was a strong pre-hui advertising process which encouraged local residents to attend and be a part of the project (ACRT, 2001). Posters, flyers and circulars with reminders were distributed among people and mailed to 60 local organisations and businesses and the news were released with the Pegasus Post (ACRT, 2001). There was no joining fee for those who wanted to join the community committee and it has been documented that more than 150 people attended including adults, youth and children and there has been a strong attendance from HNZN tenants (Christchurch City Council Advocacy Team, June, 2001). The ACTIS chairperson commented, *"There was a reasonable number of people who came and there was a reasonable cross section of the community [who] came and all ethnicities were represented there"* (7 Feb, 2017). People were nominated onto the committee. Finally, the Aranui community had chosen their own leadership group members by themselves and the Aranui Community Trust Incorporated Society (ACTIS) was formally formed *"as the community forum representing Aranui people in the partnership"* (Aranui Community Renewal Accomplishments, 2001, p. 1).

*The hui was the vehicle to move community involvement and representation from an initial group to a new, more permanent representative group. A new 29-member representative committee has emerged, to be known as the Aranui Community Renewal Committee (Christchurch City Council Advocacy Team, 2001, p. 2).*

Some other activities were defined for people to do on the Community Hui day aiming at showing the community that they were going to make decisions about their community (ACRT, 2001). The Steering Group broke people into small groups and discussed two questions including: What is good about living in Aranui? What makes it a better and a healthy place to live? Then people would write their ideas on sticky papers and place them on the wall sheets (ACRC, 2001c). Feedback was taken from 140 people plus children, youth and adults (ACRC, 2001c).

Initially, after being formed the ACTIS board members did not have an office to work from so HNZN and CCC supported ACTIS in two ways. One was by providing them with an office courtesy of HNZN. The other was by providing resources and funding to employ two full-time workers to work for ACTIS

and this was done via CCC. HNZN provided an office for ACTIS in the house that was converted into the information centre. The high-school students of Aranui were involved in landscaping and planting of the house as one of the news at the time released *“the students of Te Kupenga Aranui have willingly agreed to plant the garden at 34 Marlow Road with community, council and Housing New Zealand support”* (ACTIS, 2001). The house was called by the community ‘Community Centre’ or ‘Community House’ rather than information centre. A celebration was held as ACTIS opening day on August 2001 and the community was invited, the MP cut the ribbon with local children (ACRC, 2001b). The photos below are from the ACTIS office opening day.




Figure 5.3 (a & b): Crowd in front of ACTIS building and children playing music on ACTIS opening day. (Photo by CCC Park and Waterways Manager, 2001)




Figure 5.4 the MP cutting the ribbon with school pupils on ACTIS opening day. (Photo by CCC Park and Waterways Manager, 2001)

At the same time, the council appointed a ‘Community Development Advisor’ for Aranui to help ACTIS communicate easily with the council. The advisor describes her role here:

*Basically from the council perspective what we do is we work with ‘not for-profit’ and ‘community groups’... [We] help them help themselves. So, we can offer funding, training, mediation, strategic planning [and] supporting them to support themselves, building their capacity as groups to be able to find solutions to their own problems and providing resources here and there”*(community development advisor, personal communication 23 Feb, 2017).

According to her advice the council offered funding to ACTIS to employ a full-time worker as an on-site Community Co-ordinator working for ACTIS (community development advisor, personal

communication 23 Feb, 2017). ACTIS board members advertised the position locally and employed a local woman who was connected to the community with 12 years of experience working in Justice Department and also working with community and sports teams.

Another capability building action was that ACTIS, after being formed, first asked to have the right to be counted as an equal partner and formalize it (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017). The ACTIS chairperson noted

*I sort of said [to HNZN and CCC people], well if this is what we are going to do, if we are going to have a partnership we have to formalize it. And... we need to negotiate and sign a memorandum of understanding which recognizes the parties (7 Feb, 2017).*

HNZN and CCC already had a memorandum of understanding and they agreed to design and sign a new memorandum with three equal partners including HNZN, CCC and ACTIS. The agreement was signed on August 2001

*It was agreed that a three-partner memorandum of understanding be drawn up for the Aranui Community Renewal. This memorandum would include/respect the full partnership roles of the partners, the Renewal's priorities and objectives, the individual roles and responsibilities of the partners, the levels of shared decision-making, and a vision for a self-sufficient community (ACRC, 2001b, P. 2).*

The three parties signed the memorandum and one of the ACTIS board members said "[After the memo] we felt like that we had speaking rights now, not only rights to talk but rights to be heard (10 April, 2017).

The name 'Steering Group', which included HNZN and CCC representatives with individuals from the local community was changed to the 'Partnership Group' (community development advisor, personal communication 23 Feb, 2017). The partners would meet every second week and they had meetings with the broader community every month and they did not hold closed meetings; everyone could participate (ACTIS manage, 23 Jan, 2017).

One of the early activities that the Partnership Group decided on after forming ACTIS, was establishing a monthly newsletter for Aranui residents to form "a communication network that keeps the community informed and engaged in the community renewal" (ACRC, 2001c, p. 2). ACTIS took up the responsibility of publishing the newsletter (and it still does as of 2018). The title of the first newsletter on July 2001 was "Aranui Community Renewal: Your Community Your Future (ACTIS, 2001). It presented the objectives of the project "to make Aranui a Good Place to Live", all the events, activities and programmes happening in the area and invited adult, youth and children to participate ("Aranui Community Renewal Your Community Your Future," 2001 July) . The content of the newsletter dealt

with events and programmes happening in Aranui or areas around Aranui by ACTIS or other organizations. Also, ACTIS regularly interviews local people and publishes what they say; they are asked about positive and negative points of living in Aranui and how it can be a better place to live.

ACTIS after being formed also decided to have a logo for itself that *“that reflects the goodwill and hope of Aranui people for this community renewal”* (ACRC, 2001, p. 1). The ACTIS manager went to all the schools at Aranui and asked the students to design a logo, the logo below was chosen (out of 350 logos) designed by a student from Aranui Primary School. It means that *“Aranui is the long or big path that Rakaihautu walked on his great journey. Aranui is the unification of many cultures. Aranui is the path Rakaihautu used to cross between the terrain and the sea. Aranui is located on the...”* (ACTIS, 2015).



Figure 5.5 ACTIS logo (ACTIS, 2018)

It is important to note that these myriad trust and capability building initiatives happened in less than one year, from December 2000 until September 2001 and interestingly, partly because the project started 18 years ago, a lot of people did not remember all of the small things that they did at the time. The list of projects, events and decisions from that period is shown in Table 5.2, below. Note that formal documentation of activities started from Feb/March 2001 and that is why in the table some of the projects have no exact time. The aim of the table is to clearly show the volume of the work done before the housing renewal aspect of the project was commenced. The officials probably did not predict needing to do so much activity before getting to the “real” renewal. Other activities mentioned in the table such as the Youth Forum and the Needs Analysis...) are explained in the later sections.

Table 5.2 The list of projects, events and decisions made in the first 10 month (December 2000-Septembre 2001)

When?	What happened?	Who did that?
September 2000	A memorandum of understanding between HNZN and CCC	Housing New Zealand and Christchurch City Council
2000-2001	HNZN staff going through a learning process	HNZN
December 2000	Establishing the 'Community Day' in Wainoni Park as a large fun day for families	Funded by HNZN and CCC jointly and led by local residents.

–	Closing a road section for the community to have their celebration	The HNZN and CCC representatives in the project
Late 2000	Appointing certain people from organizations to stay in Aranui for the long-term	HNZN and CCC
–	Agreement on partnership based on Treaty of Waitangi	HNZN, CCC and local residents
Late 2000	Forming Steering Group	HNZN and CCC representatives with individuals from the community
Feb 2001	Conducting a survey in the community about the Wainoni park	Christchurch city council
Early 2001	Skip Day Project	Funded by HNZN and CCC led by local people
Early 2001	Cleaning Back of the Shops	Funded by HNZN and CCC led by local people
March 2001	Large Community Hui/Meeting	Funded by HNZN and CCC led by local people
March 2001	Establishing Aranui Community Trust Incorporation Society (ACTIS) to represent Aranui community	Done by the local community but encouraged and supported by HNZN and CCC
May 2001	Three full-time tenancy managers being based in Aranui	HNZN
June 2001	Establishing a Memorandum of Understanding with ACTIS and forming 'Partnership Group'	HNZN, CCC and ACTIS
July 2001	Establishing Aranui Monthly Newsletter	Led by ACTIS, Funded by HNZN and CCC
July 2001	Designing logo for ACTIS by students	ACTIS
July 2001	Establishing a regular Saturday Morning Clean-up	Led by local people, supported by Partnership Group
July 2001	Establishing the first Community Based Maintenance Contract (Grounds Maintenance)	HNZN
August 2001	Providing an office for ACTIS known as the 'Community House'	HNZN
August 2001	Holding ACTIS Opening Day Celebration	HNZN, CCC and ACTIS
August 2001	Doing a widespread community consultation survey (Needs Analysis)	Funded by HNZN and CCC, led by an independent researcher
September 2001	Doing Aranui Youth Forum: widespread youth consultation process	Funded by HNZN and CCC, led by CCC
September 2001	Forming Wainoni Park Design Group from local people	CCC
December 2001	Providing funding for the Community Trust to employ a full-time on-site co-coordinator for itself	CCC

## 5.5 Identifying the Issues to Address

One of the questions that HNZN and CCC had early in the project was: *"What were the main issues to focus on?"* To answer this question they did three things. One of them was a survey done by the council's Park and Waterway Unit; the second one was the Aranui Youth Forum; and the third one was a Community Needs Analysis survey. The survey was the most comprehensive attempt to answer the question and became the foundation of the Community Renewal focus.

The first, smaller survey was conducted by the council Park and Waterway unit: *"in February 2001, a letterbox drop survey of 500 houses in the immediate vicinity of Wainoni Park was undertaken as part of the Aranui Community Renewal Project"* (Hansen 2001, p.1). People were asked about the future developments for the park and due to the fact that it was carried out very early in the renewal project (Feb 2001) only a few responded (47 in total) and the survey was criticized because *"the results weren't representative of the community, they were the comments of a small number of individuals and were not statistically valid"* (Hansen 2001, p.1). Other than that, it just focused on the concerns about the

Wainoni Park. So, five months later, in August 2001 by which time ACTIS had been formed, the three partners, decided to do a widespread community consultation to find out the main issues and concerns of the community (HNZC project manager, Dec 18, 2017). In doing that, HNZC and CCC jointly funded an independent researcher<sup>1</sup> to conduct the consultation process. She conducted a qualitative research and called the end report as '*Community Needs Analysis towards Aranui Community Renewal*' she used these sources of data including:

- All the information about community consultation processes, meeting minutes and the previous park survey that have already been gathered.
- Relevant census data from 1991-1996.
- Relevant literature.
- Attendance at Community Committee meetings, Aranui Youth Forum Committee meetings.
- Focus groups and face-to-face interviews with the representative cross-section of residents and government agency workers (Kelly, 2001, p.6).

The focus group discussions were the main source of data in the Community Needs Analysis. Fifteen Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and face-to-face interviews were held. In total, 112 individuals took part in the focus groups and interviews.

Table 5.3 FGDs and face to face interviews for Needs Analysis

HNZC tenants	4 focus groups
private tenants	1 focus group
private homeowners	1 focus group
local Maori	1 focus group
local Samoan	1 focus group
Year 6,7,8 students at Wainoni Primary School	1 focus group
Year 6,7,8 students at Aranui Primary School	1 focus group
Year 5 and 6 students at St James Primary School	1 focus group
Year 11 and 12 students at Aranui High School	1 focus group
community agency representatives	1 focus group
HNZC and CCC staff working in the area	1 focus group
Department of Corrections, Aranui, staff	1 focus group
Senior Constable, New Brighton Police	1 interview

The researcher used the results of the Youth Forum as another source of the data for the Community Needs Analysis (Kelly, 2001). The Aranui Youth Forum was conducted by the Council's Recreation and Arts team and funded by HNZC and CCC (Howat, 2001). The Youth Forum was held because the partners "*felt there was still a lack of youth input*" in the Community Renewal project (Howat, 2001, p.4). Young people were gathered from Aranui High School, alternative schooling programmes and from the community (Howat, 2001). The young people were divided into around eight focus groups with a combination of girls and boys from different ages:

- aged 10-13

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<sup>1</sup> Stephanie Kelly was a lecturer in sociology at Canterbury University. She was hired and the payment was made to her (HNZC project manager, 18 Dec 2017).

- aged 14-15
- aged 16+

Altogether 60 young people participated in the one-day youth forum (Howat, 2001). According to Kelly what the youth asked for on that day was included in the Needs Analysis. This Needs Analysis identified three key problems as perceived by the community: bad state housing, poor sense of community and lack of safety.

### **Housing:** Kelly noted

*HNZC homes [were] identified as the worst in terms of look inside and out, dampness, attraction of the worst tenants. Hampshire Street from [the] shops to Breezes Road [was] identified as the worst part of the area, in terms of physical look, rubbish around the shops. (2001, p.3)*

Hampshire Street was almost entirely covered with two-storey blocks and the main shopping area in front of two-storey blocks had remained unchanged for 50 years (this location was designated in the 1950s by the National government as a potential community focal point for Aranui. Fig 4.5 in chapter four refers to it). After 50 years, according to the Needs Analysis, the community identified this place surrounded by two-storey multi-unit buildings as the worst area of Aranui.



Figure 5.6 The worst area of the Aranui according to Needs Analysis modified form Google Map (2018b)

In the figure above the areas identified as the worst are shown. A large section of Hampshire Street (red border) was covered with multi-unit buildings. The shopping area (yellow border) is located in the corner of Hampshire Street, Wainoni Park and Portsmouth Street (also covered with two-storey multi-



unit houses and duplexes). Hampshire and Aldershot and Portsmouth Streets were identified as having the worst properties in terms of damage and level of maintenance (Kelly, 2001).

The photographs below provide details of the streets and areas that the community identified as the worst.




Figure 5.7 (a&b) two storey multi-units in one side of Hampshire St and shopping area in front of Hampshire street (Photo: HNZN project manager, 2000)




Figure 5.8 (a&b): vacant two storey-multi-units on Aldershot St with smashed and burned windows in 2000 (photo: HNZN project manager, 2000)




Figure 5.9 (a&b): garages in Hampshire and Aldershot Streets covered with graffiti and rubbish in 2000 (Photo: HNZN project manager, 2000)

Aranui people also complained that HNZN policies were too relaxed or lenient and let the tenants abuse the properties, the tenants needed to be educated about property maintenance. The youth,

highlighted that the appearance of multi-units and duplexes was displeasing and 'ugly'. Some of them were vacant with smashed windows and had safety issues and the youth called for them to be torn down (Kelly, 2001). Overcrowding, low standards of the houses without drapes, carpets, insulation, proper heating and be better designed for the sun, garages and fences were reported as other problems. A local person said *"they're disgusting, damp, cold, mouldy" 'Would never live in one', say the residents of privately owned properties"* (Kelly, 2001, p.16).

**Sense of community/neighbourhood:** Most respondents at the time felt that there were mixed feelings in Aranui about its sense of community. A certain proportion of residents had no commitment to the area and this affected the sense of security and neighbourliness of others. They believed that about 95% of residents were 'good neighbours', friendly, felt a part of the community, never wished to leave, and they would create a 'good end' for Aranui (Kelly, 2001). The other group, which was around 5% of the total, caused all the problems in the area. The aim of this 5% was to move on, or be moved to somewhere else so they were creating a 'bad end' for Aranui. They added that the second group were particularly from HNZC multi-unit properties on Hampshire Street. *"[I]t was identified that the most transient part of Aranui is centralized in the HNZC multi-unit homes in Hampshire Street"* (Kelly, 2001, p.17). The long-term residents complained that transience makes people lose the incentive to have pride in Aranui.

Young people emphasized that they did not feel a part of the city because people outside the Aranui would attach a stigma to Aranui and, therefore, they felt apart.

**Safety:** 'Safety' was a topic that children, young people or teenagers and adults focused on as a key issue and most of them linked the safety issues to Hampshire Street, the shopping area, the bar or tavern and Wainoni Park (Kelly, 2001). There was a sense that there were a lot of youngsters as well as gangs hanging around the shopping area in Hampshire Street during the day and night (Kelly, 2001). Residents would feel threatened by young people asking for money and abusing them (Kelly, 2001). Moreover, most parents would not allow their children (up to 14 years) to walk to school unaccompanied because many of them had been bullied (Kelly, 2001). Students of the Wainoni Primary School and St. James Primary School commented that they would not walk around Hampshire Street and Wainoni Park alone. Also, *"a major player in the feeling unease seems to be the pub that is situated right next to Wainoni Park. The pub is seen as a place that attracts the gangs 'hard outs' and certain amount of violence"* (Kelly, 2001, p.18). Many residents indicated that they would like to see the pub closed down (Kelly, 2001). The results of Needs Analysis showed that Wainoni Park was the most talked about issue by the community and the word that they used for upgrading that was 'unsafe'. People did

not feel safe in Wainoni Park so they would not use it. Even adults stated that they would not walk in Wainoni Park at night at all, while some of them would not do it even during the day (Kelly, 2001). The children's playground in the park was regarded as unsafe because it was located in Wainoni Park next to the bar (Kelly, 2001). The CCC Park and Waterways Manager also emphasized on that:

*The biggest issue was the playground behind the shops and there was a pub on the corner and there was a lot of people drinking in the pub and spilling out into the park. And sometimes kids were left out in the park and there were fights and broken glass, lots of rubbish everywhere, crime, graffiti, vandalism and a lot of that was put down to the behaviour coming down from the pub. Where the kids were playing was out of sight and no one could see what was going on .... it has been a place where kids in New Zealand were abducted (CCC Park and Waterways Manager, 28 Feb, 2017).*

As a result, some of the community suggestions for the Wainoni part in the Needs Analysis survey were:

- Upgrading and moving the children's playground from behind the shops so it's more visible and feels safe.
- Better lighting around the park.
- Providing sporting opportunities around the park, including: rugby field, basketball court, netball for girls as well as boys. And a youth facility for the young people.
- A BBQ/picnic area in the park
- More community market days, festivals events like Christmas in the Park;
- Area behind the shops needs to be regularly swept and tidied up and protected from adults spilling alcohol, from the pub at night.
- Building new toilets closer to the playground and keeping them clean and open because the existing ones were dilapidated and insanitary.

The photos below are of Wainoni Park in 2000 when the project started.

Material removed due to copyright compliance

Figure 5.10 (a&b): Wainoni Park surrounded by fences with graffiti on them (photo: CCC Park and Waterways Manager, 2000)

Material removed due to copyright compliance

Figure 5.11 (a&b): Toilets in Wainoni Park that were locked most of the time, and children's playground behind the shops (photo: CCC Park and Waterways Manager, 2000)

Material removed due to copyright compliance

Figure 5.12 (a&b): A burned car in Wainoni Park next to the rock as a children's play area and seats at the park in 2000 (photo: CCC Park and Waterways Manager, 2000)

Therefore, housing health and safety and sense of community were high priority issues in the community view. These results of Needs Analysis were regarded by HNZA and CCC as the basis and

foundation of Community Renewal focus and how to prioritize the projects over a long-term process  
As ACTIS manager declared

*Out of that Needs Analysis, housing was the top identified area that the community thought there was a problem with. So, that is why HNZCS said, okay, that endorses what we are about to do within the community and with the CCC, let's get to work on it. We are going to do this (Jan 17, 2017).*

This process that I have already mentioned: trust building, capability building and identifying issues to address, happened all together, in less than a year (December 2000-October 2000). Importantly, the consultation for the Needs Analysis happened at the end of this process (Sep 2001) when the agency people had already had many communications with the community and they had already developed relationships, so they saw the situation ready to ask such a question. During this process, nothing substantive happened related to the housing renewal process such as design, demolition and construction. Collaboration about these things started later. The next section, 'Collaboration,' where the partners worked together on design, demolition and implementation echoes the stages of planning given great emphasis in Collaborative Governance theory.

## **5.6 Collaboration**

The Aranui Community Renewal project focused mainly on housing and upgrading Wainoni Park plenty but many other collaborative projects happened along the way so that it could lead to some confusion. To avoid this I explain how collaborations happened on the most important projects one by one. But it is important to note that these projects all happened together and impacted on each other, so they are all connected. At the end of the chapter, I will provide a table in which I will categorize the highlights and characteristics of this eight-year collaboration.

### **5.6.1 Housing**

The HNZC project manager said that when the housing design was going to start:

*We [the partners] already had lots of meetings with the community... the community would see themselves represented by their own committee. People who were in the committee had the task of going along to some of the meetings and doing various things (30 Jan 2017).*

In the Needs Analysis, the Aranui community had made it clear that their main concern was housing, mostly related to multi-units and duplexes. Therefore, HNZC took action immediately by contracting a developer and holding a design competition that different architects could enter. From the competition HNZC chose one of the architectural companies<sup>1</sup> that was "quite a prominent Christchurch

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<sup>1</sup> Wilson and Hill Architects Christchurch. They have won many national awards.

*architect”* the HNZN project manager said. One of the architects added that HNZN chose them because *“I think they felt me and my business partner Chris were a bit younger at that stage [and] it would help us and [the] community would relate to us a bit better”* (7 March 2017). On October 2001, HNZN celebrated the launch of the nation-wide Community Renewal Programme by the Minister of Housing in Wainoni Park and also announced that they were ready to demolish the first group of the multi-unit buildings that the community had the most complaints about (Aranui Community Renewal Accomplishments, 2001). Here it is important to note the negotiations that happened between two of the three MoU partners because ACTIS asked HNZN to give the demolition job to the local people as there were many unemployed local people in the community who could do some of the work and needed the income. The HNZN project manager explained:

*When we knew the first block [that] we were going to demolish, people from the community... said [that] ‘local people have that work’. We said it’s [a] specialized work, we can’t give it to a group of untrained local people [and] put them on the site to demolish the houses. It is going to be done by a demolishing contractor with all help and safety things. But what we will do we will put a tender for the demolishing contract that they have to employ local people who are currently unemployed. So, there were six young local men employed... when the demolishing contract started (30 Jan 2017).*

So, the community were listened to and employment the local people became ongoing and continued over the renewal process, as shown in the table below.

Table 5.4 Number of the local people employed by HNZN for the demolition  
(Aranui Community Renewal Accomplishments, 2001).

Time	Demolition in	Number of employed people
October 2001	Portsmouth St	six
December 2001	Aldershot St	two
August 2002	Portsmouth St	one
January 2004	Hampshire St	one
May 2004	Hampshire St	two

At the same time the demolitions were taking place HNZN announced that they wanted to hold design workshops for the first group of houses on Portsmouth Street and wanted the local community people to attend the workshops. The three partners (CCC, HNZN and ACTIS) held the first design workshop on November 2001 in the old community hall led by HNZN project manager (Aranui Community Renewal Accomplishments, 2001). ACTIS had an important role in inviting the broader community by their newsletter. From HNZN, CCC and ACTIS’s perspectives, the design meetings were well-attended, people from different social classes attended and they were listened to. The HNZN project manager added

*We wanted the local people to have an input into what those houses should have, what sort of features they should have, ... what was important... what should we put in the new ones. So, we had an architect who did the design... we wanted him to come along to community workshop in the community centre. [We] put out the invitations and we wanted anybody to*

*come from the area, so the shopkeepers come, our tenants came, private owners came... [We asked them] we want to know from you, what sort of things you do not have in your house now that should be in the new house? What are the things that you find the most uncomfortable or unhealthy about in your house? We had a lot of people there, the architect [having] a board with sheets of paper on it and saying, 'OK, what's important?' and the people say, 'My house is always cold.' 'OK right, so heating is important.' So, we worked through the issues, I mean most of these people knew what they didn't like about the house and what the problem was but they didn't know what the solution was, so that was with myself and anybody else working with me and [also the] architect listening to their biggest problems. So, [we would say] what you are talking about is insulation and heating, that goes up to the things that the design must have... we ended up with a big list of the things that were important... [then we said] we go away and to the extent that we can within the costs bring to us, we will try to incorporate all those things... when I looked at the list with the architect after the meeting, we might have said oh we are going to do all those things anyway, because that's what you would do if you build a new house. That wasn't really important thing, important thing was [that] we asked the people living in this area... it's their list. If we had done another list beforehand that probably looked very similar but that was not the point, the point was we asked them, they told us, we translated that (30 Jan, 2017).*

Participants in the housing design workshops stated that local community people were realistic about what they wanted and they did not ask for something like a swimming pool but they asked for removing communal spaces and things like that (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017). For example, the architect said

*We really listened to what they wanted and they gave us the brief of what they wanted to see in housing... The main thing that struck us was they really wanted what everyone else had. They wanted an individual house on its own piece of land, a single storey [house]... and they wanted [to be] just like everyone else they wanted a nice house on a same piece of land which was quite interesting and they didn't want to be experimented on. They wanted fences, they wanted that feeling of public [and] private, they wanted to be warm, they wanted a good healthy house... Just little things like what we take everyday sort of things, obvious to us and they were asking for them (7 March 2017).*

The officials took the list of community recommendations and wants away to incorporate them into the plans and the architect claimed that they were incorporated to a large extent (the architect, 7 March 2017). The officials wanted to keep the community involved in housing design process, so for each development three design workshops were held. One "main design workshop" and two "refining of design" workshops in which the architects would present the draft plans and a model of the new developments in miniature so, people could easily see how the houses would look like and give feedback on them (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017). And it seems that the community feedback was taken seriously and adopted by the architects. The ACTIS manager gives an example, of community feedback in refining meetings.

*They came back [architects] with the designs... for feedback on them... the community [had] said no more two-storey houses. The designers came back with Options 1, 2 and 3, and they still had two-storey houses in the designs. And we just said, 'No, get rid of that, we don't want that.' So, we got single storey houses, which are what the community wanted. So, if we were not involved we might have got two-storey houses back like we have now<sup>1</sup>, but they listened (17 Jan 2017).*

The architect also believes that the community were really kept involved and listened to in the project *"it was good the community was kept involved with the process... I think that was the good thing about it... they were listened to and I think that made a big difference having them there, just having them.... We did some other work for HNZN a bit later on and you never get to meet the owners or anything like that you just pushing out houses but here you knew who is likely living in the house and it was quite good (7 March 2017).*

The types and timing of housing design workshops are shown in Table 5.5. While they are specific to housing design it shows that HNZN created many events where local people were consulted and their feedback captured. HNZN focused on three main streets having the highest number of two-storey and multi-unit buildings. The timing of the first design meetings has been documented by the Partnership Group but the timing of the refining meetings has not been documented clearly. However, what is clear, according to the architect's point of view, is the time spent on the design for each development *"was probably four, five months with the meetings, it was probably a bit more than normal not much [because] we were getting feedback from the community and also HNZN as well"* (March 7, 2017).

Table 5.5 Housing design workshops in Aranui Community Renewal project

Housing Design Workshops	Street	Time	Led by
Main workshop	November 2001	Portsmouth Street	HNZN project manager
Refining workshop	-		
Refining workshop	-		
Main workshop	May 2003	Aldershot Street	HNZN project manager
Refining workshop	-		
Refining workshop	-		
Main workshop	April 2004	Aldershot Street	HNZN project manager
Refining workshop	-		
Refining workshop	-		

The participants also claimed that all the design meetings, workshops and refining workshops were open and inclusive for everyone, by which they meant that there was not a restriction on participation, but it does not mean that everyone in the community participated.

<sup>1</sup> Several years after the February earthquake in Christchurch in 2011, many two-storey state houses were built in Aranui but that happened after the Community Renewal project had ended. I will talk about that in the Product section.



*In any of those meetings anybody could come to, anybody that lived here, anybody that lived somewhere else, any government organization of other could come to, so there was never a restriction of who could come to our workshops... we put signs on top front and say, 'Hey, look you should come to these meetings because we think this is something that you are interested in' (HNZC project manager, 30 Jan, 2017).*

From the community leaders' points of view (ACTIS), the local community felt listened to and had large degree of direct involvement (not by their representatives) while facilitating and taking care of their involvement was done by ACTIS.

*[T]he hall was full of the people, exited people and engaged people. And the officials come with blank pieces of paper [asking], 'What do you think would be good... HNZC did the workshops, It was our job [ACTIS job] to make sure that the community participated in that, so we didn't speak on their behalf, they came and saw it [themselves]... we had huge, huge [face to face involvement] in different kinds and ways of working, and that was so honest and it was really, really good for that time (ACTIS manager, 17 Jan, 2017).*

Although most of the participants claimed that there was no conflict in design workshops between partners, the architect highlighted the role of discussions and 'persuasion' of the community when conflicts would arise and they would ask for something that were not achievable or were not normal according to the rules. The architect gives an example:

*We could offer some security things so we had fences 900 millimetres high and people wanted 1.8 millimetres high which is more than normal. We explained to them 'no' and this is why it is kept low and things like that. So, they were asking why we didn't give it to them. We had to explain to them why and getting on board with them [and] they understood that what we were trying to achieve (personal communication, 7 March 2017)*

When the implementation was going to start, ACTIS on behalf of the community, asked HNZC to get the local people involved with the implementation. The ACTIS chairperson explains:

*There was a number of separate developments. There was a Trade's Academy at the [Aranui] High-School at the time and we negotiated that every contract that would be tendered for the building of the houses they [I mean] people tendering or builders had to provide so many hours for trades' kids or kids learning trades to get work experience. That was a requirement of the contract. And we wanted things like local contracts and local organizations involved in maintenance of the places, all happened... So, it was one of the magic moments in time (7 Feb, 2017).*

HNZC negotiated with the developers to involve the students in the construction of the houses and by doing that listened to what the community asked for (HNZC project manager, 30 Jan, 2017). Therefore, when the implementation started on February 2002, "Aranui Trades Academy students started work experience on HNZC exterior painting contracts in Aranui" (Aranui Community Renewal Accomplishments, 2001, p.2). In respect to HNZC and CCC responsiveness, the ACTIS chairperson calls

Community Renewal time, a “*magic moment*” where the community was meaningfully engaged, the officials listened to them and acted in the way that they wanted (7 Feb, 2017). The ACTIS manager, as community also added,

*I think it was unique, the plan itself was great, the pilot was great. I think they provided a platform for us to be able to have a real, decent and honest conversation around improvements to the community and which I believe enhances their lives (17 Jan, 2017).*

In the above, participants of this research claimed that to a high degree local people were kept involve and informed throughout the process (design, demolition, implementation) and their feedbacks were taken into account. There was no restriction on participation, and it was not just ACTIS as the community representatives talking on their behalf, but the broader community had direct involvement. In addition, it seemed there were not many disagreements and even if there was time was taken to persuade residents to change their positions.

At the same time with collaboration on housing and physical developments, tenancy management was another project that involved many actors in collaboration.

### **5.6.2 Tenancy Management**

HNZC tenancy managers joined the Community Renewal project very early and they were actively involved throughout the process. Also, importantly, they were the last central government representatives to leave Aranui when the project finished. Initially, they were based in the community full-time because of the community’s complaints about the behaviour of HNZC’s tenants and safety issues. The reason behind their ‘Intensive Tenancy Management’ approach was to avoid causing a further deterioration in the area.

*The problems in the community can result from having a concentration of too many people in the same poor social circumstances. If you put whole a lot of people who have a criminal past together on one street there is a high likelihood that you are going to get that sort of activity continuing. So, ‘Intensive Tenancy Management’ means instead of just putting next person in the list in the next empty house, you say no, stop and think about what we know about this family, is there going to be a benefit to this street and neighbourhood or not, if not there might be some other houses to put them in. So, it means not causing a deterioration in the neighbourhood because of the way you are allocating (HNZC project manager, 30 Jan 2017)*

The first thing that tenancy managers did was to identify those people causing issues/the criminals and moving them out to different places across the city. They appeared to be very community oriented, they even moved some people who were in private properties as well because the community had complained about them too (the tenancy manager, 7 April, 2017).

*We got people out of there [Aranui] and broke their associations by moving them to the other suburbs so they couldn't interact and form a power. When you bring new people and the people that you know, they [will] look after the houses and change the dynamic around that centre... And we had the luxury of being at the heart of Aranui so we moved some of those people who might have been an issue and they might have been causing any social behaviour or [the] rest of it..., we saw change in behaviours of those people in a lot of cases because it wasn't going to be acceptable. We moved private owners too and others that we were tolerant of their behaviours ... but in the past they could do anything without lights because no one would see anything (7 April, 2017).*

HNZC tenancy managers declared that they wanted to get the community buy-in to choose their neighbours and match newcomers with the neighbours and streets (7 April, 2017). They relied heavily on the knowledge of the key local people to get the information about newcomers or existing residents. One of the tenancy managers stated, *"We knew some of the key people [like] Samona and Nolene [who] was a matriarchal type figure [and] she had been around the community a long time and she would tell us that [the] child's real father was such and such and explained a lot of things to us and some stuff that we would never going to get told"* (7 April, 2017). Then they initiated Meet-and-Greet events between the new comers and the existing neighbours as an introduction to see if they match or not, and it seems that the community really liked this idea. One of the Maori women living in Aranui (also, an ACTIS board member) stated:

*HNZC was really good and we did meet-and-greet with new neighbours and they kept eyes on who was coming in the area and I thought it was absolutely fantastic. And like the house next to my property I own my own home now, but the property next door was a HNZ's house, Antony<sup>1</sup> arranged a meet-and-greet with the new neighbour who was coming in. So, that was quite good and absolutely fantastic. So, those tenancy managers, those fathers kept the good eyes on us, it is sad to say they are here no longer (10 April, 2017).*

The local people claimed that through the above procedure the community people were listened to and it would create a durable and good relationship between the neighbours. For example, a Maori woman explains how she chose her neighbour 17 years ago and they are still neighbours and in a good relationship.

*Here next door I wanted a Samoan family who was Mormon, the church [that] I believe, I don't want Maori and I made it quite known. I don't want Maori because when they drink they fight and I said no Maori I want a Samoan family. And I named who I wanted in there and they are still there today [after 17 years]. I like my neighbour, you really like having good relationship with your neighbours (ACTIS board member, 1 March, 2017).*

Local people called HNZC tenancy managers 'fathers' of Aranui and they had those type of personalities that communication with them was very easy. An ACTIS board member said, *"We had John<sup>2</sup>, and we*

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<sup>1</sup> One of the tenancy managers in Aranui

<sup>2</sup> These are the tenancy managers who worked in Aranui for 10 years

*had Antony and back then we had Anna and they were really good to communicate with and they came to the community and they talked with us and they helped to fix our homes. So, everybody knew a new person was coming and they were doing an introduction... so it was working” (10 April, 2017).* The tenancy managers had direct communication with the community every day, always kept them informed and were available for people to talk. One of the tenancy managers said, *“That is why we went well I suppose, we were always available one of us in the office or one of us out in the field, we were only two minutes away from every property that is where we got our buy-in from the costumer we did what we said” (7 April, 2017).* This showed that HNZC’s tenancy managers developed strong relationships with the local people and they even used some strategies to strengthen their communication. One of their strategies was getting volunteer local people as receptionists to relate to the community easier during the eight years. One of their receptionist was a Maori woman who described what she was doing and why.

*I am a PP, means [a] People Person, so [those] people [who] are kind of destroyed I can open a conversation with them. So, because a lot of people were worried of HNZC in the beginning we kind of liked to go between. They [would] come to the front door and say, ‘Hi’ and I say ‘Hi’ because most of them were from our community and I knew them. ‘[I would ask] who do you want to see?’ and they were moaning... ‘Okay, you need to see John, have a seat and I go and get John.’ So, there was no picking up the phone [asking] when are you free? [just] I would get off from the desk and say John someone wants to see you now, come and have a chat. Then we put them in a private room to talk. We were going in between for them [between local people and HNZC people] and it made the community feel a lot better. Then after a while they [would] come back again saying, ‘I have a meeting for John tell him to come out’ (10 April, 2017).*

So, having receptionists from the community would make local people feel more comfortable to communicate with the officials and open up conversations about their problems. Other than that, the tenancy managers highlighted that always wearing casual clothing just like a local resident and staying in the area and with the same faces were two small strategies that helped them to build trust and have more fluent and easy communication. One of the tenancy managers stated:

*We always dressed casually... you know it is how you deal with people... our business philosophy is, if we want to be in shirts and ties then we look like policemen. People knew how we were, we didn’t have any issues we [have] never been hit with having that relationship we still greet people... shake hands and not prejudge them, it is half the battle. You can still get the outcome without having to go towards them. We always had good outcomes while we were working, and we had the relationship. You knew the family, you could go and see an ‘anti’ and so it was a wider dynamic, it was not just about the person it was about getting the family on board... then having the same faces to deal with for a period of time... if there is someone different over every 18 months they can learn the process of tenancy management and physical bit but none of those relationships (7 April, 2017).*

It is important to note that the tenancy managers were not the only faces that were the same over the renewal process. The project managers and all of HNZN and CCC representatives stayed in Aranui for eight years.

In addition, the tenancy managers did not follow their previous way of working, which was filling out an application and then assessing the application rather than seen the applicant (Application-Based Process). Instead, they would have a face-to-face contact with the applicants and would listen to what they wanted in person; this is called an Applicant-Based Process (tenancy manager, 7 April, 2017). In this process they did not really need an assessment because they already knew everybody.

*[D]uring that time there [in Aranui], we didn't have an Application-Based [process] we had applicant people apply to us for housing... they [just would] come to us to have their preliminary discussion... [and] we would register [their] application [and] book them in for what they need an assessment but we [already] knew all the people in housing, we didn't want John Smith in this house, probably knew that John Smith wants to cause a problem in this street so we could target who went where (tenancy manager, 7 April, 2017).*

As a result of this process of tenancy management, even children and disabled people in Aranui would feel comfortable and empowered to communicate with the officials and ask for what they wanted. An ACTIS board member gives an example:

*There was so much contact [with tenancy managers], my oldest special needs son decided [that], 'OK, I can move out of home now.' He went to Antony<sup>1</sup> and Antony had seen him in HNZN where their office was... I was a volunteer receptionist... one day I wasn't there. He [my son] goes and ask Antony, "I want a house, let's fill out a form" so they did. And he came and say I talked to Antony and filled out a form, I said, 'OK good on you darling, I am so proud of you.' A month later he got a house and I was 'Oh, so he left me.' I was back to Antony and Antony goes, 'It is OK and I have been watching him and I believe he has got the ability to live alone, I know you don't think so but I do, [the] house is only two blocks away from you let's give it a go.' So that is how close Housing New Zealand and the community were, my son is normally very shy, [he] had the ability to go to Antony and Antony just treated him like a normal person and it wasn't an agent for HNZN, he was just Antony very approachable very friendly. So, he got a house and I was his mother who was a volunteer receptionist so to us even though they were working for HNZN they were just John and Antony the door was always open, and we always went in (10 April, 2017).*

In conclusion, according to the above claims, local community had an important role in the tenancy management process. They were listened to and their feedback was gained through close, direct and informal communications created by meet-and-greet meetings, applicant based process, tenancy managers being in the community full-time, easy accessibility to tenancy managers, being very casual and informal not like a police man, face-to-face and everyday communications, using the knowledge

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<sup>1</sup> HNZN tenancy manager

and experience of key local people as gate keepers, using local receptionists, being the same faces, developing informal and friendly relations.

### 5.6.3 Upgrading Wainoni Park

The Needs Analysis and other surveys done by the council early in the project had clearly shown that the existing situation of Wainoni Park and the surrounding area in was a major concern for the Aranui community (CCC Parks and Waterways Manager, 28 Feb, 2017). The park, like most parks in the city, is owned and maintained by CCC. In responding to the community feedback the upgrading of Wainoni Park consisted of many small actions or projects in sequence. The first action taken by the council was forming a 'Park Design Group' from local people on September 2001 to work with the council staff to prepare a design plan for the park (ACRC, 2001). The purpose behind forming this group was *"to ensure that members of the community are involved in the decision-making process and are informed and updated of what was happening"* (ACRC, 2001e, p. 1). The partnership group put out invitations so some local people who were interested, and also some ACTIS board members, joined the group to work with two CCC Parks and Waterways Manager managers and a landscape architect (CCC Parks and Waterways Manager, 28 Feb, 2017). From the beginning of the upgrading process, this group led the process. Members were almost all local people and they generally met every second week in the old community hall. In October and November 2001, they started consulting with the broader community for the design of the park and some flagship events in the community were used to get community input (ACRC, 2001d). The first significant community consultation on the park design took place in October 2001 when HNZN celebrated the national launch of the Community Renewal project, the Design Group wanted *"to promote the Wainoni Park project and to encourage input from the community into the design process"* (ACRC, 2001d, P.1). At the same time, HNZN was consulting on housing, so both organizations opened their tents on that day to consult with the community.

The Park Design Group used art activities to involve the local community and get their input in which people could design their own plan (ACRC, 2001d). Two activities included: 1) design the park: basic plans were provided for people to draw their own design on the papers; and 2) design a logo and suggest a name for the park (ACRC, 2001e). Numerous contributions came from the community and many people drew their own design on a piece of paper. Council staff thought initially that local people did not have enough knowledge and understanding about how to re-design the park and what solutions could get them the outcomes they wanted (CCC Parks and Waterways Manager, 28 Feb, 2017). So they tried to talk with the community in a language that empowered them to understand what they wanted and to be more innovative, and they helped them to have a shared understanding of the problems and the solutions. CCC Parks and Waterways Manager said:

*When we started talking to them about the park ... people were saying, we just want a skate park, just put a skate park for the kids just do it. We said, 'Wow, what we are trying to achieve? What do we aim for?' So, it was taking them right back to figuring it out what outcome they wanted and then what was the solution, it was not just about putting a skate park. That was one option for creating recreation opportunities for young people but there were so many other issues in the park, there were safety issues, there was lack of recreation opportunities... So, we had to really encourage them to think outside what was there now. They thought just putting a skate park [is enough] and then after lots of discussions and really working out what the issues were, they started to realize that we were trying to push them to be more creative and think bigger, and we were starting to talk about taking out some houses of HNZC and making that into park and maybe changing this a bit and putting housing there, and thinking beyond what they could ever have imagined (personal communication, 28 Feb, 2017).*

The Park Design Group believed it was important to involve the local schools, so, one of the members went to five Aranui schools<sup>1</sup> asking the students to design their own park “*We did workshops with the schools where they draw art works and what kind of things [that] they wanted in the park and then they came back with pictures of basketball courts, swimming pools and skate parks... so we tried to incorporate those things into the design as well* (CCC Parks and Waterways Manager, 28 Feb, 2017). The students provided more than 200 singular ceramic tiles, artworks to be applied in the park (ACRC, 2005).

Based on the first part of community consultation, a few draft plans were designed in less than two months and they were displayed to the community on to get feedback. The Design Group wrote “*The Design Group is keen to show [that] the community input has gone into the park planning process and ... [and their] suggestions have been considered as [a] part of the design process. We also [will have] a space to display and get feedback on the draft concept plans and suggested names for the park* (ACRC, 2001, P. 1). The community was provided with a simple platform giving feedback:

*Their influence on the final decision was very much.... we had a workshop when they came up with an overhead projector with a picture of the park and they were drawing on it and saying, 'Oh we don't want this. Let's take that out. It will be good if we had a playground here. Oh, this is where we want our sports fields' and they started sketching it themselves on their overhead projector and, for them, it was really pushing the boundaries and it was great getting their input* (CCC Parks and Waterways Manager, 28 Feb, 2017).

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<sup>1</sup> Wainoni primary, Aranui Primary, Chisnallwood Intermediate School, St James Catholic School and Wainoni High School.




Figure 5.13 (a&b) Photos of the Community Day, displaying community designs (photo: CCC Parks and Waterways Manager, 2001)




Figure 5.14 Community consultation at the Community Day (photo: HNZ's project manager, 2001)

Alongside this process CCC planners felt it important to apply Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles and *“to try to address the relationship of the park with the surrounding, housing and the boundaries, so we [the council] were working closely with HNZC on that”* (28 Feb, 2017). There was one major CPTED issue: the 1.83 metre fencing on the northern boundary. Co-operation between HNZC and CCC resulted in a formal land swap to build a road overlooking the park to make it safer. The Council Project Manager said

*Wainoni Park was on sort of three sides surrounded by fences that closed off all those backyards to the park and actually when the sports going on it made it feel unsafe so kids crossing the park couldn't be seen from the joining properties and there was actually a feeling that the whole thing was unsafe. So, what those within the project wanted was to make all those fences taken out and to make things much more transparent and change the nature of*



*those fences and that came about through planning advice that if you make the boundaries of park transparent so you can get sort of casual observation from all the owners or from the nearby streets then the area will be much safer and that feeling of safety makes it be highly used... then with planner's advice, we thought we would actually need to the street player and that is why we ended up putting a new street through the park, so we had another street facing the park with no boundaries with no fences (16 Feb, 2017).*




Figure 5.15 Final plan of the road in Wainoni Park (Concepts and Plans for Wainoni Park, 2000)

The map above is Option 2 which was chosen between five different options to add street views to the park. The road was to be built in the middle of the park, the land subdivided behind that were given to HNZC and, in return, HNZC gave the land at the end and beginning of the road to the council. Although it was largely a suggestion from planners to do the above changes, the participants claimed that the community was genuinely involved in the design of the road, choosing the location and details of it. The council staff claimed that they worked hard towards this involvement.

*I was inviting community people into the council to talk with road and the transport planners and some of them were quite resistant and they believed that the road is just going to be built and they would be wasting their time coming in and participating and I remember one person in particular he initially said he come but he didn't want to come because didn't believe [that] we were going to listen to them so we just kept inviting him and sending him the minutes of the meetings and results of discussions and kept on inviting and eventually he realized that the community was genuinely being involved and their input was being valued and then he came and was able to say that, 'Yes the council was genuine and he appreciated being invited as a part of that design team.' So, it was a sort of complete turnaround from being completely negative about the whole thing... to being completely supportive and saying, 'Yes they listened to them' (16 Feb, 2017).*

The research findings also showed that Maori members of the community had input into the design. They asked for specific things, some of which were easy to achieve, some not. However, both easy and difficult were achieved. A relatively easy request was a carved “pou”:

*They wanted some specific things... that they were not difficult to achieve, things like the Pou that we put at the entrance to the park. A Pou, is a culturally significant feature and often used as entrance to Maori and in this case Wainoni Park. The Maori community wanted those established so took some time because they had to be chosen or made and then go to the right place so that was a sort of indicator [that the Maori had input] (Council Project Manager, 16 Feb, 2017).*

But Maori also asked for “hāngi<sup>1</sup>” facilities in the park which was difficult if not impossible to achieve in Christchurch under existing council rules. But the council staff supported the request. CCC Parks and Waterways Manager spoke about it

*[A] hāngi is [a] Maori cooking oven. They dig a hole in the ground and cook the food... so Aranui was a very strong Maori community and having a hāngi is something that we are not that keen on and [the] Council might not be very supportive of that, but they say, ‘Well, that is what we do, and so we have a hāngi. We don’t care what the rules are, we just want to have it,’ So, for us that was good to hear that, so we had to sort of change our processes to allow that to happen because that’s what the community wanted...[now] they have hāngi in the park and... there is one park in Christchurch where they are allowed to have hāngi (28 Feb, 2017).*

In addition, as a mark of respect to different ethnicities during the renewal process “every meeting was started with a karakia, it is a Maori prayer, essentially and significantly, [a] Maori welcome... [and] whenever there was a ceremony that we did, there was a Pacifica speaker and there was a Maori speaker and we tried to get well respected people to take those roles, a formal sort of celebratory role (Council Project Manager, 16 Feb, 2017). Although, some of the participants believe that the Maori and Pasifika people were well-represented in the Community Renewal project, some believe that they were not as involved as they could have been.

*We always tried to take them into it [but] we haven’t been always successful... Ngai Tahu was not as involved as they could have been, I remember a guy who was related to one of the board members and he had encouraged them [the Ngai Tahu] to come to some of the meetings but to be quite honest even when we had events in the park... the local Maori probably were not as involved as they could have been. The conversation about why... I don’t know you can contact Ngai Tahu (HNZC tenancy manager, 7 April, 2017).*

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<sup>1</sup> Is a traditional [New Zealand Māori](#) method of [cooking](#) food using heated rocks buried in a [pit oven](#). Hāngi" involves digging a pit in the ground, heating stones in the pit with a large fire, placing baskets of food on top of the stones, and covering everything with earth for several hours before uncovering (or lifting) the hāngi (Holiday in New Zealand, 2019).

So, even if the Maori had a say in the park, their presence in the whole renewal process was not evaluated as very strong by some people. From the Pasifica side, even though Pasifica people have been represented by the churches in the renewal because they are church goers, there is no documented evidence of their input. One of the ACTIS board members added that Pasifica people *“didn’t really say much”* and they had no specific representatives for themselves in the Community Renewal (1 March, 2017). Similarly, the Maori people did not have specific representatives for themselves so in effect all the ethnicities were represented by ACTIS. One of the board members who happened to be a Maori woman said, *“No, I am not just for Maori, I am for Samoan, Maori, Pakeha...”* (1 March, 2017).

The community consultation process on the design of Wainoni Park started officially in October 2001 and continued until April 2002 (ACRC, 2001d). However, process, which involved great effort at trust and capability-building, took much longer. CCC Parks and Waterways Manager said altogether it took two years to finish the design, *“[Which] was longer than normal”* (28 Feb, 2017).

An important point about the design process of the park and housing highlighted by the participants was that a lot of talking and discussions happened but not all of them happened in formal meetings and in collective discussions. People often preferred informal and one-to-one discussions. The records from this period reflect this because some of meeting minutes have a separate section called *‘after meeting discussions’* which are informal and individual discussions. Sometimes they would lead to making some important decisions; for example, the idea of forming the Park Design Group was created for the first time in after-meeting discussions on June 2001 (ACRC, 2001b). The council project manager added:

*[In the meetings] you have got mothers with children and you have got people paid by [the] council and people paid by HNZC, you know, sort of [an] unordered mix but we just keep meeting and keep working, a lot of talking had to happen outside of those meetings.....I mean it was quite a discovery for me... What I discovered was [that] not everyone actually did what they said ‘they’d’ do in the meetings. We had meeting and we had agreement then I go and thought we had agreement but actually we didn’t because what those people needed was quiet conversations outside of the meeting and, where I might have said, ‘Yes we were in support [but] they weren’t actually fully behind something, I needed more time and I needed sort of more individual discussion.’ So, I sort of initially worked on a professional project-based where someone says, ‘Yes, that’s what they mean and that’s what we charge ahead and we take the next step.’ And to let it be more patient and let some of the conversations happen, they needed to happen outside of our meetings but actually we could make progress ....* (16 Feb, 2017).

When implementation of the plans started in April 2002 the council representatives divided the plans into short-term, medium-term and long-term for implementation. Plans consisted of many small and

large projects to be implemented one after another over eight years. However, it appears that the council had not set a special budget for the Wainoni Park upgrade and this created difficulty in funding the projects. Yet the evidence shows that the council representatives had a strong feeling of responsibility to provide budget for the projects. CCC Parks and Waterways Manager as the leader of the park project added:

*We never had a budget, we just found money from other budgets .... We didn't have a set budget for Wainoni Park, we just tapped into existing renewal programmes and managed to get some money out of them... we were going into some other programmes [of the other areas of the city] where there was budget for something else and that has been under spent or hasn't been allocated. I kept going to our finance people and saying, "Can I have some more money, please?" and just got it from other projects... it would have been easy to say we have got no money and we can't do anything. But I said, "I need money," and I had a good relationship with our finance person. They could see what was happening and I don't know where we got all the money from to be honest but it came from other projects (personal communication (28 Feb, 2017)).*

Moving the playground was the first short-term plan, it was moved from behind the Hampshire St shops to the southwest corner of Wainoni Park on the Hampshire St frontage which is as open space, this location was chosen by the community (ACRC, 2001).




Figure 5.16 Location of the existing and proposed playgrounds in Wainoni Park (Concepts and Plans for Wainoni Park, 2002)

Local community people believed that they were listened to, and the council acted in a way that they wanted. *"We moved the playground that was behind the shops, we moved that as the community said, 'We don't want kids playing behind shops, they will be abducted or that's unsafe...' So it was re-designed and all the old equipment was moved to the new beautiful park over there"* (ACTIS manager,

17 Jan, 2017). Then a 'Planting Day' was initiated to plant around the new playground and involve the children to do that. It was an important day, which was advertised and people were invited to come. The council provided the plants and the community planted them. Children were actively involved in the planting around their own playground. The photos below are from the planting day. The local MP also joined the community on the planting day, an ACTIS board member said *"... a lot of the community [people] came in and they were so shocked when they saw Lianne [the MP]... she wasn't the mayor but she was the member of parliament, she had some talking engagement and she came and she was digging up, cleaning up and planting with us and she say I should have that sausage. She is really good she is what I call PP, she is a people person [easy to communicate with] and everybody around here knows Lianne..."* (10 April, 2017).




Figure 5.17 (a &b): Children planting the plants around the playground on Planting Day, (photo: CCC Parks and Waterways Manager , 2002)




Figure 5.18 Local MP working with the community on Planting Day (photo: CCC Parks and Waterways Manager , 2002)

At the same time, the council issued a media release though their communication networks had some positive coverage for example, *"Local residents have been actively involved in redesigning the park to create more recreation opportunities for the whole community and to improve safety and visibility in*

*the park. Continued community involvement is important to ensure that planned new developments meet local needs and that the park is well managed and cared for” (CCC, 2002).*

There were other sub-projects to be carried out in the park such as the installation of 200 singular “artworks” in the form of painted tiles and seven mural art works made by Aranui children. They were put in place in various park locations in 2005 as part of medium-term upgrade plan. The purpose behind that was to make the children feel connected to them.




Figure 5.19 Children’s artwork installed as tiles on seats around the new play area (photo: CCC Parks and Waterways Manager, 2005)

Another sub-project to be implemented was the Pou. The council contracted a local Maori carver to do the carving but on the understanding that Aranui children were allowed to go and help the carver and work with him so “*[I]t wasn’t just the carver doing it on his own, he had the kids come in and help carve it, it was theirs*” (Christchurch East MP, 13 April, 2017). The Maori community wanted the Pou to be located at the entrance of the park. Once they were installed an opening day was held by the Design Group and the community at large attended. The photos below are from that day.




Figure 5.20 Children's artwork installed as tiles on seats around the new play area (photo: CCC Parks and Waterways Manager, 2005)

The creation of a new road was another medium-term plan. Although the local community had no involvement with the engineering and construction of the road for legal reasons, they were involved with the design and choosing the name of it. ACTIS invited local people to submit their suggested names and finally the name 'Ben Rarere' was chosen for the new street. One of the Maori women living in Aranui for a long time was Nolene, and Ben Rarere was the name of her husband who passed away during the Community Renewal period. Nolene played an important role in persuading the MP's husband to be the ACTIS chairperson and she seems to be a very important character in the whole area. When the researcher asked Nolene herself *"Why Ben Rarere was chosen as the street name?"* she frankly answered, *"I named it, he has been gone 15 years [ago], he used to help a lot in the community"* (1 March, 2017).

The longer-terms plans implemented in Wainoni Park through until 2008 involved changes to the irrigation system of the park, upgrading the rugby field and other sports fields by redefining their boundaries and locations, creating picnic and BBQ facilities, an event area, a quiet garden area, new hard courts, a skate park, improving car parking, and improving the Family Centre. Also, many negotiations and discussions took place on how to bring sports back to the area. Importantly, a local community group became responsible for maintaining the park. The council contracted a group of young local people (Turangawaewae Trust) to take care of *"the toilets, litter collection, graffiti reporting, playground bark raking and graffiti reporting in nine parks and playgrounds around the Aranui"* (Aranui Community Renewal Accomplishment, 2001, p.5). This group did the maintenance job around parks in Aranui for 5 years from 2001 until 2005 <sup>1</sup>.

In the table below these multiple park-related projects explained above are set out to show who led the project and played the main role in implementation and design.

Table 5.6 Projects implemented to upgrade Wainoni Park

The projects		The main role in design	The main role in implementation	Led by
Playground		Aranui Local community	The council	Design Group (almost local people and ACTIS)
Planting Day		The Design Group	Local children	The Design Group
artworks	tile artworks	Local children	The council	The Design Group
	the Pou	Local Maori and local children	The council	The Design Group
Hāngi		The local Maori	The council	The Design Group
New road (Ben Rarere)		Engineers and Local people	The council	The council

<sup>1</sup> In 2005 because of some internal conflicts they left the job. (CCC Parks and Waterways Manager, 28 Feb 2017).

Infrastructure of the park irrigation and upgrading sports' fields	-	The council	The council
Maintenance	-	Local community group	A Local community group

It appears that during the process of upgrading Wainoni Park there was no significant conflict between the council and local community. Local people even gave an award to the CCC Parks and Waterways Manager as the leader of the park project for her good community involvement *"We worked together really well and in fact they gave me an award for excellent community consultation, community engagement and stuff like that. They made up their own little certificate and they gave it to me. It was really cool"* (CCC Parks and Waterways Manager, 28 Feb, 2017). However, there were some intra-organizational conflicts between council staff and council representatives in the project. This was because collaboration with the local community was a different way of working and some council staff said that some colleagues were reluctant to involve the community. In spite of that, the council project manager and other staff who had direct involvement in the project mediated these conflicts in support of the community. CCC Parks and Waterways Manager gives an example:

*In particular, a woman from [the council] Transport [unit], we were looking at doing some changes to the road and she had her own set process; "This is what we are doing, this is how we do it," and telling you this is it and we said, 'We are in Aranui now on a renewal programme. That's not how we operate. The community needs to be involved and they want to have their say and they don't necessarily like what you are proposing.' And so, she didn't want to hear it... Andrew the project manager at the time told them off and said, 'No, you need to involve the community more'. So they changed their approach (28 Feb, 2017).*

The Aranui people at the time were aware of the point that they were listened to by the officials and they would show that by their strong and ongoing presence in every event, meeting and workshop:

*If people don't think that they are respected they just stop coming while Aranui people kept coming to the meetings..... [It] is evidence that they did have a say... (The council project manager, 16 Feb, 2017).*

#### 5.6.4 Maori Hui and Fono

In 2004, in the middle of the process of park and housing renewal, ACTIS decided to do two important consultation projects in response to the lack of participation of the Maori and Pacifica people to date (ACTIS, 2004). 'Positively Pacific Aranui FONO' was the name of the Pacifica people's consultation process led by the ACTIS Manager. 'Maori Hui' was the name of Maori consultation process led by one of the ACTIS board members:

*The Fono grew out of frustration among agencies and the CCC working in the Aranui area at the lack of Pacific Island participation in programmes provided. Despite funds being provided for various facilities and community programmes, the only activities that seemed to attract major Pacific Island participation were public events... (ACTIS, 2004, P.4).*



*Maori O Aranui Hui was held in response to an evaluation finding of limited [Maori] community involvement in activities and projects aimed at improving life in Aranui (ACTIS, 2005, p.7).*

ACTIS members believed that job of ACTIS was to bring the community “to the table”, so they felt responsible to represent Pasifica and Maori people and give them a chance to have their say, as one of the ACTIS manager said: *“We [ACTIS] made sure that really good platforms and forums were available where people could have a chance to have their say. So, that was our job, our job was to get the community along there”* (17 Jan, 2017). The Maori Hui and the Fono were supported and funded by HNZC, CCC, Department of Work and Income New Zealand (ACTIS, 2004). Maori Hui and the Fono appeared to be quite inclusive and ACTIS tried to have the representation of each and every group and get their input even those who were too shy to say something. Both FONO and Maori Hui included face-to-face meetings with the Pasifica and Maori people and they were attended 130 and 150 people, respectively, representing a cross section of ages and genders, including high school students and young people (ACTIS, 2005). An ACTIS board member who led the Maori Hui describes the process:

*I ran the Maori Hui, even though my target was [the] Maori it was open to everyone and we didn't have a closed door... the questions were kind of the same [like Fono], ‘What you want? What do you want changed? What worked for you and what doesn't work for you?’ We divided people into different groups all the schools were invited so we had the schools we had the teenagers and we had parents and we had what we call kaumatua, which is our elderly. They all had different groups not everybody likes to talk in a group, so those who didn't want to talk we had a mystery envelop, they could write it down, or in children case they could draw a picture. Also [allowances were made for those needing translation mostly Samoan people], every bodies' view had to be there and so it worked... that was all community based so it was no [public] organization (10 April, 2017)*

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Figure 5.21 (a &b): Fono photos (photo by: CCC Parks and Waterways Manager, 2005)

Out of the consultations, what the community wanted the most were strategies to reduce crime (no drugs, no alcohol) and increase feelings of safety in the area.

So although Pasifica people and the Maori seemed to have no visible presence in the renewal process ACTIS at least tried hard to get them involved and *“In this way, the young felt their views*

*were just as valued as the adults and, taking Pacific Island culture into account, women had equal say without feeling [that] they should sit back and let their husband speak for them* (ACTIS, 2004, p.4).

### 5.6.5 Affirm Festival

From the beginning of the renewal process Aranui local people asked for “*a way of celebrating Aranui*”, so ACTIS started negotiations with the other partners to see if they would support such a programme. In 2002, HNZN and the council committed an equal amount of money to establish a festival for Aranui which was to be led by the community/ACTIS. The local community chose the name ‘Affirm’ for the festival which is “*a very positive word, it is basically to affirm something, it is kind of like to reinforce and proclaim, to promise you know, but it is also declaring I affirm something... the community chose the name*” (Christchurch East MP, 13 April, 2017). Affirm was planned to be held every December over the course of the Community Renewal Project. The first Affirm was held on December 2002 and then annually every December in Wainoni Park. In fact it has continued annually up to 2018. ACTIS invites a lot of sporting, aiding or empowering organizations. They create entertainment opportunities for the children to play and it is marketed very much as a “family fun day.” Also, in the renewal period HNZN and CCC used Affirm as a good opportunity to get the community feedback on the Community Renewal plans (HNZN project manager, 30 Jan, 2017). Affirm was highly used by the participants of this research as an evidence that the community had a say and also an opportunity to have ongoing community involvement. For example the then local MP, Lianne Dalziel, said

*[The] Affirm festival was a great occasion and enabled people to come along and see what the plans were and have a say I mean it really did feel like [that] the community was involved. And the Affirm festival in itself is community-led, and it engages the community* (the local MP, 13 April, 2017).

Further:

*That’s [Affirm] what I would say as the evidence of community participation because they wanted a festival then the council and Housing New Zealand helped significantly* (HNZN council project manager, 30 Jan, 2017).




Figure 5.22 Local people enjoying themselves at the Affirm day (photo by CCC Parks and Waterways Manager, 2005)




Figure 5.23 (a &b): Photos of Affirm festival during the Community Renewal project (Photo by CCC Parks and Waterways Manager, 2005)

### 5.6.6 Licensed Bar Removal

As mentioned earlier there used to be a bar on the western end of the shopping centre in Aranui that was described as ‘horrible’ by the participants of this research because it was where certain people could buy drugs, sell stolen goods (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017). In the Needs Analysis, the community asked for the bar to be shut down. Initially HNZN and CCC officials claimed that they did not know how to do that because it was a profitable business that had not been taken to court and also there was a lack of the police presence in the community to listen to the complaints. However, as a result of the five years of partnership between HNZN, CCC and ACTIS, from 2000 until 2005, New Zealand Police decided to come and be based in Aranui in 2005. The HNZN project manager added

*By about 2005 we were in the position where previously police would avoid this area but in 2005 through the interaction of the project we had a community consult [a police officer] based in this office three days of week in this area, from not coming to this area and avoiding here to coming and staying in this office. If people had an issue they could come here and talk. Because the police person was here and was giving the time to help sort things out here... we*

*managed to complete the evidence to convict the bar owner and have the bar shut down. This was one of the things that they hated about the area, and [it] looked impossible to be able to do anything about it, it started in 2001 and, by about 2005, it [had] happened (30 Jan, 2017).*

The police were based in the ACTIS office, and the three partners helped to provide enough information evidence to close the bar. ACTIS led the process and played an important role to close the bar forever and finally ACTIS bought the bar building for the community. ACTIS chairperson said

*[T]he guy [that had the bar] was a career criminal, he was in jail and his girlfriend ran it... and when he was in jail, he was negotiating with an Indian guy who owned it [the building] to buy it, and I went to the Indian guy and said, 'You cannot sell it to him, you have been in this community for 30 years and you owe this community, you sell it to us [to ACTIS].' And [so] we bought the building... and turned it into offices for meeting spaces (7 Feb, 2017).*

So, through a partnership process between HNZN, CCC, the police and ACTIS the bar was removed.

## **5.7 Termination of the Aranui Community Renewal project**

All the projects above, happened during eight years of the Community Renewal (2000-2008), in 2008 the project was terminated. But HNZN had started decreasing Aranui funding from 2006 preferring to spend the money on other areas in New Zealand with higher needs. For example, Porirua in Wellington received some of the funding because Porirua's Community Renewal project started after Aranui's. Aranui still had some multi-unit buildings with issues but HNZN project manager said that the funding was limited and they could not spend all of that on Aranui regeneration "*[in Aranui] there were lots of houses that were on our hate list that we never got around to demolishing [them]. We started with the ones that we in the community thought were the worst, the funding that we could access became a point, you know we didn't run out but do higher priorities elsewhere... so, it is case with sort of regeneration project there is always more than could be done, it became a point where the funding is going to be limited, it is going to be rational*" (30 Jan, 2017).

However, in the public election of 2008, the New Zealand government changed and the Labour party left. The National party had new policies and priorities that were very different from "Community Renewal" concepts, so the Community Renewal projects lost their importance and priority (HNZN project manager, 30 Jan, 2017). The HNZN staff at the time declared that after the change in the government they now faced a major lack of funding for the Community Renewal projects and, consequently, some renewal projects, such as Aranui, stopped immediately, in 2008 (HNZN project manager, 30 Jan, 2017). However, by 2010, all the Community Renewal projects were stopped all over New Zealand although the local community people were not happy with for example, ACTIS manager said, "*It was kind of disappointing because we felt at the end that it was not over, but they said the job*

*is done. Because, at that stage, HNZC had built the houses [that] they said they were going to build and they worked with [the] community... Their job was done in terms of capital gains” (17 Jan, 2017).*

In 2010, HNZC went back to its previous tenancy management policy (in the 1990s) and withdrew the ‘Intensive Tenancy Management’ approach established in the Community Renewal project. So, all three tenancy managers in Aranui were asked to go back to their central office in Linwood although they were not happy with it as one of them said, *“We were not that keen on it but that was [a] decision above us” (7 April, 2017).* After that the allocation of the new tenants in the houses became the responsibility of Ministry of Social Development (MSD) and it appears that MSD does not do a pre-evaluation on the people coming to Aranui before allocating them in the houses *“They just pick the next person in the list and put it in the next house, yeah, and it doesn’t matter who they are. And it doesn’t work and it causes a lot of problems” (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017).*

In addition, HNZC changed its approach towards partnership with ACTIS and CCC. After the government change, ACTIS tried to get the commitment of CCC and HNZC to continue their partnership by re-signing the memorandum of understanding but HNZC refused doing that and *“they said the focus had went off and they [HNZC] didn’t re-sign the memorandum but the council did (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017).*

Interestingly, some important HNCZ personalities and the council representatives who were directly involved in Aranui Community Renewal project left HNZC and CCC after the change in the policies and termination of the project. For example, HNZC and CCC project manager both left. HNZC project manager said

*In 2008, [the] government changed and Community Renewal was no longer the thing. By 2010, I was finishing Community Renewal Project in eastern Porirua in Wellington, so there was no really funding for new housing and we just stopped that project and, at that time, I thought it is really time for me to move to something different. What I do now is something similar, I work for a charitable trust that builds new houses, new affordable houses and assist families into those houses that wouldn’t normally be able to afford a new house.... (30 Jan, 2017).*

I need to note that the council had also mayoral elections in 2007 and a new mayor was selected<sup>1</sup>. The council project manager added

*Since the project finished, then I left the CCC and established my own business. [Because of] re-organization within the council, plus the chief executive that we had at the council, I disagreed with her on so many things and the whole unit was re-structured and we had whole*

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<sup>1</sup> Garry Moore (1998-2007) left and Bob Parker was elected.

*a lot of different roles, and there was no role that suited me and over the top of that was [the] chief executive and other people that I no longer respected (16 Feb, 2017).*

So, 2008 was effectively the end of Aranui Community Renewal project. In the remaining section I summarize what was explained above and highlight the significant features of this long process from a collaborative governance perspective.

## **5.8 Chapter Summary**

Before starting collaboration on the housing and upgrading Wainoni Park, there was a process of trust and capability building. Also, key local issues to address were identified. It was because of a pre-history of distrust and conflicts between the agencies and the community that the trust building work was initiated. In addition, Aranui community was a fragmented community of individuals and groups without a leadership or strong representatives to undertake an equal partnership with public organizations. Only after this process was well established did collaboration on housing design, demolition and implementation begin and that same was true with Wainoni Park. The tables below summarize what the participants claimed above, mostly in the words they themselves used. The first table is their belief about the community involvement and community influence on the decisions over the process with a diagram of each partner's influence on the final decisions. The second table is the evidence they provided and is a summary of the characteristics of whole the process of collaboration that the interviewees highlighted above.

Table 5.7 partners' influence on the final decision


Influence	the evidence	influence diagram
<p>Aranui local community highly influenced on the process (planning, design and implementation)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Putting a tender on the demolishing contract to employ local people in demolition, also putting a tender on implementation contract to employ local children on exterior painting of houses, holding three design and refining workshops for each development.</li> <li>Meet and Greet meetings and Applicant-Based Process of tenancy management (to get the community buy-in).</li> <li>Forming the Park Design Group from local people to ensure that community is involved and have input.</li> <li>School Artworks, tiles artworks, mural artworks, Planting Day and children planting the plants, children designing the Pou, children designing ACTIS logo.... (Children's input on the renewal).</li> <li>having a community-based maintenance contract with the Turangawaewae Trust</li> <li>The Pou carved by the local Maori, hāngi facilities, choosing the street name by the local Maori (Maori had input).</li> <li>Affirm festival and the bar closure as two community wants that were achieved</li> <li>Many other examples</li> </ul>	 <p>Most the participants of this research believed that the ideas and recommendations of the Aranui local community and their representatives (ACTIS) had highest importance and priority over the renewal process. In fact, they had the highest level of influence on the process in comparison to HNZC and CCC</p>

Table 5.8 Characteristics of the renewal process based on participants' points of view

Main factors	Characteristics of each factor
Meetings and discussions	<p><b>All meetings and discussions happened in Aranui/in the community</b></p> <p><b>Highly open and inclusive:</b> highly inclusive for everyone but it meant that there has been no restriction for people to participate in all types of meetings, workshops and events over the process. It does not mean that everyone participated and attended the workshops and meetings. Although not everyone was involved, community leaders chosen by the community (ACTIS) were included throughout the process. Maori Hui and Fono were the evidence of ACTIS effort to let everyone have a say.</p> <p><b>Creating a shared understanding:</b> a good and simple platform was provided for the community that let them understand the problems and solutions.</p> <p><b>Combination of formal and informal meetings and discussions:</b> not all the discussions happened in the formal meetings but also some important decisions and ideas came from informal discussions of the partners (such as forming the Park Design Group)</p> <p><b>Combination of Collective and one-to-one discussions:</b> not all the discussions happened collectively but many of them happened one-to-one.</p>
Quality of communications	<p><b>Very friendly, informal and honest communications,</b> HNZN and CCC representatives were very easy to communicate with. <b>Large face-to-face and direct communications</b> with HNZN and CCC representatives.</p> <p><b>Easy accessibility to HNZN and CCC people</b></p> <p>HNZN people using some strategies to improve the quality of their communication with the local community such as:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Being based in the community full-time</li> <li>2) Meet-and-Greet meetings</li> <li>3) Relying in the knowledge of key local people, trustees</li> <li>4) Applicant-based process rather than application-based</li> <li>5) getting receptionists from local people,</li> <li>6) dressing casually not like a police man</li> <li>7) Having the same faces (from the officials) to deal with for 8 years had improved the trust, relationships and the quality of communications with local people.</li> </ol>
Conflicts	<p><b>No significant conflict:</b> (even local people provided awards for officials because of good community engagement).</p> <p><b>'Persuasions':</b> happened in some cases when the local people would ask for some unachievable things legally</p> <p><b>Intra-organizational conflicts</b></p>
Sense of responsibility	High sense of responsibility of actors: The council representative looking for money from everywhere for the park projects.
Timing	<p><b>The design process of housing took around two years from when the project was initiated</b></p> <p><b>The design process of Wainoni Park took around two years from when the project was initiated</b></p>



## **Chapter 6 Finding two:**

### **Aranui Community Renewal: Evaluation of the products across four dimensions**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter aims to present the findings of this research related to four of the questions mentioned in chapter one. Each evaluates one dimension and includes: products, satisfaction with products, connection between process and products and contextual factors. The first relates to evaluating product performance by agreed goals and objectives of the participants. Product performance evaluation is presented in three different sections: outputs, outcomes and adaptation (durability). Most of the chapter deals with product performance because of how important that is for this research. The chapter continues with the second dimension to evaluate which is satisfaction with the products (outputs, outcomes and adaptation). The chapter then evaluates the third dimension which is the connections between process and products of Aranui Community Renewal project; and highlighting those process factors that seemed to have more influence on the products. Finally, context factors are presented being the four factors that highly impacted on the process performance. A short final summary provides the key points of the chapter. It is important to note that I use many quotes from interviews but as explained in the methodology chapter, these are supplemented by observational data and artefact documents and photographs from the project.

#### **6.2 Product Performance: Does the product meet the agreed goals and results of the process?**

As mentioned in chapter two, in this research the product was defined as outputs, outcomes and adaptation (durability). They are discussed one by one.

##### **6.2.1 Outputs**

Outputs have been defined as immediate results, physical outputs, actions, and collections of materials related to the meetings. For evaluating the outputs, they will be compared with the goals and results of the process to and international standards.

The outputs of the Aranui Community Renewal Project included around 50 new houses but also a new playground, the Pou, hangi, artworks, the Affirm festival, a monthly newsletter, Ben Rarere Ave, the Rugby League fields, the upgraded Wainoni Park with new toilets, new carparks, a children's rock

climbing area and more facilities. Other important outputs were the Needs Analysis Report, the Youth Forum, the Maori Hui, the Fono, along with other documents created during an eight-year period. Importantly, ACTIS by itself was an immediate output of the project.

#### 6.1.1.1 New Houses

The new houses were the most obvious physical outputs and they are categorized by:

- *Diversity in typology and aesthetic quality of architecture:* One of the goals of design was building houses with different forms (Aranui Community Renewal Project, 2001). The findings of observations and interviews showed that this goal has been met. The houses have different looks and different colours that resulted in architectural diversity, and that gave further choices of housing to the tenants. The photos below clearly show that.



Figure 6.1 (a,b &c): Community Renewal houses on Hampshire St, Marlow Road and Solent Place Aranui (photo by the author, August 2017)



Figure 6.2 Community Renewal houses on Solent Place from the street (photo by the author, August 2017)

- *Sun-Oriented:* The houses were sun-oriented and had natural heating. The architect said: “[We] looked carefully [about] the orientation of the houses for the sun and ... made sure that they get good sun and good natural insulation through the house” (7 March, 2017). The ACTIS manager confirmed that claim by quoting from a tenant living in one of the houses. “[T]he house is warm and it is cheaper to heat, you don’t need much heating because it is insulated. It is a warmer home and they are north facing (17 Jan, 2017). One of the defined goals of the design process was having a passive solar heating (Aranui Community Renewal Projec, 2001). This goal was achieved by ensuring best orientation to the sun (HNZC project manager, 30 Jan, 2017).

- *Open Private Space and Low Fencing:* The third positive feature of the houses was that all of them have open private spaces. They have a small front garden with low fences as that was what the community wanted (Figs below and above). The fences clearly defined the boundaries between the street and the private spaces. They also have a deck and backyard which is fairly a large open space for the families and children to play (Figs below illustrate that). It appears that providing private open spaces was a priority as it had been defined as a goal. “Low fence or defined boundary to street and having open space” were two defined goals of the design meetings (Aranui Community Renewal Projec, 2001). The evidence show that these two have been fulfilled to a large extent.



Figure 6.3 Backyard of a Community Renewal house on Solent Place (Aranui) showing private open spaces (Photo by the author, August 2017)



Figure 6.4 Backyard of a Community Renewal house on Hampshire Street showing private open spaces and low fencing (Photo by the author, 2017)



Figure 6.5 Children playing in the backyard of a Community Renewal house on Solent Place showing private open spaces (Photo by the author, August 2017)

- *Single-Storey, detached Houses with No Communal Spaces:* During design process the highest priority for the local Aranui community was having single-storey houses. “[A]n individual house on its own piece of land... two-storey houses had a real stigma and they didn’t want to be experimented on” (the architect, 7 March, 2017). Also, they definitely wanted to get rid of the communal spaces,



such as shared driveways. They wanted their own driveways because they used to share one with four or six garages before. The interview data, documents and the observations of the researchers showed that without doubt these two goals were met. ACTIS manager said: “[T]hey built some beautiful new homes in here, we got single dwellings on a single property. They have entry by their own track no shared communal access, were fenced low, high and mixture of fencing and you are in your own driveway and garage ... It was fantastic and we got the chance, I suppose, outside of that we got to have a say and how the design worked” (17 Jan, 2017).



Figure 6.6 A happy tenant in her own driveway on Hampshire St (photo by the author August 2017)

- *Highly Insulated, Warm and Energy-Efficient (green design)*: One of the very important needs of the community was having a warm house and they declared that several times. It seemed that HNZN spent some additional money to improve the quality of houses and one of them was for insulation because they had seen the importance of this factor for the local people and it did not cost them much more (HNZN project manager, 30 Jan, 2017). The HNZN representatives and the architect claimed that they insulated the houses even more than a normal New Zealand house. HNZN project manager said:

*[W]e looked at things for more, small additional costs [that] would give proportionally more benefit. For instance, [we] put more insulation than the building requires in the ceilings because the cost is only marginally higher to put 120 mm of insulation rather than [the] required 115. So, we lifted the insulation of the ceilings because of marginal costs... but it is quite a positive effect in terms of energy conservation and heating cost (30 Jan, 2017).*

The architect confirmed this: “[We] really double glazed those houses and we put lots of insulation under [the] roofs, walls and under the floor. We really insulated them well. It was probably more than normal” (7 March, 2017). Each house had double glazed aluminium windows, heat pumps and low energy compact fluorescent light bulbs, as the community asked for (Portsmouth Street Redevelopment, 2004). The ACTIS manager on behalf of the community said: “[T]he houses are warm

*and it is cheaper to heat, because you don't need much heating because it is insulated, it is north facing and I think it is easier to heat... then people say these houses improve health"* (17 Jan, 2017). So, the data show that this goal of the design process has been met.

- *High Ceiling and Welcoming:* One of the other features of the houses was having a high ceiling for the living rooms to make it welcoming and give people a less enclosed feeling than had been the case with previous state housing. It seemed that the local community people really liked that and provided good comments for the architects about that. In the design workshops, local people, asked the architects to avoid low ceiling. The architect said: *"[W]e tried hard to get a few things in there, the living room has a big ceiling, tall ceiling, 2.7 metres ceiling. It is a much nicer feeling if you get a living room with a tall ceiling, and we were very keen on getting that into the job without adding too much money.... to me it made a huge difference... when they were completed and they had the Opening Day... some of the local community could go in there and have a look and people would walk in and they gave all the comments [like] 'Oh fantastic ceiling'"* (7 march, 2017). It was a goal that was fulfilled even more than what the local people asked for. I have presented the photos below to show the high ceiling.



Figure 6.7 (a&b): Living room and hallway of a Community Renewal house (photo by the author August 2017)

- *Cheaper Materials but Normal and Standard Quality:* In the design workshops, local people asked for using permanent materials for the buildings (Aranui Community Renewal Project, 2001). According to the findings, some cheaper materials have been used for building some parts of the

houses to adjust the HNZN budget, but the architect and HNZN project manager claimed that the materials were still normal, permanent and standard, so the houses are of a good quality. The architect added:

*The cost of the houses that [we] were doing were compared with the cost of [the] normal HNZN houses. So, we had to be very careful with the materials [that] we used and how we designed it. So, we were using materials and things like painted fibre board [that] we wouldn't often use in the houses.... so we had to be pretty careful. For example, the cheapest way to do a roof is a metal roof with hips on roof crosses and things like that. We had to get some good architectural forms out of that sort of construction system, so it didn't cost too much money. But at the end, there wasn't too much difference [with the commercial houses]. I mean, we were trying to design the houses to meet a budget but also to be a normal house so they didn't feel different at all....  
.... the furniture is a bit simpler. We put a laminate bench top and you wouldn't be able to put a stone bench top because that costs so much money. But, other than that, there wasn't too much difference. I mean, when [me and] Chris my business partner we were going to the houses when they were finished, we would say we could live here and we were quite happy to live in these houses, yeah (7 March, 2017).*

The covering and coating of the structure and materials of the houses were described as good quality ones. *"The cladding materials are stained plywood and buff concrete block veneer to provide permanence and solidity to the houses. Each house is identified individually by a strong coloured front door"* (Portsmouth Street Redevelopment, 2004). Oamaru stone, brick and aluminium windows were what the local people wanted which were all applied in the new houses. *"A mix of low maintenance claddings were used to provide durability and variety. The same range of materials as used in private housing"* (HNZN project manager, 30 Jan, 2017).

One of the important factors that helped prove the good quality of the houses was that those tenants living in the houses have not made many complaints about them. It was declared by the tenancy managers<sup>25</sup> *"[T]here were not really complaints about those houses, Generally, the way that properties were constructed I can't think of any complaints, I've just been through my mind and it is nothing. They were double glazed, drop curtains..."* (7 April, 2017). An ACTIS board member confirmed that: *"one of my friends lives in one of them she likes it. In the beginning, because it was new and she was living in, I went back about six months later and said, 'Got any complaints?' She said there have been a few things but she has been around with Antony [the tenancy manager] and they fixed it so it is all good but she still likes it. So, I would not take my feedback from Antony and John [the tenancy managers] but from someone actually who lives in the house"* (10 April, 2017).

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<sup>25</sup> HNZN did not provide the researcher with the data on the complaints. These were just anecdotal comments and what the tenancy manager found in Aranui.

In addition, the Christchurch City Council inspected every house, as they are bound to do by law under the Resource Management Act 1991, to see if they were up to standard. After finishing the building stage, the council inspectors visited the houses in Aranui and they gave a Code Compliance Certificate, which meant everything was good (the architect, 7 March, 2017). So, although cheaper materials were used in some parts of the houses, they have a standard and good quality. In fact, the Aranui Community Renewal houses won an important architectural award. When the first group of houses in Portsmouth Street were revealed in 2003, they received an award from the New Zealand Institute of Architects Canterbury (Wilson & Hill Architects, 2017). The architect said: *“I think the reason was [that] it was social housing and it was a good example of it”* (7 March, 2017).

- **Smaller Size:** The size of the houses is smaller than the normal private houses because HNZN has its own standards for state houses and keeps them a little different from normal private houses. The architect said: *“The difference [with the private houses] is probably the size of the house. We had to be very careful with the size of the houses. HNZN had a certain size and does a bedroom in a certain size and it was very small for us. The bedroom is small<sup>26</sup> [smaller than normal] and kitchens were quite simple.... but it wasn’t too dissimilar from what you would see in other subdivisions* (7 March, 2017). Small-size bedrooms is not an ideal result but there was no agreed goal for it during the design process and it seemed no one talked or even considered the size of bedrooms. None of the community people that I talked to complained about the sizes of the rooms but they all had a very positive perspective about the houses and said that they were quality houses. They even thought that during the process of building, the houses incrementally got better and better one after another. For example, ACTIS manager said: *“[E]very set [that] they built, they looked at it again and said what we could do differently, some of them got solar heating, so they got better and better and better”* (17 Jan, 2017). The HNZN project manager, however, said that there was no incremental improvement and all the houses had the same quality, and there was no solar heating because it was very expensive (30 Jan, 2017).

- **Interior layout with respect to culture:** One of the positive characteristics of the interior design of the houses was related to the laundry and kitchen. The designers have respected Maori culture, because the Maori people wanted separate kitchens and laundries. One of ACTIS Maori board member said: *“[W]e are Maori, we do not wash our clothes and eat in the same place that is a no, no”* (10 April, 2017). So, a separate place was built far from the kitchen for the laundry and, in some houses, the laundry was designed to be in garages. It was a factor that Maori tenants were really happy about.

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<sup>26</sup> I have seen the rooms but actually they were not that small. They were even bigger than some of the rooms in the private houses at Lincoln that I have lived in.



The local people also asked for separation of toilets from bathrooms. While in the one-bedroom houses the toilet and bathroom stayed in the one room, in the larger houses toilets are separated from the bathroom. *“The number and placement of toilets was determined by the size of the house and the likely number of occupants. Locating the toilet in the bathroom of a one-bedroom house for an older person works well and is more cost-efficient design. Accessible showers were used in the one-bedroom houses for older persons. All but the one-bedroom houses had baths installed as well as a separate shower cabinet”* (HNZC project manager, 30 Jan 2017). So, the Maori concerns about separating the laundry and kitchen, and general concerns about separating toilets from bathrooms were largely achieved.



Figure 6.8 (a&b): Kitchen and laundry in the Community Renewal houses (photo by the author, March, 2017)



Figure 6.9 (a&b): Kitchen, laundry and toilet in the Community Renewal houses (photo by the author, March 2017)

On the Opening Day of the houses, a media reporter interviewed some local women while visiting the buildings and they stated how happy they were with the houses.

*This is what I like [about the kitchen]. I mean, even, say, someone a little big larger than myself, they've got plenty of room through here. You're not bashing against the cupboards as you go in. You have got a separate space for your fridge, which is good. [Reporter said] Tell me about that. Doesn't everywhere have that? [The woman answered] No, no way. [Reporter said] What else is here that you guys were kind of part of designing? [The woman answered] Single storey, because the blocks they had here were two-storey and one family was living on top of another*

*and that really led to a lot of difficulties between tenants and complications when they didn't get along and maybe kids were upstairs jumping around and maybe older people downstairs that didn't appreciate it... It is not square (the fences) it's one, two, three, four, five, six angles of the fence. It breaks the monotony on that. Well, people are going to be proud of what they are in, you know. Good feeling when you are in a good house. If you are in something just bad to begin with it doesn't give you much hope. Here, I don't know what to say, it is just a great place (McKenzie, 2008).*

The participants claimed that all the objectives and goals of the design process were incorporated into the houses. The table below, is the list of all the defined goals of design workshops. I have shown the goals that have been incorporated with a tick (✓) and the ones that haven't been incorporated by a (✗). Then, I have explained why some goals have not been met (with the help of the architect and HNZN project manager). However, almost all of the defined goals of housing design workshops have been fulfilled.

Table 6.1 Defined goals in the consultation meetings (12 November, 2001) (Aranui Community Renewal Project, 2001)

Defined goals			Explanation
<b>FORM OF HOUSES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Not all to look the same</li> <li>B. Orientated for the sun - passive solar design</li> <li>C. Tenants want to take 'ownership' of</li> <li>D. 'Clusters' of houses - not all strung out evenly across the site</li> <li>E. Pacific Island families - a lot of space and open space</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. ✓</li> <li>B. ✓</li> <li>C. ✓</li> <li>D. ?</li> <li>E. ✓</li> </ul>	<p>D: Clustering was used more to group a small number of houses designed for specific tenant profiles together such as one-bedroom houses for older single tenants.</p> <p>E: Practical and council planning requirements meant that the open space allocated to each house needed to be appropriate in regard to the likely size of the families who would be tenants.</p>
<b>MATERIALS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Permanent materials</li> <li>B. Aluminium windows</li> <li>C. Brick, Oamaru stone, no paint</li> <li>D. No Gib board</li> <li>E. Large areas of glass mean large areas of curtains and large areas of windows to clean</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. ✓</li> <li>B. ✓</li> <li>C. ✓</li> <li>D. -</li> <li>E. ✓</li> </ul>	<p>D: Gib board is an interior plaster board lining that is used on probably 99% of new housing. The participants were not aware that there was really no alternative interior lining.</p>
<b>FENCES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Low fence or defined boundary to street</li> <li>B. Fences downside boundaries</li> <li>C. Brick fences</li> <li>D. Fences range in height</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. ✓</li> <li>B. ✓</li> <li>C. ✗</li> <li>D. ✓</li> </ul>	<p>C: Brick fences were outside of the budget constraint and would have also been out of character with the rest of the neighborhood. A range of lighter timber fencing designs were used that promoted passive observation of the street.</p>
<b>OUTDOOR LIVING AREAS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Good relationship with living area of house - doors opening onto covered area opening onto outdoor living area</li> <li>B. Small areas offering some flexibility and options for planting</li> <li>C. No shared outdoor space</li> <li>D. Space for small vegetable garden (2 sqm) useful</li> <li>E. Decking off house</li> <li>F. Children play in front of house</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. ✓</li> <li>B. ✓</li> <li>C. ✓</li> <li>D. ✓</li> <li>E. ✓</li> <li>F. ✓</li> </ul>	<p>A: Indoor/outdoor living flow was a feature of all the housing designs.</p>
<b>HEATING / VENTILATION</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Dampness and mold currently a big problem</li> <li>B. Good rangehoods and extract fans a necessity</li> <li>C. Passive solar heating</li> <li>D. Possibility to avoid log burners with good insulation</li> <li>E. Night store heaters</li> <li>F. Gas vs electric to be determined</li> <li>G. double glazing</li> <li>H. Plenty of hot water required</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. ✓</li> <li>B. ✓</li> <li>C. ✓</li> <li>D. ✓</li> <li>E. ✗</li> <li>F. ✓</li> <li>G. ✓</li> <li>H. ✓</li> </ul>	<p>E: Not used as power supply companies had started to remove the lower night rate tariff so no financial benefit in using this type of heating.</p> <p>H: Cylinder sizes were matched to house sizes to ensure sufficient hot water supply.</p>

<b>DRIVEWAYS</b>	A. Two houses can share a driveway B. Driveways to rear sites require visitor carpark		A. ✓ B. ✓
<b>PLANNING OF HOUSES</b>	General	Open plan arrangement with bedrooms separate from living areas, avoid low ceilings, living area to have view of street, changing of light bulbs can be an issue for elderly, Access for elderly / disabled an issue, Sun very important, Some skylights	✓
	Garages	Garages attached to house, bedroom units require double garage, Laundry can go in garage, Sleepout attached to garage could be an option	✓
	If two storey unites	Generous stairways with good handrails, Sound insulation to floor, A bathroom or WC would be required upstairs	-
	Front entry	Solid door with peep hole or small window, Entry porch with space for shoes, Security screen doors front and back, Memorable entry going into house, Design of letterbox important, Security lighting	✓
	Kitchen	Pantry, Fridge space to cater for a variety of types, sink to face living area, Good flow of workspace, Plenty of bench space, Space for microwave, Good sized oven	✓
	bathroom	Toilets separate from bathroom in larger units, Separate toilets with whb and large enough to turn around in, Floor drains - always flood, Shub baths to bigger units, (2) toilets to bigger units, Accessible level entry showers	✓
			B: Council planning rules required provision of adequate visitor parking on all sites.

- *National and International Standards:* Aranui houses were built according to New Zealand building standards and their quality is based on these standards. All the houses are public rental accommodation or “social housing” which is different from private rental housing. Following the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 all houses that are built as rental housing have to be constructed in compliance with the Building Act and the relevant “Building Codes” at the time of construction (MBIE, 1986). In 2001, when the construction started, Building Act 1991 designed by Department of Internal Affairs was the reference. I have built a table and categorized all the standards with their functional requirement in a table in Appendix E.1 (7 main standards and 30 sub-standards). Christchurch city council evaluated the quality of Aranui houses and all of them received ‘*Code Compliance Certificate*’. The important point is that in the 1990s and early 2000s in New Zealand, there were some changes to building regulations such as non-monitoring of performance standards, and it led to failures of some buildings in New Zealand under the “leaky buildings”. Importantly, Aranui houses built in the Community Renewal project avoided these risks associated with 1990s constructions in New Zealand and none of them appear to be leaky or substandard.

In terms of international standards for building, it was a big challenge for me to find international standards for housing quality in general and for rental houses or social housing quality in particular. There seem to be a lack of international standards for housing quality in the world for example, OECD countries have defined 6 international standards but some of them are very general for example, good quality of construction materials. It does not say which construction materials are standard. Therefore, I have tried to find the standards of some particular countries and compare them with Aranui houses to see the difference. The table below, is a comparison of Aranui houses with the Ireland standards for social rental houses.

Table 6.2 Ireland's standards for rental social houses (Citizens Information Board, 2005) read against Aranui houses

Factors	Requirement in Ireland	Aranui houses
<b>Structural condition</b>	Proper structural state of the houses inside and out including roofs, floors, ceiling, walls, stairs not subject to serious dampness or liable to collapse.	Aranui houses seem to be in a good structural condition inside and out. They are solid and stable.
<b>Heating and cooking</b>	Installation of cooking equipment with provision, where necessary, for the safe and effective removal of fumes.	Aranui houses all are equipped with a 4-ring hob with oven, grill and cooker hood.
	Facilities for Hygienic storage of food	there are plenty of cabinets provided in the kitchen for hygienic food storage
	A fixed heating appliance in each room, which is capable of providing effective heating and which the tenant can control	There is no fixed heating appliance for each room in Aranui houses
	A fire blanket and smoke alarms	Every room and public areas have smoke alarms but there is no fire blanket.
	Access to vermin-proof and pest-proof refuse storage facilities	In New Zealand, generally it is unnecessary to have such a facility because there is no many pests.
<b>Electricity and gas</b>	Landlord needs to supply electricity and gas in the house and make sure that they are safe and efficient.	All of the houses are supplied with electricity but there is no gas supplement.
<b>Ventilation and lighting</b>	Every room that intended to be used shall have adequate natural lightning, artificial lighting	All of rooms are supplied with a big window and get natural lighting also they are supplied with proper artificial lighting that make movements safe at night.
	Every room used, or intended for use, by the tenant of the house as a habitable room shall have adequate ventilation and natural lighting and all windows and other means of ventilation shall be maintained in good repair and working order.	All rooms have windows directly opening to the external air and utilized natural lightning.
	Every bathroom and water closet shall have direct ventilation to external air either by a window or an open area not less than 1 square meters or by means of mechanical extract ventilation capable of extracting.	All of bathrooms and water closet have a huge window sometimes even more than 1 square meters and also a fan so they have both types of ventilation.
<b>Sinks, water closets, fixed baths, showers and water supply</b>	a sink with hot and cold water shall be provided	All the houses have a sink with hot and cold water
	a separate room with a toilet and water closet, wash basin, fixed bath, shower and having cold and hot water and enough pip supply shall be provided	All the houses meet this requirement. In addition, some of them have separate room for toilet.
<b>Basements, outoffices, yards and boundaries</b>	Every unoccupied basement or cellar in the building containing the house shall be maintained in good repair and in a clean condition;	There is no basement or cellar in the buildings (normally, there is no basement in houses in New Zealand except for commercial buildings)
	All out offices, yards and forecourts within the curtilage of the building containing the house and all boundary walls, fences and railings shall be maintained in good repair.	Most of them have been well-maintained to a high degree until now by both HNZN and tenants.

Based on the table above, Aranui houses meet most of Ireland standards but in terms of heating and supplying gas they fell below Ireland standards. There is no fixed heating appliance for each room in Aranui houses which is a requirement in Ireland. Aranui houses just have a heat pump in the living room and that is for whole the house. Also, in Ireland supplying both electricity and gas is one of the requirements while Aranui houses only have electricity, which is normal in New Zealand. However, gas is a natural resource that is relatively more accessible in some counties or regions in the world, such as Europe, but not in New Zealand, so it might be only a difference between these two not a deficiency of New Zealand houses. In addition, Aranui houses have some better facilities than Ireland ones for example, in Ireland providing a washing machine and a 4-ring hob with oven is necessary for private rentals not social houses. While all Aranui houses were provided with a place for laundry having a washing machine also a 4-ring hob with oven.

I have also built up a table of LEED's standards (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) in Appendix E.2 (LEED, 2013). It is the most widely used green building rating system in the world. LEED provides a framework to create healthy, highly efficient and cost-saving green buildings and it is a globally recognized symbol of sustainability achievement. It provides a set of high level standards for building and not every house is expected to meet all the requirements in order to be standard (it has 4 targeted standard level including Certified, Silver, Gold and Platinum). I have tried to evaluate Aranui houses according to LEED standards (with the help HNZN project manager). The results showed that, Aranui houses meet more than half of LEED standards.

In conclusion, to a large extent, Aranui houses have met almost all of defined goals and objectives of the design process. Houses are standard based on New Zealand scale and are sustainable according to LEED standards. However, in terms of heating and supplying both gas and electricity, they are different from Ireland standards but not necessarily below Ireland standards.

#### **6.1.1.2 Upgraded Wainoni park**

- *Improved Access, Informal Supervision and Relationship of the Park with Surroundings:* These factors were some of the goals defined in the consultation process with the community and professionals and also to apply CPTED principles for Wainoni Park (Wainoni Park Renewal, 2007). The data showed that these goals were met by removing the boundaries of the park, fences and some of HNZN's houses. In the north of the park a road was built facing the park and in one side of the road new single-storey houses were built overlooking the park. Then an accessway to Aldershot St was created (Wainoni Park Renewal, 2007). There is access to Wainoni Park from all four streets around it. All the buildings around the park are single-storey houses. All of these features have greatly



improved access to the park and have opened up views to the park and created a good relationship of the park with the surrounding environment (Wainoni Park Renewal, 2007, p.3).

- *Improved Visual Amenity of The Park:* One of the other goals was to make the park physically attractive and beautiful. To meet this goal planting days were held and many plants and mature trees were planted in the park, the tagged fences and graffiti were removed and many artworks were installed across the park (Wainoni Park Renewal, 2007). All the ugly two-storey HNZC rental properties around the park were replaced with typical New Zealand single-storey houses, which look much more attractive and conventional by New Zealand suburban standards (Wainoni Park Renewal, 2007). “[It all] has vastly improved the visual amenity of the park and surrounding properties” (Wainoni Park Renewal, 2007, p.3). So, the evidence showed that this goal has been met.



Figure 6.10 (a&b): A view of Wainoni Park from Hampshire street (photo by the author, March 2017)

- *More Recreational Opportunities and Carparks in Wainoni Park:* One of the main defined goals of the process was creating more facilities in the park for people to use and also to solve the lack of parking around Wainoni Park (Wainoni Park Renewal, 2007). The small playground was relocated, upgraded and extended with additional play items and youth recreational facilities: climbing rocks and walls, flying foxes, skate facilities, seating, a netball court and a volleyball net (Wainoni Park Renewal, 2007). A picnic and hangi area, a special event area, along with gardens and quiet seating areas, were added. By upgrading the rugby field, the league reclaimed the park as their home ground supported by new toilets and changing rooms (Wainoni Park Renewal, 2007,). New car parking was added in six places on the new road facing the park and also a new carpark was built adjacent to the new playground. So, the aforementioned goals were met by doing considerable work in the park (Wainoni Park Renewal, 2007)




Figure 6.11 (a&b): Children on their new rock in Wainoni Park (photo by: CCC Park and Waterways Manager, 2005)




Figure 6.12 (a&b): People playing sport on Wainoni Park, Aranui (photo by: CCC Park and Waterways Manager, 2005)

### **6.1.1.3 Affirm - a community sharing day**

Affirm was one of immediate outputs of the project established at the beginning of the project (2002) by the three partners. But it was still going in 2018, long after Community Renewal had ended and it continues to be led by ACTIS. The local Aranui community asked to have a special day to celebrate Aranui and to be proud of it, so they achieved what they wanted. Affirm seemed to be a very successful output. It is very well-attended and a great day for community sharing and community connectedness. The Council development advisor stated:

*So, 2018 would be the 17th one this year. It is really, really good, so, basically that day is just about community sharing. So, they have got the stage and they have cultural performances and they acknowledge successes in the community so they may have youth awards and things like that, any changes. So, we had big mergers at the schools just recently and they are acknowledging the past principals for all the working commitment [they made] in the area and then have free things for the kids, interactive stuff, big bouncy*

*balls, jumps whatever, bikes, bouncy castles, things like that and then they have all the education and health and training things. So, HNZA would have a tent, CCC would have a tent, they have the stop gambling and smoke free test, free blood test, employment.... they [people who attend Affirm] take up all the park and they just follow with stalls, entertainment and all those sorts of things for the day. That is really well attended around 3000 to 9000 people attend, it is local but it is so wide and well known that people can come in... I think the biggest year we had was when Scribe came in and he is a boy grown up in Aranui and was quite famous and popular back many years ago so everybody from Christchurch came for free concert. The schools usually come and do cultural performances and things like that and yeah it is really a good way of connecting the community (23 Feb, 2017).*

#### **6.1.1.4 ACTIS: A well-known and developing community organization**

ACTIS was an immediate output of the Community Renewal established in 2001. So, here I will just look at ACTIS as an output but later in the outcome and adaptation parts I will explain what ACTIS has done for Aranui over the years.

The Community Renewal ended in 2008 and partners who supported ACTIS left, but ACTIS stayed alive and now, in 2018, ACTIS was still working as a very well-known community organization in the whole of Christchurch (the MP, 13 April, 2017). ACTIS has nine board members and two of them are Maori women, the remainder are a mix of Europeans and Pasifika. It also has a manager who does the everyday management and implement plans and projects. Four of the board members and the ACTIS manager have been working for ACTIS since 2001, when ACTIS was established, until the time of writing. It has been 17 years of work as representatives Aranui. Most of them are local and they are described as very skilled with strong personalities for this job. The Council development adviser said:

*It is the thing that always amazes me about the committee and the trust members is their longevity, their passion for it and their skills for it.... you got local matriarch Nolene, she is there... she is very, very much one of the people in the community that the community look to and if she tells you to do something you get to do it (23 Feb, 2017).*

The ACTIS manager is described as “a very extraordinary manager, she is very strong, she is very focused, honest and committed” (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017). Having local people working in ACTIS has made them more passionate and serious for this work as ACTIS manager said:

*Most people who work here are local in our trust, everyone has skills. I have worked here for 16 years, before that I was in the Justice Department for 12 years, I also did lots and lots of sport teams, so I have lots of knowledge around sport, the law and reading. I could read legislation and I was born here and I had a passion to want to work in the community. I have got workers... who are here for a reason, and don't want to sit and have a coffee at the community shops, I am serious, my board is serious. I work for my board, and I have run about 10 different contracts and I have to get it right because I have to be accountable back to them so we continue to get money. So, I think this part and this place is where people are local so*

*we do really have a passion and a drive to allow our people to do well or get to where they need to be (17 Jan, 2017).*

Over the years, ACTIS has tried to keep the community involved and informed by establishing monthly newsletter and a Facebook page. The newsletter, which was funded by the organizations in the Community Renewal Project has never stopped publications, even after the formal end of the project. The ACTIS manager has stated: *"We have been running that (the newsletter) for 16 years, that was really the communication one to the home. The people we didn't see a lot of but like this; for example, "Hi guys, we are working on that, and the next month here is the update". It might be the same but we are taking them on the journey (17 Jan, 2017).* One of the main titles of the newsletter is: *"Aranui: A proud community of hope and opportunities where people stand tall"* (ACTIS, 2001). ACTIS has expanded over the years and they have bought a new building, which used to be a bar. With the help of HNZA and CCC the bar was closed and ACTIS bought the building for community meetings. When they started there were 12 people but now they have got 12 workers as well (paid workers who undertake community development tasks) so, they have developed and expanded (ACTIS manager, 17 Jan, 2017). The findings shows that ACTIS seems to have been a very strong advocate for Aranui which met the purpose of creating such an entity during the Community Renewal Project.

#### **6.1.1.5 The Needs Analysis Report as an impactful document**

Many documents and events were created during the Community Renewal Project and these qualify as outputs of the project. They included the Needs Analysis results, the Maori Hui and Fono, the Youth Forum, and all the minutes and many more documents and notes. The most important published output was the Needs Analysis survey which seemed to be a very successful document because it was not only the basis for whole Community Renewal but also the council was still using that years after the renewal. For example, the council was now going to build two full-size basketball courts in Wainoni Park that the community asked for in the Needs Analysis survey. The ACTIS staff were shocked when hearing about that. The Council Park and Waterways manager said: *"Talking to Elizabeth (ACTIS manager) a few weeks ago and said that's what we are going to do and her and Jane said 'We thought that plan had all gone and you had given it away.' But the plans are still there and we are trying to get funding for that, we are still following that plan that is just taking longer and they said the demand is there for the courts, netball is growing, basketball is still popular"* (CCC Park and Waterways manager, 28 Feb, 2017).

In the section above I presented outputs of Aranui Community Renewal project. According to the data provided above, it seemed that the outputs of Community Renewal met the agreed goals of the process to a large extent. Most people who were involved in the project believed that the outputs

were exactly what they wanted them to be. However, the houses do not meet all of the international standards.

## **6.2.2 Outcomes**

Outcomes were defined as the direct evidence of benefits for stakeholders and they showed changes in the conditions that were undesirable. The outcome assessment focused on the extent to which the designated goals in targeted public conditions, goods, service or product were achieved. Also, how people used and experienced the outputs can help to evaluate the outcomes. The outcomes of the Aranui Renewal are as follows:

### **6.1.2.1 Safety, privacy and health**

Safety was one of the most important outcomes of the project. We have already pointed to some signs of safety being improved in Aranui. For example, the police, often viewed with suspicion in former times, were accepted as having a base in Aranui after five years of partnership because the area looked safer than before. Demolishing multi-storey buildings, building single-storey houses, removing fences around the park, building a road overlooking the park and tenancy management activities were seen as the factors that made the area safer. For example, Wainoni Park was seen very much safer than before as Community Constable said *“From my observations and experience, incidents of disorder and anti-social behaviour in the park have diminished. The space is now used for a legitimate purpose. People feel safer”* (Wainoni Park Renewal, 2007, p.4). This safety in Wainoni Park is related to applying CPTED principles and increasing informal supervision on the park:

*The park has been made safer through application of CPTED principles such as increased surveillance and visibility, attracting more people into the park, improving sightlines, and avoiding entrapment spots. Most of the six-foot-high tagged fences that closed in the park have been removed or changed to open fencing... Opening up views into the park by removing houses and creating new road frontage with houses facing into the park has greatly increased surveillance and safety* (Wainoni Park Renewal, 2007, p.4)

The new playground is a good symbol of safety, it is located in an open area and whenever I have been in Aranui I have found it very busy and full of children playing with the equipment. The ACTIS manager said, *“[T]he playground is such an amazing facility.... they put CPTED... trees don’t grow high so kids can be seen. And [there are] speed reductions so, if they are running full tick, these barriers got to slow them down ...* (17 Jan, 2017). Moreover, the houses were reported by the community representatives to be secure places for them and their children to play because they have a front yard and the backyards were fenced (Fig 6.6). They also have a higher level of privacy because they have no communal space. The ACTIS manager stated:

*We talked to lots of people and ask, "What do you like about the new houses? They said, 'I love it, just love my garage, all I can get and pass in my own front door, I don't need to pass anybody to get in there, that's secure for the kids.....' They said they were built nice, they just like the landscape of them and the privacy. You are in your individual space; they are secure. You don't fight with your neighbours as much because I am not parked in your space. "Get out of my driveway." That view that people have with communal access and driveways and that happens all over the city (persona communication, 17 Jan, 2017).*

Although I do not have official statistics about health in the area, the community representatives claimed that the houses increased the health in the area *"I think it is easier to heat, lots of health problems come from the cold houses [that] are not insulated so people are cold, then people get sick all the time, then they get ill. Then [that's why] people say these houses improve health"* (ACTIS manager, 17 Jan, 2017).

### **6.1.2.2 Well-used products**

The data showed that all the outputs of the Community Renewal were well-used. The houses were very well-occupied and many of the tenants who originally moved into the houses were still living in them<sup>27</sup> (Tenancy Manager, 7 April, 2017). I asked one of them; why do you still live in this house? She said, *"Oh, I love it... I love everything that I have done here, I am really happy with it. Life is what you make up....."* (1 March, 2017). The new road is highly used by the local community. *"It is really well-utilised road that they have built houses looking into it. And the percentage of usage of the park is 70%<sup>28</sup> more than was 15 years ago"* (ACTIS manager, 17 Jan, 2017). Although in the past the families were scared to let their children play in the playground, the new playground was always busy and crowded so the council now used the park as a place to test new equipment for other play areas in the city. The CCC Park and Waterways manager said:

*[The] playground was moved [and] it is really well used. It's a good place to test the new equipment. We put an artificial climbing rig, they dug out all the back and go underneath it.... We thought, if that catches on fire and they are stuck in underneath there that's so dangerous... we took it away and then put a bottom on it and then put it back. So, that is the first rock we have done like that in Christchurch (28 Feb, 2017).*

One of the highly important uses of Wainoni Park is for the sports and, specifically, Rugby League. Since the playing field has been upgraded, ACTIS could bring the Rugby League team back to Aranui. Every Saturday rugby league was played in Wainoni Park. Wainoni Park even hosts international Rugby teams to do their training in the park. In general, Wainoni Park with all the facilities has become a

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<sup>27</sup> HNZN did not provide me with the data on the use and how long tenants stayed ...

<sup>28</sup> This is anecdotal, I have checked with the city council for the official data but there are no data there about use of the parks.

focal point in Aranui. People get together and use the park as a hub. The CCC Park and Waterways manager stated:

*The place is so well used now, It has become a real community focal point. They have big events [there]. The playground, sports are really good so that's growing and it means that other people are using the park and they have events and things and it's a big community centre. It has become a real community focal point while it before used to be a quite an unsafe area (28 Feb, 2017).*

#### **6.1.2.3 A Sense of ownership**

Aranui local community people have a strong sense of ownership towards the outputs of the Community Renewal, including housing and the park. They believed that they owned everything because they have been involved in the design and implementation of them. One of the ACTIS board members said:

*It is not just for us it is for everybody. We have got the houses, we have got the park and we have got the games here and we have got the playground and we have got all the artworks and all the children in the community helped with.... So, they did things, designs were chosen and we made little tiles, these all things are community-owned and everybody had a part in it. Then we decided where we wanted to put things. Then we planted [the plants], then we did the tiles. So, even though the council was doing [things] we wanted to pay the x amount to do it and we did it and it gave us ownership (10 April, 2017).*

The ACTIS chairperson stated that the objective behind the community involvement was building community ownership: “[T]he idea was to get the community engagement, to get people taking responsibility and making decisions and to try to encourage ownership of the issues the solutions” (7 Feb, 2017). It seemed that they fulfilled this goal, the example below illustrates how the local people showed their ownership feeling on the housing Opening Day and on Planting day.

*When houses were built before people moved in, we took those same people [who were involved in design] through these houses... To them it was a real feeling that they have contributed to the new housing. [And] even if they saw people who rented that house they said to them. “That house is a warm house because we said it needs good insulation, good heating”. That gives them a sense of ownership and some control or direction on what’s happening in their community rather than us coming as HNZC and saying we know how to do it, so, don’t worry give it to us. So, [an] exact difference and that’s whole community development type (HNZC project manager, 30 Jan, 2017).*

*I remember on the planting day talking about hoping that it doesn’t get wrecked and we don’t want people to come along and rip it out. And the local people were saying “I will be watching this garden. If I see anyone coming and wrecking things, they will have me to face!” And they were like, “We are looking after this garden and nobody is going to wreck it. It is our garden”. And the little kids who were doing it were coming out and watering it each day. Yeah, and they really took ownership and it was cool (CCC Park and Waterways manager, 28 Feb, 2017).*

#### 6.1.2.4 Identity, image and pride

With the start of the Community Renewal project, the Aranui people felt that the stigma and negative attitudes about Aranui were still on their shoulders. They strongly connected that stigma to multi-storey buildings and believed that getting rid of that stigma was an important need for them. They claimed that this need was met in the Community Renewal Project. An ACTIS board member said:

*Yes [they met the community needs] because the houses that we had [were] like a massive big block and everybody knew everyone and that was a whole lot of crime in there. And, like, when they pulled [them] down it was like a great and big relief, like everything had been lifted off you. Because it had been a whole lot of stigma with those properties. They hadn't been fixed or anything, they were there and HNZC just didn't care. So, when they all [were] smashed down, everybody felt a relief they felt renewal. And so that was... making us to breath because all [people] had sad stories about those properties. They were gone and new ones were coming in, fresh start, new beginning let's go with that (10 April, 2017).*

This meant that the image of Aranui improved and moved towards having a better identity with the demolition of those old houses and the building of new ones with a totally different character, shape and landscape. The new ones do not reveal the residents' identity as low-income people and give them confidence about themselves. The ACTIS manager compared the community renewal houses with the latest one that was built after the 2011 earthquakes:

*Ideally you should not be able to drive down the street and identify where people live... People drive down here and they don't even know that they are state homes. You know, that's how it should be; there's a mixture of tenure and it is great. Then they [HNZC] went backwards and built these new houses and it is like, straight away you judge, they are all the poor people. And that's what we got away from [but] Housing New Zealand put them back (17 Feb, 2017).*

The perspective of the Aranui people within themselves about their neighbourhood has undergone a definite change (The community development advisor, 23 Feb, 2017). They feel their area is changing for the better and they are proud of that. This feeling was called "identity" by (Dixon et al., 2009). One of the ACTIS board members living in Aranui for around 60 years said:

*[F]amilies [in Aranui] are not as bad as they used to be. They are sort of growing up a bit... It is the way I have always wanted it to go. Back then it was a place of gangs, we are better than that, that's what I wanted cut out... Aranui is much better now. I am proud of Aranui because it is going the way I really vision what would be like. I am happy with the renewal, you know some pieces and parts of Aranui are far greater than what they used to be (1 March, 2017).*

It appears that the perspectives of non-residents who were involved in Community Renewal have also positively changed. For example the architect said:

*If there was not that [project] I would still drive through Aranui and not stop. Communities like that get often a bad press and things like that but you get down there and get involved*



*in this. Then you know it is all people living there, trying to bring up their kids. Yeah, [my perspective] changed a lot by being involved there (7 March, 2017).*

#### 6.1.2.5 Less transient population

One of the factors that the participants see as an important outcome of the project was the change in demographic trends of Aranui. They believed that the migration from Aranui had decreased since the project was implemented. Aranui has always been known as an area having a high rate of transient residents and this population was mostly tenants of HNZN's houses. *"We do not have that huge transient population anymore so, people are happy, they stay longer they like their homes and they want to be a part of the community.... And also they participate, they engage more. Those houses made a huge impact in here (ACTIS manager, 17 Jan, 2017)<sup>29</sup>.*




Figure 6.13 Growth rate of Aranui and Christchurch population (Statistics New Zealand, 1991 AND 2006)

I have compared the population growth of Aranui and Christchurch from 1991 until 2006 (the latest census before 2011 earthquakes). The data showed that the population of Aranui decreased, from 1991 until 2001, while it experienced growth from 2001 until 2006 (the same time as the renewal). According to Kelly (2008), for the first time since 1981 the population of Aranui started to grow and, in 2006, it had its highest growth rate (3.1%) since 1981. At that time, the Community Renewal was about to finish because the new houses were completed and most of Wainoni Park had been upgraded. I am unable to claim that all of this growth was because of Community Renewal but what I can say was that the Community Renewal probably had an impact on the positive growth in Aranui's population. However, this population increase changed into a huge reduction in 2010 and 2011 because of the two large earthquakes experienced in the city. The normal census was not conducted

<sup>29</sup> Although HNZN did not provide the researcher with the immigration data and turnovers. Also, there is a lack in New Zealand census data, as it does not provide immigration data for suburbs and just covers cities and regions. The Christchurch City Council also claimed that they have no data about transient population for the suburbs in the city. However, one piece of data that I found helpful was the normal population data that showed the growth in Christchurch's suburbs.

in New Zealand in 2011 and even if it were I could not compare that with the 2006 census results because of earthquakes' impact on migration.

HNZC's tenancy managers saw the reduction in the transient population as a result of change in the HNZC tenancy management policies, "*[The] transient population decreased... [because at the time] we didn't worry about a house might be empty for another week we were trying to make the right allocation for the right person to the house. So, there was going to be sustainable and workable options...*" (7 April, 2017). However, a less transient population seemed to be an outcome of Community Renewal.

#### **6.1.2.6 Learning to seek for new developments**

Because of Community Renewal the local Aranui community learned to pursue other community development projects and measurements of well-being in their area. ACTIS was formed very early in the Community Renewal process and it quickly looked for different ways to bring new development initiatives to Aranui. ACTIS had the ability to make connections to government, non-government and private organizations in order to solve some of Aranui's problems, meet the community needs and bring some significant benefits for the area. This is evident in at least five examples: 1) successful bidding for the Strengthening Communities Action Fund; 2) Community Education and Empowerment projects; 3) Outcome-based Measurements; 4) the Heartland project; and 5) Individual Learning and Empowerment.

##### **6.1.2.6.1 SCAF; Community access to the government fund**

As mentioned earlier, in 2000, the Minister of Social Development (MSD) initiated a project called 'Strengthening Communities Action Fund (SCAF) that was about devolving government funding to the communities... it was about \$200,000 a year for four years" (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017). In 2000, the Christchurch East MP applied for Aranui to receive SCAF funding when the Community Renewal had not yet started and the Community Trust (ACTIS) had not yet been formed. She said Aranui was rejected, "*because there was no capacity of organizations to do this*" This meant that there was no organization to provide a plan for Aranui and be accountable for it (the MP, 13 April, 2017). After ACTIS was formed ACTIS board members applied for the second round of SCAF in 2001. They were required to provide a primary plan about who and how they wanted to spend the money. ACTIS provided its own plan and submitted that and this was approved by the Minister so they won the funding in 2002.

The MP believed that Aranui won the fund because the renewal process had already given them the ability and confidence to collaborate with the other organizations. She was happy to see the Community Renewal happening first even though at the beginning she wanted SCAF for Aranui rather than the renewal project.

*It [the Community Renewal] was the opposite to what I wanted but actually I say now that it was the right way around because with the housing they gained confidence to work in a collaborative way with [the] central and local governments in terms of helping to promote the design of their community housing themselves and so they engaged in an extremely positive way. [Then] they looked for other solutions in the area not just housing solutions... So, all sorts of things started to happen and I think it was because the community was starting to coming together and wanting to make a difference and then they won the Strengthening Community Action Fund. So, that came in second and gave the community access to the funds... they were able to set their own priorities and established their own way of doing things and that fund really made a difference.... (13 April, 2017).*

One of the immediate advantages of winning SCAF for the Community Trust was gaining some financial autonomy and the ability to purchase commercial premises for an office. ACTIS did not have control on the Community Renewal budget and it appears that initially ACTIS board had suffered from a lack of money and an office for themselves (they had to share an office with HNZN and CCC staff). The ACTIS chairperson talked about this:

*There was always tension because we had no money. We were one of the partners [and] we were equal partners but we had no money. We had tensions, HNZN made a community houses... and they employed workers. We used to have the meetings in there and the council had a couple of workers... and we always had to print something off for the circulars we had to get their permission. We didn't have money to buy paper... The group had to agree to do something because it [would] involve spending money otherwise it couldn't happen. Sometimes I staged a walk out when we said we are not interested in being here anymore with you guys, we are going to go over there. It is all a part of theatre or politics and putting the pressure in here. But all of them were really good people but that fundamental lack of money created a fundamental inequality in the relationship as they had to sign the checks [for] anything that was done (7 Feb, 2017).*

Therefore, SCAF provided access to funding for ACTIS and one of the first things they did was to buy a building for \$95000 (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017). So, ACTIS secured a permanent place for itself to stay alive and then they employed a full-time manager to run the place (paid by the council). In 2002, ACTIS started doing its own community development type of things; for example, the ACTIS chair said: "some of that SCAF money was grants to organizations [means] co-operative societies working in the community or people wanting to do something. They needed some money to do that. They [would] make submission to us and present it to us and say why they needed this money. And we would make a decision at the community level about whether the community will support them" (ACTIS chairperson, personal communication. 7 Feb, 2017). Previously, community organizations used to submit their plans

to the council to see if they would provide funding for them but since ACTIS received SCAF they would submit the plans to ACTIS for money. ACTIS also funded and supported the ‘Richard Starling’ organization, which works with the young children who have complex and difficult problems (like those who are too shy to go to school or have anger and violence [issues]) (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017). It uses 12 steps to help these children and get them back to schools. The HNZN project manager said, “Richard Starling... is an independently funded event that illustrates that the Aranui community is developing a greater capacity (Aranui Community Renewal Accomplishments, 2001, p.11)

#### **6.1.2.6.2 Community Education and Empowerment Projects**

Further evidence of a learning outcome was community education and empowerment projects in Aranui. The ACTIS chairperson said, “[W]e [were] supposed to be a facilitating organization not actually a delivery of the services [organization]” so ACTIS hosted other organizations, such as education and health providers and undertook the coordination (7 Feb, 2017). In the 2000s, the New Zealand Department of Education funded some adult education centres around the country (but this stopped in 2009). In 2002, early in the Community Renewal, ACTIS got connected to the East Christchurch Adult Education Centre that was holding adult education classes in local high-schools at night. The director of the centre said:

*I was sort of working around with organizations around Aranui and I became really well-connected with the Aranui Community Trust because they were really a place, a hub for the community. So, we started delivering adult education programmes through the Trust... because Aranui Community Trust started to work as a place to advocate for change and renewal in the Aranui community (17 April, 2017).*

The director of the centre believed that adult education was a very strong way of empowering communities and Aranui was an area that really needed that. He said:

*Adult education has a very sort of strong approach to community development and empowering those that don't have strong voice in the community and it also looks to empower people through education and learning to understand their role in a democratic process..... There were a lot of issues with learning and education in Aranui and that [had] been for many years. A lot of people had not succeeded in learning or education and had a really bad experience in education and didn't value education as being positive or good. So, part of what I wanted to do and work with the Trust to deliver the programmes that supported communities but also gave adults some key skills and core skills, literacy, numeracy but also social skills as well so just connecting with each other and doing learning things that they wanted to learn so we funded that (17 April, 2017).*

ACTIS and the Adult Education Centre employed local tutors for this job and some tutors from elsewhere and they also employed those local people who had certain skills, such as a local carver. They held a variety of programmes for five years, including literacy, numeracy, cooking classes, carving, social skills to help people build connections to the others. Sources of funding for these programmes

were from the Adult Education Centre (Ministry of Education), and SCAF, which was ACTIS money. They held the programmes at the ACTIS building, high schools at night and in some other organizations in and around Aranui. The ACTIS chairperson talked about the programmes:

*I was really excited because I love it... we bring them into our place and intimidated people had bad experience at school or they didn't have much confidence they were quite shy and intimidated by going down to school and coming down to our place and do some learning with groups of mothers and groups of women, they get more confidence, get inspired and exited (7 Feb, 2017).*

The adult educator said that they would ask local people what they wanted to learn then they would find a tutor for that and he calls this 'engagement' and defined that as *"the ability to ask the right question and listen to what people saying and then act in the way that represent their views"* (17 April, 2017).

ACTIS and the Adult Education Centre also supported "Supergrans" to work in Aranui, *"[T]hey were older ladies so grandmothers were going to homes and support young moms with their home life so we funded those guys as well"* (Adult educator, 17 April, 2017). They would run week-long events at the same time as the Adult Learner's Week in New Zealand to encourage adults to learn and they would present many awards to them. ACTIS named a day on September 2002 "Aranui Independence Day"; this name was chosen to *"reflect a sense of independence to be gained through education and employment"* (Aranui Community Renewal Accomplishments, 2001)

They held all these programmes and events for more than five years, from 2002 until the end of the Community Renewal. But the director of the adult education centre changed his role in 2006 and started working for ACTIS but was paid by the Department of Internal Affairs. He took the role of forming "Outcome-Based Measurement" for the Trust, which will be discussed in the following section. However, the data showed that the level of education was improving in Aranui. In 2008, Kelly (2008), reported that, in 2007, there had been a significant drop in the number of residents who held 'no qualification' (41.3%) in comparison to the 1990s. There was also a significant increase in the number of residents who hold a 'pre-tertiary qualification' (from one quarter of the population in 1996 to one third in 2007). In 2007, the number of Aranui residents who hold a university degree had doubled since 1996 (Kelly, 2008).

#### **6.1.2.6.3 Outcome-Based Measurements: making public organizations co-responsible for Aranui's future**

In 2007, the ACTIS governance board members decided to develop a strategic plan for the next five years in Aranui and clearly define the areas, goals and outcomes that they wanted to achieve in five

years (*Our Aranui*, 2010). In fact, the purpose of ACTIS from doing this work was – “to make government agencies co-responsible for outcomes. The Outcome-Based Approach was an attempt to align approaches and prove this through shared data stream (Adult educator, 17 April, 2017).

ACTIS defined five results or outcomes that they wanted to achieve in five years including: 1) A community that is socially and spiritually strong (high participation); 2) A community full of knowledge and learning; 3) A great physical environment; 4) People who know and fit in Aranui (no family violence); and 5) A community that is healthy (*Our Aranui*, 2010). Then, for building the measurements for each area they tried to use the same indicators other governmental departments used as they actually wanted to create a dialogue with them based on the same indicators:

*Government agencies often look at community organizations [like ACTIS] as being weak. [So] by creating a discussion based on the same performance indicators that they use we were trying to align how we make improvement in our local community at a level which people could see we were working together (Adult educator, 17 April, 2017).*

The strategy that ACTIS wanted to use in order to achieve the goals above was partnership. ACTIS wanted to form a *Partnership Model* with original partners (HNZC and CCC) and added new partners, including the police, the schools and health providers (Adult educator, 17 April, 2017). ACTIS contacted these new organizations to get some baseline measurements to measure development in Aranui then get their help to improve those areas. For learning and education, they contacted the Ministry of Education to give them the data about achievements of Aranui local schools and see the number of children leaving schools without qualification. For family violence, they contacted the police to give them the number of callouts for family violence. For health, they asked the local Canterbury District Health Board whether they could provide them with measurements of people health the from Aranui who used either emergency or primary health care centres. Because many in Aranui do not use doctors, it was too expensive and they cannot afford to go to doctor, so they went to an emergency centre and that cost the health system more (Adult educator, 17 April, 2017).

After getting these indicators and data from the government departments, they did a door-to-door survey and asked every house in Aranui what they thought about those five areas. The adult educator said: “[W]hat we wanted to do was presenting a form of the community perspective saying [for example] we want to improve access to primary health care locally. So, how were we going to do that? (17 April, 2017). Their purpose was to tell the government agencies, as an equal partner, what the local people wanted through the door-to-door survey. By doing this they felt that the government agencies would feel a greater responsibility to listen to and assist ACTIS. ACTIS did the survey with a very specific approach called a ‘Strength-Based Approach’ by the participants. The Adult educator said:

*[The] majority of people really liked being asked about their community... And because we went from the Strength-Based Approach and we used [a] positive asset approach. We said what is good? What has worked previously and what could be improved? I think by using that asset approach, you know a positive psychological approach, people felt they could talk really positively about their community... What could be done differently to make things better and better? [Rather] than saying what is really bad about the community? So, a lot of people thought they were really engaged in been asked those questions... (17 April, 2017)*

After the door-to-door survey they commented:

*We could create a dialogue [with organizations] which was constructive and a partner-based approach. So, we did that for those areas and we got really good population-based indicators. So, that was like work with the partners because it is how they understand the world" (Adult educator, 17 April, 2017).*

ACTIS said to the schools that they wanted to work with them to reduce the number of students leaving schools without qualifications; then they asked the police to help them reduce the numbers of incidents of family violence in Aranui, and they also communicated with the health providers to provide local health for Aranui. So, they tried to grow partnerships in several dimensions. *"The first partners were the Christchurch city council, the community Trust and HNZN but the growth of that model really was when they started to have robust discussions about how things could change in Aranui (adult educator, 17 April, 2017).*

They would get data every year for the three years from 2007 until 2009 and compare them and see any improvements (this approach follows the previous community education projects that began in 2002 and ended in 2008 which was supported by the Ministry of Education). In 2009, a year after the government change, the budget for the role of adult educator working for ACTIS stopped and also the budget for the adult education and all the aforementioned activities also stopped.

#### **6.1.2.6.4 Heartland Project: access to Government Services**

As mentioned above ACTIS did not have any control on the Community Renewal budget and SCAF was the only money that ACTIS had but it was cut in 2005. After the general election in New Zealand the Labour government was re-elected and a new minister for Ministry of Social Development was appointed. The new minister had his own priorities that were different from SCAF. The ACTIS chairperson said

*The new minister eventually got scared [because] government officials do not like devolution, devolution of decision making and devolution of spending [money]. They like to control everything. So, the new minister had a list of priorities and SCAF funding was way down here and he wipes it (7 Feb, 2017).*

So, ACTIS did not receive further SCAF payments but the ACTIS board members strongly wanted to continue all the projects that they had already initiated based on SCAF:

*We were supposed to get more [SCAF money] because we were later, you know, we went to second round and we never went the whole time. Of course, the ideal of this pilot was to succeed and it is a way of experimenting and devolving funding to local communities to work for themselves. So, our vision was to continue on and to develop all this amazing stuff and it was stopped. Because the officials didn't prioritize it because they didn't like it and this minister didn't know about it, and he just [said] 'yeah, OK that's gone' (ACTIS board member, 7 Feb, 2017).*

At this time, the MP started to advocate Aranui in the government. The minister did not agree with giving SCAF back to the community but they provided another project for Aranui called "Heartland" as a compromise. The MP explained the story:

*SCAF was a pilot project, at the end of the pilot project the government decided not to continue. So, I was very angry about this because it wasn't the right that they weren't continuing with it. So, myself and Bruce... who was an associate minister, we made sure that there was something else so the community could get something else instead of continuing the work that they were doing. So, that was where the Heartland Centre came from.... So, I like to think that I had a little bit to do with that because both Bruce and I went to see prime minister [and] we were not happy (13 April, 2017).*

The ACTIS chairperson who has a close relationship with the MP revealed that "*she/the MP threatened to resign from the cabinet over it... [then] after a number of meetings about this and as a compromise we were given Heartland (7 Feb, 2017).*" However, Heartland was an indication of Aranui's success with the SCAF project

*So the Heartland Centre was a separate project but it really was as a recognition that Aranui had succeeded with the SCAF funding but the project wasn't continuing. So, they found another project for Aranui (ACTIS chairperson, 7 April, 2017).*

So, it meant the minister gave Heartland to Aranui because they had worked very well when spending the SCAF money. Heartland was about taking the government services to the local people rather than them going to where the services were. "*Government services like IRD, social welfare and HNZC, Community Law have Clinics [in Aranui]... They come over and have a clinic. So instead of people going to Linwood or to the city to have an appointment to talk about their benefits or whatever they can make an appointment between on this date of the week or a month. They can walk down and it is in our office [ACTIS office] (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017).*" Heartland Centre rented part of the ACTIS office and one of the ACTIS staff did the coordination for them. There are many Heartland Centres all around the country which are managed by government departments but the Aranui one is community-led and ACTIS invited service providers to come. It seemed that it was one of the most successful Heartlands in New Zealand. "*When it started it was the busiest in the whole of New Zealand... they had*



*the most service providers and the most walk ins. So, it was really, really popular.... It still operates, so it creates more awareness for the community about what they can do” (council development advisor, 23 Feb, 2017).*

Stopping SCAF by the new minister was a huge shock to ACTIS, and it created a conflict between ACTIS and the Ministry of Social Development. Although the Aranui Community Trust received Heartland as a compromise, they were not 100% happy with it in comparison to SCAF. The chairperson of ACTIS explained how upset they were:

*[Heartland] was [a] Labour government initiatives, there was one [Heartland] in Hornby and then they agreed to put one there to compensate us for losing the SCAF funding and that’s still there and we still coordinate and we get paid for the coordinators wages and rental of the space. But it is not as exciting as the work that we were doing so we lost all that sort of stuff and we lost the adult and community education, which was so, so exciting and had so much potential (7 Feb, 2017).*

#### **6.1.2.6.5 Individual Learning and Empowerment**

The projects above were examples of collective learning in Aranui that meant that Aranui as a community learned networking and getting connected to public organizations to improve their area. But a big part of learning is on an individual basis as Koontz (2014) argues. It means the individuals in communities gain hope and try to improve themselves and progress. In the case of Aranui, some of those individuals who were involved and participated in the meetings with government people, architects... (even those who were always silent) changed their lives in some way afterwards. Some of those people who had no confidence and no education changed into some of the leaders for Aranui. One example was a Maori woman who was a shy ‘mom’ and she changed into a leader, a spokeswoman, an ACTIS board member and a student at college. She is called a treasure on the ACTIS website. She explains her story here

*When we started Community Renewal I was just a mom of five, that’s it. So, I never dreamt in the future X many years that I would be running the Maori wardens, that I would be standing out and talking to people and even doing this interview. I hated having photos taken and I may be absolutely allergic to it but since doing that it has given me confidence and I have also just graduated... it is a free education place and you can go and get a certain thing and it costs us nothing. So, I have just finished doing Level 4 social services and I am still doing the wardens and my plan this year was to attend Massey University and carry on my studies...*

*I learned that determination can carry everything through, I learned that I was a lot stronger than what I thought I would be. To me I was a mom of five and two of my children are autistic. I have learned that I am a lot more than that and that carries a lot more than that. I now run the Otatahi Maori wardens I have 23 people under me and they are all volunteers and I pay everybody the same amount ‘Nothing’.... so we do patrols at night... we care of whole of Christchurch... we do that and we also do daytime petrol and scraps to make sure that the walls are ok... it is just for the safety of the community... (10 April, 2017).*

So, by being involved in the community renewal she has learned to be a more useful person for the community and bring some benefits for herself and Aranui. She was only one example but there are others, such as the ACTIS manager who was a CCC staff member and then changed to being a strong manager who has managed ACTIS for 18 years. These are examples of individual learning as outcomes of Aranui Community Renewal.

What was presented, above, including safety, privacy, a sense of ownership, identity and pride, well-used products and less transient populations were the outcomes of the Community Renewal. The data showed that they met the defined goals of the process to a high degree. In addition, learning was a very important outcome of the Aranui Community Renewal. Although they did not clearly define learning as a goal, it was the goal behind all of the Community Renewal Project as HNZN project manager said to ACTIS chair at the beginning of the process *“what the ideal of this is, to build your capacity so, we actually don’t have to be here”* (ACTIS chairperson, 7 March, 2017).

### **6.2.3 Adaptation (durability)**

In this research adaptation has two meanings. The first is durability and sustainability of relations between partners and developing new relations and the second is durability and sustainability of new developments and places. These two meanings are explained in the following section but I also include the resiliency of Aranui after disasters as adaptation because the ultimate goal in adaptation is to make communities able to thrive in complex situations. The earthquakes were one of those very complex situations that Aranui faced in 2010 and 2011 rivalling the “man-made” difficulties of the renewal, so how Aranui reacted to these problems is helpful in gauging the level of resiliency and adaptation.

#### **6.1.3.1 Durability of Relations**

Relationships are the core of social capital and one of the goals of Community Renewal was building social capital. *“Community Renewal was a housing New Zealand initiative and Mark Gosche was the minister, very good guy. And their brief was not just about housing it was building a social capital as well”* (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017). But, unfortunately, the relations of central government departments with ACTIS and the council was not enduring. An ACTIS board member said: *“HNZN disappeared to a large extent after 2008; the council has remained in there and the council and us have got a very close working relationship...”* (10 April, 2017). Examples of this new challenge, largely under a new government, include: new state housing, a new tenancy management approach and the new school (Haeata). These illustrate the relations between ACTIS and central government agencies after the Community Renewal while the new library and new hub show the relations of ACTIS with the council after Community Renewal.

*a. New state housing after the earthquakes*

After the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, many of the HNZN houses became damaged and were vacated, so ACTIS asked HNZN to pull them down because they were attracting bad behaviour. HNZN pulled the houses down and rebuilt new ones without involving the Aranui Community Trust; *“They were not committed to the real consultative process and engagement...they came to build the new houses they came and sort of briefed us on the new things. They said to us we want to consult on these new houses... this is our plan what do you say and I said, wow this is not the way we do things here, the last time we did this with HNZN you guys came here with blank pieces of the paper and we had public meetings and we asked people what they wanted. You have come here this time with something already done”* (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017).

Clearly, HNZN under the National government had much less time for community involvement, but the point here is that ACTIS board members still insisted on involvement and worked hard to change their minds about the designs. ACTIS involved the police, fire services and, finally, they were able to make HNZN officials do some changes on the plans although they were minimal. The ACTIS chairperson noted:

*We had lots of these meetings, it took a long time and meeting after meeting to get them to agree to consider some minor changes. Eventually they agreed to lessen the density, they took a couple of units out and they reconfigured the driveways to remove most of the communal stuff. So, they made it less intensive* (7 Feb, 2017).

So although HNZN had no durable relations with ACTIS and ACTIS board members are still unhappy and worried about future of Aranui because of these new high-density houses with communal spaces they had the capability to change the government plans to a limited degree.

*b. New tenancy management approach*

Since Community Renewal stopped, HNZN has changed its tenancy management approach that reduced the communications with the local community. Specifically, the new houses have become a problem because there are many more units than there were before and HNZN does not evaluate the tenants before putting them in the houses *“I really believe now HNZN doesn’t really care and we have a new set of people and a new set of what we call Rangatahi a new set of youth, we have got a new set of crime, a new set of tag* (ACTIS board member, 10 April, 2017). Currently, tenancy managers just go to the Aranui office every Tuesday and Wednesday for two hours. One of them said: *“Sometimes I will see nobody because people have to remember if they want to see John this is between these two hours on Tuesday what day is it then, today? Many of these people do not have an indication of what day it is”* (7 April, 2017). However, although HNZN had no durable relations with the community

related to tenancy management, the results of their previous applicant-based tenancy management approach in the Community Renewal are still positive in the community which was obvious after earthquake 2011 when neighbours responded well.

*I will be a bit fearful if you and I and John live in all of those concretes and I don't interact with you and you don't interact with me... so, it is not that oversight in that caring for each other. That is what got people through the earthquake in the area and there was certain with people in Ben Rarere [Street], you would be really surprised during the earthquake that [they] stood up and [said to neighbours] come to my place I have got a gas cooker I will cook the sausages and produce the food... [Because in Community Renewal] they got the buy-in from the community (HNZC tenancy manager, 7 April, 2017).*

*c. Aranui Public Library:*

The library was referred to by participants as an indication of a close and durable relationship between the council and the Aranui community. One of the identified needs of Aranui in the Need Analysis (2001) was having a library but the city council had no budget for it at the time of renewal (the council project manager, 23 Feb, 2017). ACTIS's communications with the council for building a library was very long, around eight years, and it continued after the renewal. In 2007, the Mayor changed and the new mayor was happy with the idea. Eventually, the library was built in 2011 and was located in Wainoni Park (on land exchanged with HNZC). Although ACTIS was not happy with their lack of involvement in the process of designing and building the library and choosing the location for it, they were very satisfied with the final product because the council met some of the local needs and provided computers for children to use since many of them did not have computers at home or books and other educational resources. The ACTIS chairperson said:

*I wouldn't put the library where it is, it is in a wrong place, but it is a nice place and it is good to have a library there. I [would] maybe put it closer to the school, or down to the Pages Road corner. The council did [it] and it was a secret decision, [the] community were not involved in that decision, they were [involved] superficially [and] at the end of the day they said thank you very much we want to make a decision and they made the decision. But I think that's an amazing facility, it is amazing and I know [the] library has changed so much and it is focused on the needs of that community and it is opened and encouraging (7 Feb, 2017).*

The ACTIS board members believe that the reason for not engaging with the community was having a new council with a different perspective in 2007. *"When that library was opened we had a different council, we didn't have a very good councillor in my opinion. And they opened that library without engaging with us. You know, normally we run things in that community, but they run it (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017).* However, ACTIS and the council had re-signed the Memorandum of Understanding every year, and ACTIS board members are generally proud of their durable relationships with the council although they have had some ups and downs.

#### *d. New Community Hub*

The Aranui Community Hub was cited by participants as another indication of the good and durable relationship of ACTIS with the council and some other organizations. Aranui had two community centres that were destroyed because of the earthquakes. As a result of ACTIS's communications and negotiations with CCC, a volunteer organization (Lions Clubs International), and some central government organizations, built a new large community centre in Aranui. All these organizations contributed money to build the community centre but it was mainly funded by CCC (it cost \$6 million) (ACTIS manager, 17 Jan, 2017). The new centre was double the size of the original ones. What was clear about this was that ACTIS members were very happy with the process of community engagement and the results of that. The hub was designed by a young, local architect and it is highly used by the community as (Baker, 2007, p. 158) says: *"The hall is used by many different groups, churches, youth groups, dance lessons, community groups, after funeral functions, weddings, birthdays, car club and other groups"*.

ACTIS and the council run the centre by a formalized partnership. ACTIS insisted on this and did not want to run the place alone, although it was difficult to be achieved. The MP helped ACTIS to achieve this. The ACTIS chairperson explained:

*We had a meeting with [the council's] facilities managers and people from the lease department and they said to me "OK what we do is that we draft a formal lease and your organization (ACTIS) will lease the place off the council and you will run it". I said, 'It won't be happening, that's not how we do things. We will be running that place in partnership with the council... We are not going to lease it like a commercial tenant and then run in the way that we have to pay for everything and charge people with lots of money to use it.' I spoke to Jillian (the MP) who gets this, she is one of the few people that gets it, and I explained to her what happened... And then she shakes her head and says, 'Oh, I will sort this out.' Then she talked to Mary who works in chief executive office who also gets it because good people in there and they get this. [So] I have created with the council a new memorandum of understanding which incorporates the running of that hall and we will run it [together] (7 March, 2017).*

So, ACTIS runs the hub with the help of volunteers and the council pays for the maintenance if it. However, the council and ACTIS have also been doing many things together after the renewal and their relations seem to be more durable than those with HNZC. The council development advisor said. *"I think the environment that has been created is open and honest communication..."* (23 Feb, 2017). The partnership of ACTIS with the council has got stronger since 2013 when the previous MP became the mayor. *"That's been a constant struggle to maintain community engagement as equal partners and it was resolved you know there was a commitment in the council particularly with Lianne (the previous MP, current mayor) and her position now and the council generally respect to Aranui and they respect their organization (the MP, 13 April, 2017).*

Furthermore, at the time of writing of this thesis the council was building two basketball courts in Wainoni Park. This is because in 2001 the local community had asked for that (CCC Park and Waterways manager, 28 Feb, 2017). Also, on the 15<sup>th</sup> of May 2018 the council and ACTIS are re-signed the memorandum of understanding reflecting a commitment to continuing the partnership.

The examples above show that HNZN collaborative relations with ACTIS and the Aranui community have not been highly durable but ACTIS's relations with CCC has been durable and they made new achievements out of their relations after the renewal project such as the new hub, the new library and basketball courts.

#### **6.1.3.1 Response after disaster: Aranui as a resilient community**

It is evident, perhaps against popular expectation, which after the Christchurch earthquake in February 2011 the Aranui community, although very hard-hit, responded very well. All the participants of this research, especially the council staff, believed that Aranui was one of the most resilient communities in whole the city. The council development advisor said

*We got official responses... while that was getting sorted, the communities were on their own [for three days]. So, Aranui was a community that responded really, really well. Statistically they weren't supposed to [because] the worst areas the poorest, that is where you get the disease and whatever, it didn't work because of how connected that area was, and I think predominantly through the agencies that were there and through the people that working there and have all been there for decades (2, Feb, 2017).*

When the earthquake happened some local people immediately gathered at Aranui Primary School, a state school, and converted the school into a *de facto* civil defence emergency response hub. They did not wait for central and local government to come and help them. They used what they had at home and made the school into a place where people could go and get water, do their laundry, get information and get clothing. It had not been planned before and they did not even ask the Ministry of Education to let them do that at the public school. One of those people who acts as a local leader, a local historian, a trust board member with family ties in Aranui and who has been living in Aranui for a long time gives the story of their response activities.

*After the February quake I said I am going to go to school and get the well going. So, I went down there put a generator in the trailer and I thought I better ring the caretaker and I said, 'Hey Craig, what are you doing? He says, 'Oh I've just arrived at school and I said, 'Oh I'm right behind you.' So, within about two minutes we both arrived to do the same job to get it up and running... he knows where all the tools are, we both have keys, so we disconnected the irrigation pipe and put one end down and we went and got a 2000 L container and used the generator for power and pumped water into the container and people came and got water. So, within day one we had water. We got it tested within a day, a day after that to make sure there was no bugs, which there weren't. Then, the church who uses our school hall they had contacts with foodstuff people and they gave out something like \$600,000 worth of food over*

*about three weeks from Foodstuffs. So, the government was paying Foodstuffs that cost to get their food to come down, which I only found out about three weeks ago from one of the guys helping. So, there was water, there was food, there was entertainment, all the different people who came around Christchurch... there was different entertainment they came down to entertain kids for a while and also washing machines. I had three going from home and Fisher & Paykel (company) said would you like some and they delivered eight. So, we put them on the veranda and set them up and that was all going. When we did the washing machine the power was back on and we were lucky there. But we had to find a pressure pump to pump the water to get them into the washing machine to get them enough pressure to make them work, that was something I learnt about it took two days to get that going (19 Sep, 2107).*

Just after the quake ACTIS conducted another door-to-door survey to see how families were coping, to find out what they needed, and also to prove their accountability to the public organizations for the 'Community Resilience Partnership Fund' which was also called Metropolitan Fund<sup>30</sup>. This fund was provided for some community organizations after the earthquake. ACTIS had already done a door-to-door survey once, so it was easier for them to do it again and they had volunteers to it. As a result, they provided a report and presented that to the organizations, so they won the Resilience fund/Metro Fund which was \$ 150,000. The participants of this research see that as an example of their resiliency after disaster. The ACTIS chairperson added:

*After earthquake, we were one of the first organizations who adopted result-based accountability for funding. There was an American guy [from council] came out here and said you actually have to demonstrate... what you want to achieve. So, that's accountability through results, and we set that up and Mike went to the presentation [for us] .... we were one of the first organizations with council funding. That's what we wanted, we were one of the two organizations in the east with Metro funding [Resilience funding]. To do the result-based accountability we had to map the whole area, door knock every house and find out all everything about that. We had done that well before the earthquake and when the earthquake happened [we did that again]. That's the unintended consequence of all of this work meant that Aranui was one of the strongest communities and one of the resilient communities after that disaster to respond (7 Feb, 2107).*

This second door-to-door survey revealed that there was a very strong relationship between Aranui local residents and ACTIS as their representative. It showed that the local people trusted ACTIS highly and also ACTIS acted in a way that strengthened this trust. The ACTIS chairperson explained:

*[While doing the door to door survey] People would go there and there were illegal migrants in the houses and many people in the house. So, they would ask how many people are in the house? We wanted an accurate number. People would say, "Oh I don't know, who wants to know?" I am from ACTIS, if you want to verify it, ring Elizabeth (ACTIS manager) and then they would open up [tell the truth]. They said this information will not go anywhere then they trusted us. They trust us because the organization (ACTIS) has a reputation in the community for being trustworthy. Yeah. We don't squeal to the authorities, we don't pass the information to the authorities. So, we trusted, we work with our partners but we are very clear about our*

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<sup>30</sup> The Metropolitan Fund was a fund provided by different central organizations and the local council together. These funds were supposed to be awarded to local community organizations that had defined goals and plans for the recovery of their community after the earthquakes.

*obligations in here. At the end, we were asked through the authorities for the information and they knew what we were doing and we said we would not give that to you, It has been given to us on trust (7 Feb, 2107).*

Although the earthquake was a natural disaster, the termination of the Community Renewal Project and cutting all the funds was another type of disaster that ACTIS faced. ACTIS was able to survive and look for development in Aranui by creating what they call a 'partnership model' that was already explained about in the learning section. Some partners, such as, HNZN had left Aranui but ACTIS became connected to the police, the schools and health providers before the earthquake to achieve the five main goals (a healthy community, no violence, education, partnership and physical environment) mentioned in the learning section. The participants believed that these links were reinforced at the time of earthquake and helped Aranui to be in a resilient place. Adult educator said:

*[Before earthquake] funding stopped for my role [I left] but the model and the way of working still continued.... whilst we didn't have an earthquake we were working towards a model which was based around really strong relationships and partnerships because whilst you can measure everything, what really makes things change is the relationships between the partners. What the earthquake did was that it reinforced those links that were there before. So, whenever things happen when you have those links previously which are well-connected when you need to be resilient you have got those links already.... So whilst the model in Aranui probably didn't continue with the same sort of approach that was there, the same commitment to partnership and working together was (17 April, 2017).*

For example, ACTIS gained a large community health project through its connections with a private health provider company<sup>31</sup>; the MP, had a role in making this connection. The company had developed a new technology for detecting diseases and wanted to apply that in poorer areas. The private company specialists had meetings with Nga Tahu leaders and ACTIS leaders but, finally, they decided to give whole the project to ACTIS for Aranui (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017).

*The contract was a three-year contract with \$500,000 to us. It was amazing and we got \$500,000 out of this contract and we had to employ a nurse and a social worker. So, we bought a van, turned it into a health van, and there was a nurse who had been nursing work in Aranui but they wouldn't fund her anymore. She, came in and we would be able to employ her with this money... they also needed a social worker to pay for the way and do the preparation work. So, out of that we got this health service on the ground and it was \$500,000 and it went into our bank account (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017).*

Aranui was able to procure, and still maintains, its own health van and a nurse who is very active in the area. Thus, after the earthquake ACTIS was networking with others to get development projects for Aranui. Some believed that ACTIS by developing its partnership model helped decentralise funding, which was the purpose of renewal.

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<sup>31</sup> Safe Technologies



*The interesting thing about [the] urban renewal was that it was decentralized policy about decentralizing funding and enabling local communities to be more empowered and also have the power to be able to spend money on the things that they saw important. So, when the Community Renewal [project] finished it was really nothing in place to be able to have a resource.... So, in the absence of that the partnership approach goes as far as you can to be able to get those people who were local representatives and who have an investment in their community even if they are government agents to be able to see how they could work better together to see change. But what you really want is a constructive effort at community level for decentralizing funding at the areas that need it the most (17 April, 2017).*

Moreover, all the examples above appear to show that Aranui has learned to react quickly and appropriately to any new challenge that they see as a negative thing for the future of their area. ACTIS board member said: *"If something is coming up that is not too cool, we put submissions out"* (10 April, 2017). Here is a very recent example (in 2014),

*There was a bottle store that was opening here right next to our chemist. We went, 'What the hell, we don't need a bottle store, we already have six places around us where you can go buy alcohol, we don't need another one in our local shopping centre.' So, we started and we advertised it to the community, 'Hey, what is your views on this, come along, you can file a submission and objection to the council.' So we did the forms and we told them about the forms, lots of people wouldn't know how to do that. We helped them to complete that... to object to the renewal the licence, it took us months, and they withdrew that. The chairperson here is a lawyer, so he led the community and their objection at [the] council... And we objected and we worked with council licensing. So, the community came and we supplied something like 60 signed written submissions and I filed them on behalf of the community (17 Jan, 2017).*

Therefore, it seemed that Aranui community after earthquake as a natural disaster, and after some manmade disasters and difficulties such as cutting all the fund, had a capacity to be resilient to be adaptive and to stay alive and progress. The research showed that ACTIS was durable itself and it had developed relations with different agencies and tried to keep the relations durable and growing.

### **6.1.3.3 Durability of new houses**

In this section of the work I look at the maintenance of the houses that were built during the Community Renewal, how people have behaved in them and I also look at any sort of changes made to the original houses. The photos shown in the output part of this chapter were taken by the researcher in 2017, long after the renewal. What I saw during the observations was that the houses seemed well-maintained but the gardens were not well looked after. The local community board members (ACTIS) believed that the householders were maintaining the houses very well. Local residents not only looked after the houses but also took care of the whole the community although they did not bother with the gardens. The ACTIS manager said

*The majority of people who have gone into the new single-storey homes [behaved them] very well. We have got a lawn mower that cuts the grass, it is getting used all the time. It is all part*

*of beautifying the community and people wanting to take pride in their own community, because lots of people don't have a lawn mower. And when your neighbour does that you ask, "Where did you get that mower?" "Down from the Trust." We only charge \$ 8. And we did an article before Christmas and we got three mowers donated to us. We did a big article; [about] people really wanting to improve the beautification of their homes (17 Jan, 2017).*

Tenancy managers have a different idea; they believed that the houses were maintained well previously (in the Community Renewal period) but now they are not so well maintained because of a lack of a proper tenancy management approach. They believe that the active presence of tenancy managers in the area in Community Renewal had resulted in respect for HNZN and respect to the houses:

*All the new ones normally had, like, a back garden with a degree of planting but how much they have been maintained now I don't believe much, not now. Originally, they would have been [maintained] because we have the right people in there... [They were maintained] initially very well because we were putting people that we chose and less so now I think because we don't know who we are bringing there and some people adversely know who we expect for the house... We had a lot of respect for HNZN when we were working in the area, we had a Community Renewal office in Marlow Road and it never got torched by anyone and never got damaged or tagged or other. In fact, all the fences around us got tagged and our office wasn't touched... that is whole mindset change [because before the renewal] we were the enemy and you know we were people who did nothing, that is how we were regarded. At the end of 10 years the complete opposite happened, I don't know where we are going at the moment but I guess perhaps we are going the other way again, because people are just seeing us putting you in this house next to the other neighbours and you are the real problem and you have got maybe drug and alcohol problems... we put you right in the heart of a place where you can influence other people (HNZN tenancy manager, 7 April, 2017).*

In the literature, there are some who talk about 'adaptation of places to people' which refers to changing and updating the houses over time by the tenants (Brand, 1995). Such a change could not happen in the case of Aranui because the houses are owned by HNZN and, according to HNZN tenancy rules, tenants are not allowed to make any changes to the house. The community board members claimed that the houses are nice and exactly what they wanted so, they did not really need any changes, "No [I didn't changed anything in my house], because when it was getting built, I used to come in and the builders looked at me, [ I would say] don't worry it is my house, they [builders] went to HNZN and say a lady is in here, [HNZN staff would answer] "Oh it is only Nolene checking her house"(ACTIS board member, 1 March, 2017).

All the new developments related to the Community renewal that I observed looked well-maintained but, I did not see much involvement of the tenants with their gardens. Although they have been well looked after until now, the long-term maintenance and durability of them might be a challenge because of HNZN tenancy management approach that choose not to undertake a proper background check or assessment of the tenants before putting them in Aranui houses.

On this basis, I concluded that adaptation as one of the products of CG was achieved to a high degree in terms of durability of relations, resiliency and adaptation to the changes. Adaptation and durability of places was achieved to some degree but the long-term adaptation of places might be a future challenges in Aranui because of a lack of proper tenancy management approach to choose suitable tenants for the houses.

### **6.3 Satisfaction with the products (output, outcome, adaptation)**

At the end of the product section, I wanted to see the degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the products and highlight the factors that were satisfactory or dissatisfactory. It helps to see what are the values of the products for the stakeholders. It was very clear while asking this question that all three main actors including HNZZ, CCC and ACTIS had a high degree of satisfaction with the products and they highlighted two factors including local community empowerment and hope for change as satisfactory and non-durable relations/lack of commitment of central government as dissatisfactory.

#### **6.3.1 Local community empowerment**

Most participants in my research were satisfied and they thought Aranui community was empowered now in comparison to before the renewal. The Aranui community, both collectively and as individuals, are more empowered than before and this empowerment was the value for some participants.

*It was a huge difference with that community [before renewal], so the way the community was and the way that it is now will be apart. I am satisfied [and] I always use this as an example. So, back in the 90s there is no way that the Aranui community would have come and made a submission to the council's annual plan, no way... they didn't have a community trust to speak you know it is a part of the community. They would never come and ask the council for anything as a group and a community so they weren't really engaged with each other and engaged with power. I think the social capital was being built out of coming together to form the trust... now if they were unhappy with something that was in our plan they will come and make a submission at council and they did (the MP, 13 April, 2017).*

*The community learned that they can influence the council and make a difference... the confidence in them and knowing what to ask for and be able to go [for] a presentation to council. They did go and talk to council and put a request for funding, they have never done that before, they would just have said, 'Oh, bloody council useless.' Suddenly they saw they could be involved and they could have some influence to get things to happen, they need to work with the council and follow their system and they can (CCC Park and Waterways manager, 28 Feb, 2017).*

*One of the greatest demonstrations of satisfaction was seeing a Maori woman come to early meetings seat[ed] in the back not saying anything ending up being a leader in community front... and actually wanting to go on and get more education herself. So, from being just a mom in back to actually a community leader (the council project manager, 16 Feb, 2017).*

The ACTIS members as representatives of the community also felt that they were stronger and more empowered now; they carried on even after losses of funding and that was why they were satisfied. One of the ACTIS board members highlighted that:

*We carried on the way that we did at the beginning we (the community) felt like the second-class citizens, [then] they got ACTIS on board and we ended up with SCAF funding and that really gave us where we are... So, that worked and I reckon that they (HNZ, CCC) were shocked. And this is where we are here now because SCAF funding was only for a certain amount of time and I think they thought that we were just doing what we were doing [at that time] but we were determined no matter what we were going to carry on and we are going to do the best that we can for Aranui and with the backing of the local MP at the time [who] is now the mayor. With backing like that we were not going to fail, failure is not an option and that is why we are here now (ACTIS board member, 10 April, 2017).*

Former HNZN staff also have the same view. They said that Community Renewal was about community empowerment and when they see ACTIS still strong and active they feel satisfied because that is an important indicator of empowerment:

*So, by 2005, 2006 they (ACTIS) were in a position that they could actually purchase a building.... ACTIS had its own building... They grew their capacity, they became more demanding and that was good because we now had a community who had their own voice and that voice was getting stronger. And the whole concept of [the] Community Renewal approach was that housing authorities cannot keep putting huge amount of money into one location because there is all others. But there was a point where a local community is able to do a lot of those things happen... So, if we finished in Aranui probably in about 2006 in ten years the trust is still here, still strong which is a sign of success achieved for what we wanted to do (30 Jan, 2017).*

Thus, community empowerment was an important satisfactory factor for participants and they saw it in Aranui. This meant that community empowerment was what they considered as the value of a collaborative process.

### **6.3.2 Community hope for change**

Hope in the community for making Aranui a better place was mentioned as a product of Community Renewal that was very satisfying for some. In spite of the fact that Aranui had gone through many years of depression and deterioration, some believed that because of the Community Renewal there is now a more constant hope for change in the community. So they work for that and they work towards partnerships for the better. An adult educator added:

*It is not hopeless in [the] community where there has been this... decline going on. There are actually the ways to work and change the areas and cities where you need hope. Yeah, and the ability for different agencies to work together and see things happen together for instance we did a 'It Is Not OK' campaign a local family violence campaign and we got a lot of dads and boys together to say that is not OK to be violent.... You know, different agencies working in partnership were able to put a project together and help celebrate things and prompting*

*local solutions to family violence... So, there were projects like that which showed me that the community has the hope that things can be different (17 April, 2017).*

### **6.3.3 Non- durable relations of central government with Aranui community**

Although actors were highly satisfied with the products, ACTIS members had a level of dissatisfaction because of central government lack of commitment to community involvement. Central government agencies such as HNZN and Ministry of Education discontinued their relations with ACTIS and their communication stopped to a significant degree. They did not fund the programs in the community and made some decisions at the top that put renewed stress on the community. For example, the lack of tenancy managers present in the community once again makes the process of renting a house long and tiring. Also, HNZN does not consider the needs and welfare of tenants anymore. An ACTIS board member said

*I do not like changes they have [made] after that (the renewal) like, taking tenancy managers out. There is still a great need to have them here and losing them was one of the biggest wants that we ever had.... I know a lady who is living in Shirley she is an elderly lady and she is alone and people next door are young and active having parties every night and she really wants to get out of that house. She has been there for 20 months and they say, 'No you can't go because there is no two-bedroom places available' but I know two [two-bedroom houses] around here that were [available]. I know that one of them was definitely available because my nephew just moved in. So, they have kind of just put him with the old people. And my friend, who is elderly, she is with youngies. And I thought a bit of brain pattern just change them around youngies with youngies and elderly with the elderly, there is no brain there (10 April, 2017).*

Therefore, three main stakeholders in Aranui were highly satisfied with the products and community empowerment and community hope were two satisfactory items while non-durable relations of central government agencies was a source of dissatisfaction.

## **6.4 Connections between the process and product**

In this section, I ask what the interviewees thought about the nature of the links between the process with the products of the Community Renewal and how they evaluate both of them. Also, I try to determine which factors in the process have been the most influential in achieving the products (good or bad). All the interviewees believed that both the process of Community Renewal and the product of it were successful. ACTIS chairperson called the Community Renewal time, *“a successful journey, a magic moment, a unique plan”*. They believed that a good process of collaboration resulted in a collaborative product that was broadly acceptable for everyone. They saw the process as time-consuming and not cheap but they thought that it was worth spending more money and time because it will save costs in the long-term: *“At the beginning if you take a bit more time in your plan and a bit*

*more involvement for communities you actually are going to save money in the long run”* (community development advisor, 23 Feb, 2017). The MP also strongly believed in community involvement:

*There was one cabinet minister who is in charge of earthquake recovery he will tell you that community consultation slows things down. I never believe [in] that I believe it will always make things better in the long-run. Yes, it might make it longer in the short-run but it will make it shorter in the long run because if you get people that are unhappy with what has been decided, if people feel like they haven't had a say they feel like they have just been told what to do then they will react against it* (13 April, 2017).

The factors below were highlighted by the participants as the most important factors in the process influencing the success of the products including:

#### **6.4.1 Community involvement as an equal partner (the role of memorandum)**

Some of the participants believed that engaging the local Aranui community in the renewal and treating them as equal partners was the main feature of the process that resulted in having good products.

*I don't think anywhere in New Zealand has learned the lesson of what that was based on. That comes down to one thing and that is that the community sat at the table as equal partner and Maori will tell you the same thing Ngai Tahu sits at the table as an equal partner, the Aranui community trust sits at the table as an equal partner. So, if you do not have that then you don't get the full benefit of what a community is capable of, they have got to be recognized as a partner, they are not somebody that you go and do something to... Then [the] Aranui Community Trust sat at the table as an equal partner that's how it was set up to start with, that is the way it should be. So, there was a three-way of memorandum of understanding signed right at the beginning but I don't see that model anywhere else they have one or two representatives from the community on their board and that's it. So, it is the factor that you do the same* (the MP, 13 April, 2017).

#### **6.4.2 Government support and commitment**

It has often been mentioned that the central and local governments strongly supported the project in terms of resources and they had a high willingness and commitment to real community engagement. And this was seen as the main reason of getting such a good product. The ACTIS members claimed that whenever they needed money HNZN and CCC people raised their hand to help, also, she said “*the government supported us to be able to have some money through other funding scheme, to be able to employ some more people to help our Trust*” (17 Jan, 2017).

*There was a willingness at significant levels of both organizations HNZN and CCC to make it happen. I don't believe that exist today, [or] even existed beyond the leadership that we had at the time... It was well-supported, people from Aranui went to Auckland sponsored by the council and HNZN to learn from things that happened up there... So, HNZN were really committed to doing the right things... And there was a big participation from council staff and sort of getting it right as well* (the council project manager, 16 Feb, 2017).

*I think it has been an extraordinary successful journey and I think what is apparent to me through all of this is that you have to have partnership with the partners remain [ing] committed... we were all committed and working together, there were real commitment to make this work and understanding of what's required (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017).*

### 6.4.3 Trust

Some participants highlighted that the small wins at the beginning and the trust that was formed over the process were the successful factors for the process and products.

*I think that having early wins you know something that the community had identified that they wanted and they got done striate away. I think that gave people a real sense that something could happen. So if you are in a community that has been disillusioned, feels abandoned or whatever and somebody comes along and promises things that being promised before if you can get something done quickly that make people feel like, 'Oh, OK. Wow, we could do more.' You know, that to me is core critical.... It was like moving the park, moving the playground equipment right to the front and that was something that the community wanted for a long time and it happened.... that sense of anything is possible you know that sense of hope is critical to success (the MP, 13 April, 2017).*

They believed that there was two-way trust between local community people and government organizations.

*Governments [normally] don't like to trust people, they expect people to trust the government but they don't trust the people and you do have to show trust [to] both. And I think the Strengthening Community Action Fund (SCAF) was great in a sense that there was accountability that the government didn't tell them how to spend the money. I think that was very good for the community because they could employ their own person who could engage or help set up what has become in an incredibly well-respected organization in Christchurch. So, I mean people throughout Christchurch know about Aranui Community Trust (the MP, 13 April, 2017).*

### 6.4.4 Supportive people in the project

Some of participants believed that all of those who were involved in the Community Renewal process, including people from the council, central government organizations, ACTIS and, even the ministers, were very special, supportive, honest, focused and committed. They were the "right people" for that job and that was why this project was successful.

*[At the time] we had two chief executives from HNZN, we had CCC chief executives and councillors who supported this whole thing. Therefore, I was able to step [in] as a council manager and George was a HNZN project manager and we worked hard to achieve things because we knew that we had council support... they were supportive, senior council and staff supported the idea. Before I left the council we had a chief executive who just suddenly wouldn't support that sort of stuff and the same with HNZN, they had a change in philosophy. So, without that willingness you just wouldn't go ahead.... but [now] the environment has changed... I suppose it is change in the government [but] it could come down to personalities I think. You know the executives and seniors of these organizations can [help] if they are*

*supportive of the idea [and] tremendous amount can happen if they are not supportive nothing happens, it is too much of a battle (CCC project manager, 16 Feb, 2017).*

One of the suburbs of Christchurch called Shirley has the same geographical location and some of the same problems as Aranui. The council people claimed that they have tried to communicate with HNZN to work together to initiate a renewal for Shirley but those personalities working for HNZN at the time did not believe in Community Renewal and community involvement so did not support it (CCC Park and Waterways manager, 228 Feb, 017).

#### **6.4.5 Community “passion,” willingness and determination for change**

Some participants highlighted that Aranui local community were very passionate for change and they had a strong presence in the process. They even were happy to break the rules and get what they wanted so that was why they succeeded:

*Aranui is quite a transient community but there are people who have lived there for generations - long-term residents - and they were passionate about the area and they came to see the things happen and they were prepared and... people were committed and they had the time to put into it and they also didn't let things stop them. They didn't necessarily follow the rules and they are quite happy to break the rules and that was quite good (CCC Park and Waterways manager, 28 Feb, 2017).*

Also one ACTIS local board member said:

*My determination was to make Aranui a better place to live... they looked at Aranui as the Bronx of the city, I said no I wasn't brought up in the Bronx and... I want the changes. You got to get out there, stand your ground, stand by HNZN or the council but always stand your ground on what you know and what you believe in... [The] community worked hard to get what they wanted. Stick with that. It is community willingness and passion to make a change, so they participated highly.... (1 March, 2017).*

#### **6.4.6 Community Leadership (ACTIS)**

One of the participants believed that ACTIS as a community leader was one of the most important factors that led to success of the project. He saw ACTIS as a very strong and impactful leader for Aranui that tried to bring different organizations together to help Aranui to be a better place. An adult educator commented:

*A lot of people would see ACTIS as the only place in Aranui where things happen but that is not true. What the Trust is, it is a bit like a glue like the links in the network, you know network is a group of nodes and often access the glue, often the bonding element in the network but actually get things happen again. That is a really important role to have and a really important role which leadership brings together. So, that was the seriousness and the commitment from the governance board [of ACTIS] ... they are really committed to making sure that they are really serious about driving development in the area as well and they are really committed to not been the only place where things happen. The only way to have*



*development in the area is to have strong partners because HNZA is changed, they no longer committed in the same way [that] they were previously but the strength of the renewal processes is there is enough partners committed to the whole process, they moved out but other partners have filled the gap (17 April, 2017).*

#### **6.4.7 Communications**

Being able to easily communicate with partners and having open and inclusive meetings was also highlighted as the key point of the process that helped the project to succeed. The ACTIS manager stated:

*I would say the communication was key and worked really well.... The communication was great. We had an open and clear line of communication, that is what worked for us, so back then we had made [a meeting] every second week, our partners were in the memorandum and everybody else who needed to be there. We had made it every second week so the lines were always open. And we had a community meeting every month. It was always open and if there was a problem you would bring that at the table. So, I think the lines of communication and the ability to meet every couple of weeks without having scheduled meetings with individuals was fantastic.... We reported stuff back to the community; the media was all over it... (17 Jan, 2017).*

In conclusion, participants of this research believed that there was a direct and positive connection between the process and product of Aranui Community Renewal. A collaborative renewal process resulted in collaborative products that were broadly acceptable for all of those who were involved. They also identified, or helped identify, seven factors or features of the process that helped obtain good products including: community involvement as an equal partner, governmental support and commitment, trust, supportive people in the project, community passion, determination for change, community leadership (ACTIS), and communications.

### **6.5 Contextual factors**

Contextual performance was related to those factors in the context of Aranui or New Zealand impacting the process performance of collaboration. Four factors have been highlighted by the participants as important contextual factors that facilitated the process performance.

#### **6.5.1 Pre-existing failure**

This was not a factor impacting the success or failure of the process but this factor helped to establish a collaborative renewal in Aranui. The pre-existing failures were related to 17 years of economic revolution in New Zealand (explained in background chapter footnote p.70) and closure of many industries, including some in Aranui. This resulted in many unemployed people in the area. Aranui had also experienced nine years of top-down policy making in social housing in 90s. For example, some policies like disposing of social housing, no funds for maintenance and no tenancy management

approach. Community representatives believed that these policies in the 90s disrupted the community. *"It was vicious, so the community [had] high levels of unemployment, high levels of deprivation, high levels of need and it was just awful"* (ACTIS chairperson, 7 Feb, 2017). This prior failure was reported by most participants in this research as one of the main reasons why the central government decided to address the issue in a better way and they established a collaboration for that.

### **6.5.2 Political outlook or philosophy**

According to the participants the political outlook of central and local government at the time was a very impactful factor on the establishment of Community Renewal project and the success of the process. The Labour government, as the government of New Zealand at the time, had strong policies on community development. HNZN project manager said: *"It is [a] government agency that initiated Community Renewal here, obviously [this] goes back to the political situation at the time.... It happened because that particular government wanted to increase housing stock and knew it had to be done in a holistic way"* (30 Jan, 2017). According to the findings it was not so much the legal matters that helped but it was the political ideology of that government wanting to do something different (the MP, 13 April, 2017). The MP believed if [the] government was not Labour, the Community Renewal could never have happened *"We went into the government, in 1999, and going to the government was critical to what happened. So I don't think what we did could have being possible if we were an opposition"* (the MP, 13 April, 2017). The Labour government's philosophy and high willingness for Community Renewal allowed the money and resources come and fund the project. They not only funded housing but also community education and community strengthening (SCAF). *"The key thing was the political willingness, that allows the funds, bring the funds, it had to be about money"* (tenancy manager, 7 April, 2017).

Although the local councils do not tend to be a part of the central government parties, ACTIS chair said that at the time of renewal: *"We had a very supportive council, it was essentially a Labour council"* (7 Feb, 2017). So, the presence of a Labour government and its political priorities at the time was seen as essential for what happened but, after change in the government, in 2008, the political priorities changed again and everything stopped.

*It was a very high profile of government policy around housing and for HNZN as an organization. Community Renewal over that period of time was able to access a reasonable amount of funding that comes to organization... because it all seemed to be the wider the future and all those words, we were able to get funding. When the government changed they didn't want to push on with [that]. Then they all dried up and that's why it stopped. It's an indication of how important it was to the organizations and the government at the time* (HNZN project manager, 30 Jan, 2017).

### 6.5.3 Having a strong advocate inside the government

Most participants of this research highlighted the importance of the MP's role on facilitating Community Renewal process "[She] was a member of parliament at the time and she was a real supporter back to the government and got government funding for it so, she was [a] strong advocate" (CCC Park and Waterways manager, 28 Feb, 2017). Every local person that I talked to declared that the MP, who became the mayor of Christchurch in 2013, was a good friend to them. The MP herself confirmed what others said about her advocacy for Aranui

*I didn't play such a big role in the front I was more like behind scenes... they (Aranui local people) know me and they know that [I] will never change and I am on their side. I will say that social capital is measured obviously by relationships between people but also the relationship of the group with positions of power, and because the power is an important part of social capital so they have a direct line. Except that I do not have much power [now] because mayors in New Zealand do not have that much power (13 April, 2017).*

The mayor believed that being a MP in the government gives you more power (if you are not in an opposition with the government) than being a mayor. When the earthquakes happened she was an MP but in opposition with the government so she did not really have power (the Christchurch East MP, 13 April, 2017). Based on what she said, in general in New Zealand, local governments do not have much power in comparison to other countries, "There are very strict limitations on what local government can do and there is a lot of things that the central government does that is normally done at the city level, because we are a small country. So education, hospitals, police they are normally employed by the city so, in New York city, the mayor is an executive mayor and has power right across, he is like the executive chair of a cooperation you know that is the role that he has. But here the police is all central, hospitals are all central..." (the MP, 13 April, 2017).

### 6.5.4 Cooperation between public agencies

Some participants believed that the co-operation between public agencies was really strong at the time of the Community Renewal and it really impacted on the success of the process. Specifically, HNZA and the council as two central and local government organizations, worked together from the beginning to the end "[T]hey (HNZA) established memorandum of understanding with the city council and... we had George (HNZA project manager) from outside and we had a guy called Andrew (council project manager) two of them worked very well together and they were close together and they were on the same page pushing both their organizations and say this is what we need to do" (CCC Park and Waterways manager, 28 Feb, 2017). HNZA and the council shared all the expenses related to workshops, events, celebrations and projects. They also worked with the police, schools, with the Ministry of Education and other council departments, like the city planning team (HNZA project

manager, 30 Jan, 2017). However, this was a new co-operation, not a pre-existing one, because before the renewal all the organizations in Aranui had been working separately (CCC Park and Waterways manager, 28 Feb, 2017).

## 6.6 Chapter summary

The above chapter has presented qualitative information related to the four questions of this research. The first and the main question was: *Do CG products (outputs, outcomes, adaptation) meet the agreed goals and objectives of participants?*

I therefore evaluated the products of Community Renewal based on three aspects: outputs, outcomes and adaptation, and I presented the data related to interviewees' thought, photos and results of the observations and also documents about the products. The results showed that the outputs and outcomes of the Community Renewal met the agreed goals of the process to a high degree, also, outputs met most of the international standards for rental social houses. The data also revealed that probably the most important outcome of the Community Renewal was 'learning to seek for new development projects in Aranui'; which meant ACTIS as the community leadership started networking with many agencies other than HNZN and CCC for betterment of Aranui.

In terms of the adaptation and durability of relations, central government organizations cut their relations with Aranui community to a large extent from 2009, but the local council had a much more durable relationship with Aranui community and their representative (ACTIS). However, although the central government organizations were not committed to community involvement and partnership with ACTIS after the Renewal, the examples and data showed that Aranui was a resilient community after natural disasters including the earthquakes, and after cutting all the community funds, as a manmade disaster.

The second part of durability was about the places in Aranui. All the physical outputs have been well-maintained, up until now, but the long-term durability of houses might be a challenge because HNZN no longer uses an appropriate tenancy management approach.

The second question was: *How satisfied or dissatisfied are participants with the product?* Most of interviewees claimed that they were highly satisfied because: 1) they saw Aranui community as an empowered community; and 2) they saw a constant hope in the community for change. 3) A source of dissatisfaction for the community was the lack of commitment and durability of the central government relations with Aranui after the renewal. So, these three were the three important values for the product that the participants highlighted.

The third question answered was: *What are [or: What is the nature of] the connections between process and product performance (if there are any)?* The participants believed that there was a direct and positive connection between the process and products. The well-conducted renewal process resulted in an acceptable product. They also highlighted seven factors in the process as important that helped to achieve these acceptable product including: community involvement as an equal partner, organizational support and commitment, trust, supportive people in the project, community passion, willingness and determination for change, and communication.

The last question answered was: *Which contextual factors influence the process of collaboration the most?* The purpose of this question was to determine which contextual factors facilitated or created barriers for collaboration. These factors were: 1) pre-existing failures to address the issue, really helped to establish this collaborative renewal; 2) political frameworks at the time; 3) having a strong advocate at the government, not only helped to establish a collaborative renewal but also facilitated the process; and 4) co-operation between public agencies facilitated the process.

## Chapter 7

### Background; Abouzar, Iran

#### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter provides background information for the Abouzar housing renewal project as the second, albeit less detailed, case study. Abouzar is in Iran and has a significantly different political structure from New Zealand and a significantly different political past, especially in recent decades. Consequently, Iran's central political structure is explained and the different organizations within that structure and the different roles are outlined. The local government structure of Iran and especially that relating to the capital city, Tehran, are described next and then the history of deteriorated housing in Tehran with the projects implemented to deal with that are explained. Finally, the Abouzar neighbourhood itself is described.

#### 7.2 Iran's political structure

Iran is known as an Islamic theocracy; at the top of Iran's power structure there is a supreme leader. There are also three main bodies, including the presidency, parliament and judiciary.

**1) Supreme Leader or Supreme Leadership Authority:** Supreme leader is positioned at the top of the power structure of Iran and according to Iran's constitution, supreme leader is responsible for delineation and supervision of the general policies of the country, it means he sets the tone and direction of domestic and foreign policies. The supreme leader is supposed to always be a man not a woman (because in Islam Vali-e-Faqih or the Guardian-Jurist or supreme leader is always a man). The Supreme leader also is chief of Iran's army and controls the Islamic Republic's intelligence and security operations. He has the power to appoint and dismiss the leaders of the judiciary and television networks, he also appoints six of the twelve members of the Council of Guardians: the powerful body that oversees the activities of parliament and determines which candidates are qualified to run for public office (Frontline, 2014; Kurun, 2017; Mahmood, 2006). Supreme Leader is a role that has been defined by Iran's current regime since it came to power by a Islamic Revolution in 1978. Since then Iran has had two supreme leaders, the second one is now in power. Before the Islamic Revolution, Iran's government was not an Islamic theocracy but it was a constitutional monarchy where the country had a king, a parliament and a constitution.

**2) The President (executive)** is the head of the government, directly chosen by public election every four years. Elections happen all over the country and people over 18 years old can vote. There are two

main parties in Iran: reformist (seen as friendly to the West) and fundamentalist (more Islamist). Each party introduces its own candidates and people vote directly for the candidates (Frontline, 2014; Kurun, 2017).

The President is responsible for setting the country's economic, social and environmental policies. Policy making, planning and implementation of policies happen through ministries. The President has a cabinet of 22 ministers whom he or she appoints after being elected. Each ministry acts in one area; for example, agriculture, economic affairs and finance, communications and information technology and so on, like most other countries in the world.

**2) Parliament (legislative)** is a unicameral legislative body with 290 members who are publicly elected every four year. Parliament's members come from all over the country. Every region, depending on its population, has one or several representatives in Parliament. Parliament drafts legislation, ratifies international treaties and approves the country's budget, as suggested by the president (Frontline, 2014).

**3) Judiciary:** The head of Judiciary is appointed by the supreme leader then the head of the Supreme Court and the chief public prosecutor are appointed by the head of Judiciary. Public courts deal with civil and criminal cases. There are also revolutionary courts that deal with certain categories of offences, including crimes against national security and narcotics smuggling.

There are two other important bodies in Iran's political system that include:

**Assembly of experts:** These are 86 "virtuous and learned" clerics who are elected by the public every eight years and they can be male or female (ISNA, 2015). Their role is to elect the supreme leader from within their own ranks, supervise his activity and periodically reconfirm him (Frontline, 2014; Mahmood, 2006). In actuality, the assembly of experts have never challenged the supreme leader for his activities and that is why one person (Ali Khamenei) has been a stable supreme leader for 28 years. The group members are supporters of the current supreme leader or are scared of him and they do not question his authority. They gather and meet every year and talk about the activities of the supreme leader. The current members of the assembly (2018) were chosen two years ago and many of them are against the supreme leader which is unusual.

**Council of guardians:** This council has 12 members, six of whom are appointed by the supreme leader and six of whom are appointed by the head of Judiciary, who is officially appointed by the supreme leader (Frontline, 2014; Mahmood, 2006). The council of guardians is vested with the authority to

interpret the constitution and determine if laws passed by Parliament are in line with Islamic law (though they usually confirm all of the laws passed by Parliament). The council also examines presidential and parliamentary candidates to determine their fitness to run for presidency (Frontline, 2014).

**Women in the political structure:** In terms of gender, Iran is a very different world in comparison to other Muslim countries. Iran's revolution in 1979 is called Islamic Revolution, meaning that before 1979 we were not Islamic, or if we were Muslims we did not want to mix politics with religion. Though we are now called Muslim by our government, most Iranians follow the old cultures and traditions in which women and men are treated equally. This Islamic government established some laws and regulations that treat women and men unequally such as forcing Hejab on women (Kian, 1997; Paidar, 1997; Yeganeh, 1993), but mindset of most Iranians has not changed and has not accepted this unequal rights. Publicly, in most aspects of our society, women have been treated as equal to men. In terms of education, the number of girls and boys at schools and universities are the same and women have always been allowed to drive in Iran. In 1963, Shah did a revolution called 'White Revolution'<sup>32</sup> and a part of it was that women became allowed to vote for the first time and since then they have continuously voted in all of the elections (Daneshvar, 1996; Mehdizadeh, 2014; Sheibani & Jalalpour, 2017). In terms women role in non-governmental body, a high percentage of jobs are occupied by women but government/governance body is male-dominated. There are many female MPs in Parliament and some of ministers in the cabinet are also female. Although females have not yet reached the presidency position, they have been candidates for presidency several times. Women also exercise their power outside of the formal structures of government and are highly represented in professions and the tertiary sector if not in government per se<sup>33</sup>. Kian (1997) believes that Iranian women present a modern reading of Islam. However, the role of women is complicated and very progressive and restrictive at the same time.

### 7.3 Local Government Structure

Every province in Iran has a governor whose task is ensuring safety and security and mediating conflicts between different organisations within the province. The governor is also the head of the police in each province and works closely with them (Rasoolimanesh, Jaafar, & Badarulzaman, 2013;

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<sup>32</sup> It was called White Revolution because it was planned to be a bloodless revolution. Asadollah Alam, the leader of Mardom (people) Party, first suggested the concept of a 'White Revolution'. He was clear about political imperative of such a revolution as a vehicle for consolidating the power and authority of the Shah. In the aftermath of the Iraqi coup d'état, Alam argued that a 'White' revolution was needed in Iran if the Iraqi coup was not to be repeated in Iran. This revolution is also called Shah and Mardom Revolution as well (king and people) (Ansari, 2001)

<sup>33</sup> I need to note that, this does not mean that Iran is a liberal government, now, we seem to be more liberal than 39 years ago when the current regime came to power, but we still have a long way to go to be liberal.



Tajbakhsh, 2003).

Every province has cities, districts and villages, each with their own local council. Council members are elected by direct public vote every four years in all cities and villages (Alekbaf, 2014; Tajbakhsh, 2003). National and local elections are run at the same time. The political orientation/affiliation of council members mirrors that at national level; in other words, contests are mainly between reformist and fundamentalist administrations. Council members in cities are in charge of electing the mayor (unlike in New Zealand, where a mayor is voted for at local body elections by voters, not council), confirming each year's city council budget (the mayor provides a plan for the next year and determines income and expenses; this needs to be approved by council members), supervising the activities of municipalities, studying the social, cultural, educational, health, economic and welfare requirements of their constituencies, and more (Alekbaf, 2014; Tajbakhsh, 2003). Tehran, the capital and largest city of Iran, has 22 districts, each with its own district council acting under the supervision of the central council. Tehran's mayor is chosen by council members, but district council mayors are selected by Tehran's mayor.

According to Iran's constitution, city councils [specially Tehran's council] does not receive funding from central government except for specific projects and situations, such as establishing subways in the cities. This rule was established in 1994; previously, city councils were funded by the central government (URO district manager, 10 June 2017). Councils in Iran have two main sources of income: rates and fees for establishing building permissions (Tajbakhsh, 2003). They also receive some funds and subsidies from the government as help towards maintenance of the cities. Tehran's city council relies significantly on fees that it charges for establishing building permissions. In fact, most people in Iran do not pay rates (believed to relate to a lack of trust in the current regime), in 1994 the council decided to charge those who apply for building consents especially for apartments. Sometimes these fees are higher than the construction expenses, which has made Tehran a very expensive city, as the council is selling air. Prior to this period, the council would not need rates because central government annually specified a budget to the council but in 1994, the government stopped paying that and asked the council to be independent.

However, based on Iran's constitution each council should be independent in managing and planning of the city, with no intervention from central government. Without doubt there are some aspects that are controlled by central government such as structures like power lines, water and telecommunication in the cities, or master plans are designed by central government while detailed

plans are designed by councils. However, central government is not supposed to interfere in policy making and renewal planning.

## **7.4 Poor Housing in Tehran**

Iran's previous regime was called Pahlavi, the king of which was called Shah. In 1941, the Shah led an agricultural land reform across the country (Daneshvar, 1996). The Shah transformed the ownership of agricultural lands from feudal lords to small farmers working on the lands in 1963 as a part of his White Revolution. This resulted in a significant migration of those who did not receive agricultural land to cities, especially Tehran. Tehran's population grew from just over one million to around three million from 1940s to 1960s (Rasoolimanesh et al., 2013). The original city expanded to the north and south; richer people resided in the northern part, while the poor settled in the south. South was basically the original Tehran and north was just an area of mountains and villages with good weather. Tehran's city centre is still largely in the south. This contradiction between the north and south started at that time and the north became known as the higher-class area while the south comes with a stigma of being low class and home of the poor. Those who migrated to the south had just enough money to buy small sections, with areas of 45, 50 or 60 m<sup>2</sup>. Construction quickly started without professional monitoring, using unstable materials and structures, with very narrow streets. This migration lasted around 20 years.

At the end of this migration (in 1979), Iran's regime was changed by a revolution. Shah's government had just finished designing the 6<sup>th</sup> Development Plan of the country based on professional evaluations. It was, by modern standards, the best and the most comprehensive development plan in Iran's history although, this plan was never implemented (Teerex, 2015). One year after the revolution (1980), while the new regime had not yet formed itself, Iraq (under Saddam Hussein) invaded Iran, this is called the Imposed War in Iran which lasted for eight years. At the time, most of the country's resources were spent on the war. At this time, urban planning was not a priority, especially in the southern part of Tehran, which became a 'forgotten' area.

In August 1988, the war ended and Iran's president called his government the 'Rebuild Government', wanting to rebuild all of the cities and areas of the country. His policies are known as 'reconstruction policies' (Kian, 1997). However, southern parts of Tehran remained forgotten and were even negatively affected by the era of the Rebuild Government. For example, in 1990 Tehran's council decided to build a highway that would connect north and south Tehran and would reduce traffic (Tarh Va Memary Consulting Engineers, 2010). Since implementing that plan was too costly, the council relied on Legislation 24 of the Urban and Construction Law, which allowed the council to add

apartments to each side of the highway with a setback of buildings a distance equivalent to the width of the highway (Regional Manager of Urban Renewal Organization [URO], 14 June, 2017). This highway would cut some southern neighbourhoods of Tehran into two parts, but the council did this and many scholars in Iran believe because the council was thinking of reducing traffic first (Etemad, 2013; Tarh Va Memary Consulting Engineers, 2010) and secondly, it would solve the problem of many people living in those poor neighbourhoods by buying their houses and building good quality apartments for them (URO project managers, 1 May 2017).

The highway started to be built in 1994 and was called Navvab Expressway. Two poor neighbourhoods, Navvab and Berianak, were hugely affected by this project (Etemad, 2013). The council bought houses from their owners then demolished them, so a huge number of people were relocated to other areas. After completion of the apartments, these people did not like to come back and live in apartments (Tarh Va Memary Consulting Engineers, 2010). In terms of implementation and quality of buildings, Navvab project was one of the most successful projects in Iran and significantly reduced traffic within the city. However, the council was heavily criticised for the huge displacement of residents and the lack of a neighbourhood or community-based view (Etemad, 2013; Tarh Va Memary Consulting Engineers, 2010). The Navvab Highway divided neighbourhoods of the south into two parts located on opposite sides of the highway. Although the council built quality apartments with good facilities, people were not willing to buy them. According to an evaluation by the Civil and Urban Improvement Organization in Iran on the Navvab community around 15 years after building the highway, most of those living in Navvab now do not have any roots or family ties to the area (Tarh Va Memary Consulting Engineers, 2010). This means that local people migrated elsewhere after building the highway. A lot of research has been published in Iran with a social view, criticizing Navvab project for not having a social impact assessment (Etemad, 2013). The council representatives declared that Navvab taught the council that it should have a neighbourhood-based view in all of its projects in the future<sup>34</sup> (Regional Manager of Urban Renewal Organization [URO], 14 June 2017).

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<sup>34</sup> It is somehow similar to the story of Lower Manhattan Expressway in 1950s and 1960s, when Among Robert Moses one of the one of the prime urban planners in New York City, suggested a plan (very top-down) to build an expressway that would have cut through SoHo and Little Italy village. The plan was ultimately nixed in 1962 due to widespread disapproval from the public encouraged by Jane Jacobs and her book "the death and life of American cities". Moses with having a top-down planning perspective believed the only salvation of cities was the large-scale destruction of their existing features while Jacobs believed that maintaining the future of cities rests on preserving exactly those qualities (Martin Chatelain, 2013; Paletta, 2016).




Figure 7.1 Navvab Expressway in Tehran (from: ISNA, 2017)

No many other projects were defined or implemented in the southern parts of Tehran from 1995 until 2004. In December 2003, Iran's most disruptive earthquake in 100 years happened in Bam City. Around two-thirds of the Bam population died (30,000 people) because of unstable structure of houses (Akbari, Farshad, & Asadi-Lari, 2004; Fallahi, 2007). This was a significant shock to Iran's government, making them think about unstable housing in some of Iran's cities, and the most important one Tehran. At the same time with the earthquake, around 2.3 million people were living in southern parts of Tehran in unstable houses. Tehran is the political capital of Iran and if Tehran is destroyed it mean whole the regime is destroyed, so this political vulnerability made Tehran a priority for renewal. Thereafter, the president proposed a bill that passed into law named the 'Revitalisation and Renewal of Deteriorated Urban Areas Law' (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017). This was approved by the parliament and in this law, some areas were defined as 'deteriorated' based on three indicators, including: 1) unstable materials and structures; 2) narrow roads and streets that are hardly accessible for public services such as fire station cars, and 3) having small lots of land (less than 100 m<sup>2</sup>) (URO, 2010). The law also emphasised that all central government and local government organisations are responsible and they have to co-operate to renew at least 10% of Tehran's deteriorated areas annually (URO, 2010).

The Tehran Municipality, was seen by the central government as the most responsible organisation for the renewal, as urban planning and management was a council task. The central government asked the council to provide encouragement for residents of deteriorated areas such as loans and free building consents. However, since the money from building consents was the main source of the council's income, the central government declared that it would pay the money back to the council, instead of local people paying it (URO project manager, 1 May 2017).

There is one thing that is not officially declared by Iran's government, but the officials and even local people all know about. URO project manager and one of local community representatives explained that to me as the researcher in our personal communication. Before putting the renewal task onto the council's shoulders, the government had negotiated with some international companies (including some from Japan and Turkey) to help do the renewal of the urban deteriorated areas in Tehran. However, none of the companies agreed to help (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017). The reason for this was that Iran's government at the time had some radical policies in conflict with international laws<sup>35</sup>, so western countries (with US leadership) put the strictest sanctions of Iran's history on the country, so most countries in the world stopped or reduced relations with Iran to some degree (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017). I need to note that the history of sanctions and international pressures on Iran is long and goes back to the same year when this regime came to power in 1979 which was the first round of sanctions, then the second round was in 1981, 1987, 1995, 2010, sanctions became more comprehensive over time (Levs, 2012). However, asking international companies for help showed that the government knew that it did not have the knowledge and capacity to undertake the renewal itself.

At first, in 2004, the council revived the Urban Renewal Organisation of Tehran (URO) which was first established in 1968 by the Shah. This organisation had virtually ceased to operate after the 1978 revolution. This dormant unit suddenly became responsible for the housing renewal in Tehran; in mid 2000s, other council departments such as the Traffic Department, Park and Green Space Department, Department of Social and Cultural Development, Department of Architecture and Urban Design) were responsible for other aspects of the renewal, such as building parks and new streets.

The URO studied how to carry out the renewal and came up with two ideas: firstly, designing plans for housing renewal in some deteriorated neighbourhoods as a pilot project and secondly, forming smaller organisations called Nosazan to implement the plans (URO project manager, 1 May 2017). Although the Navvab project showed the previous council that they had to be community and neighbourhood-based, URO officials started designing the plans in their own offices for the homes and lives of others without consultation. One of URO district manager declared that:

*They had collected a very professional group [and] specialists in Urban Renewal Organization having at least four or five years of experience. They started designing plans and one of the plans was designed by myself and my colleagues. We would sit in our office here and make decisions for peoples' homes. (14 June 2017.)*

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<sup>35</sup> Working on nuclear power.

While designing the plans, the engineers and architects of URO came to a point where there were only two ways to carry out the renewal. One was land consolidation according to the URO's plans (because the lots of land were very small) whereby the owners gave their lands to the URO to consolidate that for them. The second option was buying the lands from owners and rebuilding them if they did not agree with consolidation. One of the plans they designed was called "*Urban Landscape Plans*," specifically designed for some neighbourhoods of the south in 2006; they had even determined which lots had to be merged together. URO and the council asked Nosazan organisations as a part of themselves to start implementing the plans (URO district manager, 13 June 2017). Some neighbourhoods of the south were chosen as the pilot, one of them called Arabak in which many conflicts raised between local people and officials. Local people did not accept the plans; for example, they did not want to consolidate their land with this or that neighbour, they did not want the renewal of their buildings and land merger, or they did not want to sell their land. The URO regional manager said:

*Urban Landscape Plans started to be implemented and we would see that all the lines that we had designed and drawn became like smoke in the air (were rejected by local people). We should have talked to local people to be able to progress and solve the problem (14 June 2017.)*

The result of this renewal from 2006 until 2010 was rebuilding of just % 3 of Tehran's 3,000 hectares of deteriorated areas (URO district manager, 13 June, 2017). The URO found out that it would be too expensive to renew 3,000 hectares this way. Also, Nosazan had bought many parcels of land that were spread throughout the neighbourhoods; this had resulted in dissatisfaction within the communities in the south and made the whole neighbourhoods unsafe. Because it provided places for addicts to gather, Atabak was a place hugely affected by this project and much of its population moved out of the area.

Material removed due to copyright compliance

Figure 7.2 (a&b): Empty land lots between two buildings in Atabak, an example of unsafe spaces (from: Javaheri, 2014)

There were numerous of criticisms of Urban Landscape Plans and URO for a lack of community engagement in the renewal process. For example, (Aminzadeh & Rezabeigisani, 2012) stated,

*...the result of implementing Atabak Urban Landscape Plan was breaking down the traditional special structure of the area, creating unsafe spaces, migration of local residents from Atabak and consequently, an increasing community distrust to city management organisations in terms of community engagement (P.1)”.*

URO officials found out that they could not carry out such a top-down planning and expect the communities to accept it; they had to let the community design and implement the plans themselves. Consequently, in 2010 a new project was established by the URO called “*Collaborative Renewal of Urban Deteriorated areas*”. They believed that it would be a community-based renewal in which local people would be engaged from the beginning to the end and they would decide on the renewal and design it. Then it would be built by community developers (meaning that local people would choose the developers themselves) while the council and central government would provide loans and other incentives to facilitate the process. The collaborative renewal objectives based on a report by Andalib (2010, p. 151) who was URO’s head at the time were:

*Participative Renewal of the area by the local people and residents with the support and guidance from the city governance/management body.*

- 1. doing the renewal by the community with their direct presence and participation*
- 2. Creating a good example and experience in the participative renewal (knowing that we haven’t got any practical example and experience)*
- 3. Creating a framework or role model by implementing some pilots to be able to expand it to the other deteriorated areas of the city*

4. *Testing how to use the council's capacities [power given to the council by the government] to support implementation of the project*
5. *Identifying legal, constitutional and implementational barriers, and planning to make the renewal happen.*

Thereafter, URO chose five neighbourhoods as pilots in which to implement these collaborative renewals. Therefore, this renewal was initiated by the council (URO was council's organization) and designed to be a collaboration between Tehran's council (URO and other council departments), local community people and private developers. This renewal is seen by Tehran's council as a good process of collaboration in which they have been successful in engaging with the community and local developers and it has made the renewal process go faster. In this thesis the author describes one of their best examples of community engagement in Abouzar neighbourhood.

## 7.5 Abouzar Neighbourhood




Figure 7.3 A map of Tehran, Tehran's seventieth district and Abouzar Neighbourhood (Arad Consulting Engineers, 2016, it was from their GIS data)

Abouzar is located in the 17<sup>th</sup> district of Tehran, Abouzar was regarded by the renewal organisation as one of the most deteriorated areas of Tehran according to the three defined indicators of deterioration. Firstly, it had the highest number of houses with an area less than 100 m<sup>2</sup>; secondly, it had the highest proportion of narrow streets with low accessibility for cars; and finally, it had the highest number of buildings with unstable materials and structures.

Around 60 years ago, areas around Tehran were agricultural lands including Abouzar. In the 1960s, unpermitted houses began to be built there and the area became a part of Tehran. Abouzar streets



were very narrow, just 3 or 4 m wide, full of trees, power poles and cul-de-sacs, these were potentially good places for drug dealers and very inconvenient, if not impossible, for service vehicles and emergency access and evacuation, in say, an earthquake or major fire. Abouzar, like other southern neighbourhoods of Tehran, was a poorly-serviced area with a lack of green spaces around 1 m<sup>2</sup> per capita while the national standard for a city like Tehran is 8 m<sup>2</sup> per capita and the international standards is more than 15 m<sup>2</sup> per capita (Maab Consulting Engineering, 2010). It was the same with educational and recreational facilities and it had serious sanitation problems. Abouzar was not affected by previous projects that the URO and the council had implemented such as the Navvab Highway or Urban Landscape Plans. It effectively remained a forgotten area for many years. The photo below (3) shows Ramezani Street in Abouzar just before the start of the renewal. The photo shows that the street was very narrow and fully surrounded by houses and trees and power poles were barriers for easy movements and delivery of public services.



Figure 7.4 Ramezani Street in Abouzar in 2010 (Photo by URO project manager, 2010)



Figure 7.5 (a&b): A house in Saadatagah Street in Abouzar (photo by the author, June 2017)

Figures 4 (a and b) above show the smallest type of houses in Abouzar (35 m<sup>2</sup>). They normally have a small yard in front with stairs in one side going upstairs. These houses normally have a room downstairs with a bathroom and one room upstairs. All of these houses have a small toilet outside in the yard (this is small door under the stairs in figure 7.5a). In some of these houses there is a small space inside for the kitchen, but in some almost all cooking is carried out in the yard outside.

Nearly all Abouzar houses are in private ownership, it meant that there were no government-owned houses in Abouzar (Karaminejad & Moosavi, 2012). Therefore, in the collaboration as envisaged or defined by the URO the local people were to provide the land.

In terms of population, this part of Tehran is the most populated area, with 15,000 residents having only 12.9 m<sup>2</sup> residential area per capita (ISC, 2006). This is significantly lower than Iran's national standard for cities of more than one million people, which is 25 m<sup>2</sup> or more (Maab Consulting Engineering, 2010). Abouzar is a place where the lowest income people of the city live; they are mostly working class. The rate of crime in Abouzar has been one of the highest in comparison to other suburbs of Tehran (Karaminejad & Moosavi, 2012). The police had even installed cameras in some streets to monitor behaviour [this is not a common act in Tehran and is not normally done for other neighbourhoods]. The photo below shows a sign that was installed at the beginning of Iji Street, reading *"Dear residents of Iji Street. Please be aware that this area is monitored by the police cameras (Officer Moradi, Iran's Police)"*.



Figure 7.6 A police sign in Iji Street in Abouzar (Photo by URO urban planner, 2010)

From a social point of view, Abouzar was also one of the most religious suburbs of Tehran, perhaps even Iran, the number of mosques and other religious places within the area was much higher than in other suburbs (3,343 m<sup>2</sup> religious areas). In contrast, there was a lack of green spaces and parks in Abouzar (Karaminejad and Moosavi, 2012; Maab Consulting Engineering, 2010).

Two main ethnicities live in Abouzar: Fars and Turk, comprising 35 and 61% of the population, respectively with the remaining 3% belonging to three other ethnicities (Kurd, Lor and Afghan) (Karaminejad and Moosavi, 2012). The community has always had their own local council chosen directly by the community vote every four years. Local council members do not necessarily belong to each and every ethnicity, but they are elected based on trust and their fitness for the job. As mentioned above, in Iran no one ethnicity has power over any others, not only in policy but also in other aspects such as economy.

Abouzar was selected as a pilot project for Collaborative Renewal by the URO in early 2010. It was going to be a collaboration of three main partners including local people as land owners and their representatives, the URO and other council departments and private developers. Central government departments were not going to be directly involved but they were supposed to collaborate whenever needed, also central government was supposed to provide loans and incentives (pay the building permission fee back to the council instead of the residents paying that).

## 7.6 Chapter summary

The chapter above introduced the current Iran's political structure as it has evolved over the past century. It showed that the planning and management of the cities are tasks of municipalities in Iran. So, in essence urban and housing renewal in Tehran is regarded by the central government as a task of Tehran's city council, it means central government is not supposed to interfere in that. Considering that and the complexity and the scale of Tehran deteriorated areas and the fact that it is Iran's capital city, central government still puts all of the responsibility of the renewal on Tehran's council which is relatively unusual by international standards. However, the Revitalisation and Renewal of Deteriorated Urban Areas Law made all the central government organizations with some responsibility or jurisdiction liable to collaborate with the council in this renewal. From 2004 the council implemented some projects that resulted in failure based on their own indicators. Eventually the Municipality initiated a collaborative renewal and Abouzar in Tehran's south was chosen as a pilot. The following chapter, explains the story of Abouzar renewal according to what the research participants said and it is specifically focused on the process and product aspects of this pilot project.

## Chapter 8

### Finding three: Abouzar housing renewal project

#### 8.1 Introduction

This chapter presents research findings on Abouzar based on the five key questions as set out in Chapter One. It first talks about process performance and how the renewal was implemented in Abouzar. Then it presents the products that include outputs, outcomes and adaptation; they are assessed according to defined goals of the participants and then how satisfied or dissatisfied the participants were with them. Discussion of the connections between process and product follows and the main influential factors of the process that impacted the products are also mentioned. Finally, the main contextual factors that impacted the process performance are presented.

#### 8.2 The process

##### 8.2.1 Inadequate trust-building at the beginning of the project

The participants of this research claimed that there was a substantial lack of trust within Abouzar local community towards public organizations. The URO project manager said

*For around 40 years this area had been forgotten by the government. It means that they didn't pay even a little attention to the area and people living here. Occasionally, one of the residents would do a [big] crime related to drugs or robbery, then they would be arrested and punished... Many families here have a family member in prison. Public services such as waste collection and road maintenance are terrible here. So, people would see the government as those policemen coming and arresting their children; they would see the government and the council as those who come annually and ask them to pay the rates, then they wouldn't provide any services. (1 May, 2017).*

At the beginning, URO planners did some research or scoping in the community by walking and talking to local people in the area and they found out about the current distrust in the community. At the time, URO took some important actions including: establishing a local office in the middle of the neighbourhood. Such an action had never been taken before and it was regarded as an unusual initiative by a public organization. The second action was: employing local people in the local office. They advertised in the community and employed some “educated” local people who had university degrees in planning and sociology . Therefore, while only the Project Manager was from the URO the rest of employees were from the Abouzar community. The research participants, especially the URO representatives, believed that having the local office in the heart of Abouzar and having local people working there really helped them to build trust. The URO project manager said



*We put our office in the middle of the community on December 2010... then we (URO staff) tried to identify experts in the community. For example, if we needed a social expert we would try to go for those social experts living in the community and knew the community well. We employed an architect and an urban planner from the community to work with us. We tried to choose 100% of our staff locally. For example, Mr Aghazade was our planner and even Mr Heidari who is a waiter in the office is from here. When people would come in and see their neighbours working here, they would trust us. So, we were able to socially find some status in the community for ourselves by having a local office and having local people working there (1 May, 2017).*

Also, the local office, with the help of its local staff, got connected to the mosques in the community because Abouzar was a religious neighbourhood and most people were mosque-goers (Karaminejad and Moosavi, 2012). The URO representatives in the office used mosques to communicate with local people because it was an easy way to engage with people. Often, after praying, people were invited to talk about the problems of the area and what they wanted to be changed. Then URO representatives would record these problems or take notes (URO project managers, 1 May, 2017). The other action taken by URO was establishing fieldtrips for local men and women to other northern suburbs of Tehran to see how those neighbourhoods looked and to give them a sense of what a renewal project could deliver (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017).

Moreover, the URO office staff formed four small community groups from the following: key local people (trustees); local women; primary school students, and; local developers. Then, they held several Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with each group to identify the issues and needs of the community. They also conducted a door-to-door survey and asked every family (2,612 families) what were the issues and needs of the community. Then, everything was recorded.



Figure 8.1 (a & b): A meeting with school students and also some paintings by the students (photo by URO planner, May 2011)

In door-to-door survey, local people opened up and talked to local office staff about their problems. For example, some residents said how difficult it was for them to commute while having many trees in the middle of their narrow streets. They had contacted the council for permission to cut the trees several times but the council did not agree. All the while, as the trees grew, getting around the neighbourhood for the community was getting harder. The URO staff in the local office designed a removal plan behind the scenes with local people even though they were working for a council department. They helped the community to remove trees at night knowing that under the council rules it was illegal to cut the trees (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017).

URO representatives claimed that because of what they did at the beginning, after around four months some local people (owners of the houses), started to trust the URO local office and they started thinking about the renewal project (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017). However, by contrast with Aranui very few projects and events actually happened in the above trust-building process. Although what happened was novel for the Abouzar local community, most of it was just trying to start developing relations and finding a way to communicate with local people, asking them what they wanted and listening to them without acting or creating small side-projects to solve particular problems or enhance community spirit.

### **8.2.2 Who defined the issues to be addressed?**

The FGDs mentioned above and the door-to-door survey had been designed to ask local people what they wanted and what they saw as issues. At the time, plenty of inputs were received from the community including students' paintings, questioners and meeting notes but what happened afterwards appears to have focussed only on housing. It showed that those community inputs were not regarded as important and were not going to be read. It seemed that the purpose behind that was just letting the community express their feelings and having face-to-face communications with them.

In fact the door-to-door survey and other results of the consultation process were neither officially analysed let alone taken into account for the purpose of the renewal. Two years after the door-to-door survey of 2010 some voluntary work was done to analyse data that had not been process (Karaminejad and Moosavi 2012). The data was analysed in Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) and showed that the community was really concerned with environmental issues related to rubbish around the streets and other dirt and sanitation problems because of a lack of proper rubbish collection by the council. The second major issue was, predictably, poor housing in the community. But also, and this was illustrated in children's paintings local people highlighted a lack of green spaces such as football

fields and playgrounds (Karaminejad and Moosavi, 2012). However, it appears that all along the project was going focus on housing and building earthquake-proof houses; it was what the central government had asked the council to do and then the council had asked URO to focus on. Thus, although poor housing was one of the top identified issues by the community, other community needs were not treated as important.

### **8.2.3 A missed opportunity for community capability building**

Approximately four months after the local URO office was established in Abouzar some of the local people endorsed or gave support to the renewal project but in this renewal process the URO representatives did not try (or did not think) to bring the local people together and build a community as a collective group or encourage representatives or leaders from within the community. The Abouzar community normally has its own local council selected by the community votes as the representative of all ethnicities, but this group does not really have power in local government. In fact, many local people do not even know that they have a local council. In the renewal process not only were there no attempts to bring this group to the table, support them, and accept them as the community representatives and formalize a partnership with them but also there were no efforts to form or recognise other leadership entities in the community. So there was still a lack of a “go to” community organisation in the Abouzar renewal project.

### **8.2.4 Collaboration**

In essence all decision-making in the Abouzar renewal project was limited to housing. There were no accompanying plans for development or redevelopment of schools, parks and public facilities. There appeared to be no attention to having a comprehensive approach to “renewal” or looking at Abouzar as a real community. The URO was officially just responsible for housing. Building parks and other amenities were the responsibilities of other council departments. The URO project manager, district manager and regional manager all claimed that they had long discussions with other council departments to try to agree on building or rebuilding parks and more green spaces. URO project manager stated:

*we said to the council that we already have a big population living here with a big lack of green spaces, if we start renewing houses the population will probably increase, so you need to build parks and other things for them. Unfortunately, the mayor laughed and said, ‘of course if the housing renewal happen, I will build parks and do everything for people’. Now, after 7 years of housing renewal, they haven’t even added a tree here (1 May, 2017).*

Housing design meetings started in 2010, led by URO representatives, there was direct involvement of normal local people who were owners of those small houses. Most local people did not have great



knowledge or awareness about building, construction and engineering nor even a good high school education. The URO urban planner stated that *"the knowledge of local people about building and renewal was nearly zero. They just had some information heard from their neighbours around themselves and most of the time it was wrong information"* (24 May, 2018). There was no presence of an informed and educated leadership or representative for the community. Design meetings were simply open to local people but there was no sponsored learning or preparation in advance. Another group of people invited to design meetings were local developers who were likely to bid for new building work. The URO representatives asked the community to select the developers by themselves and go for those that they trusted and knew the quality of their work. The URO project manager said *"We didn't bring developers from somewhere else, those that the community didn't know. If we brought some developers ourselves, the community would think that we were looking for our self-interest"* (1 May 2017). One could argue that by doing this the URO was avoiding responsibility for the problems that might happen with the developers afterwards. The documentary evidence shows that the local people did not necessarily do a good background check on these developers. The URO urban planner said *"as the developers were local, the community people knew them or they had already seen their work but a lot of times they wouldn't do a good background check and just would listen to their neighbours saying which developer is good. Sometimes, the developers directly would talk to local people and get their agreement. I can't say that there was really a good background check of their work quality"* (11 July 2018).

There were several meetings (often around 3 or 4) between URO representatives, local people and developers, and they would finalize the building design components. Participants claimed that agreements were achieved in the design meetings with a high degree of satisfaction between three partners. One of the local people said *"it was really good and whatever we wanted they accepted and agreed to"* (13 May, 2018). They even agreed to meet the local land owners' demand of equal split of outputs even though the landowners had contributed less (URO project manager, 1 May, 2018).

However, conversations with the URO urban planner, the URO project manager and local people revealed an important point. In design meetings the only way specified to local people to do the renewal was by land consolidation with their neighbours (whoever they wanted to), otherwise they would never be able to renew their small houses because the council would not give them consents for rebuilding such a small house (URO urban planner, 22 May 2017). If they consolidated more land they could get five-storey buildings with free building permissions from the council and loans from central government (the loan was 50% of building cost)' (URO urban planner, 22 May 2017).

If local people would agree on that, each of them would receive an apartment unit which was much more expensive than their original house and also, they would get some extra money as well. It appeared that the council had already decided on what to do and just had asked URO to share it with the community and get their response (the answer just could be yes or no). After having a few meetings, a lot of local people agreed to do the renewal this way. One of the local community council members believed that they agreed because of their poverty:

*When they are poor, when they see with the renewal, their 1 Rial (Iran's money) will become 2 Rials they will be encouraged to do it. Although they are not happy with losing their small house because they have privacy there and they won't have privacy in an apartment, when they see free building permissions and five-story buildings, they go for that. Because they can have 50,000 Rials profit out of this and spend that on other problems of their life. So, these people do this renewal because of their poverty but it is not basically right and they are not satisfied from the bottom of their heart (18 June, 2017)*

The URO urban planner criticized the council and URO managers at the high level and declared that the community had no power and role in decision making.

*There were some made decisions at the high level saying that the renewal should be like this and that... if you build based on this you will get these benefits. They were imposed to the community from the top and when these decisions were being made the community wasn't involved. All what they knew was like this is my own building and this is my neighbours and based on what these people say, I can only build like this. If the council and URO want to really increase the community involvement they can't do it this way in which local owners can do nothing. They should have involved the community or at least their representatives when they were making the main decisions...*

*they had already made all the decisions, then at the implementation stage of what they had decided, they said let's participate with the community and involve them. Then they put a name on it 'Collaboration' saying that the power is in the community's hands but actually developers had a higher level of authority than the community. The community just gave their lands and had no role in decision making, it is a financial participation not a real community involvement. In a real community involvement, they have to have a role in decision making (24 May, 2017).*

Nonetheless, most local people as owners of the houses said yes and went through the renewal but what actually was offered to them to make decisions about was interior and exterior design of the buildings and nothing more. The width of all Abouzar streets were going to be changed but local people were not asked about that. Sometimes they would present their idea about width of streets but it wasn't taken into account. For example, one of local community council members said "we told them (the council) to get rid of those streets with 3m width and try to merge houses here with those in the back (lateral land merger) and avoid lineal land merger. By doing this we could widen both streets for 8 m<sup>2</sup>.... But unfortunately they didn't do what we asked for" (28 May, 2017).

In terms of interior and exterior design, it seemed that agreements had been achieved and the community ideas were included. But according to what local people saw afterwards, there had not been a good platform provided for the community to understand the options and make decisions. One of the local people said *“they didn’t clearly explain everything to us, in other countries, they provide a three-dimensional map, so you can see the terrace, the bathrooms, toilets but they didn’t do it for us. You see the building when the walls are done and you have no other way except accepting that”* (13 May, 2017). There has been a lack of shared understanding about some of that items that they had talked about in design meetings. For example, they had agreed on applying “second quality” ceramics in the bathrooms. But the developers applied a very low quality ceramic claiming that this was second quality when in fact it was much lower *“in the design we had agreed on applying second quality ceramic but what the developer has actually applied is not second quality and not even fourth quality one... he (the developer) was just thinking about his own self-interest rather than our collective interest* (local community land owner, 13 May, 2017). They had not discussed which ceramic is second quality for example, Yazd or Kashan (these are names of two types of ceramic produced in Iran), so everyone could have a different understanding of second quality (or they might have trusted the developers too much). This lack of clarity and transparency about some topics that they talked about resulted in misunderstandings and in the final event developers did things according to their own understanding and their own self-interest. Even one of the local developers confirmed that and said *“you know most people here are uneducated and don’t have enough knowledge and awareness, so the developers after design, start doing things differently”* (21 June, 2017). He believes that lack of community awareness and knowledge led to them being co-opted by developers.

After finishing designs the planners and developers got into implementation of what the community gave consents on. Here, the developers had to design architectural maps and submit them to the council Department of Architecture and Urban Design (DAUD) to receive building consents. According to the comments of the URO project manager, at this stage, three things happened in which the developers did something in conflict with Iran’s Building National Law/Code but the council department of DAUD approved them and regarded them as legal (1 May, 2017). First, the developers would give architectural, civil and electrical maps of the buildings to acquaintances who had some practical experience but they were not professional designers. Under the law, the design had to be done by certified architects, certified electrical engineers and certified civil engineers<sup>36</sup> (MRUD, 2010).

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<sup>36</sup>This is a certificate that engineers after receiving their university degree have to pass. It is a theoretical and practical exam that engineers take to be a certified and able to freely work everywhere.

Certified architects and engineers would charge the developers much more for designing the maps, so developers would bypass the professionals from design. A certified architect said

*developers don't ask us to do the design, they don't pay me the fee. As an engineer, I charge a defined amount of money for design per m<sup>2</sup> like 1000 Rial. Developers have to pay me that as an architect then they have to pay electrical and civil engineers for other things.... But they don't pay this money while they get it done all together for 50,000 Rials out there (1 May, 2017).*

The council department of DAUD just would rely on its own architects who would look at the maps and implement some changes then, they finally would approve all of them and issue the consents (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017)..

The second illegal action was that, the developers introduced themselves as builders of the building to the council department of DAUD (they had to be just investing their money) while the National Building Code says 'the builder of the building must be certified engineers' (MRUD, 2010). Again they did this because certified engineers would charge a significant amount of money, and although the council could reject it, unfortunately the council approved that. The URO project manager criticized the council and said *"those people who have received some money from their fathers have become developers while they used to have a supermarket or be a computer engineer not a builder, they have no academic knowledge about building"* (1 May 2017). The council department of DAUD (17<sup>th</sup> district council) broke the law.

*Tehran's council is not allowed to issue building consents if designer, builder and inspector are not certified engineers. Tehran's council is breaking the law (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017).*

The third illegal act of the council and developers was related to the people that developers employed to do the labour work. Most of them did not have relevant trades certificates for what they were employed to do.<sup>37</sup> According to the National Building Law/Code construction work is to be done by certified workers, but the developers said *"there are not enough skilled workers with certificates and it is difficult to find them"* (1 May, 2017). Also, it is more expensive to have skilled certified workers. Indeed the lack of certified skilled labour was, and remains, a problem throughout Iran. The URO project manager said *"in this country, we haven't educated enough skilled people for building. We normally need around 120 skills in building but here those who install power points do the welding work when needed because we haven't educated skilled workers"* (1 May, 2017). Regardless of a lack of

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<sup>37</sup> Whoever wants to do building work has to go through education and pass courses that are held by Technical and Vocational Training Organization, they are short courses.

enough skilled workers in Iran, the council still could ask for certified skilled workers but it not only did not ask for that but also approved the unskilled labour that developers introduced.

Finally, with all the problems above, the council issued building consents that were mostly five-storey buildings and the consents were supposed to be free building consents as they had promised to the community and developers. It had to be free because the central government had asked the council to issue free building consents for people in deteriorated areas and get the money back from the central government instead (because building permissions' fee is the only council's income) (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017). According to 17<sup>th</sup> district council's detailed plan, three-story is the maximum of stories that a building can have in Abouzar, but the council department of DAUD added two more levels to the buildings as an encouragement/incentive for developers and the community and making the renewal economically beneficial for them (URO District Manager, personal communication, 7 June, 2017). The point is: although the council would not charge for the first three levels, it would charge the developers with a significant amount of money for the last two levels. URO District Manager revealed that the money that the council would charge for two added levels was equal to the money that it had discounted for the first 3 levels. He said *"we would call it miscellaneous fees because it was out of our rules and regulations. Miscellaneous fees were equal to the fee that we would remit for building allowed three-story houses"* (URO District Manager, personal communication, 7 June, 2017). On this basis, the council had actually planned to get money from both developers and the central government.

According to the views expressed by participants it appears that the council issued building permissions under the circumstances above (not having certified and charging for building consents,...) because they merely wanted to increase the quantity of the buildings that they were renewing. The quality was not important at all (URO urban planner, 24 May, 2017). By focusing on the quantity they could increase their income because *"annually every district council had to gain a defined amount of income. So, they had to increase the number of buildings levels and add miscellaneous fees to be able to reach the income that they wanted"* (URO District Manager, personal communication, 7 June, 2017). Also, two URO representatives in the local office added that the council just wanted to *"politically show off... they just wanted to loudly say that 'we have renewed X percentage of the houses', unfortunately they are more a political institution rather than being a public institution for people"* (URO urban planner, 24 May, 2018).

URO representatives in the local office claimed that they were unhappy with what was happening: *"We were changing the form of the problem not solving that. For example, building five-story buildings*

*in the streets with 6m width was wrong, we asked the council to change this plan... but unfortunately they just wanted to increase the quantity of buildings being built. We had no real power to change the building consent” (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017).*

After receiving the council’s building consent, developers had to pay a significant amount of money to the central government departments of electricity, gas and water which were all housed under the Ministry of Energy. For example, in one case four houses were going to be merged and a new apartment having 10 units was to be built instead. So, they needed more power and water services. URO officials at high level discussed with the aforementioned departments to co-operate and make it free or decrease the fees: *“According to Deteriorated Areas Revitalization Law, the council was not the only responsible organization for the renewal but all the public organizations had to co-operate. For example, water department has to provide related infrastructure... but they never co-operated because they wanted their money”* (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017). So, the developers would have to pay to receive services from these central government departments.

The data from interviews show that when the actual building started, there were frequent manipulations or substitutions by developers of specified construction materials and also a lack of efficient building inspection. Local people, URO and even the council officials claimed that the developers used low-quality and non-standard materials to increase their own profits or save costs. URO urban planner said

*The materials that developers would use in the buildings were mostly different from our defined building materials. They just wanted to use something that would help them increase their self-interest but how the building was being built was not important. They just wanted to build it in a way to have relative satisfaction of the community and also to be able to sell their own units (24-May,2017).*

Even one of the developers who I interviewed, criticised the work of other developers:

*Some developers should have added 1 meter of concrete, but they just added 90 or 80cm. For example, I have seen that in Ramezani Street... While concrete placing, they didn’t do any vibration, they used very low quality concrete and then they didn’t water it well... I have seen people from URO office coming and giving them a warning/notice but nothing happened (21-Jun, 2017).*

One of the local land owners described one of the worst buildings that was built: *“I brought a person who was specialist on building and he said that the bars that our developer was using were thermal for controlling concrete temperature, not load bearing bars .... It can be very dangerous for our life if we live in this building”* (13-May, 2017). Some interviewees also noted that developers’ lack of knowledge about the building was the reason for making mistakes. One of the developers said *“I am*

*sure that you can't find a developer that does something intentionally or uses some wrong materials that are dangerous for people's life. If they do wrong things, it means that they don't have knowledge about it and it isn't intentional"*( 17-May, 2017).

People from the URO local office did some inspections and gave developers warnings if needed but they were not legally in a position to stop the construction so developers would not listen to them (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017). Officially, the inspection had to be done by certified building inspectors working for Tehran Engineering Organization. If they found anything wrong with the building they had to report it to the district council and the council then had to issue an abatement notice. The inspectors were the only certified engineers legally monitoring the building process.

The data showed that there were two groups of inspectors in Abouzar, one group who worked well but they still claimed that the council sometimes ignored what they would report. For example, one of them said *"as an inspector when I see a building with a problem, I write to the council 'Mr council, I don't approve the concrete of this building and the labour working here, it doesn't have certified builder....' The council says 'I don't care' then they archive my report"* (1-May, 2017). The second group of inspectors, would take bribes from developers and ignore building problems. A local developer said *"some developers discuss with the building inspectors saying that we give them some sweets (bribes)... then the inspectors will sign the inspection form as Okay and go"* (21 June, 2017). I have to note that some developers do these illegal things while some work well, use good quality materials and do the right things.

The standard and cost of building materials in Iran seems to have been one of the main reasons for what the developers did. At the time of the renewal a number of Western countries (backed by the UN) had the highest amount of sanctions on Iran. Some building materials could not be imported into Iran so the price of those already in the country rose daily. URO project manager said *"today concrete is \$3 per kg, next week the same concrete with the same quality was \$6 per kg. We don't have stability in the market"* (1 May, 2017). Some developers claimed that when they did use standard materials they lost a lot of their profit because of increase in the price of building materials and decrease in the price of units (a local developer, 17 May, 2017). Housing units' prices decreased because of less demand in the market and families had less financial capability because of economic pressures in the country.

On the other hand, one of the interviewees claimed that at the time of Abouzar renewal (2017) *"we didn't and we don't have standard building materials in Iran... 40 and even 20 years ago we had the best steel bars and concrete in Esfahan and Ahvaz (Iran's cities) but in the past 10 years their quality*

*seriously decreased. We started producing whatever we could and added whatever metal we had to the iron like Cooper and Lead. Our officials would say to the companies that ‘just produce because we are under sanctions, so we don’t have standard materials’* (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017). He believes that Iran’s infrastructure was affected highly by the sanctions and it was not ready for the renewal. The URO project manager claimed that Iran’s Standard Organization (ISO) just placed an ISO logo on the building materials to keep the country going although they were not really standard materials (1 May, 2017). This was just a claim and is anecdotal mentioned by one interviewee and I have no more evidence for that and there might be many people who do not agree with that (not having standard materials in the county). The clear thing is that in Iran, there are different building materials with different degrees of quality and most participants of this research believed that the developers often would go for low quality ones. The developers themselves claimed that they have used standard materials and they have trusted all the materials having standard logo. They put the blame on ISO and Engineering Organization if there is any problem.

*If the materials have the standard logo on them, nobody can say why you have used this.... I am 100% sure that those companies producing standard concrete, their concrete is really standard... our country is not that bad and out of control... I don’t have knowledge to understand if the materials are standard or no by just looking at them. Also, I don’t have the capacity to test all the materials... If a company is not producing standard materials, ISO has to stop that from producing* (a local developer, 17 May, 2017).

According to the claims of the council and URO representatives, after 5 years, “around 60% or 70% of Abouzar has been renewed” (URO project manager, 1 May 2017). But when I had an exact look at the maps and data I saw that actually around 30% of the houses have been renewed (it means the rest of the population did not say yes to this renewal).

### **8.3 Product performance: Do the products meet the agreed goals and objectives of the participants?**

#### **8.3.1 Outputs:**

The main, and arguably, the only, outputs of this renewal were the houses in the form of apartments and also wider streets. The photos below show some of the newly built apartments in Abouzar.





Figure 8.2 (a & b): Ramezani and Safari streets in Abouzar (Photo by the author, 21 July 2017)

The results might have looked impressive at first but they were questionable. I have categorized the main characteristics of these outputs as follows:

1. *Low-quality materials and structures:* The developers claimed that “the structure of the building is highly strong but the finishing parts of it are not as high quality as the north of Tehran because the price of houses are much higher there” (17 May 2017). The head of the council department of DAUD who is the responsible person for issuing building permissions who also claimed that the structures of the buildings are strong and earthquake proof (28 June 2017). By contrast, other participants in the research, including the chair of the local council board said that they were worried about the quality of the buildings, although he placed the blame with the laxity of the inspectors (28 June 2017). One of the local community board members said

*these buildings can't even stand a  $M_w 2$  earthquake... their look is good, but they are like chips because the developers have stolen the materials (used low-quality materials). Whatever materials they used the person who was applying them was not professional and didn't know how to do it. For example, they make the concrete today, but they use it tomorrow, that concreted has failed and is not strong anymore....* (10 June 2017).

By some accounts evidence for the low-quality of buildings, unfortunately, was two deaths in Abouzar in 2014 “because of a storm in Tehran, stone of a building's cladding fell down and killed a dad and son on the street” (the chair of local council board, 3 June 2017). The reason was that the cladding's stone had not been well attached to the building.

2. *Lack of appropriateness and variation:* Many of the new building facades did not match Iran's culture and climate, as Figure 8.2 shows. Most of the apartments look the same using stone cladding. Traditionally, brick was the main façade material in Iran. Brick is well-matched with Iran's climate but

*“developers just would think of their own pocket (own interest) also they have no knowledge to build a façade that has visual aesthetic and is sustainable, they just use stone. Stone is not good for very cold and hot weather”* (URO project manager, 1 May 2017). The result is that most of the buildings look the same, do not respect tradition and do not perform well for the very hot days and very cold days of Iran.

3. *Inappropriate design for sun-orientation:* The houses have orientation to the sun but the way they have been built does not let them get enough sun. Iran, like most countries, has four distinct seasons, and the sun has different angles in different areas. The URO project manager said *“where the sun has a direct angle, apartments can have 18m height. In Tehran, sunshine’s angle is not direct, so apartments can just go 12m high in the street with 6m<sup>2</sup> wideness. But here in Abouzar, apartments in both sides of the streets have 21m height. The ones in the south of the street don’t get any sun but the one in the north gets sunshine but just in the levels 4 and 5. So, people will have a lack of vitamin D and some other diseases”* (1 May 2017).

4. *New design (apartment) in conflict with traditional design:* Abouzar residents had to agree to the land consolidation and building apartments because it was the only introduced way to do the renewal. However, after living in the apartments for some time they claimed that the apartments were not what they were used to, and they did not like the new environment. They tried to do things that they used to do in their previous small ground-floor houses like putting their motorcycle in the elevator and taking it to the 5<sup>th</sup> floor. They did their noisy vacuum cleaning at 2am. Neighbours fought over paying to fix leaky rooves. In essence they were used to houses and were not able to reconcile themselves with apartment living.

5. *Uneven width of the streets, congestion and traffic problems:* In the renewal, many of Abouzar streets having 4m width changed into streets with 6m width. At the same time, every four or five small houses changed into a 5-storey building having 10 units. It meant that the population increased while there were still some pylons and trees in some streets (figure 8.2). Also, some houses at the beginning and the end of streets were not renewed because owners would have lost their small shops in the process. It means that in some cases the street is wider in the middle and narrower at the end and beginning. The participants claimed that traffic in these streets is very difficult because they are not wide enough for the population and also, they are potentially very dangerous streets in a crisis situation. A local community board member said *“If there is a fire here, all of people have to die because fire trucks can’t get in... The council shouldn’t have let these many buildings be built here but they let it happen to get the revenue... If a problem happens, people in the apartments have no way to escape, even those on the streets will die”* (18 June 2017). A local community board member said

*If in our neighbourhood, they (the council) had asked ourselves which streets needed to be 8m<sup>2</sup>, 6m<sup>2</sup> or 12m<sup>2</sup>, we would have told them what to do. They didn't ask us, they just designed everything on papers while they had never seen our area... I don't really understand why they have made some street 12m<sup>2</sup> wide while those streets didn't really need that. We have some other streets that need to be 12m<sup>2</sup> wide but they are 6m<sup>2</sup> wide, so cars have serious problems getting into their parking (28 May, 2017).*

By contrast, the council and URO representatives claimed that the streets are wider now and delivery of public services is much easier. For example, the Assistant Manager of DAUD claimed *"This has been a successful renewal because streets with 2 or 3m<sup>2</sup> wideness have been widened, it means the delivery of public help/services is easier, fire fighter can get there easier and access to hospitals is easier"* (28 June, 2017). But the point is that those streets that are wide enough now for the population residing there used to be wide before (e.g. those 6m<sup>2</sup>, 8m<sup>2</sup>) and traffic was much easier. And while the streets with 3m<sup>2</sup> and 4m<sup>2</sup> wideness had serious traffic problems before, after the renewal they are not still wide enough for the population i.e., they have become 6m<sup>2</sup> wide but the population has increased so much that doubling the width has been insufficient.

6. *Poor infrastructure (green spaces, parking, water pipes)* There is a fundamental lack of green space in Abouzar. Although the council department of DAUD was responsible for increasing and improving green spaces in Abouzar, as has already been observed, they did not add even one tree to the area. The Abouzar Detailed Plan had defined some residential areas to be turned into green spaces but there was no effort from the council to talk to house owners there and buy their houses and change them into a park. So, URO representatives in the local office (including myself) held some meetings with local people (as the house owners) and asked them to sell their lands to the council but none of them agreed. The owners asked for such a high amount of money it was not reasonable. As the data shows this was the only effort of public agencies for providing green spaces in Abouzar. URO project manager said *"we haven't provided public services... it seemed that the council was in a dirty competition and just wanted to increase the number of buildings been built saying that we have issued 500 building consents in deteriorated areas this year. But what is the quality of those 500 buildings? Have you provided green spaces for them? These are not important"* (1 May 2017).

Other than a lack of green spaces, there is a problem with water pipes and electricity cables in Abouzar. The URO project manager noted: *"before the renewal, for example, there were 50 houses in a street in which around 60 household would live. But after the renewal, the houses (units) became around 120. The least thing that should have happened was that the thickness of the wires should have increased. Now, we see that electrical wiring is very old, and water pipes are the same* (1 May, 2017). The participants claimed that the water pipelines and electricity wires don't have the capacity to

provide services for the population there. It is the responsibility of Ministry of Energy as a central government agency to upgrade these things but there is no effort for that.

There is also a lack of enough lights and walkway lines in the streets, so pedestrians do not know which side of the street they can walk safely.

Around 40 goals or design specifics for the houses had been defined in the consultation meetings with the community and developers (Appendix F). The developers claimed that all the defined goals were incorporated into the houses and they have even supplied and applied some more and better appliances and materials that had not been defined in the design. One of them said *“in the design we have agreed on applying iron staircases but I applied stainless steel ones”* (17 May, 2017).

Opposing what the developers said almost all other participants noted that not all the defined goals were implemented. The URO urban planner stated: *“In more than 90% of the cases what was built wasn’t matched with what we had defined and designed. Most of the materials at the end would change”* (17 May, 2017). The basic goal of this renewal was building earthquake-proof buildings, the council manager of DAUD who was responsible for issuing building consents believed that all of built houses are earthquake-proof. All indications about the methods of building and the structure of the houses suggest that the houses are not really earthquake-proof and not as high-quality as is claimed.

In terms of national standards, the council provided Payankar Certificates for almost all of the buildings. This certificate is like New Zealand’s Code Compliance Certificate saying that the houses comply with the building national standards. In Abouzar, the quality of building materials and the way they were implemented by unprofessional people showed that the houses do not meet either national nor international building standards. One of the basic criteria for having a standard house was having a certified builder building the house not unprofessional people doing that. The URO project manager stated *“we have some non-standard building materials being implemented by some unprofessional people. When the worker says to the builder this is the best weld, he will believe in it because he doesn’t know what the best weld is”* (1 May, 2017).

### **8.3.2 Outcomes:**

1. *Higher community standard of living:* It is clear that the new apartments have improved some community living standards Their previous small houses did not have a proper bathroom and kitchen. Thus a lot of households would use their small yard to take a bath or cook. But in their new homes in the form of apartment units, everything is provided together.

*Before, people had mice and beetle in their houses, thieves could easily steal their stuff in those houses, so households couldn't easily travel. Now, the level of their hygiene has increased by having modern and up-to-dated bathrooms and toilets.... they have safety in their apartment. The same for their kitchens, previously, the kitchens were right at the end of their houses producing germs and bacteria and without any ventilation, it would result in a lot of diseases (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017).*

An average household's standard of living has improved by having a unit which is much bigger than the previous house they owned.

2. *Higher neighbourhood safety:* During the renewal all of the narrow cul-de-sacs were removed and what the criminals would do in their small stand-alone houses could not happen in the apartments anymore. The community have more informal surveillance on the streets. So, it seems that the area has become a safer place.

*Now, at least we can't see those crimes that we would see in the first years of being in Abouzar. One of the first streets that we started the renewal was Iji, there was a pylon in front of our office in Iji St having police's camera on. But a local person had hanged his underwear on the camera... it meant that they had mocked the police. The police was not able to come and go around the streets easily (because of narrow streets). When the police was called about a fight here, they wouldn't come right away (they would kill time to arrive at the end of the fight)... we had a lot of these things here. But this renewal, by widening the roads, helped to bring safety to the area. Now, the community people themselves can move around by their vehicle, they can at least monitor their area by their eyes (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017).*



Figure 8.3 (a&b): A cul-de-sac and a street with 4m width in Abouzar before renewal (photo by the author, 21 June, 2017)



Figure 8.4 An Abouzar streets after renewal (photo by the author, 21 June, 2017)

3. *Economic benefits for the local community:* Local house-owners got a newly built unit which has more economic value than their previous small house. Beyond that every local owner received a significant amount of money (after sharing 50/50 profit) so they could easily buy a car or spend the money on their other needs. The URO urban planner said

*Previously, just around 10% of the community had cars and most of them had motorcycles (cheaper than cars) or bicycles. By the renewal, people have a parking for themselves while in the past they didn't have a parking and couldn't bring their car into their narrow streets. They have their own private car now, they are more empowered now. They use their car on the weekend, go for a picnic with their family or work as a taxi and earn some money (24 May, 2017).*

4. *Lower mobility in the population:* The URO local office conducted a survey in 2014 to find out the percentage of migration from and to Abouzar after renewing a lot of houses. The results showed that most of previous residents of Abouzar were still living there (in their new apartments). Also, a big population had migrated to Abouzar which might be because of high price of housing elsewhere in Tehran while Abouzar had many cheap apartments by comparison (URO, 2014).

5. *A Sense of loss of privacy and peace of mind:* Many local people believed that with the renewal project and moving into apartments they lost important things such as privacy. They felt that they had more privacy in their previous small stand-alone house because they could have control on who was coming into their building but in the apartments, they have no control over that (URO urban planner, 24 May 2017). One of the local people said *"Our apartment is like a hotel, people come and go, and you don't know who they are and when you ask them 'who are you? and which unit are you going to? They say 'it is none of your business' (13 May 2017).* Local people also believed that they had lost their

peace of mind because of not only a lack of privacy but also the low-quality building materials amplified noise problems. One of local people stated:

*These people before being moved to the apartments haven't been educated how to live in an apartment and respect other people there. Our problems are firstly, because of the developer and not using good materials then because of neighbors not respecting each other's right... when I ask them please don't talk and laugh loudly after 10pm they fight with me and threaten me.... I wish I could go back to the past (before the renewal) and get my peace of mind and my family safety back... In life, the most important thing is peacefulness and safety. We can tackle our economic problems by many ways for example, we buy less cloth, eat less, don't spend much for pleasure but peace of mind and family safety are the most important things for me that we can't compromise (13 May, 2017).*

6. *Depression*: This outcome was highlighted by one of the local developers born and raised in Abouzar. He constantly criticized the council and other developers and he also said that the local people that he knew for years were very depressed and hopeless now:

*Most of the local people here are old, when their apartments are ready and they move into them, they will become very upset saying that the apartment is like a cage with no yard. After 3 or 4 years they'll become very depressed and a lot of them will die in 5 years. In our street (Iji), around 20 to 30 people passed away for different reasons for example, they wanted 4<sup>th</sup> floor but they were given the 1<sup>st</sup> floor, or had a problem with quality of the house like the elevator. We have a neighbour in the 5<sup>th</sup> floor and it's become a week that he hasn't come down because he is scared if the elevator gets a problem. The elevator was not working last week (21 June, 2017).*

The renewal has clearly brought some positive outcomes to Abouzar like neighbourhood safety and increase in living standards. But there are still negative outcomes. It is clear that all the outcomes are related to housing, good or bad side of it, because the focus of this renewal process was just improving housing, so there is no other outcomes like community empowerment.

### **8.3.3 Adaptation**

#### *1. Durability of Relations*

The history of the process shows that during the renewal project there were not strong relations between local community people and the council and URO representatives. There were not even strong relations between public organizations. However, some of URO representatives claimed that their local office was really faithful to the community and the community trusted them:

*Local community's trust to our local office has significantly increased and they see the office a place belonged to themselves where they go and ask for what they want, they regard this office as a different place or agency form the council (URO urban planner, 24 May, 2017).*



Yet a local community person expressed something different:

*I have a labour job and I wake up at 6am and go to work... when I came to this local office [5 years ago] I trusted them. Then, when I saw the developers not implementing what we agreed on for the foundation, roofs... I hated the local office. To make the story short, I've lost my trust to this office and not just me but a lot of other people have lost their trust to this office. Because we saw them not defending our rights... that building was the only thing that I had... (13 May, 2017).*

The records shows in some instances to some degree, the intra-organizational relationships in the council and also between the council and central government organizations have improved. For example, as a result of stronger communications between URO and other council departments like DAUD, a festival was established in 2014 called 'Towards Better Facades'. The festival was like a competition for choosing the best facades in Abouzar and as a result of this festival a law was formed in 17<sup>th</sup> district council called 'Façade Law' (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017). The law requires every builder or developer to design its building's façade according to Iranian traditional architectural features which are very suitable for Iran's climate. The council then offers money to developers to have their buildings' façades designed by certified architects; as a result, the number of buildings having different-looking facades with bricks is increasing considerably.

As a result of co-operation of the council's different departments and URO some educational classes for developers were implemented to provide them with some scientific knowledge building techniques and standards. They also started writing some material with an easy language for non-professional developers to learn more about building (URO project manager, 1 May, 2017). Another positive result of internal co-operation between council departments was building some automated multi-storey parking in Abouzar because there was a lack of parking space there.

URO representatives claimed that the relationships between the council and central government organizations have improved since the '*National Regeneration Act*' was passed by parliament and enacted in 2014. The Act focused on two things; 1) co-operation of all the public agencies (local and central government agencies) and involving the communities for regeneration of deteriorated areas and 2) having a holistic and comprehensive approach to the renewal and looking at all aspects of the renewal such as housing, parks, roads. (URO district manager, 7 June, 2017). The URO district manager declared that since the Act was passed the URO changed its role to a "bonding" organization trying to facilitate connections between different organizations (7 June, 2017). He also presented some examples of their collaboration with the Ministry of Energy as a central government organization in which the ministry agreed not to charge the developers and local people for installing water and gas



pipelines. In actual fact the ministry charged the council instead so it means the ministry did not agree to do the job for free or do it with a cheaper price.

Although the '*National Regeneration Act*' emphasized community engagement as well I did not find any effort by the URO, the council or any other public agency to improve that in such a short time frame. There is no indication of improvements in the community capacity and also adaptation to the changes. In fact, some of the local people believed that after the renewal project they had lost what they had previously.

## 2) *Durability of places*

Two groups live in the new apartments: one group is the previous owners of the houses that remain the owner of their new unit while the other group is tenants (tenants of the developer units). According to the interviewees, the owners take care of the houses well while tenants do not care much, so maintenance of the building has become a subject of fights among residents for the buildings. For example, a local community board member said *"after less than one year we saw that the roof leaks at the top floor because it hadn't been built well. It resulted in conflicts, and fights among neighbours, some of them would say 'it isn't our ceiling that leaks, the family living on the top floor has to pay for that because their ceiling leaks'"* (28 May, 2017).

A very big problem of the new apartments highlighted by the participants was that they have no capacity for change and adaptation. It creates conditions for yet another deterioration because these mammoth and monolithic apartment blocks that have been produced cannot be changed. The URO urban planner said

*One of the most important problems of this project is that changing the product [houses] and fixing it is so difficult, just the Elephant Prophet can fix it (means that it is impossible to be fixed). It is impossible to change the buildings, the owners do some changes, they must do that because the quality of the building is bad. These buildings can't last more than 20 years.... When I think about it, I feel just an earthquake can solve the problem, destroy all of them then they can be built again* (24 May).

It implies that this renewal is just going to end up in a future deterioration. There are big "lacks" in Abouzar and the biggest one is lack of green spaces, but actually even before the renewal the area had shortage of green spaces. A lot of retired men used to get together and sit around one of the small roundabouts in Abouzar (Moghadam Roundabout) every evening and they still do that. When I asked a local person '*what local people do with lack of green space*' he answered: *"they have forgotten that they have such a need, some of them walk a long distance to Baharan Park (nearest park), but after a*

*while they get tired to walk such a long distance and they leave it”* (Local community board member, 28 May, 2017).



Figure 8.5 Elders getting together and sitting around Moghadam roundabout in Abouzar (Photo taken by the author August 2014)

## 8.4 Satisfaction with the product

I found a high degree of dissatisfaction among those local community people and some of the URO representatives that I spoke to. Conversely, those people working for other council's departments like DAUD and one of URO representatives felt satisfied with the product. I have categorized the main factors for satisfaction and dissatisfactions highlighted by the participants.

1. *Physical features of the buildings (e.g. Lack of quality and safety of the buildings):* From a community point of view, many of physical feature of the buildings have problems such as elevators, water and gas pipelines, foundation, walls, insulation. These are a source of dissatisfaction for the community. They see the buildings as an unsafe place for their families to live in. One of them said *"In terms building's facilities, they are low, quality is low..., the building doesn't have safety at all, the elevator's safety is zero..."* (21 May 2017). Two of the local people that I talked to declared that they were looking for selling their apartments and buying a new place, one of them was looking for a higher quality apartment, another was looking for a small stand-alone house to renovate (to recreate he had before) because he feels they have more peace of mind there *"I feel I have lost the peaceful life that I had in my small house although it seemed not to be safe for the earthquake"* (a local community home owner, 13 May, 2017).

2. *Lack of enough neighbourhood facilities (e.g. green spaces, wide and bright streets);* Some URO representatives and local people highlighted these as important causes of dissatisfaction. The

URO project manager said *"The council gave consents for building 100% of the land sections and now around 90% of the apartments have no garden, have no green space, and other facilities... especially in Abouzar and Moghadam we have no green space, it is zero, even in our schools we have no green space"* (1 May, 2017).

3. *Lack of capacity for change and improvement to apartments:* Some URO representatives were dissatisfied because they feel they have produced some buildings that are merely a future source of deterioration. The buildings have no capacity to be improved. URO urban planner said *"all of it was a waste of money, an area like this was formed that changing it is very very difficult. This kind of houses were formed by a lot of investments while we can't change them with even two times, four times or five times more investments.... problems have significantly increased"* (24 May 2017).

4. *Community standard of living;* This factor was a satisfactory item for the council representatives and some of the URO representatives. For example, one official stated *"[the] local community have got bigger units with better and more facilities inside and they have got a better lifestyle there"* (URO regional manager, 14 June 2017). However, one of the local people living in his new unit said *"it is more comfortable for my wife and children to have kitchen, bathroom and toilet all in one unit but a lot of the time, water is not pumped to upper floors, water pump doesn't work well, when there is no water, our package (heating and cooling system) and radiator don't work, we regularly would pay money to fix the elevator's engine and finally we changed it..."* (21 May, 2017). One of local community board members believed that this renewal improved the community facilities, but it was not an action that fixes the problems, it is like solving one problem and creating another problem (28 May 2017).

5. *Quantity of the renewed buildings;* This factor was very satisfactory for the council representatives that I talked to and they believed that the council did its mission very well. The council chair of local board said *"the numbers are important for us and the numbers are really satisfactory"* (3 June, 2017). As mentioned earlier some URO representatives criticized the council a lot *"the council is satisfied because they are looking for quantity, and quality of the work isn't important... the only criteria for them is issuing consents in deteriorated areas. For example, saying that this year we renewed 200 buildings in Abouzar. The Quality of the community life is not important, providing green spaces and playing areas are not important..."* (1 May 2017). URO representatives felt that the council did not give the URO enough power and authority in the renewal.

In essence local community people and most of the URO representatives who were directly in contact with the community were highly dissatisfied with the products while the council representatives felt satisfied because they have a higher number of renewed houses and therefore higher revenue.

## 8.5 Connections between process and products

According to the process and the products as described above it seems that there is a direct connection between the process and products of Abouzar renewal. The process was an unsuccessful process in terms of collaboration of stakeholders and also the products of it were not successful in many aspects. The views of interviewees show that the most influential factors of the process impacting the product include:

1. *Sense of responsibility of public organizations*; the council representatives that I talked to claimed that the process and product of this renewal both were very good and successful although they still had some doubts about the quality of housing. They believe that the main reason of this success was the council's high sense of responsibility. In their view the council provided free building consents and sacrificed its own profit and income to make the building economic for developers and local community. They also declared that if there is a problem, that is because of very low sense of responsibility of central government agencies and putting all the pressure on the council. The council chair of local board said

*A part of the renewal work had to be done by the council and a part of it by the central government. Unfortunately, the central government doesn't help while the council has sacrificed its own right and didn't really charge for issuing building consents...." (3 June, 2017).*

The URO regional manager also said *"there are plenty of problems in the city such as lack of green spaces, the council's budget is not enough and the government doesn't help"* (14 June, 2017). But actually the records in many instances already showed that the council did not really provide free building permissions. It would issue building permissions in a way to receive money from both the developers and central government, so the council had planned to receive more money than what it normally get (at the time of writing it is worth noting that although the central government owes the council a lot of money it has yet to pay it).

In contrast with what the council representatives said local community representatives and some of the URO representatives believed that both the process and product of this renewal were unsuccessful. They strongly put the blame on the council and said that the main reason of this failure was lack of council's sense of responsibility to the community's well-being and the law. For example a local developer said *"unfortunately, the council managers do whatever they personally believe in, they don't implement the law, everything can be changed with money..."* (21 June, 2017). One of the Abouzar local community board members said they have to stop this renewal as soon as possible (18 June, 2017).

2. *Lack of community awareness*; Some interviewees noted that lack of community awareness and education exacerbated the problem and because of that the council and developers could easily do whatever they wanted. A local community board member stated *“these people are illiterate; they have 2 or 3 jobs to be able to earn money for their family. They don’t know what they need and what they have to ask for in terms of public services that the governmental organizations have to meet. They don’t even think that they need a park and safety and governmental help here”* (18 June 2017). Thus, the lack of efforts to raise community awareness and educations is seen as one of process factors that influenced the product.

3. *Self-interest motivations*; Not only developers but also local community people were blamed for being greedy in the process. Some believed that the local people just would think about their own profit. For example, they wanted 50% of ownership of the final product while the developers should have taken 60% of the profit because their investment was more. Also, when the URO wanted the local people to sell their houses to the council to turn them into green spaces, local people asked for a huge amount of money that was unreasonable. *“The value of their land is \$ 740 per m<sup>2</sup>, but they said we don’t sell it for less than 5 million Tooman per m<sup>2</sup> (URO district manager, 14 June 2017). Such motivations in the process clearly had impacts on the final product as URO district manager added “local people influenced the renewal by being greedy, they wanted to solve their poverty in this project. For example, their house is \$ 1850 per m<sup>2</sup>, but they are not satisfied with receiving 50m<sup>2</sup> apartment and they want 80m<sup>2</sup>. The developers won’t build if their profit is 20% and they want 40% profit. All of these sorts of things have made the project like this (7 June 2017).*

4. *Trust*: Some URO representatives who believed that they have a good process and product claimed that they were able to establish trust at the beginning of the project because of their local office. They said that because of this trust, they were able to bring the local people and local developers with their small investments to the table. So, they see it as an achievement that they had and it was an impactful factor on “success”: *“that trust-building that we had among local people and local developers was the most important factor... after around 6, 7 years this community’s trust to us has increased and we were faithful to the community and tried to put ourselves in their shoes, fight for their right... although we didn’t have much power to force the developers do this and that”* (1 May, 2017). As mentioned above many local people rejected this claim and said that they had no trust in the URO local office anymore.

## 8.6 Contextual factors

From the information presented above it appears that contextual factors in Iran definitely impacted the renewal process and created some barriers and constraints for the renewal. They include:

1. *Prior failure to address the problems*; What was clear from the background section on previous council interventions was that the council had some top-down renewal experiences in other areas of the city. Their failure in these projects was the reason to establish a renewal which was labelled “collaborative.” Although Abouzar was not affected by those earlier failures, it was a neglected area for a long time.

2. *Socio-economics condition of the community (poverty)*; according to the interview and demographic data it seems that a very strong reason that made Abouzar’s people “participate” was their high level of poverty. One of the local community board members said

*All of this renewal was because of materials... people talk to me saying that they like their small house and they don’t like being in an apartment... [but] when they hear about some money and profit they will be encouraged. When they hear that they get around 50 million Toomans (other than an apartment), they agree with the renewal. They are right because they are poor for example, [ a man who] his daughter wants to get married and needs some money, his son is addicted to drugs and needs some money, his wife wants him to take them to a trip.... It is all materials, poverty, poverty, and if poverty comes into your life faith goes out (18 June, 2017).*

So, poverty is seen as an important contextual factor impacting the process of collaboration.

3. *Political framework of the council*; Tehran’s council had a political framework and even if the law was a barrier for implementing it, they would break the law or ignore it. The main purpose of council’s political framework was increasing the quantity of dwellings overall, including the quantity of buildings being renewed, and this goal heavily impacted the renewal process. Thus, doing the renewal at any cost had much more priority over doing genuine collaboration or community engagement. Too much concentration on increasing the number of units created inconsistencies even within the council. For example, the law did not allow for two levels of parking in the streets that are 6 - 8 m<sup>2</sup> wide but the council manager tended to treat it differently according to their personal point of view because the law was not sufficiently important to them. One of the local people complained: *“I asked the council ‘why don’t you allow us to build two levels of parking while our street was originally 8m<sup>2</sup> wide and now will become 12m<sup>2</sup> wide. Toomari Street is only 6m<sup>2</sup> and you have given two levels of parking to one of the building there?’...” (18 June 2017).*

A local developer also added *“when getting the building consents, we give the maps to council, the maps will be changed differently because of council’s engineers at the time. Everyone implements its own personal ideas for example, Mr Ahmadi, the head of DAUD, now makes something obligatory. Unfortunately, they do not obey the law, the council is allowed to do everything and with money you can fix everything (21 June, 2017).*

4. *Lack of organizational co-operation*; It is clear that the public organizations had no co-operation and even council departments had conflicts and did not work together easily. Although under the Deteriorated Areas Revitalization Law all governmental (central and local) and non-governmental organizations had to work together for the same purpose i.e., the renewal, in actual fact only the council worked towards that. Other central government organizations such as the Ministry of Energy did not take any sort of responsibility and they did not even co-operate when the URO asked them to help. All of this non-cooperative nature of relations between organizations in Iran impacted the process of renewal negatively. However, the chair of local council board believed that they had no conflict but some of organizations did not do their tasks very well and if they had an integrative city management in which the mayor was the head of police and everything else the problem would be solved (the chair of local council board, 28 June, 2017).

5. *Political situation of Iran in the world*; Since the Islamic revolution that happened in Iran more than 39 years ago Iran's government has had major conflicts with other countries. So, in some ways sanctions have been normal for a long time but in June 2005 a new president came into power in Iran; Mahmood Ahmadinejad (he was very close to the supreme leader but not to Iran's people). As a result of his policies, the worst sanctions ever known on the country were imposed. For example, building materials could barely be imported into Iran and such sanctions influenced every renewal project including the Abouzar project. It resulted in a shortage of building materials or at least quality-assured ones and high inflation of the prices of the materials that could be provided. The renewal process was affected by these two and conflicts would arise between stakeholders because of quality and price of building materials. So, this lack of international trust to Iran has resulted in increasing distrust in the country too (e.g. trust to ISO).

6. *Lack of construction materials*; This factor was directly connected to the above factor which was the relationship of Iran with international world. At the time of the renewal there was not enough construction materials in the country for supporting this renewal. The country did not have the ability to provide enough standard materials without the world, in a situation like this big renewal projects started to happen, and they faced a lack of enough standard concrete, steel and other things, nor stability in the price of materials. The URO project manager added that "*when the government decided to do the renewal at the same time it has to think about providing enough materials.... This will be a big renewal other than water, power, gas, sanitation services we had to think about providing enough concrete and steel and have stability in the price. The government should have prepared enough infrastructure* (1 May 2017).

7. *Lack of public trust in government*; It seems that people in Iran and in Tehran do not trust either the government in general nor the council in particular. A reflection of that is the legally

required payment of annual rates to the council by property owners. In fact, most people in Tehran do not pay their rates. In 1994, when the government stopped paying money to the council, the council became insolvent because city residents would not pay rates. So, the council decided to highly charge people for building permits, it made the building process very expensive, the role of private sector became necessary and consequently buildings became taller and denser in the city and more expensive. The URO district manager said *“around 30% of the studies have shown that if Tehran’s people pay their rates, the council doesn’t need to charge for building permissions anymore... why people don’t pay that, maybe we have to make the process clear for them, show them how this money is going to be spent, involve them on making decisions about spending the money...”* (14 June, 2017). This lack of public trust as a contextual factor in Iran as a whole also impacted the renewal process because building permits were expected by central government to be granted free of charge.

## 8.7 Chapter summary

The first question was *“How was collaborative governance process practiced in Abouzar housing regeneration?”* At the beginning of the process there was a trust building process that was very short and after seeing the first superficial signs of the community trust, collaboration on housing renewal started. Also, It seemed that the community defined the issues to address but actually the project had already been designed to focus on housing, so other issues were not taken into account. Also, the project did not care about community capability building, so public organizations collaborated with a community of property-owning individuals not a collective and integrated community that had a strong, independent advocacy agent.

The whole process of housing renewal was called ‘collaborative’ but actually almost all the interviewees believed that the council had the highest influence on the whole process in comparison to the other players and its influence was negative. Those people working for the URO as a council department, saw themselves as different from the council and believe that to a limited extent they were able to improve community trust, bring them to the table and bring local developers to the process with their small investments. But even URO representatives, who were officially a part of the council, declared that the council was the most influential player. In essence the community believed that they had ‘zero’ influence on decisions (local community board members, 18 June, 2017).

The information presented above seems to show that it was not just the council impacting this renewal process. All of public organizations, mainly through not acting (central government organizations) and semi-public organizations (like Engineering Organization) negatively influenced the process. The main player in Tehran’s governance is the council, so the council had the highest impact



in comparison to other organizations. The developers had the second highest impact on this renewal. Although their impact was small in comparison to the public organizations. Developer wealth gave them more power and authority to influence the renewal process. At the end, the community had very little influence on these already defined decisions and were coerced or bribed into “giving” their lands to make the renewal possible. The diagram below shows the influence of three players in three main spheres and their size is a recognition of their influence.




Figure 8.6 the players' influence on decision making

I have categorized characteristics of collaborative process above and presented them in the following table.

Table 8.1 characteristics of collaboration according to participants point of view

Main factors	Characteristics of each factor
Meetings and discussions	Meetings with the community were only limited to interior and exterior design not meetings for the rest of the project (the community as a whole) Any other meetings except interior and exterior design were not inclusive for local community. Normal local people had direct involvement in the interior design meetings as individuals not a collective group. Discussions were just limited to interior design while bigger discussion topics like 'how to do the renewal or what is the solution' were not offered to the community to discuss. There was a lack of a good and simple platform for the community to understand the options (like 3-dimentional maps), so lack of clarity and transparency of discussions. Lack of a shared understanding of what they agreed on and gave consent on.
Communications	Local community people had direct communication with the developers and URO representatives in the local office.
Conflict of interests	Developers manipulating and using cheaper building materials in the building for increasing their own self-profit. The council just focused on the quantity of the housing renewal not the quality of it, so it did illegal things to increase the quantity. The council added two more levels to the legal building levels to receive more money and also increase the quantity of buildings being built and politically showing off.

	The council charging for the building permissions and issuing them without having certified builders and labour.
Sense of responsibility	<p>Lack of co-operation and sense of responsibility of central government organizations such as electricity, water and gas departments, they would charge money to provide services.</p> <p>Lack of the council sense of responsibility about the quality of buildings, just issuing the consents for 5-story buildings and no care about the future of the neighbourhood, no effort for providing green spaces.</p> <p>Lack of sense of responsibility of developers about the quality of houses that they built.</p> <p>Lack of sense of responsibility of building inspectors (working for Engineering Organization) towards the quality of building been built.</p>

The second question that this chapter aimed to answer was related to evaluating the products (outputs, outcomes adaptation): *'Do the products meet the agreed goals and results of the participants?* Outputs of this renewal were just related to houses and they did not meet the target goals of the process to a high degree and they also did not meet national and international building standards. The renewal had some positive outcomes including safety, better amenities within dwellings, and economic benefit for some families. But there were still some negative outcomes including a sense of loss and depression among residents. Therefore, to some degree the outcomes met the target goals of the process, but clearly, they were all related to houses and streets and there is not an outcome like community empowerment or learning.

In terms of adaptation, it seemed that the relations between public organizations have improved to some degree. But there is not a better and new approach for community engagement and consequently there is no indication of higher adaptive capacity of the community. In terms of adaptation of the places, new places look well-maintained by those who are owners of their units but not very well-maintained by the tenants. So, maintenance has become a subject for fights in the buildings.

In term of *'how satisfied or dissatisfied are participants with the products?'*, local community people and most of URO representatives felt very unsatisfied with the products because of 1) Physical features of their buildings; 2) Lack of enough neighbourhood facilities and; 3) Lack of the product capacity for change and improvement. In contrast, other stakeholders felt satisfied with the products because of: 1) higher standard of living; 2) higher quantity of renewed buildings.

Moreover, all of the information above showed that the process and products of the renewal were both unsuccessful and non-collaborative, although the council and some of URO representatives had a different idea. The council and URO representatives believed that the council's high sense of responsibility and trust-building at the beginning were the reasons for the success while Local community people believed that lack of council's sense of responsibility was the main reason for

failure. Other important factors of the process were including: Lack of community awareness, self-interest motivations.

Finally, in terms of the context, prior failure of the council to address deterioration was a reason to establish the renewal in Abouzar which was called collaborative. But some strong contextual factors really acted as barriers and constraints of the process including: socio-economic condition of the community (poverty), political framework of the council, lack of organizational co-operation, political situation of Iran in the world, lack of public trust to the government, lack of construction materials. On this basis, the Abouzar housing renewal seemed to be simply a particular manifestation of a top-down approach about physical 'improvements', which did not appear to have sufficiently controlled the building process.

## Chapter 9

### Discussion

#### 9.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 justified my research aim of developing an evaluation framework for collaborative governance (CG) with various components. The first was evaluating 'process performance' by undertaking a critical examination of process indicators and goals often detailed in current theory. In chapter 2, the CG process was criticised for having two weaknesses; one related to 'democratic' issues, such as lack of a strategy for addressing power imbalance or being sufficiently inclusiveness, and the other related to a lack of attention to the history, context and future of collaborations. In this respect, this chapter starts with evaluating process performance with special attention given to these two issues in the process. Process performance is evaluated by comparing the findings of two case studies (in chapters, 5, 6 and 8) against the literature to build a discussion that leads to new evaluative criteria for the process.

The second component to evaluate was product performance, as mentioned in chapter 2. Products cover three aspects that include: evaluating the outputs, outcomes, and adaptation, according to the 'agreed goals' or the extent to which the outputs and outcomes reflect the agreed upon goals of the participants. There are many universal criteria specifically for evaluating outputs (for example houses meet LEED international standards for sustainable housing) some building codes and standards) and outcomes (like safety or social learning) of housing regeneration projects, but these outputs and outcomes are very context-driven and are also the result of agreed goals from the participants. As a result, although universal criteria may be useful but they are not appropriate to evaluate products. In this research, agreed goals of the participants are considered as the main unit of analysis for evaluating outputs, outcomes and adaptation.

The third component to evaluate was the level of participants' satisfaction or dissatisfaction with outputs, outcomes and adaptation. Satisfaction is evaluated because the process of defining goals is not immune from power imbalances. On this basis, after process evaluation, the chapter focuses on evaluating outputs, outcomes and adaptation according to the agreed goals first, and then the level of the participants' satisfaction.

The fourth component to evaluate was the 'connections' between the process and the products (outputs, outcomes and adaptation). To show these connections, there is a separate section (9.4) for

discussing connections after the process and product performance evaluations. This is depicted in Figure 9.5.

At the end of the chapter, contextual factors are briefly discussed as something to consider but not to evaluate. The point is that the main themes and indicators of this research were developed according to the Aranui case in a developed world. Consequently, the context section considers the extent to which my findings (based on Aranui) might be applied to other contexts.

## **9.2 Process performance: A comparative analysis of case studies in New Zealand and Iran viewed against the literature**

The current literature on CG lacks nuance on a number of points. Most studies focus on the formal collaboration phase, this is usually recognised by invited meetings with minutes taken and the beginning of face-to-face dialogue between different actors. Such processes are concerned with the level of face-to-face communication, inclusiveness, equity, impartiality, power sharing and conflict resolution (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Habermas, 1984; Innes & Booher, 1999, 2003a, 2010; Leach, 2006; Memon et al., 2012). While there is some consensus that these issues need to be addressed, the extent to which such considerations are informed by context and pre-existing conditions is unclear. Some scholars clearly acknowledge that CG initiatives often have a history of antagonism, conflict and distrust between the actors (Andranovich, 1995; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Emerson et al., 2012; Gray, 1989; Gunton & Day, 2003; Margerum, 2002; O'Flynn & Wanna, 2008; Warner, 2006). Others also note a history of power imbalance between the actors going into negotiations (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012). The question is, how can formal collaboration begin while the context is hostile, with many conflicts between actors and power and capability imbalances? What is missing from the literature, but highlighted in my case studies, is sufficient attention to what I will call a 'pre-collaboration phase'

### **9.2.1 Pre-collaboration: Balancing pre-existing conditions**

The pre-collaboration stage acknowledges the context and history of CG and emphasises what is necessary in building a foundation for the more formal collaboration process. This pre-collaboration stage has four different aspects or goals, with each one related to a specific question.

- 1) *When, where and how does collaborative governance start?*

#### **9.2.1.1 Balancing pre-existing trust and conflicts before formal collaboration**

CG is often referred to as a process in which stakeholders, including local communities and public agencies, deliberate in formal settings with guidelines that seek to adhere as closely as possible to

Habermas' ideal speech situation (Innes & Booher, 1999; Leach, 2006). Although these situations have been interrogated and updated by CG proponents, they mostly deal with indicators of good process, such as inclusiveness and face-to-face communication. However, a more critical question concerns the extent to which such conditions can ever be met, which leads to a line of enquiry interrogating the nature of the relationships between actors. *How can they easily start collaborating and making decisions if they do not trust each other?* This is particularly the case where conflict and distrust develop as a result of former top-down plans and community exclusion (Andranovich, 1995; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Emerson et al., 2012; Gray, 1989; Gunton & Day, 2003; Margerum, 2002; O'Flynn & Wanna, 2008; Warner, 2006). Some researchers view the history of conflicts as a hindrance or negative precondition for CG (e.g. Andranovich, 1995; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gray, 1989; Margerum, 2002). They believe that "a prehistory of conflict creates a vicious circle of suspicion, distrust, and stereotyping" (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 553). Others believe that a history of conflict has the potential to be a strong motivation for collaboration, so it is not necessarily a barrier (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Futrell, 2003; Weber, 2003). However, the unanswered question is: *What are the preconditions or factors that help to address pre-existing conflicts and distrust and turn them into positive motivation?*

In response to the above questions, there has been some sporadic talk about the importance of early wins or small wins for trust-building (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Huxham, 2003; Saarikoski, 2000). Ansell and Gash (2008, p. 561) say that: "Small wins can feed back into the collaborative process, encouraging a virtuous cycle of trust building and commitment." The point is that these scholars view small wins as an 'intermediate outcome' or 'tangible output' of the formal collaboration itself and not some wins happening before starting to formally collaborate. They believe that: 1) formal collaboration starts first, then small wins happen afterwards as a result of formal collaboration; and 2) there is a lack of clarity around how small wins are achieved and how to tell when there have been 'enough' of them so we can move onto something bigger.

The current study provides a more detailed analysis of the significance of small wins, when and where they happen and when there have been 'enough' small wins that we can move onto something bigger. Vis-à-vis 'when' CG begins, my research shows significant effort directed towards simply understanding the setting, getting to know people, becoming familiar with local landmarks and community assets. Importantly, in contrast to dialogue or negotiation in 'formal' settings with set procedures (minute taking) and hierarchies (chairs, convenors), time should be spent on-site, on building relations and trust and simply being present before starting formal collaboration on larger projects. So, in CG initiatives such as a housing renewal, it is beneficial if public agencies go to the

communities where the communities are, rather than the local communities going to the agencies' and authorities' offices to discuss the problems. An on-site-presence of agencies is not something that authorities normally do but it is an important early win that can be used to improve trust, promote more personalised relationships between local communities and agencies and address an imbalance of power (given interaction takes place 'in the field', rather than a setting that is unfamiliar to community participants) (Dixon et al., 2009). My research strongly supports the argument that, in the context of urban regeneration projects, an on-site presence of the agencies is a critical success factor in delivering socially sustainable urban regeneration: "The location of the regeneration agency offices in the areas being regenerated... can guarantee a forum for discussion and transparency, helping reduce mistrust towards city authorities, which often characterises these areas" (Dixon et al. (2009, p. 4).

At the beginning of the projects in Aranui and Abouzar, representatives of the public agencies (HNZC, CCC and URO) when first communicating with key local people or trustees found a distrust from the community towards these agencies because of the negative history of their relationships. In both cases, formal collaboration on housing did not start right away; the agencies first made a substantial effort during pre-collaboration to build trust and relationships with the community, especially in Aranui. Table 5.2 (p. 83) shows that approximately 24 small projects and events were implemented over 10 months in Aranui. There was much more investment and patience in Aranui during pre-collaboration than in Abouzar. HNZC and CCC worked hard to develop relationships and trust by listening to the community and meeting its needs by implementing a number of small community- and government-led projects. These projects resulted in many early successes and paved the way for work on the large projects because the community already trusted HNZC and CCC and believed in their commitment.

It is important to note that time working on trust and relationship building in the pre-collaboration stage cannot be quantified; my case studies indicate that officials should focus on what needs to be achieved in this pre-collaboration stage rather than pre-determining how long this stage should take. The main approach to trust and relationship building is initiating a mix of small and larger community-led and government-led projects that focus on meeting the often small, but immediate needs and aspirations of the community. The key success feature of trust building is the quality of these early projects; there should be an appropriate mix of community- and government-led projects that are achievable and directly meet the community's needs and sit alongside the bigger project(s). It is clear that this pre-collaboration phase needs considerable resources (money, time, energy, support and commitment) from the public agencies. These small projects and small investments in the pre-

collaboration phase result in many small wins and early successes that facilitate the rest of the process and further collaboration on the larger projects. They pave the way for the success of larger projects.

The section, above, highlights the importance of the 'pre-collaboration' phase in terms of building trust and relationships. Trust and relationships can be built and balanced by the on-site presence of the relevant agencies in the community that implement an appropriate mix of small community- and government-led projects that are achievable and respond to community needs. In summary, my research suggests that the pre-collaboration stage is important, and may facilitate the success of larger projects through the implementation of a mix of small community- and government-led projects.

While this helps us better understand questions around when, where and how 'collaboration' begins, it does raise other questions pertaining to broader concerns around democracy, power and inclusion. In particular, I turn now to consideration of another of my questions

- 2) *What is the community in CG (organised or diffused actors) and is it capable of collaborating with public agencies on an equal footing?*

#### **9.2.1.2 Balancing actors or capability-building: building a community**

According to the literature on CG, "If some stakeholders do not have the capacity, organization, status, or resources to participate, or to participate on an equal footing with other stakeholders, the collaborative governance process will be prone to manipulation by stronger actors" (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 551). While this is helpful in identifying an issue, given it is normal to have actors with unequal abilities, it is important we consider what to do about it. CG has been described as a "governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process ...." (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 554). But *'who' or 'what' is a community when acting as a non-state stakeholder? And are they capable of establishing an equal partnership with the public organizations?*

Most advocates of collaboration accept the importance of organised groups as collective community representatives (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Buanes et al., 2004; Rogers et al., 1993). English (2000) argues that "the more diffuse the affected stakeholders, and the more long-term the problem horizon, the more difficult it will be to represent stakeholders in collaborative processes" (as cited in Ansell & Gash, 2008, p.551). Therefore, a significant issue is that, often, communities do not have the *'organizational infrastructure'* needed to effectively represent 'the' community. In contrast, public agencies have strong organizational structures, defined goals, a culture and history of political decision-making, resources, knowledge and a mandate. Is it possible for 'a' community to collaborate equally with such



an entity? My research, in accord with Ansell and Gash (2008), suggests that this is indeed a difficult, but not *'insurmountable'* problem.

The current study highlights once again that the 'pre-collaboration' phase is crucial in equalizing participants. A community encompasses many individuals and groups and households that, potentially, have many capabilities but they are diffuse, disparate and fragmented and do not necessarily work together. The pre-collaboration phase presents an opportunity to integrate these capabilities, to build 'a' community able to act as a collective group. Building a community and integrating fragmented capabilities and resources under collective leadership may help manifest the community's latent, potential capability, and enable the mobilisation of collective resources. Supporting leadership from the community facilitates communication that bodes well for more formal stages of collaboration. Building a community does not guarantee that the collaboration will be equal but an integrated community with an organised group and an organizational infrastructure is more capable of being an equal partner with public agencies than a community of disparate groups and individuals.

Sometimes there already exists some well-known representatives of the community, and they can be readily identified 'key stakeholders'. But care must be taken because the obvious stakeholders might be partisan and represent specific interest(s) rather than the interests of the broader community. In other cases, it may be that there are no obvious community leaders which makes answering the question *"Who can represent the community?"* more difficult. In such cases, potential or emerging leaders may have to be supported.

At the beginning of the Community Renewal project in Aranui, 'the' community could be better described as an aggregate of individuals and disparate groups working in the community for their own purpose. There was much capability in evidence, but the people did not necessarily work together as a collective group with the same goals, with recognised leadership. The HNZN and CCC representatives identified the lack of community togetherness and leadership, so they encouraged and supported the community to get together and form a local entity with local leadership working together towards a collective goal with an identifiable strategy. ACTIS was formed to bring myriad community groups and households together, so their capability was multiplied and manifested in a way that was totally different from Aranui before ACTIS. If HNZN and CCC had preferred, or had chosen, to collaborate with the individual groups in the community, they would not have been able to see what the community was really capable of achieving. It is important to note that ACTIS board members were eventually chosen by the local Aranui people themselves and this was genuine bottom-up leadership. Many members were people who had lived in the area for years, so they had a high level of knowledge and commitment to Aranui. Even though the chairperson (a well-educated person) was not from Aranui,

he was highly trusted by the local people and they targeted him and worked hard to appoint him as chairperson. Therefore, in the pre-collaboration stage, ACTIS had a defined goal (Aranui development) and a strategy (partnership), took leadership of the community and changed into a strong actor capable of a more equal partnership with HNZN and CCC.

In Abouzar, as explained in Chapter Eight, this kind of leadership- and capability-building was missing. There was no effort to balance actors and build 'a' community. URO and the council did not identify or acknowledge such a need to bring the community together to become a more equal partner. If they did identify this need, they preferred to collaborate with individuals directly; the collective leadership element was never developed. Although the Abouzar community had some existing representatives, because they lacked community support and power, these representatives were unable to act as equal partners. Abouzar's capability remained latent and potential.

### **9.2.1.3 Providing sufficient and appropriate resources and formal authority prior to the principal collaboration project**

Attempting to remedy any pre-existing power imbalances between actors by, say, establishing a funded "Community Trust" helps to improve the local community's capability, but other important parts of capability relate to resources, expertise, skills, knowledge and, more importantly, formal authority. According to Purdy (2012), power has three resources: 1) *discursive legitimacy*, which is "the ability of an organisation to represent a discourse or speak on behalf of an issue in the public sphere" (Hardy & Phillips, 1998); 2) *formal authority*; and 3) *resources, expertise and skills*. Forming an organised leadership for communities helps to improve their discursive legitimacy because their leadership is more capable of having informed talks with public organisations, but they still need some level of formal authority and resources to become more empowered and self-sustaining (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gunton & Day, 2003; Lasker & Weiss, 2003; Merkhofer, Conway, & Anderson, 1997; Murdock, Wiessner, & Sexton, 2005 ; Warner, 2006). This is one of the pre-existing conditions of CG and, according to Ansell and Gash (2008, p. 551), "If there are significant power/resource imbalances between stakeholders, such that important stakeholders cannot participate in a meaningful way, then effective collaborative governance requires a commitment to a positive strategy of empowerment and representation of weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders."

CG scholars do not generally offer appropriate strategies about how to empower weaker actors, nor when to do so. The current study indicates that, for example, signing a 'memorandum of understanding' (MoU) with community leaders in the pre-collaboration stage is an appropriate way to give formal authority to the communities. The MoU has to provide an equal setting for actors to have a partnership. It has to offer the community formal and equal rights to have a say, be listened

to, and to have information, knowledge and awareness about the whole process and its products. Although having a MoU does not guarantee an equal partnership, it reassures the weaker actors that they have formal rights to have influence. The longevity of the MoU is very important because a long-term MoU helps community leaders to count on the government's commitment. In Aranui, the first request of ACTIS (as the community leader) was to sign a formal MoU with three equal partners. In the MoU drafted by ACTIS, the community was counted as an equal partner with HNZN and CCC; it received all the rights to have a say and be listened to through the whole process.

Other than the MoU, resources can be provided for the community to empower it and make it capable of acting on its own. In Aranui, when ACTIS was formed, it did not have money, an office or any funds to employ staff to work towards achieving its goals. HNZN and CCC both provided resources and funds for ACTIS in the pre-collaboration stage. HNZN provided a free place for ACTIS to use as an office and CCC provided funds for ACTIS to employ an expert to work full-time for ACTIS board members. The two agencies also provided some funds for ACTIS to spend on things it saw as important (such as small community-led projects). By doing this, they improved the community's capacity and confidence to see itself as an equal actor and stand on its own feet.

Therefore, providing appropriate resources for the community, and having an MoU with the community's leadership, is important in the pre-collaboration phase and helps to form an equal setting for formal collaboration.

### 3) *Who does define the issues to address in CG?*

#### **9.2.1.4 Problem definition and agenda setting by the community**

One criterion of CG in Ansell and Gash's (2008) well-known framework is that CG *"aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets"* (p. 544). They distinguish CG from other types of decision making because it *"focuses on public policy and issues.... [and it is] the governance of public affairs"* (p. 547). Other scholars (Booher, 2004; Innes & Booher, 2010; Purdy, 2012) also confirm that view. A critical question, raised by critical scholars including Whatmore and Landstrom (2011) concerns who *identifies and defines the 'public issues' as public issues?*

In theory, any public agency anywhere could decide; for example, that 'this or that neighbourhood has a housing problem (or whatever), let us collaborate with the community to address that'. Although at first this seems collaborative, it also reveals that the problem has already been defined in a non-collaborative way. In the community's view, a park may be a more important issue than housing. Public agencies often start from a position of assumed knowledge. The problem is: "Whose knowledge

is a stake?” and often “expert reasoning” has priority when there is distance between the experts and those affected by the dispute (Whatmore & Landström, 2011).

The current study’s findings suggest that agencies may be better starting from a position of *presumed ignorance*. Thus, the pre-collaboration phase again becomes important in establishing what the problem is. Doing a Needs Analysis or a survey with a broad community consultation in the pre-collaboration phase is a good way to do that. In Aranui, although HNZC representatives knew that there was a problem with housing, they started from a position of ignorance and undertook a Needs Analysis Survey, a Youth Forum and a Park Survey to better understand the community’s concerns. It is important to note that not just HNZC tenants were surveyed but private owner occupiers, private owner tenants and also everyone who was a part of the community was surveyed.

Three years after the first analysis, a second round of research (Maori Hui and Fono) was conducted, but this time it was led by ACTIS. This process gave the Aranui community ownership of the project because the whole idea of being not simply focused on housing renewal but also other pressing matters such as the Wainoni Park upgrade was the community’s priority. That was why, at the beginning, Housing Renewal had a name change into Aranui Community Renewal because the community priorities were much more than just housing. A large amount of money went into housing and upgrading Wainoni Park, but considerable sums were also spent on smaller community issues that the community saw as important.

In Abouzar, a needs analysis survey was also conducted and the community was asked about issues they thought important. However, many of their ideas were not taken into consideration. URO and Tehran’s council had already defined the problem based on their knowledge (low quality housing), so the survey’s results were not adequately analysed. The Abouzar Renewal failed to let CG focus on the problems that the community prioritised and it therefore failed to provide an adequate foundation for future CG.

#### **9.2.1.5 Pre-collaboration Section summary**

Pre-collaboration as a ‘stage’ in CG deserves far more consideration. In standard CG theory, this stage is often overlooked but my research has shown that it can be crucial in paving the way for successful, but more formal, collaborative processes. Success may be more likely if CG happens on-site in the community by implementing a mix of community- and government-led projects. The pre-collaboration phase introduces some important preconditions for CG (see Figure 9.1). A ‘good’ CG process is more likely if the preconditions are met but the greater the distance between the agencies and the community, the greater the investment needed on pre-collaboration. In Aranui, considerable

investment was made in the pre-collaboration phase but, in Abouzar, there was considerable attention given only to trust-building; the rest of the preconditions remained untouched.




Figure 9.1 The Collaborative Governance process

## 9.2.2 Collaboration

In chapter 2, evaluating process performance was defined as the first component of the CG evaluation framework. In the section, above, I introduced pre-collaboration as an important aspect of the process to evaluate, although it is not often acknowledged in the literature. Though clearly important, my research finds pre-collaboration is only one part of the process and that there is more to understand about the more formal phase as well. This is the stage we often refer to when we talk about 'collaboration'. The collaboration phase is more concerned with addressing the main issues or problems defined by the communities in the pre-collaboration phase (housing and Wainoni Park in this research). It often begins with the signing of a MoU and the adoption of a more structured approach with some well-established criteria for evaluation (those associated with participative democracy or ideal speech). Therefore, in the following parts which relate to the formal collaboration phase, the criteria of the standard theory are discussed, criticized and new indicators are developed and offered.

### 9.2.2.1 Ongoing active involvement

One critical question about CG is: *Who is involved?* Standard theory suggests that CG has to be open and inclusive. For example, Ansell and Gash (2008, p. 556) note that: "it is no surprise to find that the literature on collaborative governance emphasizes that the process must be open and inclusive." Chrislip and Larson (1994a) believe that: "The first condition of [a] successful collaboration is that it must be broadly inclusive of all stakeholders who are affected by or care about the issue" (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 556). The question is how can every affected person be included; this ideal of broad

inclusion in CG has been heavily criticized (e.g. Hillier, 2003; Mouffe, 2005; Purcell, 2009). Purcell (2009, p. 153), for example, argued that: “Such inclusiveness can never be total, every group that includes must always also exclude... every inclusive ‘we’ must exclude a ‘they’ in order to exist.”

In response to this critique, some CG proponents say that good collaboration includes a broad enough spectrum of stakeholders to reflect the issue (Gray, 1989). Some define inclusiveness as placing few formal restrictions on participation and being more open (Leach, 2006); while some believe that successful collaboration gives considerable attention to the inclusion of critical/key stakeholders and if key stakeholders are not included then the policy outcomes are not legitimate (Koch Jr, 2005; Reilly, 1998). However, it is still unclear who the ‘critical’ stakeholders are and whether not being ‘exclusive’ assures inclusivity. The question ‘*Who to include?*’ is complicated even further by the discussion in the preceding section that suggests CG has different phases, including a vital ‘pre-collaboration’ stage where trust is built, actors are balanced, community capability is built, and problems are defined. Consequently, questions about the ‘who’ might have to be re-considered in terms of ‘when’.

The current research indicates that sufficient investment in the pre-collaboration phase may help resolve some of the inclusion issues that arise in the more formal stages but it is also vital that collaboration be seen as comprehensive, long-lived and ongoing, and not simply a case of better ground-work or problem definition and project identification. Project(s) design, implementation and checks on progress need active and ongoing community involvement even if these steps are not as linear as project managers would desire. While the literature on CG tends to focus more on collaboration in the design and decision making stages, this research findings, especially in Aranui, show that the community was involved through the whole process, including the problem and goal definitions, design, implementation and monitoring stages.

Nevertheless, not every individual in communities has the resources, time and capacity to attend a collaborative forum (Leach, 2006). This research indicates that, while a commitment to providing an open and inviting process, it is also important to make sure that local leaders, who can speak from the community, participate throughout the process. The case of Aranui shows that ACTIS board members were the community’s collective leaders who were nominated and chosen by the community (European, Maori and Pasifika people) in trust in the pre-collaboration phase. They then had an ongoing involvement in the more formal process (the process was still open for the wider community, although not everyone participated). Nonetheless in adding nuance to this process, my research suggests that ‘inclusion’ of whom may look different at different stages. Here, it helps to frame the process in terms of the problem definition, design, implementation and monitoring stages.

The role and involvement of the community in the collaboration phase was significant and they also had leadership roles in many other parts of the projects. Although two large projects were implemented; housing renewal and upgrading Wainoni Park, these projects were divided into many smaller projects. For example, Wainoni Park project was divided into eight smaller projects and six were led by the community (Table 5.6, p 109). Some projects, including the playground, planting day, artworks, the hangi and the pou, were led and implemented by the community, but the new road, new fields and new infrastructure were led by the council. Maori designed and implemented their own projects, including the hangi and pou (they asked for these two). Therefore, although the overall renewal process was state-initiated it was divided into '*many projects of varying scales*', some led by government organizations, some by the community. On this basis, although the theory defines CG as state-initiated and state-led (Ansell & Gash, 2008), this study shows that CG seems to have been state-initiated but it has a mixed leadership of the community and the government. Government organizations in Aranui implemented the projects that the community was not capable of implementing themselves, such as renewing the park infrastructure. Table 9.1, below, shows the government and community's roles based on the literature, and also illustrates their roles according to the current research findings.

Table 9.1 Government and community's role according to the literature and the current research findings

<b>Government role in CG (literature-based)</b>	<b>Government role in CG according to this research findings</b>
Initiator, funder, and leader of collaborative initiatives  Shaping the ground rules of governance  Role change from a provider state to a facilitator and cooperative partner that supports private governing:  Enable socio-political interactions Encourage many of the varied arrangements for coping with problems Distribute services among several actors Control political and legal aspects	Initiator and funder of the main project but having 'shared leadership' with the local community  Enabling, empowering, encouraging and supporting local communities (building a community...)  The role of government agencies is limited to the aspects that cannot be dealt with by the communities (such as acquisition of land and tenure...)
<b>Local community role in CG (literature-based)</b>	<b>Local community role in CG according to this research findings</b>

Directly involved in 'design and decision making'	Directly involved in whole the process including: Problem definition Design and decision making, Implementation and monitoring Leadership role for some aspects of the main project as well as smaller projects Initiator and funder of some aspects of the main project as well as smaller projects
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The process was characterised by 'messiness', because the community had multiple tasks at the same time. For example, while being involved in designing houses in one street, the community was also involved in the demolition and implementation of building houses in other streets or in relocating the playground. This shows that the steps of design, implementation and monitoring were not necessarily as tidy or linear as the literature indicates (the procedural theory of planning) (Allmendinger, 2009; Chadwick, 1971a; Chadwick, 1971b; Faludi, 1987; Levy, 2009). They did not come in order but fed into each other. Conceptualised this way shows how the question *Who to involve?* has become more nuanced and changed into *When and through which stage?* Ongoing involvement in the whole process, including the crucial implementation stage, is the key.

The word 'Involvement' has been deliberately chosen in this study to describe the ongoing and active nature of community participation, as explained above. Involvement in this study reflects the '*quality*' of the community presence and its '*activeness*' rather than the '*quantity*' of community representatives present at formal meetings. This is in contrast to a significant literature that measures inclusion by counting the number of submissions on a plan, or number of people who attend meetings. 'Inclusion' needs to cater for meaningful, active roles, possibly across the entire process.

The word involvement in this study has a different meaning from involvement in the IAP2 spectrum of public participation. IAP2 introduces five levels of public participation on a spectrum (inform, consult, involve, collaborate and empower) (IAP2, 2018). The level 'involve' promises that: "*We will work with you to ensure that your concerns and aspirations are directly reflected in the alternatives developed and provide feedback on how public input influenced the decision*" (IAP2, 2018). It talks about involvement in decision-making but not implementation; '*empower*' is the highest level of promise that *We will implement what you decide* (IAP2, 2018). Although IAP2 places the final decision in the hands of the community, it does not seem to involve them in action and implementation. In the current study, involvement comprises all levels of public participation in IAP2 and goes beyond that because the concept involves them in action and implementation not only decision-making.



Abouzar failed to meet this involvement criterion to a large degree; there were efforts to involve the community from the beginning, but it was not ongoing and active. The community was included only in a small part: defining the goals related to the interior and exterior design of the houses. The community had no role in the implementation. Importantly, there was inclusion of individual local people without having collective leadership. However, Abouzar helped to highlight the importance of active, ongoing involvement.

In conclusion, this section suggests ‘ongoing active involvement’ as a new criterion that is more rational and practical in CG than the ideal of broad inclusion. The study’s findings also show that CG does not only involve communities in design and decision-making but also involves them in action and implementation. CG illustrates a messy process, including many projects of varying scales with a mixed leadership of the community and government organizations.

#### **9.2.2.2 Ongoing two-way formal and informal communication**

In response to the question: “*How are the actors involved?*” The CG literature introduces ‘face-to-face dialogue’ as the basic communication tool (Ansell & Gash, 2008). For example, Bentrup (2001) says: “It [face-to-face dialogue] is at the core of the process of breaking down stereotypes and other barriers to communication that prevent exploration of mutual gains in the first place” (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Face-to-face dialogue is also seen to be at the heart of the process of building trust, mutual respect, shared understanding and commitment to the process (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gilliam et al., 2002; Lasker & Weiss, 2003; Plummer & Fitzgibbon, 2004; Schneider, Scholz, Lubell, Mindruta, & Edwardsen, 2003; Tompkins & Adger, 2004; Warner, 2006). It is undeniable that face-to-face dialogues or direct communication improves relationships among stakeholders but, again, the quality of that dialogue is crucial. For example, by having a constant feedback loop in which actors seek each other’s comments and concerns and act in ways that represent each other’s comments and concerns.

In Aranui, there was a constant feedback loop or two-way communication between HNZN and the CCC representatives and the Aranui community and ACTIS. The important point is that the agencies provided ‘simple platforms and techniques’ for local people, adults and children, to understand the plans before asking them for comments. These included painting facilities, head projectors, 3D maps, and miniature maps to add things to the map and then remove or change them. The community could easily understand the plans and the discussion and were easily able to submit relevant comments and feedback. Furthermore, the on-site presence in the community for eight years by agencies facilitated this two-way communication. The agencies employed local people as receptionists or managers and, for eight years and retained the same staff who were always casual and informal.

Indeed, 'informal' collaboration became a significant feature of the whole process that improved the quality of the two-way communication. The tenancy managers developed many informal and friendly relationships with local people because of their full-time on-site presence in Aranui. Such relationships empowered local people to communicate easily with them; even disabled members of the community would not hesitate to go and have a chat to solve their problem. Informal conversations were an important part of the meetings in the whole process; there was frequently an item called '*After Meeting Discussions*' in the meeting minutes of the partnership group. On some occasions, informal conversations led to making important decisions; for example, forming the Wainoni Park design group was a decision made in an after-meeting discussion. There were many smaller-scale discussions or one-on-one discussions after formal meetings.

The findings of this study highlight that CG has both a 'formal and informal' structure with a combination of collective and one-on-one discussions. This result contrasts with a tendency in the literature (e.g. Ansell & Gash, 2008; Padiila & Daigle, 1998; Walter & Petr, 2000) to impose the criterion of '*formal*' on CG to distinguish it from casual and unconventional forms of collaboration. The literature also indicates that discussions in CG are collective (not one-on-one) and that the standard consultative techniques should be stakeholder surveys or focus groups (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

These two-way formal and informal communications also had an ongoing nature and the Aranui findings indicates that for eight years the Aranui community and ACTIS had constant communications with HNZN and CCC at every step of the renewal process, whereas the CG literature is more concerned with face-to-face communication in the design and decision-making stages. ACTIS was constantly in direct communication with HNZN and CCC representatives in professional meetings and the broader community was constantly being updated and feedback was taken in many events, ceremonies, large gatherings in Wainoni Park and the monthly newsletter. This ongoing communication worked and the community felt respected.

With regard to this criterion in Abouzar, the community had face-to-face communication with URO, council representatives and developers but at only one stage, 'defining goals for the design'. The communication was not ongoing although URO representatives had an on-site presence in the community and employed some local people to work for them. The Abouzar community was not updated after defining the goals, was not asked for comments and did not receive feedback. Moreover, all communications happened in formal meetings (as the literature describes); there was no indication of informal, friendly relationships being developed between stakeholders.

In conclusion, the above section suggests that 'ongoing two-way formal and informal communication' is an important indicator in CG. The findings highlight that CG has formal and informal structures,

including collective and one-on-one communication. Meaningful communication is recognized by an ongoing feedback loop between the actors. Its quality can be improved by creating a simple platform for the community to understand the plans, an on-site presence of the agencies (location of it) and informality in the process (structure).

### **9.2.2.3 Consensus orientation**

This study's findings indicate that, in CG, *consensus-orientation* is a key concept or principle. However, we have to be aware that a complete consensus is unlikely and difficult to achieve and this perhaps explains why much of the literature is concerned with *consensus-building* and *conflict resolution* process (Andranovich, 1995; Booher, 2004; Dryzek, 1994; Innes & Booher, 1999, 2010). Many strategies and techniques have been offered to improve the quality of this consensus-building process including: equality (treating everyone equally), equity, impartiality, fairness, power sharing (Laurian & Shaw, 2008; Leach, 2006; Skelcher et al., 2008; Voets et al., 2008). Though useful it is questionable whether these guidelines are sufficient in addressing issues around power imbalance and 'conflicts'. As explained in Chapter 2, power and conflicts often play a role in collaboration and they are difficult to address (Mouffe, 2000, 2005; Purcell, 2009; Young, 1997). *Consensus-building* in CG seems to have two sub-ideals: *conflict resolution* and having *equal influence* on the process outcomes. All three (as mentioned in Chapter 2) have been criticized in the literature. In this study, two bodies of the critical literature are used to build the discussion, including: first, *satisficing* literature that is according to incrementalism or muddling through (Chadwick, 1971b; Levy, 2009; Lindblom, 1959b); and, secondly, *agonistic pluralism* (Mouffe, 2000, 2005). These two bodies of the literature are used to discuss the findings and suggest two new sub-criteria for what is called consensus orientation in current research.

#### **9.2.2.3.1 Satisfaction balance with the goals**

According to incrementalism and satisficing literature, a consensus or complete agreement is impossible to achieve because everyone's values are different (Levy, 2009; Lindblom, 1959b). In World War II, the US, Great Britain and the USSR had different values and goals but they ignored their differences and agreed on the necessity to defeat Germany (Levy, 2009). The values of central government, local government and communities can be radically different however those differences do not have to be resolved to work towards a common end: "If agreement is necessary for action and the various parties have different values, making value clarification a requisite for the next step would make further progress impossible" (Levy, 2009, p. 406). Critics have proposed alternatives. For example, the satisficing literature acknowledges that we cannot make a decision that is best for everyone and accommodates everyone's values (*optimization*) (Chadwick, 1971b; March & Simon, 1958). Agreement can be achieved on the 'goals' when everyone makes some compromises; Levy

(2009, p. 408) notes that politics is “the art of compromises not the art of optimization.” Thus, the actors try to make a decision that brings everyone to a balance of satisfaction that is enough for cooperation. Simon (1957) calls this ‘*bounded rationality*’, that is bounded to reality and happens in the real world and in practice: “Most human decision-making, whether individual or organisational is concerned with the discovery and selection of satisfactory alternatives: only in exceptional cases is it concerned with the discovery and selection of optimal alternatives” Chadwick (1971b, p. 322). It is also appropriate here to connect this discussion of satisficing with *power*. Power is relative (Mouffe, 2000) and every party has a different level of power; parties cannot simply discard their power and then attempt collaboration. So, the actors somehow practice their power in collaboration. The dream of CG scholars to share power needs to change to an aim for a balance of satisfaction with the goals or process outcomes or decisions rather than the removal of power differences.

In Aranui’s case, the community felt that it had a significant influence on decisions but even here there were several examples where central government exercised its greater power. For example, the four-year SCAF fund provided by the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) was the sole source income for ACTIS. However, after two years the new minister immediately halted this funding due to differing priorities – an example of a minister practising his power. The Aranui community was disappointed but there was dialogue and discussion between ACTIS and the minister mediated by the MP. As a compromise, the minister endorsed a new project for Aranui called Heartland. Although there was a clear power imbalance and ACTIS was not 100% satisfied with the new project compared with the previous one, it was satisfied enough to continue the collaboration and work with this government agency.

Overall, seeking community consensus is important to the extent that is practicable, but it needs to be realistic as often only a balance of satisfaction with the goals, decisions and process outcomes can be achieved. Power imbalances and value differences between actors means that making a decision that is totally optimal for everyone is difficult. The Aranui case demonstrates that it is possible to generate high levels of satisfaction, even in the face of fundamental differences, when participants see the decisions as good and appropriate (but it does not mean that no one is unhappy).

#### **9.2.2.3.2 Conflict management/conflictual consensus**

In Chapter two, it is discussed that, according to the conflict management literature and, more specifically, the argument of Mouffe (2005), conflicts or antagonistic relationships between actors in collaboration are not only not removable or solvable, more importantly, these tensions are necessary for discussion and dialogue as the core of CG (Keshavarz & Mazé, 2013; Mouffe, 2005). Mouffe argues that although conflicts and antagonism can never be eliminated, through dialogue and discussion they

can be transformed into *agonism* or, as some people call it, *conflictual consensus* (Keshavarz & Mazé, 2013). Agonism is a recognition and acceptance of the inevitability of some level of conflict or tension such that parties try to manage them and make a decision that is relatively satisfactory for everyone even to the extent of considerable compromise to satisfy others and to allow a conflictual consensus to be reached. These conflicts and antagonism are necessary conditions for discussion and for the feelings of satisfaction and consensus will eventually arise between the parties.

In Aranui, for example, the locals wanted 2 m high boundary fences but, according to the council's by-laws, the maximum height for fences could only be 90 cm. The architects engaged in conversations with the locals and persuaded them to accept the lower height. Despite compromising, the local residents also felt respected. So, they had reached a conflictual consensus or agonism but, clearly, they would have preferred the 2 m option. Also, in Aranui, residents asked HNZN and CCC representatives to set up local offices and staff in the area. Although initially neither organization wanted to make such a move, in the end they recanted and established a local presence. Counterintuitively, it was such situations of potential conflictual tension that, when successfully negotiated, actually played a large part in the feeling of satisfaction and consensus that that parties experienced afterwards.

In Abouzar, however, there was a lack of acceptance or acknowledgement of conflicting perspectives and there was no indication of a willingness to sit around the table to manage them. For example, developers used cheaper materials for their own benefit but to the detriment of the local community. However, as this aligned with the council's income-based motives (gaining more income out of building permissions) the council failed to act in the community interest: "*I don't care*" (URO project manager, 1 May 2017). Council and developers were not willing to entertain a conflictual consensus and the requisite personal compromise. As a result, in the end, the local community was the disadvantaged actor.

Therefore, conflict management or conflictual consensus seem to be what can be achieved by an acceptance that conflict exists, and always will, rather than by an attempt to eliminate it. The examples outlined here demonstrate that the two sub-criteria of consensus orientation – a satisfactory balance of goals and conflict management/conflictual consensus – were indicators of success for CG. They therefore provide some alternatives for consensus building, conflict-resolution and power-sharing. These options are more pragmatic than optimal because they do not overlook or attempt to deny the role of power and conflict in collaboration. More importantly, they show that the process of CG has to be 'adaptive', interactive and flexible; and to accept that there is no 'one size fits all' solution. Ironically, the key to managing conflict seems to be acceptance of its inevitability, rather than its denial and attempted eradication.

### 9.2.2.4 Section summary

The above section highlights ‘collaboration’ as the more formal phase CG which is often presented as distinct and discrete process. My research shows that even ‘formal’ collaboration is likely to have informal elements that profoundly shape the overall process. It could more accurately be seen as a messy complex of formal and informal processes with indistinct boundaries and sometimes obscure beginnings (Figure 9.2).




Figure 9.2 The Collaborative Governance process (two)

### 9.2.3 Post-collaboration (the future)

Whereas the pre-collaboration stage emphasises balancing and building trust with actors, authority, resources and capability building before the formal collaboration phase, this study’s results suggest that post-collaboration is another important, but poorly understood, part of the process. *How might this look like in practice?* My research found evidence of continuing collaboration after the completion of the project. This collaboration even withstood changes at central government level. This raises some interesting questions about when collaborative processes end.

*When does CG end? Is it a fixed process?*

In Aranui, in 2008, the Community Renewal Project was terminated by the new central government just after it was elected. As a result, HNZN left, removed its office from Aranui and its tenancy managers left Aranui to return to their central office in Christchurch. ACTIS and the broader community were very disappointed with that decision because they felt that the project was not yet complete. HNZN did not re-sign the MoU with ACTIS, however the CCC remained committed and

continued to sign the MoU. Some important points to consider are after the end of the project, ACTIS was in a position where they could continue to operate and develop a closer collaboration with CCC and even some new agencies (such as MSD, the Ministry of Health, private agencies and the Police). It has now been 10 years since the end of the Community Renewal Project, but ACTIS and CCC have re-signed the MoU every year. They have continued to work closely and their partnership has resulted in many new investments and developments in Aranui that were supported by the council. For example, a large, new community hub was built in Aranui, a large, new library was built in Wainoni Park, a new basketball court and many smaller projects were also implemented.

In contrast, HNZN initiated a new 'top-down' housing project in Aranui in 2011 that did not exhibit the same commitment to collaboration. This was a significant disappointment for the community and ACTIS. Again, importantly, the community did not lose hope and resign themselves to being passive recipients of HNZN decisions; ACTIS constantly contacted HNZN and asked it to revise the plans that they had already developed. Eventually, HNZN agreed to make some changes to the plans, although these were minimal (they decreased the number of multi-storey buildings). It shows that even breaks and disappointments did not stop the community from having further collaborations. Therefore, it can be argued that Aranui's regeneration is continuing and community capability and capacity is growing even though the project formally finished in 2008 and the ruling government party has since changed twice.

The current study defines post-collaboration as a new 'stage' of the CG process. Post-collaboration concerns are, as much as possible, to continue collaborating, maintain and develop trust and relationships, use two-way communication and have a consensus orientation. In the literature, CG is often treated as a fixed and formal process that starts and ends with, primarily, 'discourse' or 'negotiation' on a major project. The identification of a post-collaboration stage indicates that if many of the criteria of good process are satisfied, the community and their collective efficacy may endure. On this basis, perhaps the true test of CG should not be based on one project but, regardless of the success or failure of the project, include a willingness to continue collaborating.

#### **9.2.3.1 Section summary**

The above section thus adds another stage to the CG procedural performance evaluation: post-collaboration. Therefore, the process can be seen as a package of three stages comprising pre-collaboration, collaboration and post-collaboration where none are, in themselves, enough to assess the success of the process.




Figure 9.3 The final Collaborative Governance process framework

### 9.3 Product performance: Outputs, Outcomes and Adaptation

In chapter 2, product performance was defined as another important component of CG to evaluate. CG theory tends to be process-focussed with the consequence that less attention is given to the products of CG on the ground. On this basis, another goal of this study was to pay equal attention to the evaluation of both the process and the products. In chapter 2, I suggested that ‘product performance’ can be assessed in terms of outputs, outcomes and adaptation. However, rather than relying on generic assessments of quality and universal criteria, the literature raises questions about the extent to which these meet the goals agreed to by the participant and also participants’ level of satisfaction.

The products relate to the ‘substance’ or ‘ends’ of planning (Allmendinger, 2002, 2009; Faludi, 1973; Faludi, 1987). Rational planning theory distinguishes between procedural rationality (means, process) and substantive rationality<sup>38</sup> (ends). In this model, planning and planners are mainly concerned with substantive rationalities and meeting the ends, goals and values that have already been defined by politicians or by the state (Allmendinger, 2002, 2009; Friedmann, 1987; Reade, 1987; Sandercock, 1998). Planners, like scientists, use ‘technical’ and generic modes of analysis (such as building standards) to choose the ‘best’ course of action to meet those ends. However, when collaborative planning approaches are used, ‘technical’ assessments do not always reflect the ‘best’ solution for all participants. Thus, in this section, I address questions about the implications the elision of ends and means has had in practice in my case study areas.

<sup>38</sup> Faludi (1973) was the first person to highlight this planning typology that remained dominant until the early 1980s. His work is rooted in Max Weber’s work that suggests a form of bureaucracy and rational decision making that separates facts and values (formal rationalities/procedures and substance) (Allmendinger, 2009).



### 9.3.1 Outputs

*'Outputs, actions or immediate results'* are an important aspect of every collaborative attempt (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Thomas & Koontz, 2011). In this study, the outputs included houses, a park, a road, sports fields, festivals, ACTIS (a community organization) and so on. My research has certainly suggested that a democratic and empowering process may lead to broadly acceptable outputs. For example, in Aranui, the outputs were characterized by 'variety' and included houses, a park, a playground, a road, a rugby field and more, that were also what the community wanted. That was because the process was empowering because the community were able to 'have a say' and, to some extent, 'have their way'. In this process, the community's preferences (houses, park, and playground) were much more diverse than the government's preference (only housing). As a result, the name Housing Renewal was changed into the 'Community Renewal' in Aranui, which is in recognition of a community-based process that led to the community's desired outputs<sup>39</sup>. This suggests there may be a relationship between means and ends, processes and products. If ends and means go together, it could be argued that a democratic and empowering process is as important as the outputs (Allmendinger, 1998; Allmendinger, 2001, 2002, 2009; Paris, 1982; Reade, 1987; Thomas, 1979).

### 9.3.2 Outcomes (from both products and processes)

The relationship between products and processes becomes even more interesting when 'outcomes' are also considered. Outcomes in the literature seem to be viewed as impacts flowing from the outputs (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). For example, in the case of Aranui, safety can be seen as one of the outcomes of an upgraded park, or community education can be seen as the outcome from after-schools classes for adults. Yet, the upgraded park and educational classes, as ideas not thought of by CCC or HNZC, themselves were a type of output, or a thing, that came from a process aimed at empowering the community. Before the Community Renewal project, the CCC had implemented a number of council-led upgrades to Wainoni Park, but none of these resolved issues related to the safety of the park. It was only when the collaborative process addressing various needs was initiated that safety concerns were alleviated. Interestingly, in Aranui, 'process quality' had, itself, been defined as a 'goal', so giving the community a voice and power was a priority. As a result of such a process, community empowerment and social learning were achieved as outcomes. In the 1970s, Friedmann was one of the first who highlighted the role and importance of process quality, over substance

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<sup>39</sup> This also highlights that renewal or regeneration does not seem to work if it does not involve the community (community having an active role in the process). Abouzar's renewal was just a housing renewal and a result of a government-oriented process that did not seem to work.

(product) in his '*transactive planning*' model. He argued that focusing on process quality leads to social learning that links knowledge and action, and social learning begins and ends with action (Friedmann, 1973, 1987). Accordingly, the findings of this research appear to support the idea that outcomes can flow from the process, the product or from a mix of both. Outcomes can also be a way of evaluating both process and outputs. Some of the outcomes are as follows.

### **9.3.2.1 Social learning**

Social learning appears to be one of the most important outcomes of CG in the Aranui study. It has two sub-outcomes that agree with Koontz's (2014) categorization of social learning; individual and collective learning. In terms of individual learning, Aranui's case shows that some disadvantaged and less educated local people became determined to continue with their education. For example, today, one person is attending Massey University and is also leading some small community organizations where 20 people work under her.

In the current study, network-building is regarded as the main tool for collective learning, so they are the same thing. Aranui community learned to hope for change and work to make positive changes in the community. ACTIS played an important role in that, ACTIS itself was the output of a process that was empowering. It bonded all fragmented groups and individuals together to form an empowered community and sought for new development projects for the area. Although ACTIS meant only to collaborate with HNZC and CCC on Community Renewal but it made connections with some new organizations (such as MSD, MIF and ME). As a result, it won some funds and new development projects that they would not have normally been able to access. For example, SCAF which helped them to become financially independent; Heartland project that provided free access to governmental services for Aranui people; adult education and empowerment projects that last for more than 6 years to empower less educated adults and disabled children. ACTIS bonded all fragmented groups, individuals and capabilities together to form an empowered community. Ties within the community had also greatly increased and ACTIS kept the community aware of everything by a monthly newsletter, events, and by being in the community every day.

### **9.3.2.2 Other outcomes**

Other than social learning as an outcome, which was found only in Aranui's case, CG had other outcomes related to social sustainability of the projects; Abouzar shared some of these with Aranui.

#### *Safety, security and privacy*

The international association 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CEPTED) and many scholars (e.g. Acioly, Ruijsink, Huysman, & Geurts, 2007; Dixon et al., 2009) have defined safety,

security and privacy as major outcomes and indicators of socially sustainable renewal projects. Aranui had this outcome, whereas, in Abouzar, safety and security increased to some degree at the neighbourhood level but not at the household level. Householders felt that they had lost their privacy in the new apartments because they have no control over people coming and going in and out of their building and the building was not highly earthquake proof.

#### *Sense of ownership*

A sense of ownership is one most important outcome of successful urban regeneration projects (Dixon et al., 2009; Hemphill, Berry, & McGreal, 2004). The local community, in Aranui's case, had a role in each and every step of the process and they felt that they own it and are still taking care of it, years later. In Abouzar, a sense of ownership was an implicit goal but was not met because the local people declared that they would migrate to other parts of Tehran if they had money to do so.

#### *Pride, image and identity*

I have combined these three ideas (*pride, image and identity*) because they have the same goals even though the literature separates them (Black, 2012; Op Zuid, 2006; Palazzo, 2000). Areas needing urban regeneration often have a bad image and reputation and the residents lack pride in them. If the renewal changes the bad reputation, bad image or identity of the area, even very little, it will increase pride in the community and the attractiveness of the neighbourhood for its people. This happened in Aranui; local residents had a higher sense of pride and belonging to their place and non-residents felt that their perspective of Aranui had changed. Local people would no longer be identified by their houses as the poor because the new houses looked like typical New Zealand houses. In Abouzar, the community was depressed and felt that it had lost something like its culture (living in a small house with a small garden, having long talks at night).

#### *Health and well-being*

Health and well-being are very connected and highly important outcomes of successful urban renewal programmes (Dixon et al., 2009; Layard, 2005; Roberts et al., 2015). These were two important defined goals of both urban renewals. In Abouzar, the 'welfare' of the households improved because they got clean bathrooms, toilets and kitchens all in one unit, so their physical health will probably be improved in the long term. Nevertheless, despite this, their well-being, mental health and happiness decreased because they did not like the apartments and so had a sense of loss. In Aranui, the new houses were warmer and their physical features had improved; the houses were also exactly what the community wanted and liked. This meant that their physical and mental health, happiness and well-being all improved.

### *Demographic change*

Demographic change, such as changes in age, migration and mobility, is a criterion of socially sustainable urban renewal projects (Dixon et al., 2009). Both case studies in this study had that outcome. In Aranui, the transient population decreased and changed into a growing population and in Abouzar the population also grew and the average occupancy time of the houses increased.

### *Use*

Well used outputs are considered a good outcome and both case studies achieved that. New houses and Wainoni Park in Aranui are very well-used; HNZA tenancy managers' report that the new houses are never empty because people like them (21 March 2017). In Abouzar the houses are also very well used and occupied.

In conclusion, most of the positive outcomes, specifically social learning were found only in Aranui. Such outcomes had not been defined as ends or goals for the Abouzar projects, nor were they evident to me during my fieldwork. Rather, in Abouzar, the ends and goals were limited only to outputs that were defined by planners and engineers. The Abouzar renewal seems to be more an example of top-down, modern rational planning where claims about its collaborative nature lack substance. In contrast, in Aranui from the beginning, empowering communities had been defined as one project goal. To meet this goal, public organizations did not move directly to problem definition and expert design. Rather, they focused on a long-term community-development process, that focused on what local people wanted and how they wanted it. In so doing, social learning and empowerment were promoted.

### **9.3.3 Adaptation or durability**

The literature of adaptive management, adaptive capacity, CG, CP and social capital all highlight adaptation as the ultimate purpose of collaboration (Adger, 2003; Aldrich, 2012; Bull & Jones, 2006; Kapucu, 2014; Kapucu & Garayev, 2011a, 2012; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Shaw, 2003; Smit & Wandel, 2006; Tompkins & Adger, 2004; Waugh & Streib, 2006). The goal behind adaptation is to activate the '*transformative potential*' of communities and organizations to adapt in difficult, unpredictable situations or, in other words, to be resilient (Innes & Booher, 2010). Although Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) have introduced adaptation as one aspect of CG products, the nature of adaptation, how it happens and the relationship between processes, outputs, outcomes and adaptation is unclear. My research found signs of adaptation in practice as a product of CG; and it was also found to be related to outputs, outcomes and the process. This research shows that adaptation is the result of positive durability, the growth of outputs and outcomes, and the process in the long term. Aranui is a good

example of this, where ACTIS was an output from the empowering process of collaboration that has lasted for 18 years. The impact/outcome of ACTIS was an increase in the ability of different agencies to improve relationships. ACTIS and its mission of relationship building remained durable and grew after the project ended, this led to community resiliency and adaptation of the community after man-made and natural disasters (e.g. the earthquakes in 2010/2011, or the stop of SCAF fund).

Even though Aranui was one of the most affected areas, it was found to be one of the most resilient neighbourhoods in the city after the earthquakes. Their main resilience tool was the development of and strengthening of bonding, bridging and linking relationships. Although HNZN withdrew support, some new organizations came into place. This is shown in Figure 9.4, below, where grey signifies the original partners in the Community Renewal Project.




Figure 9.4 The network of ACTIS relationships after the Community Renewal ceased in 2008

An adult educator highlighted that:

*What the ACTIS manager is doing is quite sophisticated, so she is building an opportunity for adaptive capacity to work at [the] local level and advocating for change in the community and I think that is one of the real strengths of the Aranui model. [They have a good leadership] That leadership is shared. A lot of people see the Aranui Community Trust as the only place in Aranui where things happen but that is not true. The Trust (ACTIS) is a bit like a glue, like the links in the network, you know, network is a group of nodes and often access the glue or the bonding element in the network. That is a really important role to have and a really important role which leadership brings together (17 April 2017).*

Some examples of Aranui's resilience, that have previously been described, include gaining a health project from a private company and campaigning against the granting of licence for a proposed bottle store. However, some physical outputs (e.g. HNZN houses) do not seem to be resilient in the long-term. Some have labelled this 'adaptation of the building' (e.g. Brand, 1995; Jane Wilkinson, 2014; Schmidt III, Austin, & Brown, 2009). In the case of HNZN houses, some new tenants do not prioritise maintenance but it is HNZN's responsibility to work on that not the community's, so the houses may not have long-term adaptability. However, this does not change that Aranui is more adaptive than previously.

The Abouzar case supports the above idea but in reverse. In contrast with Aranui, the process in Abouzar was not community-based, trust-based or empowering. As a result, there was no community leadership to facilitate long-term community empowerment, nor was there trust and relationships to be maintained. Therefore, there was no adaptation at the community level but, at the organizational level, relationships seemed to become closer and more collaborative. URO, Tehran's council, the Engineering Organization and the Ministry of Power developed new relationships with new perspectives because of the National Regeneration Act.

In conclusion, this research found indications of adaptation as a product of CG in practice. Adaptation is connected to outcomes and outputs and all three are linked to the process; so, processes, outputs, outcomes and adaptation go together and cannot be separated. An empowering process of collaboration is more likely to lead to empowered and adaptive communities.

#### **9.3.4 Satisfaction with outputs, outcomes and adaptation**

In this study, assessing the satisfaction with the outputs, outcomes and adaptation aimed to make apparent the role of power in defining agreed goals and ends. The results show that, in Abouzar, the local community was dissatisfied with the products whereas those having more power, including the developers and Tehran's council, were satisfied. Satisfaction, to some degree, illustrates the 'values' and 'real intentions' of the different players in the collaboration. In contrast, in Aranui, although not everyone shared the same values and goals, the process was flexible and responsive thus achieving a balance between general satisfaction and consensus. Once again, the elision of process and product becomes apparent.

### **9.4 Connection between the process and products of CG**

The sections, above, highlight the direct connection of the CG products and processes, and show that

*A collaborative process is one where the process quality is a goal in itself, but one that also seems to lead to collaborative products that are broadly acceptable for wide range of participants.*

This section uses the diagram below to illustrate the connections and highlight the factors that appear to be 'necessary' in the processes that help have broadly acceptable products on the ground, and what aspects of the processes are attributed to which aspects of the products. Accordingly, what happens in the pre-collaboration phase (four factors) to balance the pre-existing conditions appears to be necessary to result in adaptive communities.

What happened in the collaboration phase also helped in terms of the adaptations in the community but, as the blue lines show, they had a direct impact on having quality physical outputs and outcomes such as safety, a sense of ownership and more.

## Connections




Figure 9.5 Diagram of connections between process and products of CG



## 9.5 Contextual factors

This research did not claim to evaluate the context performance because contextual factors can be very diverse, so a comprehensive evaluation was difficult. On the other hand, context factors were important to consider to see how widely applicable the findings are across different contexts. Some contextual factors which appeared to influence the process are, nonetheless, described in brief here. It is important to note that the first three factors had a significant influence in the success of the process and improve the products of CG.

- Personalities (personal commitment, accountability, sense of responsibility)

The people involved in the projects played a critical role in success, including those at the macro level having top seats at the government, such as the Prime Minister at the time, the Minister of Housing and the Minister of Social development, the MP, senior managers, executives and councillors and also, those at the micro level, including tenancy managers, ACTIS board members, local community natural leaders, CCC and HNZA staff in the community. These personalities seemed to have the same goal, which was community development, and they shared a sense of responsibility, accountability and commitment towards the community and that made a real difference. In New Zealand eleven community renewal projects were initiated with the same goal at the same time but Aranui's renewal was the only one completed, received a large investment and succeeded, while the rest of the projects failed. The ACTIS chairperson admitted that the specific time of Community Renewal was a 'magic moment' because everyone from the top (such as ministers) to the bottom (local community leaders) were on the same page. The Minister of Housing and the Minister of Social Development, for whatever reason (it might have been their vanity), supported this project to the end, both financially and spiritually, and they remained committed to a meaningful community involvement for eight years. The MP (Lianne Dalziel now Christchurch's Mayor at some point even wanted to resign from her role over Aranui, and the HNZA and CCC representatives were very committed and some left their jobs when the project was finished. The ACTIS board members were so assertive and committed, many had been working in Aranui for almost 19 years. Tenancy managers who opened the doors for building relationships and trust in Aranui were called 'fathers' of Aranui by local people and they still remained as one of the most trusted people by the locals. People in the project showed not just legal accountability but an ethical orientation that made the process and products a success.

- Organizational commitment and vision

The organizations involved in the Aranui project had a high degree of commitment to support community empowerment, even though this was a resource-intensive approach. The project was sufficiently well-funded to meet the goals of community empowerment and social learning. HNZZ even sent its staff for training on community engagement and community development.

- Community willingness for a positive change

In some communities, like Aranui and Abouzar, which are low socio-economic areas, local people could easily lose hope about having a positive change in their communities. Yet, in both Aranui and Abouzar, local people were determined and passionate about improving their neighbourhoods and communities. They were therefore willing participants in the renewal processes.

- Prior failure to address the problem

Some scholars (e.g. Crosby & Bryson, 2014; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015) talk about the importance of previous failures as a contextual factor as does this study. CG often seems to be initiated where there is a history of failures of public agencies to address the problems with top-down planning and policy making. When public agencies discover that the community's role is important there is no way but to have bottom-up planning. Top-down landscape plans in Tehran, and top-down tenancy management and state housing developments in Aranui, resulted in failure, so collaborative renewals were initiated

- Level of political connectedness and trust (local, national, international)

The importance of connections between public agencies has also been highlighted by some authors (e.g. Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Selin & Chevez, 1995), but this research also shows the importance of the international context and connections to the world. Iran is politically isolated and lacks international trust and connections, so it has shortages of building materials and high prices. Consequently, developers use low standard materials, and perhaps the government produces non-standard materials to keep the economy going. This situation creates a vicious cycle of distrust in Iran. Relationships within and between agencies and the community can also facilitate the CG process. For example, the MP in Aranui was the community's direct connection to those who held the power while the Abouzar community did not have that. In New Zealand, agencies seemed to work for the same goals while, in Iran, central government agencies did not work with URO and Tehran's council. In Iran, collaboration did not permeate to all institutions and lacked common goals; each wanted to achieve its own goals and was happy to break the law. This warns planners that institutions have to be integrated and work together towards the same purposes otherwise CG may not work.

- Political or institutional philosophy

Policy and legal frameworks have been highlighted by (Bingham, 2008; Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Ostrom, 1990b), as important contextual factors but this study found the government's political philosophy important but not its legal philosophy. In New Zealand, the 'political philosophy' of the Labour government is to increase the number and quality of state houses and encourage community empowerment. Senior managers in HNZN designed their 'political frameworks' on this basis, which recognise the '*political will*'. This lets money and financial resources come, so financial resources seem to be a sub-category of the political philosophy. The National government stopped financing the project because its philosophy was different. In Iran, the council's political philosophy was to achieve a profit at any price, so housing quality was not important. Therefore, it issued building permits for five-storey houses to receive increased building consent fees. Checking the quality of the houses was neglected because this was not the council's goal. According to the Building Laws, the council was not allowed to issue building permits for buildings not designed by certified architects, but still issues them permits and so breaks the law. This meant there was a huge 'abdication of responsibility' by Tehran's council.

- Planning history

This study finds planning history, knowledge, resources and physical infrastructure important contextual factors but these are not often reported about in the literature. Planning in every part of the world has its own history and experience that impacts on what we do today. When Iran was moving towards modernism a revolution happened, then war with Iraq and two massive earthquakes, subsequently, all planning and governance structures were lost. Planning was not a priority for years and planning lost its institutional memory, normal planning was not practised and incremental development did not happen. For example, URO failed with the Urban Landscape Plans designed by planners, but they repeated their mistakes and did not really know the right definition of collaboration. Even when they wanted to do things right or enact the law, they were not able to because of internal and international pressures (e.g., a lack of imported building materials). However, the planners continued to work while the community needed shelter. The URO project manager said: *"We have accepted the current situation of our country... we know that we have no standard materials, but we try to use the best of what we have... I don't have the power to force and improve the standard of the materials ... (1 May 2017).* Although in New Zealand planning has always been happening in peace, the shocks in the form of an earthquake turn the system into a mess. For example, the Christchurch earthquakes in 2010/2011, raised conflicts between CERA (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority) and CCC.

- Socio-economic conditions

The socio-economic condition of communities has been known to be an important contextual factor in CG (Borrini-Feyerabend, 1996; Emerson et al., 2012). Aranui and Abouzar show, it might be easier to implement CG in low socio-economic areas than what people believe it is. It was said that the Abouzar local people were involved not because the renewal looked to be collaborative but because they were poor and wanted a change. So, renewal planning was welcomed by locals and this facilitated the process.

Five factors above, influence the 'implementation' of a CG initiative. No renewal, even if very collaborative, can succeed if the above factors act as barriers in each context. Abouzar did not involve a case of bribery, although there was corruption. This was a case where contextual barriers were very strong, which turned the renewal into a disaster.

## **9.6 Chapter Summary**

The first objective of this study was to critically evaluate the process performance of CG. CG has often been criticized for its democratic deficits, while this chapter found another deficit in the theory, a lack of attention to the prehistory, context and future of the collaboration. The chapter shows that CG is not a one-step formal collaboration; it has three stages: pre-collaboration, collaboration and post-collaboration. Pre-collaboration is concerned with balancing the pre-existing conditions before formal collaboration begins. After this crucial pre-collaboration, collaboration on the major problem starts, which is recognized as an adaptive, non-linear, pragmatic process that includes many projects of different sizes and its leadership. Three pragmatic criteria that are not idealistic have been developed for the collaboration phase: ongoing two-ways, with formal and informal communication involving the local community from the beginning to the end of the process rather than only in the decision making. Finally, being consensus-oriented and seeking a satisfaction balance between actors and managing conflicts. Post-collaboration, as the final stage of the process, highlights that CG is not fixed but is durable and continues when formal collaboration is finished. A commitment and a willingness to continue to collaborate are important criteria for success.

The two other objectives of this study were to assess the products and satisfaction with the products of CG and form a balanced evaluation of the process and products. The study shows that the product is a package of outputs, outcomes and adaptations (durability); all three have to be considered as success criteria. These three, as the substance or products, are connected and enrich each other and they are well-connected to the process. This shows that the process and products go together; they are inseparable. A procedure in which process quality is a goal is more likely to lead to broadly acceptable ends and products and with a broad satisfaction with the products.

The other aim of the study was to look at the connections between the process and products as this is clear since they seem to have a direct connection. This chapter highlights what are '*necessary*' in the process that probably every CG initiative needs to meet to be successful. The necessary factors were more in the pre-collaboration phase, that were attributed to adaptation, community learning and network-building. They include building a community with collective leadership, doing many small projects to have early wins, formalizing an equal partnership with the community through an MoU, and letting the community decide what problems are more important to spend money on. However, the rest of the process indicators help in having an adaptive community but they help even more to have quality outputs and outcomes, such as safety and a sense of responsibility. These indicators relate to the context of CG and significantly contribute to the success of the process and products at the same time. They include: personalities and their sense of responsibility, organizational commitment and vision, and community willingness for a positive change.

## Chapter 10

### Conclusion

The literature presented in Chapter 2 raised a number of important questions about collaborative governance and planning. These included:

How are CG processes practiced in the context of such concrete situations such as housing renewal projects?

How do we delineate a CG process?

To what extent do CG products meet the agreed goals of the participants?

Are there any connections between process and outputs, outcomes and adaptation?

The data gathered during my fieldwork in Aranui (New Zealand) and Abouzar (Iran) contributes to a better understanding of the on-going processes of collaboration between local and central governments and community groups working together to achieve distinct programmes of work in the context of housing regeneration and community renewal. It is worth noting that the literature around CG relates more strongly to multi-sector collaborations across institutions, and government departments whereas, this research highlights collaborative governance with communities.

Based on my reading of these questions against the data gathered during my fieldwork in this chapter I now present the larger lessons, so to speak, from the research including implications for both theory and practice.

#### 10.1 Key learnings from the study

The aim of this research was to evaluate two cases of collaborative governance in light of current theory emphasising its benefits and drawbacks. Because CG has both advantages and challenges, it was important to consider ways in which inadequacies can be addressed - and opportunities maximised - in practice. These cases also provided an opportunity to contribute to an area of scholarship highlighting possible connections between the process of collaboration and the products of that process. Through a critical evaluation of these cases, and using qualitative research methods, I was able to interrogate the proposition that *“there is some kind of relationship between CG process and broadly acceptable products on the ground”*. The findings of this study indicate that the establishment, extension and composition of what is eventually regarded as ‘the formal’ process of CG have important implications for its success. In contributing to a more nuanced account of how collaborative governance is practised, my conclusions can be presented around the themes of ‘when’, ‘where’, ‘how’ and ‘what’. These are explained below in more detail.

### *When does collaborative governance begin and end?*

One of the most significant findings is that CG may have more nebulous beginnings and futures than is currently acknowledged in the literature. Much of the current scholarship adopts Ansell and Gash (2008) framework for CG where collaborative governance is defined as *“a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a decision-making process that is formal, consensus oriented and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets”* (p. 544). Whilst they note context and history as issues to take into account, my research has shown these to be critical concerns worthy of much deeper consideration. Context and history can be seen as part of an important ‘pre-collaboration’ phase that may shape the ultimate success or failure of the endeavour. This phase enables communities to become ‘collaboration-ready’ and can be achieved through addressing small problems that may seem tangential to the larger project, but that build trust, relationships, leadership, capacity and capability. My results suggest that ‘collaboration’ on the “main problem” or according to Ansell and Gash (2008) the “public affair” could more appropriately be seen as the second stage of the process that should be deferred until adequate levels of trust, relationships, leadership, capacity and capability have been achieved (except perhaps where the pre-existing relationships and conditions are already good). While Ansell and Gash and other CG scholars (e.g. Booher, 2004; Innes & Booher, 2010; Purdy, 2012) note that CG is focused on public affairs, my research has illustrated that public affairs should be co-defined with the public, and not by experts acting alone.

My results also suggest that CG does not always have a ‘defined end’ and may not be a ‘fixed’ process; collaboration may continue even when the formal project or programme is complete. The Aranui’s case provides a useful example. Although the Community Renewal project formally ended in 2008 and central government organizations left Aranui, the community’s capability and capacity endured and effectively developed further. New relationships were developed between ACTIS (as the community leader) and various other public and private organizations, and ACTIS’s relationship with CCC has also become much stronger than it was before the renewal process. As a result, at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes (starting in 2010), the Aranui community with ACTIS leadership was able to respond more quickly than many other suburbs in the city. On this basis, Aranui’s case showed that the relationships, trust, commitment to partnership and the community’s capabilities did not end when the project was formally terminated but instead, adapted and endured.

To summarise, CG might usefully be seen as having three – possibly iterative - stages: pre-collaboration, collaboration and post-collaboration. Although these kinds of extended processes may be expensive and difficult, the benefits arguably outweigh the costs, particularly over the long-term.

Aranui, today, saves money for the government because it is empowered enough to respond to many problems on its own without asking for help.

### *Where does CG happen?*

This study indicates that CG is more likely to succeed if agencies are able to go where the communities are rather than expecting communities to come to them. Communication is known to be a key factor in CG and this study shows that the on-site presence of the agencies significantly improved two-way communication with the community. This presence builds a better sense of context and local knowledge, and helps the agencies understand the community's problems in a direct way. On-site presence of the agencies and everyday contact with the community helps build trust and empower the community.

### *How does CG happen?*

This study indicates that CG might be better understood through an analysis of its composite projects enacted at various scales in an, often, non-linear way. Aranui's case, in particular, highlighted that the evidence of some community-led projects happening alongside some council or government-led projects may be an indication of a successful process. Therefore in CG, leadership becomes more fluid and is shared or redistributed based on trust: some projects are community-led and some are government-led – while the conventional literature defines CG as government-initiated and government-led. In such a process, messiness and unexpected emergent actions are expected, for example, various actors may dip in and out at various times according to participant's capabilities, skills and interests or communities may be leading one project, but be involved in implementing another led by public agencies (leadership can manifest at various times, in different ways).

Another important point is that the literature often debates issues of 'inclusion', 'impartiality', 'transparency' and 'accommodating diversity' as the obvious criteria for formal collaboration (which are often measured quantitatively in terms of how many community members attend formal meetings or workshops). These researchers seem to have a checklist of these indicators and hope to tick them off and have at least a minimum level of each. However, my research suggests that the *quality* of participation may be far more critical and this point may apply across the extended process (from pre- to post-collaboration, and include implementation and monitoring). Moreover, while the literature often defines CG as a 'formal' collaboration, this study indicated that CG also has an informal component in which less structured or formal interactions, such as conversations at events or chance meetings, were an important criteria for success. Although the claim is that collaboration is about being transparent, inclusive and impartial, in reality, life heavily relies on behind the scene



conversations that are informal and this is how life works. So, it might be better not to pretend that CG is only about formal collaboration and indicators but is also about informal pre- and post-collaborations that may be even more important than formal collaboration.

### *What is the connection between process and products?*

CG is often recognized as a process designed to achieve certain ends (or 'products' including outputs and outcomes), yet there is very little research acknowledging or assessing the relationship between process and product. This study emphasises that the end products should not be ignored amidst debates about process; the end-products and outcomes they generate are inseparable from the process. A 'good' process which is durable, empowering and committed to ongoing relationships – the qualitative basis for inclusion' – may be more likely to have broadly acceptable products on the ground. Therefore, looking at the process and products as a package is an important criterion for success.

## **10.2 Theoretical contributions and implications**

The main theoretical contribution of this study is that it indicates the need to extend and expand our conceptualisation of CG. It is important to remember that Ansell and Gash's (2008) definition was deliberately restricted so as to facilitate their comparative work. Though widely adopted, their definition was not meant to exclude other approaches. This is important given the difficulties of achieving many of the criteria of, for example, Habermas' Ideal Speech situation. These challenges of matching theoretical ideals with actual practice leaves us searching for answers to questions about inclusion, consensus building, power imbalance and representation. Although some ideas, such as 'sufficient consensus' or a 'sufficient agreement' (e.g. Dryzek, 1994; Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 2010), are appealing, they are difficult to achieve within the confines of 'a formal process'. In contrast, my research shows that CG should be extended beyond a formal collaboration and be seen as an extended, expanded and composite process that provides varied opportunities for inclusion and alternative means of representation.

Consequently, this research suggests a new set of criteria applicable to informal pre-collaboration stages as well as the formal collaboration process, and the on-going activities and relationships that endure post-collaboration. Though formal 'collaboration' seems to be the main focus of the theory, the paradox is that this phase does not work if the pre- and post-collaboration are not attended to sufficiently. Regardless of any perceived failure or success of the formal phase (collaboration on a major project), we need to accommodate the larger context and reserve making judgements about its success based on one project, but to look for durability of inclusion, trust and building relationships.

Also, if the three stages of process are followed, broadly acceptable outputs, outcomes and adaptation are more likely.

Secondly, conventional CG theory does not suggest a process which is itself adaptable and negotiable. Instead it tends to be fixed, idealistic and optimistic, aiming at 'resolving' conflicts, 'building' consensus, 'equal sharing' of power or equity or making a decision that is best for everyone. This process is often criticized for its democratic deficits and, more specifically, its dilemma in trying, but not being able, to remove power inequalities and existing conflicts. However, if we give up these unachievable Habermasian ideals, what would be a better alternative? This study suggests that CG should be seen as an 'adaptable', 'interactive', 'flexible' and 'pragmatic' process rather than being idealistic. CG is not an intervention that appears magically and resolves conflicts or shares power. This study has found the need for an adaptable process with adaptable indicators that do not overlook the role of power and conflicts. Such an adaptable process accepts that 'one size does not fit all', so a more realistic option is to seek for consensus as much as possible, knowing that it is impossible to make a decision that is best for everyone. Therefore, being consensus-oriented and sometimes relying on a balance of satisfaction with the goals or values; also, managing conflicts seems more practical and honest.

Thirdly, CG theory is very focused on 'talking' and 'discourse' and often, scholarship posits dialogue as the centrepiece of CG. This leaves implementation under-examined. My study's findings illustrate that CG goes beyond decision-making and dialogue; it also involves action, implementation and monitoring. Aranui's case, in particular, showed that the community had an ongoing involvement in the whole process. Therefore, although there is much talk about 'discourse', this study indicates that '*doing it*' may be even more important than 'talking about it'. Such a process provides the community with a feeling of ownership and satisfaction with the products and CG.

Fourthly, this study integrates long standing debates about substantive rationalities and procedural legitimacy and highlights their relationships. In the past researchers have avoided looking at the connection. Some researchers are only concerned with substantive rationality where products can be evaluated according to their technical criteria (e.g. a house can be well-insulated, energy efficient) without looking at the processes. Others, including CG researchers, focus on the process evaluations based on power, roles and responsibilities of different players and they assume that the products are 'good'. This study shows that for evaluating the success of CG initiatives, process and product including outputs, outcomes and adaptation and their relationships need equal attention. Neither of them in isolation from each other is sufficient for judgements.

If we seek a better understanding of CG, we need to move beyond Ansell and Gash's (2008, p. 544) deliberately restricted definition of CG as *"a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a decision-making process that is formal, consensus oriented and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets"* (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 544). Based my research, I propose an alternative as:

*a **type of governance** where one or more public agencies **are directly engaged with** non-state stakeholders in the decision-making and **implementation** that has both formal and **informal** elements, is **satisfaction-oriented** and deliberative, and aims to make **and** implement public policy **and** manage public programmes, assets or problems **co-defined by the community**.*

Below is a comprehensive framework to assess CG performance see Figure 10.1.

## International context

### National context

### Satisfaction with the products

#### Process

##### Pre-collaboration

Equalizing pre-existing conditions

Balancing trust and relations by small and (community-led projects)	Balancing actors and capabilities by building a community and collective mobilization	Providing appropriate resources and authority	Problem definition or agenda setting by the community (surveys or FGDs)
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##### Collaboration

Ongoing active involvement
Ongoing two-way communication
Consensus orientation
Satisfaction balance with goals
Conflict management

##### Post-collaboration

Continuing to collaborate when the project is formally complete
Having willingness and commitment to re-engage when breaks and disappointments happen.

State and community-led

#### Product

Outputs	Outcomes	Adaptation (durability)
Houses parks roads festivals newsletters	Safety, security, privacy Sense of ownership Health and wellbeing Pride, image and identity	Durability & maintenance of places
Community leadership/local entity or representative (e.g. ACTIS)	Demographic change Use Social learning, Network building	Durability of existing relations Durability of network-building Resilience of the community after man-made and natural disasters

### Connection

Figure 10.1 A framework for the CG process, product, satisfaction, connection and context

Building a community and capability  
 Balancing and building trust and relations by early wins  
 Managing formal authority and resources  
 Problem definition by the community  
 An adaptable process that seek for consensus and balance of satisfaction and managing conflicts  
 Ongoing community involvement and communication

### 10.3 Practical implications

The first implication of this research is that planners and public agencies when working with a community, make more investment in the informal pre-collaboration phase, even in difficult situations when there are time and money pressures. How much effort and expenditure is required before moving to a more formal phase will vary across contexts. It might be better to consider what this pre-collaboration phase seeks to achieve. Some practical things considerations include:

- Building a community before starting any sort of formal engagement can be an important principle. This can be done by supporting and encouraging fragmented groups and individuals to become integrated and form collective leadership for themselves from themselves. This act mobilizes the community's capabilities and collective resources and multiplies its capabilities. As a result, the community becomes a stronger actor and more capable of equal partnership with public agencies. Such a bonded community will be more demanding, informed and is capable of acting on its own when the agencies leave, or when disasters happen. The community would be more empowered and more able to adapt and respond to many problems without seeking for help from agencies.
- Co-design work on small projects related to the community's immediate needs and issues. Small community issues may not easily attract public attention but working on them is sometimes key to developing the capabilities and relationships necessary for larger endeavours. Avoid starting from a position of assumed knowledge about communities' problems and needs. Instead, start from a position of assumed ignorance. Before allocating money to a specific project for a community, it is better to go and ask the community what the issue is and which type of project can best help to address that. This leads to communities' sense of ownership, support and commitment to the project.
- Insofar as possible, go where the communities are and set up 'good offices' even though this may seem unconventional or threatening to local government or central government staff.. This brings those in power and the weaker actors onto common ground and new planning arenas and it gives agency representatives a better understanding of the community's issues, wants and needs in context. Such an action significantly facilitates mutual communications between agencies and local citizens, builds trust, friendly and informal relations, and puts the power in the hands of the locals in an informal manner.
- Thirdly, this study reveals that it is important to involve communities in decision-making as well as in action and implementation. This is a factor for planners and practitioners to work on, to involve local communities as the end users when implementing decisions or, even, leading the projects that they are capable of leading as there may be many aspects of a project

that local people are capable of implementing. While the literature is more concerned with a community's inclusion in decision-making, my study shows that involvement in a project's implementation may result in well-maintained products into the future.

This research also suggests that it might be critical to distribute resources across a number of projects of different scales rather than one large project. In Aranui, at that particular time and place, there was a kind of alignment between senior managers at the city council and central government that is not always there. This helped the project to succeed but such a situation and such a project is rare even in developed countries. It happened once in New Zealand and ten years after that still no similar projects have been implemented, so it is more about luck and fortune. The point, which was beyond luck was that Aranui's project was a small-scale project at a neighbourhood level not a mega scale project aiming at massive changes to society. Central government, rather than initiating one mega project had decided to have 11 small projects, and Aranui was the only one that succeeded and effective outcomes. The fact was even within the Aranui project, there were several small projects and two larger ones. As a result, luck and the risk of failure were distributed between different projects rather than one massive project which, if it had not worked, would not have had any good results. Moreover, you can also be more successful in relying on certain personalities when a project is small.

Finally, although academics often talk about collaborative governance, governing collaboratively, collaborative planning, consensus building, conflict resolution and agonism and conflict management, the current study shows that in the real world, if processes are under-pinned by a basic respect for humanity, positive changes can result. This can happen by going to the communities and people, asking about their challenges and needs, listening to their stories and experiences, what they like or do not like, relying on real relationships that are friendly and informal rather than formal and artificial, and prioritizing people over projects and plans. Aranui is a useful example where the human dimension was prioritized; central and local government agencies sent their representatives to the community to, basically, live there for around eight years, to listen to them with the hope that projects could be defined and implement together.

## **10.4 Future research**

This research, while based principally on two in-depth case studies, highlights some key areas for further investigation. First, the CG framework developed from this study emphasises pre- and post-formal collaboration phases that both need further investigation. More research is needed to better understand the importance of the pre-collaboration phase and what indicators may be used to assess whether collaborators are ready to move onto a more formal phase. Although building a community before formal engagement was found to be crucial, along with implementing many small and larger

projects that are achievable, these are not easy tasks and they can make the process expensive and long. Further studies on the nature of pre-collaboration can help to improve our understanding on how to make it more practical and easier to achieve, and how to make the participants confident about further success.

Secondly, for years, many CG scholars have aimed at consensus-building and conflict resolution, through a fixed process of formal collaboration. This study indicates that these goals are not always achievable, but if you mix small and large projects at different phases you can provide more opportunities to achieve consensus and manage –rather than resolve - conflicts. Therefore, a ‘composite’ and ‘non-linear’ collaborative process seems to be very important. On this basis, it will be very useful to conduct research in different contexts to see how composite and non-linear collaborative processes merge, and how these aspects contribute to the overall success of projects.

Lastly, this study was mainly based on Aranui, a “poor” neighbourhood in New Zealand, which helped to define and refine the main themes, which were then tested on Abouzar, a “deprived” neighbourhood in Iran. Despite popular perceptions and myths about New Zealand as an egalitarian society, Aranui reminds us that deprivation, disempowerment and institutionalised racism exist here just as much as in other parts of the world. This provides an opportunity for further research to be conducted on case studies from other cities in the world, both westernised and non-westernised, with similar levels of deprivation. Just as importantly it would be helpful to carry out studies in neighbourhoods that are less deprived and disempowered. Such research would improve the reliability of the framework developed by this research and also highlight its weaknesses.

## Appendix A

### Human Ethic Committee Approval Letter

Research and Innovation

T 64 3 423 0817  
PO Box 85084, Lincoln University  
Lincoln 7647, Christchurch  
New Zealand  
[www.lincoln.ac.nz](http://www.lincoln.ac.nz)

**Application No: 2016- 60**

**Title:** Planning, collaborative governance and housing regeneration: matching theory with practice in Iran and New Zealand

**Applicant:** Z Karaminejad

---

*The Lincoln University Human Ethics Committee has reviewed the above noted application.*  
Thank you for your response to the questions which were forwarded to you on the Committee's behalf.

I am satisfied on the Committee's behalf that the issues of concern have been satisfactorily addressed. I am pleased to give final approval to your project.

Please note that this approval is valid for three years from today's date at which time you will need to reapply for renewal.

Once your field work has finished can you please advise the Human Ethics Secretary, Alison Hind, and confirm that you have complied with the terms of the ethical approval.

May I, on behalf of the Committee, wish you success in your research.

Yours sincerely



Grant Tavinor  
Chair, Human Ethics Committee

**PLEASE NOTE:** The Human Ethics Committee has an audit process in place for applications. Please see 7.3 of the Human Ethics Committee Operating Procedures (ACHE) in the Lincoln University Policies and Procedures Manual for more information.



## **Appendix B**

### **An example of email communication**

Dear David,

My name is Zohreh Karaminejad, I am doing a PhD in urban planning at Lincoln University, and I am focused on Community Renewal Projects. Your name and email was provided by Mr Bill King.

Aranui Community Renewal Project done by a collaborative approach between CCC, HNZN and Aranui community is one of my case studies. Because of your role and position in Aranui Community Renewal Project, I would like to invite you as a potential interviewee.

Your role and experience as a prominent Christchurch Architect in the collaborative design process are very important for my research.

If you are interested, I can send you my research information sheet and consent form where you can find more details about my research.

Kind Regards,

Zohreh

Zohreh Karaminejad  
PhD Candidate,  
Department of Environmental Management  
Lincoln University  
Lincoln 7647  
New Zealand

## Appendix C

### Forms

#### C.1 Research information sheet for interviews



Department of Environmental Management Faculty of Environment, Society and Design

#### Research information sheet for interviews

You are invited to participate in my Doctoral research project titled **Planning, collaborative governance and housing regeneration: matching theory with practice in Iran and New Zealand**. Participation in this research is voluntary, so there is no obligation to take part.

The objective of this research project is to explore whether involving different stakeholders in housing regeneration projects helps our cities to be good and healthy places to live, work and play. I am comparing two housing regeneration projects in Aranui in Christchurch and Abouzar in Iran which were both developed with the involvement of a range of stakeholders. I am particularly interested in knowing how you, as someone who has been involved in the Aranui/Abouzar project, evaluates it, in terms of process and product. The *process* refers to the way the project was run and came about, including the amount of influence you had in decision making. The *product* refers to the end result – the housing development itself – and your satisfaction with that.

If you agree to participate, a face to face interview will be conducted at a time and place that suits you which should take about an hour. With your permission, our conversation will be recorded, notes taken or both depending on your consent. The results of the project will be presented as a PhD thesis and published in academic journals and possibly presented at an international conference, but your anonymity will be carefully maintained. The identity of any participant will remain confidential and Human Ethics Committee in the event of an audit. Only aggregated data will be presented in any publications and no information will be reported in a way that might identify an individual participant. The project has been reviewed and approved by the Lincoln University Human Ethics Committee and is overseen by experienced academic supervisors.

You have the right to: decline to participate, decline to answer any question, ask questions about the project and view a summary of the project findings. You have also the right to withdraw from the project up to 8 weeks after the interview, including withdrawal of any information you have provided, and you can do that by contacting either the principal researcher or anyone from the supervisory team using the contact details provided below.

**Principal Researcher:**

Zohreh Karaminejad

Email: [Zohreh.Karaminejad@lincolnuni.ac.nz](mailto:Zohreh.Karaminejad@lincolnuni.ac.nz)

Phone: 0279738039 (NZ)/ 09122395743 (Iran)

**Supervisory Team:**

Supervisor: Dr Roy Montgomery ([Roy.Montgomery@lincoln.ac.nz](mailto:Roy.Montgomery@lincoln.ac.nz))

Co-supervisor: Dr Suzanne Vallance ([Suzanne.Vallance@lincoln.ac.nz](mailto:Suzanne.Vallance@lincoln.ac.nz))

Advisor: Dr Andreas Wesener ([Andreas.Wesener@lincoln.ac.nz](mailto:Andreas.Wesener@lincoln.ac.nz))

## C.2 Consent form for interviews

### CONSENT FORM

(for interviews)

**Name of the project:** *Planning, collaborative governance and housing regeneration: matching theory with practice in Iran and New Zealand.*

*The objective of this research project is to explore if involving different stakeholders in housing regeneration projects helps our cities to be good and healthy places to live, work and play.*

I agree to participate in the project, and I consent to publication of the results of the project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. I also understand that I may withdraw from the project up to 8 weeks after my interview, including withdrawal of any information I have provided.

I provide consent to:

(please tick one or all of the following options)

Having an audio recording taken ☐

Having notes taken of the interview ☐

Being identified by my profession or role ☐

Name:

---

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

---

### C.3 Research information sheet for observations



Department of Environmental Management Faculty of Environment, Society and Design

### Research information sheet for observations

Dear .....

You are invited to participate in my Doctoral research project titled **Planning, collaborative governance and housing regeneration: matching theory with practice in Iran and New Zealand**. Participation in this research is voluntary, so there is no obligation to take part.

The objective of this research project is to explore whether involving different stakeholders in housing regeneration projects helps our cities to be good and healthy places to live, work and play. As the new houses in your area (Aranui/Abouzar) have been built through involving different stakeholders, I particularly want to observe how these houses, as the product of recent renewal, have been built and what quality they have.

If you agree to participate, I (Zohreh Karaminejad) will visit your house and have you escort me through to point out building features at a time that suits you. If you permit, I will take some photos, otherwise notes will be taken. Through this observation, I want to explore some of the key findings already achieved through interviews. The results of the project will be presented as a PhD thesis and published in academic journals and possibly presented at an international conference, but your anonymity will be carefully maintained. The identity of any participant will remain confidential and Human Ethics Committee in the event of an audit. Only aggregated data will be presented in any publications and no information will be reported in a way that might identify an individual participant. The project has been reviewed and approved by the Lincoln University Human Ethics Committee and is overseen by experienced academic supervisors.

You have the right to: decline to participate, ask questions about the project and view a summary of the project findings. You have also the right to withdraw from the project up to 8 weeks after interview, including withdrawal of any information you have provided, and you can do that by contacting either the principal researcher or anyone from the supervisory team using the contact details provided below.

**Principal Researcher:**

Zohreh Karaminejad

Email: [Zohreh.Karaminejad@lincolnuni.ac.nz](mailto:Zohreh.Karaminejad@lincolnuni.ac.nz)

Phone: 0279738039 (NZ)/ 09122395743 (Iran)

**Supervisory Team:**

Supervisor: Dr Roy Montgomery ([Roy.Montgomery@lincoln.ac.nz](mailto:Roy.Montgomery@lincoln.ac.nz))

Co-supervisor: Dr Suzanne Vallance ([Suzanne.Vallance@lincoln.ac.nz](mailto:Suzanne.Vallance@lincoln.ac.nz))

Advisor: Dr Andreas Wesener ([Andreas.Wesener@lincoln.ac.nz](mailto:Andreas.Wesener@lincoln.ac.nz)) Consent form for observations

## C.4 Consent form for observations

# CONSENT FORM

(For observations)

**Name of the project:** *Planning, collaborative governance and housing regeneration: matching theory with practice in Iran and New Zealand.*

*The objective of this research project is to explore if involving different stakeholders in housing regeneration projects helps our cities to be good and healthy places to live, work and play.*

I agree to participate in the project (observation of my house), and I consent to publication of the results of the project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. I also understand that I may withdraw from the project up to 8 weeks after observation of my place, including withdrawal of any information or photos.

I provide consent to:

(please tick one or all of the following options)

Having photos taken of the observation ☐

Having notes taken of the observation ☐

Being identified by my profession or role ☐

Name:

---

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

---

## **Appendix D**

### **Interview Questions**

#### **Process performance and stakeholders' evaluation**

Please tell me about the process of renewal that you were involved in.

1. Other than you who else was involved in the renewal process? How were people chosen to participate? For example, how did you come to be involved? Were there people or groups that you think should have been involved but weren't?
2. How were you involved and how were you communicating with other participants?
3. At what point did you become involved in the project? What sort of things had already been decided? What sorts of things were still being worked through when you first joined? Do you have any examples? at what points did your participation finish?
4. Can you please elaborate your roles and responsibilities in renewal? Were your knowledge and skills used in the best way?
5. Do you think to what extent you had influence on achieving group goals as an individual? Were there some people or groups that had more influence over decisions than others? Could you give me examples?
6. To what extent were your ideas, concerns and recommendations taken into considerations? Can you please give an example of a suggestion that was adopted or ignored? What happened to leading up to it?
7. Have you attended any meetings/FGDs/workshops on housing renewal? If so, did you have regular attendance/how many programs were held for communities? what were the discussions about? How did these meetings influence decisions? Give me examples.
8. What happened during the meetings? what were the dynamics of the meetings? How did people interact? How were conflicts dealt with, if they arise? Give me an example of where conflict took over or was resolved.
9. During the renewal process, was it clear for you what was happening? For example, did you know what public agencies do with the decisions made? or did you know all sources of funding? Did media have access to reports? Were there confusion or clear understanding of how to participate?
10. In what ways do you think the process went well, could have been better, what would you do the same/different if you were to be involved in another project? Did you think the process was good but the product bad or vice versa?

#### **Product performance and stakeholders' evaluation of that:**

11. What type of actions were taken to implement the established goals of renewal process? what reports and documents were produced? (enacting new laws, marshalling resources,

events that brought people together, training sessions, workshops, FGD, security endorsements)

12. What physical outputs did you get and what good or bad characteristics do they have? (for example, house quality, design, noise, size, sun, green-based design, parking, pedestrian, energy efficiency, accessibility, tenure mix, social mix)
13. Do you use the new developments/how do you feel about them (belonging, sense of community, proud of them)? what do you like or dislike?
14. Has your neighbourhood changed since the renewal project? How and what are the evidence? (turnovers, migration, population stability and density, ownership, tenure, feelings)
15. Are the outputs and outcomes that you got, matched with what you had agreed during the process of discussions (what are the differences)?
16. Do these outputs and outcomes address your needs, to what extent are you satisfied with (which factor are satisfactory which factors are not)? (satisfaction)
17. What did you hope the outcomes would be? if you wanted to build the new houses how would you do that? (satisfaction)
18. In your opinion, how satisfied are the other stakeholders (e.g. city council staff) with the outcomes and outputs (and why)? (satisfaction)
19. Which characteristics of the renewal process have been the most influential on achieving these outputs and outcomes (good or bad)?
20. What benefits did you get as an individual? for example, did you learn new things/ did you make new friends/ did you strengthen your relations to others (what else)?
21. How are the new houses maintained (after 5-7 years)? Do you like to keep them like the first day they completed?
22. Are you still in contact with those who involved in the housing renewal project?

### **Context**

23. To what extent did below factors support or restrict regeneration of your neighbourhood? (is there any example or evidence)
  - Social, economic and cultural characteristics of the neighbourhood
  - Legal and political frameworks
  - Pre-existing cooperation between public agencies, connections, trust or conflicts within communities and between them and public agencies
  - Prior failure to address the issue
  - Resource condition

## Appendix E

### Building standards

#### E.1 New Zealand Building standards based on Building Act 1991 and Building Regulation 1992

General provisions		Functional requirement
Fire safety	Structure	<i>Buildings, building elements and sitework</i> shall withstand the combination of loads that they are likely to experience during <i>construction or alteration</i> and throughout their lives.
	Durability	<i>Building</i> materials, components and <i>construction</i> methods shall be sufficiently durable to ensure that the <i>building</i> , without reconstruction or major renovation, satisfies the other functional requirements of this code throughout the life of the <i>building</i> .
Stability	Prevention of fire occurring	Fixed appliances using controlled combustion and other fixed equipment must be designed, constructed, and installed in <i>buildings</i> in a way that reduces the likelihood of illness or injury due to <i>fire</i> occurring.
	Fire affecting areas beyond the fire source	<i>Buildings</i> must be designed and constructed so that there is a low probability of injury or illness to persons not in close proximity to a <i>fire source</i> . <i>Buildings</i> must be designed and constructed so that there is a low probability of <i>fire</i> spread to <i>other property</i> vertically or horizontally across a <i>relevant boundary</i> .
	Movement to place of safety	<i>Buildings</i> must be provided with: (a) effective means of giving warning of <i>fire</i> , and (b) visibility in <i>escape route</i> <i>Buildings</i> must be provided with means of escape to ensure that there is a low probability of occupants of those <i>buildings</i> being unreasonably delayed or impeded from moving to a <i>place of safety</i> and that those occupants will not suffer injury or illness as a result.
	Access and safety for firefighting operations	<i>Buildings</i> must be designed and constructed so that there is a low probability of firefighters or other emergency services personnel being delayed in or impeded from assisting in rescue operations and performing firefighting operations. <i>Buildings</i> must be designed and constructed so that there is a low probability of illness or injury to firefighters or other emergency services personnel during rescue and firefighting operations.
	Structural stability	Structural systems in <i>buildings</i> must be constructed to maintain structural stability during <i>fire</i> so that there is: (a) a low probability of injury or illness to occupants, (b) a low probability of injury or illness to <i>fire service</i> personnel during



		rescue and firefighting operations, and (c) a low probability of direct or consequential damage to adjacent <i>household units</i> or <i>other property</i> .
Access	<u>Access routes</u>	<i>Buildings</i> shall be provided with reasonable and adequate access to enable safe and easy movement of people. Where a <i>building</i> is provided with loading or parking spaces, they shall be constructed to permit safe and easy unloading and movement of vehicles, and to avoid conflict between vehicles and pedestrians.
Moisture	<u>Surface water</u>	<i>Buildings</i> and <i>sitework</i> shall be constructed in a way that protects people and <i>other property</i> from the adverse effects of <i>surface water</i>
	<u>External moisture</u>	<i>Buildings</i> must be constructed to provide <i>adequate</i> resistance to penetration by, and the accumulation of, moisture from the outside.
	<u>Internal moisture</u>	<i>Buildings</i> must be constructed to avoid the likelihood of (a) fungal growth or the accumulation of <i>contaminants</i> on linings and other <i>building elements</i> ; and (b) free water overflow penetrating to an adjoining <i>household unit</i> ; and (c) damage to <i>building elements</i> caused by the presence of moisture
Safety of users	<u>Hazardous agents on site</u>	<i>Buildings</i> shall be constructed to avoid the likelihood of people within the <i>building</i> being adversely affected by <i>hazardous agents</i> or <i>contaminants</i> on the site
	<u>Hazardous building materials</u>	<i>Building materials</i> which are potentially <i>hazardous</i> , shall be used in ways that avoid undue risk to people
	<u>Hazardous substances and processes</u>	<i>Buildings</i> where <i>hazardous substances</i> are stored and <i>hazardous</i> processes undertaken, shall be constructed to provide <i>adequate</i> protection to people and to <i>other property</i> .
	<u>Safety from falling</u>	<i>Buildings</i> shall be constructed to reduce the likelihood of accidental fall.
	<u>Construction and demolition hazards</u>	<i>Construction</i> and demolition work on <i>buildings</i> shall be performed in a manner that avoids the likelihood of: (a) objects falling onto people on or off the site, (b) objects falling on property off the site, (c) other hazards arising on the site affecting people off the site and <i>other property</i> , and (d) unauthorised entry of children to hazards on the site.
	<u>Warning systems</u>	<i>Buildings</i> shall be provided with appropriate means of warning people to escape to a <i>safe place</i> in an emergency.
Services and facilities	<u>Personal hygiene</u>	<i>Buildings</i> shall be provided with appropriate spaces and facilities for personal hygiene.
	<u>Laundering</u>	<i>Buildings</i> shall be provided with <i>adequate</i> space and facilities for laundering.
	<u>Food preparation and prevention of contamination</u>	<i>Buildings</i> shall be provided with space and facilities for the hygienic storage, preparation and cooking of food, that are <i>adequate</i> for the <i>intended use</i> of the <i>building</i> .
	<u>Ventilation</u>	Spaces within <i>buildings</i> shall be provided with <i>adequate</i> ventilation consistent with their maximum occupancy and their intended use.
	<u>Interior environment</u>	<i>Buildings</i> shall be constructed to provide: (a) an <i>adequate</i> , controlled interior temperature, (b) <i>adequate</i> activity space for the <i>intended use</i> , and (c) <i>accessible</i> spaces and facilities.
	<u>Airborne and impact sound</u>	<i>Building elements</i> which are common between occupancies, shall be constructed to prevent undue noise transmission from other occupancies or common spaces, to the <i>habitable spaces</i> of <i>household units</i> .
	<u>Natural light</u>	<i>Habitable spaces</i> shall provide <i>adequate</i> openings for natural light and for a visual awareness of the outside environment.
	<u>Artificial light</u>	Spaces within <i>buildings</i> used by people, shall be provided with <i>adequate</i> artificial lighting which, when activated in the absence of sufficient natural light, will enable safe movement

	<u>Electricity</u>	Where provided in a <i>building</i> , <i>electrical installations</i> shall be safe for their <i>intended use</i> .
	<u>Piped services</u>	In <i>buildings</i> provided with potentially <i>hazardous</i> services containing hot, cold, flammable, corrosive or toxic fluids, the installations shall be constructed to provide <i>adequate</i> safety for people.
	Gas as an energy source	In <i>buildings</i> where gas is used as an energy source, the supply system shall be safe and <i>adequate</i> for its <i>intended use</i> .
	<u>Water supplies</u>	<i>Buildings</i> provided with water outlets, <i>sanitary fixtures</i> , or <i>sanitary appliances</i> must have safe and <i>adequate</i> water supplies
<b>Energy efficiency</b>	<u>Energy efficiency</u>	<i>Buildings</i> must be <i>constructed</i> to achieve an <i>adequate</i> degree of energy efficiency when that energy is used for (a) modifying temperature, modifying humidity, providing ventilation, or doing all or any of those things; or (b) providing hot water to and from <i>sanitary fixtures</i> or <i>sanitary appliances</i> , or both;

## E.2 LEED<sup>40</sup> international standards for sustainable buildings (LEED,2013)

Area	Requirement	Do the Aranui houses meet the requirement?	
Location and transportation	Floodplain avoidance	✓	Aranui is safe according to Tonkin and Taylor report of the sea level rise in 100 years.
	Neighborhood Development	✓	Aranui is officially a part of Christchurch city and housing redevelopments were allowed by the council.
	Site Selection	✓	In Aranui more that 75% of the total buildable land is previously developed.
	Compact development	✗	In Aranui, all the houses are all single-story buildings on their own land.
	Distance form Community resources (at least 800 meters)	✓	In Aranui, the building have more than 800 meters distance from the community resources (supermarket, etc.) so they encourage daily walking and bicycling
	Access to transit <sup>41</sup>	✗	In Aranui, the public transport infrastructure was already in place and provides a similar level of service as the rest of Christchurch.
Sustainable site	No invasive plants	✓	No Introduction of invasive plant species into the landscape
	Heat island reduction	✓	Landscape is covered with trees, plants and light-colored roofs and materials.
	Rainwater Management	✗	Aranui is flat low-lying ground so short term surface flooding does occur at some points at times of high rainfall. On site rainwater is directed to the council drainage infrastructure in the street. It is not common for rainwater to be collected on site.

<sup>40</sup> Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)

<sup>41</sup> Locate the project within a 1/4-mile (400 meter) walking distance of bus or streetcar stops, or within a 1/2- mile (800 meter) walking distance of bus rapid transit stops, light or heavy rail stations, or ferry terminals.

	Non-toxic pest control <sup>42</sup>	-	Not applicable
Water efficiency	Water metering	✗	Water Metering is not installed in some NZ houses, including Christchurch.
	Reduction of total water use <sup>43</sup>	✗	The underlying sandy nature of the ground in Aranui means it does require more water to keep lawns and plants alive in summer.
	Indoor water use <sup>44</sup>	✓	Applying the fixtures (showerhead,...) which are Water Sense labeled to minimize the indoor water use.
	Outdoor water use <sup>45</sup>	✓	Using native plants or plants adopted to the region in landscaping other than grass to reduce the water consumption.
Energy an atmosphere	Minimum energy performance	✓	Houses are highly insulated, and energy-efficient appliances have been applied.
	Energy metering	✓	Electric Meters have been installed for every unite.
	Efficient hot water distribution <sup>46</sup>	✓	
	Home size (compact)	✗	No compact housing
	Advanced utility tracing	-	Not applicable
	Building orientation for solar	✓	The houses are son-oriented.
	Air infiltration <sup>47</sup>	✗	Not commonly done in NZ. The concept is starting to be considered.
	Envelop insulation	✓	Insulation have been installed in the walls, ceiling and under the floor.
	windows	✓	Houses have aluminum and double glazed windows.
	Space heating and cooling equipment's <sup>48</sup>	✓	
	Heating and cooling distribution systems	✗	Not commonly used in NZ housing
	Lightening	✓	low energy compact fluorescent light bulbs have been used.

42. To minimize pest problems and risk of exposure to pesticides).

43. To reduce demand for water through high-efficiency fixtures and efficient landscaping practices.

New standard plumbing fittings are slowly becoming more water efficient.

44. To minimize indoor demand for water through high-efficiency fixtures and fittings.

45. To reduce outdoor water consumption through efficient landscaping practices.

46. Design and install an energy-efficient hot water distribution system, based on either maximum pipe length requirements or maximum pipe volume limits. The source of hot water is assumed to be a water heater, boiler, circulation loop piping, or electric heat-traced piping. Multiple water heaters and multiple distribution systems may be used to comply with this credit.

47. The rate of air leakage to outside must be tested and verified by a qualified energy rater.

48. Any piping designed as part of a heat pump system to carry water that is well above (or below) the thermostatic temperature settings in the home must have better insulation. Refrigerant piping must be insulated better on the air-conditioning mode suction line or the heat-pump mode discharge line.

	Efficient domestic hot water equipment <sup>49</sup>	✓	an energy-efficient–qualified water heater has been installed
	High-efficient appliances <sup>50</sup>	✗	New appliances are rated for energy efficiency and this is one of the considerations in selecting appliances
	Renewable energy <sup>51</sup>	✗	
Materials and resources	Using non-tropical, reused or reclaimed, or certified wood by the council	✓	
	Durability management (moisture control of the home)	✓	
	Environmental preferable products	✓	In Aranui, all local materials were used (from New Zealand)
	Construction waste management	✗	In Aranui, all the waste went to landfill. Waste management only starting to become a consideration on NZ building sites
	Material efficient framing	✓	
Indoor environmental quality	ventilation	TSE <sup>52</sup>	local exhaust systems such as fans in the bathrooms and range hoods in the kitchens have been installed but there is no mechanical ventilation for the whole house but every and each room has its own window enough for air flow.
	Combustion venting	✓	
	Air filtering	✗	Not commonly used in NZ
	Enhance ventilation	✓	Every bathroom with a shower has an exhaust fan.
	Contaminant control	✓	In Aranui, a shoe removal and storage space has been designed near the primary entryway separated from living areas
	Balance of heating and cooling distribution system	✗	This standard means: Install a system with at least two space-conditioning zones with independent thermostatic controls. In houses with both a heating system and a cooling system, each must have at least two zones.  It is not commonly used in NZ housing.
	Combustion venting	✓	No Fireplace or Woodstove

<sup>49</sup> Applying an energy-efficient water heater

<sup>50</sup> Applying high efficient appliances in the house.

<sup>51</sup> Design and install a renewable electricity generation system

<sup>52</sup> To Some Extent

	Enhance garage pollutant protection	✖	Exhaust Fan in Garage
	Low emitting products	✖	<p>In the interior of the home, use products that have been tested and found compliant with the Department of Health Standards.</p> <p>Little NZ regulation in regard to measurement and restriction on VOC emitting products in house construction. There is some ongoing effort to reduce the level of potentially harmful emissions.</p>

## Appendix F

### Defined Goals for housing renewal in Abouzar

	Items	Defined goal
1	Skeleton structure of the building	Concrete
2	Materials and walls	Bricks and clay brick
3	Ceiling	Polystyrene and brick
4	Water plumbing	Standard green and white pipes
5	Gas pipes	Standard of Gas Organization
7	Flooring: Bedrooms and living rooms	Good quality ceramic tiles based on the norm in 17 <sup>th</sup> district of Tehran
8	Flooring: kitchen and bathroom	Good quality tiles based on the norm
9	Toilet bowl and hand basin	Good quality based on the norm
10	Tabs in kitchen, bathroom and toilet	First quality Iranian made
11	Power points and switch	Good quality based on the norm
12	Electrical wiring	First quality
13	Kitchen cabinets	Not provided by the builder, unit owners have to buy themselves
14	Rangehood in the kitchen, fans in bathroom and toilet	Can be from two brands: Azbast and Polika
15	Painting	shared spaces will be painted by the builder (like stairs), but the units have to be painted by unit owners
16	Electrical meter board	Installed separately for each unit

17	Elevator	Installed with Italian engine having at least a capacity of 4 or 5 people
18	Wardrobe	Each room has its own wardrobe
19	Intercom	Installed for each unit
20	Skirting board	Good quality ceramic tiles
21	Building gates	Metal
22	Entrance doors for each unit	Wooden or first quality HDF
23	Bathroom and toilet doors	UPVC or HDF first quality
24	Door frames	French metal
25	Window frames and glasses	Double glazed
26	Stairs	Ceramic
27	Flooring: court yard, parking and storage	Mosaic
28	Stairs handrails	Metal
30	Balcony railing	Metal
31	Yard wall	concrete
32	Roof terrace	Tiles and bitumen roof
33	Power meter	Installed for each unit separately
34	Gas meter	Installed for each unit separately
35	Water meter	Installed for each unit separately
36	Cladding	Ceramic (Traverton)
39	Internal fluing installation	Radiator and gas flue installed for each room separately
40	Air conditioning duct	Installed for each room separately

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